How Did Life Begin?
Introduction
1. Purpose of apologetics
2. The biggest problem facing evolutionists is molecular biology and the rise of life out of non-living matter.
I. Prescientific Theories of Spontaneous Generation
A. Aristotle
1. Aristotle even believed that under the proper conditions putatively “simple” animals such as worms, fleas, mice, and dogs could spring to life spontaneously from moist ”Mother Earth."
2. Others believed that life had existed on earth for ever. This view is not supported by scientific observation today.
B. Middle Ages
1. Such "spontaneous generation" appeared to occur primarily in decaying matter. For example, a seventeenth century recipe for the spontaneous production of mice required placing sweaty underwear and husks of wheat in an open-mouthed jar, then waiting for about 21 days, during which time it was alleged that the sweat from the underwear would penetrate the husks of wheat, changing them into mice. Although such a concept may seem laughable today, it is consistent with the other widely held cultural and religious beliefs of the time.
2. Maggots were thought to spontaneously generate from rotting meat
C. The death of spontaneous generation
1. Francesco Redi (1668) proved that maggots came from eggs laid by flies on the meat. The invention of the microscope only served to enhance this belief. Microscopy revealed a whole new world of organisms that appeared to arise spontaneously.
2. Lazzaro Spallanzani (1745) replicated experiements which were thought to prove spontaneous generation, but sealed the flask, not allowing outside microorganisms in.
3. The young French chemist, Louis Pasteur (1859) boiled meat broth in a flask, heated the neck of the flask in a flame until it became pliable, and bent it into the shape of an S. Air could enter the flask, but airborne microorganisms could not - they would settle by gravity in the neck. As Pasteur had expected, no microorganisms grew. When Pasteur tilted the flask so that the broth reached the lowest point in the neck, where any airborne particles would have settled, the broth rapidly became cloudy with life. Pasteur had both refuted the theory of spontaneous generation and convincingly demonstrated that microorganisms are everywhere - even in the air.
II. Abiogenesis
A. What is abiogenesis?
1.
1 Certain simple molecules underwent spontaneous, random chemical reactions until after about half-a-billion years complex organic molecules were produced. .
2 Molecules that could replicate eventually were formed (the most common guess is nucleic acid molecules), along with enzymes and nutrient molecules that were surrounded by membraned cells. .
3 Cells eventually somehow “learned” how to reproduce by copying a DNA molecule (which contains a complete set of instructions for building a next generation of cells). During the reproduction process, the mutations changed the DNA code and produced cells that differed from the originals. .
4 The variety of cells generated by this process eventually developed the machinery required to do all that was necessary to survive, reproduce, and create the next generation of cells in their likeness. Those cells that were better able to survive became more numerous in the population (adapted from Wynn and Wiggins, 1997, p. 172).
2. The major links in the molecules-to-man theory that must be bridged include
(a) evolution of simple molecules into complex molecules,
(b) evolution of complex molecules into simple organic molecules,
(c) evolution of simple organic molecules into complex organic molecules,
(d) eventual evolution of complex organic molecules into DNA or similar information storage molecules, and
(e) eventually evolution into the first cells. This process requires multimillions of links, all which either are missing or controversial.
B. Primordial Soup
1. Four and a half billion years ago the young planet Earth... was almost completely engulfed by the shallow primordial seas. Powerful winds gathered random molecules from the atmosphere. Some were deposited in the seas. Tides and currents swept the molecules together. And somewhere in this ancient ocean the miracle of life began... The first organized form of primitive life was a tiny protozoan [a one-celled animal]. Millions of protozoa populated the ancient seas. These early organisms were completely self-sufficient in their sea-water world. They moved about their aquatic environment feeding on bacteria and other organisms... From these one- celled organisms evolved all life on earth (from the Emmy award winning PBS NOVA film The Miracle of Life
2. History of the theory
a. Russian scientist A.I. Oparin in the 1920s. The theory held that life evolved when organic molecules rained into the primitive oceans from an atmospheric soup of chemicals interacting with solar energy.
b. Later Haldane (1928), Bernal (1947) and Urey (1952) published their research to try to support this model, all with little success.
c. Then came what some felt was a breakthrough by Harold Urey and his graduate student Stanley Miller in the early 1950s. The most famous origin of life experiment was completed in 1953 by Stanley Miller at the University of Chicago.
The Miller/Urey experiments involved filling a sealed glass apparatus with methane, ammonia, hydrogen gases (representing what they thought composed the early atmosphere) and water vapor (to simulate the ocean). Next, they used a spark-discharge device to strike the gases in the flask with simulated lightning while a heating coil kept the water boiling. Within a few days, the water and gas mix produced a reddish stain on the sides of the flask. After analyzing the substances that had been formed, they found several types of amino acids. Eventually Miller and other scientists were able to produce 10 of the 20 amino acids required for life by techniques similar to the original Miller/ Urey experiments.
For example, equal quantities of both right- and left-handed organic molecules always were produced by the Urey/Miller procedure. In real life, nearly all amino acids found in proteins are left handed, almost all polymers of carbohydrates are right handed, and the opposite type can be toxic to the cell.
The reasons why creating life in a test tube turned out to be far more difficult than Miller or anyone else expected are numerous and include the fact that scientists now know that the complexity of life is far greater than Miller or anyone else in pre-DNA revolution 1953 ever imagined. Actually life is far more complex and contains far more information than anyone in the 1980s believed possible.
3. Problems:
a. Assumes that the atmosphere of the early earth was different from our present atmosphere. Very little scientific evidence exists for this assumption; it is postulated simply because it is necessary for the theory to work.
b. It is a theory that is based upon assumption, not observation. Life is assumed to have arisen from non-living matter, so a mechanism is sought to validate that assumption.
c. No geological evidence exists to support this theory.
d. No experiment has been conducted that has even been able to produce the building blocks of living matter, such as proteins. All experiments so far have fallen way short.
e. Even if an experiment could produce protein molecules, it would not prove that it actually happened. In fact, it would prove that intelligence is needed to produce protein molecules.
f. It is not enough to show that the building blocks of life can be created in a scientific experiment. Life is more than random molecules just as a house is more than a pile of bricks. There must be information, an intelligence that arranges those molecules and animates them. Then these entities need to be able to grow and reproduce. This is an incredible feat that could not happen by mere chance.
3. Before the explosive growth of our knowledge of the cell during the last 30 years, it was known that “the simplest bacteria are extremely complex, and the chances of their arising directly from inorganic materials, with no steps in between, are too remote to consider seriously.” (Newman, 1967, p. 662). Most major discoveries about cell biology and molecular biology have been made since then.
4. Cytologists now realize that a living cell contains hundreds of thousands of different complex parts such as various motor proteins that are assembled to produce the most complex “machine” in the Universe—a machine far more complex than the most complex Cray super computer. We now also realize after a century of research that the eukaryote protozoa thought to be as simple as a bowl of gelatin in Darwin’s day actually are enormously more complex than the prokaryote cell. Furthermore, molecular biology has demonstrated that the basic design of the cell is essentially the same in all living systems on earth from bacteria to mammals... In terms of their basic biochemical design... no living system can be thought of as being primitive or ancestral with respect to any other system, nor is there the slightest empirical hint of an evolutionary sequence among all the incredibly diverse cells on earth (Denton, 1986, p. 250).
5. We now realize that the Urey/Miller experiments did not produce evidence for abiogenesis because, although amino acids are the building blocks of life, the key to life is information because, although amino acids are the building blocks of life, the key to life is information (Pigliucci, 1999; Dembski, 1998). Natural objects in forms resembling the English alphabet (circles, straight lines and similar) abound in nature, but this does not help us to understand the origin of information (such as that in Shakespear’s plays) because this task requires intelligence both to create the information (the play) and then to translate that information into symbols. What must be explained is the source of the information in the text (the words and ideas), not the existence of circles and straight lines.
6. Yet another difficulty is, even if the source of the amino acids and the many other compounds needed for life could be explained, it still must be explained as to how these many diverse elements became aggregated in the same area and then properly assembled themselves. This problem is a major stumbling block to any theory of abiogenesis: ...no one has ever satisfactorily explained how the widely distributed ingredients linked up into proteins. Presumed conditions of primordial Earth would have driven the amino acids toward lonely isolation.
7. The warm pond and hot vent theories also have been seriously disputed by experimental research that has found the half-lives of many critically important compounds needed for life to be far “too short to allow for the adequate accumulation of these compounds” (Levy and Miller, 1998, p. 7933). Furthermore, research has documented that “unless the origin of life took place extremely rapidly (in less than 100 years), we conclude that a high temperature origin of life... cannot involve adenine, uracil, guanine or cytosine” because these compounds break down far too fast in a warm environment. In a hydrothermal environment, most of these compounds could neither form in environment. In a hydrothermal environment, most of these compounds could neither form in the first place, nor exist for a significant amount of time (Levy and Miller, p. 7933). III. Did Life Come from Another Planet?
C. The probability of life arising by chance
1. A major issue then, in abiogenesis is “what is the minimum number of possible parts that allows something to live?” The number of parts needed is large, but how large is difficult to determine. In order to be considered “alive,” an organism must possess the ability to metabolize and assimilate food, to respirate, to grow, to reproduce and to respond to stimuli (a trait known as irritability).
2. As Coppedge (1973) notes, even 1) postulating a primordial sea with every single component necessary for life, 2) speeding up the bonding rate so as to form different chemical combinations a trillion times more rapidly than hypothesized to have occurred, 3) allowing for a 4.6 billion—a trillion times more rapidly than hypothesized to have occurred, 3) allowing for a 4.6 billion- year-old earth and 4) using all atoms on the earth still leaves the probability of a single protein molecule being arranged by chance is 1 in 10,261. Using the lowest estimate made before the discoveries of the past two decades raised the number several fold. Coppedge estimates the probability of 1 in 10119,879 is necessary to obtain the minimum set of the required estimate of 239 protein molecules for the smallest theoretical life form. At this rate he estimates it would require 10119,831 years on the average to obtain a set of these proteins by naturalistic evolution (1973, pp. 110, 114). The number he obtained is 10119,831 greater than the current estimate for the age of the earth (4.6 billion years). In other words, this event is outside the range of probability. Natural selection cannot occur until an organism exists and is able to reproduce which requires that the first complex life form first exist as a functioning
3. It appears that the field of molecular biology will falsify Darwinism. An estimated 100,000 different proteins are used to construct humans alone. Furthermore, one million species are known, and as many as 10 million may exist. Although many proteins are used in most life forms, as many as 100 million or more protein variations may exist in all plant and animal life.
Even using an unrealistically low estimate of 1,000 steps required to “evolve” the average protein (if this were possible) implies that many trillions of links were needed to evolve the proteins that once existed or that exist today. And not one clear transitional protein that is morphologically and chemically in between the ancient and modern form of the protein has been convincingly demonstrated. The same problem exists with fats, nucleic acids, carbohydrates and the other compounds that are produced by, and necessary for, life.
4. Abiogenesis is only one area of research which illustrates that the naturalistic origin of life hypothesis has become less and less probable as molecular biology has progressed, and is now at the point that its plausibility appears outside the realm of probability. Numerous origin-of-life researchers, have lamented the fact that molecular biology during the past half-a-century has not been very kind to any naturalistic origin-of-life theory.
III. Did life come from outer space?
A. Popular ideas
1. Mission to Mars, War of the Worlds, UFOs
2. Asteroids, meteorites and space dust
B. Problems with this view
1. It merely pushes the problem further back in time, but it doesn’t solve it
2. If life can’t spontaneously arise here, it can’t anywhere else
Conclusion
1. How life arose from non-living matter is the greatest problem faced by evolutionists today. Very few talk about how life began because they know that they have no answers. This is the weakest point in the argument of naturalism and I feel that it is insurmountable. It takes more faith to believe that life was generated from non-living matter than to believe that God created life.
2. Life is a gift from God. God breathed into man and he became a living being. The spark of life is the result of God’s touch. All life bears the special mark of God.
3. You are alive because God gave you life. Your life is totally in his hands. You are dependent upon him for your very existence. Every breath you take is a gift from God. Don’t take life lightly but realize how precious it is and live it for the glory of God.
Saturday, July 4, 2009
How Did the Universe Begin?
How Did the Universe Begin?
Introduction
1. Cosmological Questions
1) Is the universe finite or infinite in content and extent?
2) Is the universe eternal or does it have a beginning?
3) Was the universe created?
4) If it wasn’t created, how did it get here?
5) If it was created, how was this creation accomplished, and what can we learn about the agent and the events of creation?
6) Who or what governs the laws and constants of physics?
7) Are such laws the product of chance or have they been designed?
8) How do these laws relate to the support and development of life?
9) Is there any noble existence beyond the known dimensions of the universe?
10) Is the universe running down irreversibly or will it bounce back?
2. Cosmological Argument: “The effect of the universe must have a suitable cause.”
1) Everything that begins to exist must have a cause.
2) The universe began to exist.
3) Therefore there must have been a cause for the universe.
I. Five Models of the Universe (Chart)
A. Eternal Universe
1. Steady State
2. Quantum Mechanical Model (Stephen Hawking)
B. Universe had a Beginning
1. Creation from something
2. Order out of chaos
3. Creation from Nothing (Genesis 1)
II. Evidence for the Big Bang
A. Why scientists resisted the Big Band
1. Arthur Eddington
“Philosophically, the notion of a beginning of the present order of nature is repugnant to me. I should like to find a definite loophole. We must allow evolution an infinite amount of time to get started.”
2. Albert Einstein
He was threatened by the implications of his theory of relativity because it carries a threat of an encounter with God. Through the equations of General Relativity we can trace the development of the universe backward to its origin. He introduced the concept of the Cosmological Constant to avoid this implication by yielding a Static Model of the universe. He dreamed of a universe that was infinitely old. Later, Einstein considered this to be the greatest blunder of his career. He ultimately gave grudging acceptance to the necessity of a beginning and the presence of a superior reasoning power, though he never accepted the existence of a personal God.
B. Definition of the Big Bang Theory
1. George Gamow: “The Big Bang theory holds that the primeval fireball was an intense concentration of pure energy. It was the source of all matter that now exists in the entire universe. The Big Bang theory predicts that all the galaxies in the universe should be rushing away from each other at high speeds as a result of that initial Big Bang.”
C. Background Microwave Radiation and Big Bang Ripples
1. Arno Penzias and Robert Wilson at Bell Telephone Labs in 1965:
Observation of the background microwave radiation of the universe convinced most scientist of the validity of the Big Bang theory. Further observations of Big Bang Ripples in 1992 have made acceptance of the Big Bang theory nearly unanimous. The data points to a beginning of the universe about 14 billion years ago.
Arno Penzias in NY Times interview: “The best data we have concerning the big bang are exactly what I would have predicted if I only had the five books of Moses, the Psalms and the Bible to go on.”
Why are some Cosmologists predisposed to an old universe? “Some people are uncomfortable with purpose. In order to come up with things that contradict purpose, they tend to speculate about things they haven’t seen.”
2. NY Times April, 1992: Big Bang Ripples discovered by COBE Satellite
“Most important discovery of the century.” Stephen Hawking
“It’s like looking at God.” Headline
“These findings make the hypothesis that God created the universe more respectable today than anytime within the last 100 years.” George Smoot, head of COBE team
3. Red Shift
Hubble and others realized that the most obvious explanation for the "red shift" was that the galaxies were receding from Earth and each other, and the farther the galaxy, the faster the recession.
All galaxies are accelerating away from each other, and the farther a galaxy is away from us, the faster it is accelerating away from us. This can only be explained if the universe began as a small point and exploded outwards.
III. Explanation of the Big Bang
A. Hugh Ross:
“By definition, time is that dimension in which cause and effect phenomenon take place. If there is no time, there is no cause and effect. If time’s beginning is concurrent with the beginning of the universe, as the space-time theorem suggests, then the cause of the universe must be some entity operating in a time dimension completely independent of and preexistent to the time dimension of the cosmos. This conclusion is important in our understanding of who God is, and who or what God is not. It tells us that the Creator is transcendent, operating beyond the dimensional limits of the universe. It tells us that God is not the universe itself, nor is God contained within the universe.”
B. Leon Lederman, The God Particle
“In the very beginning there was a void, a very curious vacuum, a nothingness containing no space, no time, no matter, no light, no sound. Yet the laws of nature were in place and this curious vacuum held potential. A story logically begins at the beginning, but this story is about the beginning of the universe and unfortunately there are no data for that beginning; none, zero. We don’t know anything about the universe until it reaches a billionth of a trillionth of a second, a very short time after the creation in the Big Bang. When you read or hear anything about the birth of the universe someone is making it up; we are in the realm of philosophy. Only God knows what happened at the very beginning.”
C. Stephen Hawking, A Brief History of Time
“The actual point of creation lies outside the scope of the presently known laws of physics.”
“It is difficult to discuss the beginning of the universe without introducing the concept of God. My work on the origin of the universe is on the borderline between science and religion, but I try to stay on the scientific side of the border. It is quite possible that God acts in ways that cannot be described by scientific laws.”
Are science and Christianity competing philosophies? “Of course not. If that were true, then Isaac Newton would not have discovered the law of gravity.”
“Even if there is only one possible unified theory, it is just a set of rules and equations. What is it that breathes fire into the equations and makes the universe to describe them?”
“The idea that God might want to change his mind is an example of a fallacy, pointed out by Saint Augustine, of imagining God as a being existing in time. Time is a property only of the universe that God created; presumably he knew what he intended when he set it up.”
John 17:24; Eph. 1:4; 1 Pet. 1:20; Rev. 13:8
IV. Stephen Hawking and the Quantum Mechanical Model
A. Explained
He takes a very simplified model of the universe that uses imaginary time. In his model, the universe does not have a sharp point of beginning but a rounded point, so that there is no single point of beginning.
B. Refuted
Imaginary time is useful for solving mathematical equations, but it cannot be used to describe the real world. It is not valuable scientifically because it has no empirical basis, makes no scientific predictions that are not made by simpler models, and it has no research agenda. It simply seeks to evade the cosmological argument, cause and effect, the fact that if there is a beginning of the universe there must be a creator.
“When we go back to the real time in which we live we will encounter singularities.”
V. Science and Christianity: Scientists speak out
A. Alan Sandage
“The nature of God is not to be found within any part of the findings of science; for that one must turn to the Bible.”
Can a person be a scientist and also a Christian? “Yes. I am a Christian. The world is too complex in all its parts and inner connections to be due to chance alone. I am convinced that the existence of life, with all of its order in each of its organisms, is simply too well put together. I am staggered by the high information content of even the simplest biological self-replicating biochemical system.”
B. Donald Paige:
“The mathematical simplicity of the universe is possibly a reflection of the personal simplicity of the gospel message, that God sent His Son Jesus Christ to bridge the gap between Himself and each of us who have rejected God or what He wants for each of us by rebelling against His will and disobeying Him. This is a message simple enough to be understood even by children, quantum cosmologists and the rest.”
C. Chris Eischam:
“The God of Christianity is not only the ground of being, He is also incarnate. Essential therein is the vision of the resurrection of Jesus Christ as the new creation out of the old order and the profound notion of the redemption of time, through the life and death of Jesus Christ. I think it will be a very long time before particle physics has anything to add to that. What I have found in Jesus Christ is infinitely more profound than anything I have found in particle physics, or expect to find.”
Conclusion
1. The universe began at a point in time in the Big Bang. This was an immensely powerful, yet a very carefully controlled and planned release of matter, space, energy and time. It was very carefully fine-tuned and operated within the laws and constraints that govern the physical universe. The power and care of this explosion exceeds human ability and potential by multiple orders of magnitude.
2. A creator must exist. The Big Bang ripples, Red Shift, and Background Radiation point to a creation ex nihilo. The big Bang is consistent with the creation event described in the first few chapters of the book of Genesis.
3. This creator must have awesome power and wisdom. The quantity of material and energy within the universe are truly immense, and the information and intricacy manifested in any part of the universe, and especially in a living organism, is beyond our ability to comprehend. And what we do see is only what God has shown us within the four dimensions of space-time that we inhabit.
4. If the universe has been created, then there is a creator. If there is a creator, then we are his creatures, owned by him and subject to him. Therefore, the purpose of life is to know and love our creator and glorify him by living in conformity with his nature and will.
Introduction
1. Cosmological Questions
1) Is the universe finite or infinite in content and extent?
2) Is the universe eternal or does it have a beginning?
3) Was the universe created?
4) If it wasn’t created, how did it get here?
5) If it was created, how was this creation accomplished, and what can we learn about the agent and the events of creation?
6) Who or what governs the laws and constants of physics?
7) Are such laws the product of chance or have they been designed?
8) How do these laws relate to the support and development of life?
9) Is there any noble existence beyond the known dimensions of the universe?
10) Is the universe running down irreversibly or will it bounce back?
2. Cosmological Argument: “The effect of the universe must have a suitable cause.”
1) Everything that begins to exist must have a cause.
2) The universe began to exist.
3) Therefore there must have been a cause for the universe.
I. Five Models of the Universe (Chart)
A. Eternal Universe
1. Steady State
2. Quantum Mechanical Model (Stephen Hawking)
B. Universe had a Beginning
1. Creation from something
2. Order out of chaos
3. Creation from Nothing (Genesis 1)
II. Evidence for the Big Bang
A. Why scientists resisted the Big Band
1. Arthur Eddington
“Philosophically, the notion of a beginning of the present order of nature is repugnant to me. I should like to find a definite loophole. We must allow evolution an infinite amount of time to get started.”
2. Albert Einstein
He was threatened by the implications of his theory of relativity because it carries a threat of an encounter with God. Through the equations of General Relativity we can trace the development of the universe backward to its origin. He introduced the concept of the Cosmological Constant to avoid this implication by yielding a Static Model of the universe. He dreamed of a universe that was infinitely old. Later, Einstein considered this to be the greatest blunder of his career. He ultimately gave grudging acceptance to the necessity of a beginning and the presence of a superior reasoning power, though he never accepted the existence of a personal God.
B. Definition of the Big Bang Theory
1. George Gamow: “The Big Bang theory holds that the primeval fireball was an intense concentration of pure energy. It was the source of all matter that now exists in the entire universe. The Big Bang theory predicts that all the galaxies in the universe should be rushing away from each other at high speeds as a result of that initial Big Bang.”
C. Background Microwave Radiation and Big Bang Ripples
1. Arno Penzias and Robert Wilson at Bell Telephone Labs in 1965:
Observation of the background microwave radiation of the universe convinced most scientist of the validity of the Big Bang theory. Further observations of Big Bang Ripples in 1992 have made acceptance of the Big Bang theory nearly unanimous. The data points to a beginning of the universe about 14 billion years ago.
Arno Penzias in NY Times interview: “The best data we have concerning the big bang are exactly what I would have predicted if I only had the five books of Moses, the Psalms and the Bible to go on.”
Why are some Cosmologists predisposed to an old universe? “Some people are uncomfortable with purpose. In order to come up with things that contradict purpose, they tend to speculate about things they haven’t seen.”
2. NY Times April, 1992: Big Bang Ripples discovered by COBE Satellite
“Most important discovery of the century.” Stephen Hawking
“It’s like looking at God.” Headline
“These findings make the hypothesis that God created the universe more respectable today than anytime within the last 100 years.” George Smoot, head of COBE team
3. Red Shift
Hubble and others realized that the most obvious explanation for the "red shift" was that the galaxies were receding from Earth and each other, and the farther the galaxy, the faster the recession.
All galaxies are accelerating away from each other, and the farther a galaxy is away from us, the faster it is accelerating away from us. This can only be explained if the universe began as a small point and exploded outwards.
III. Explanation of the Big Bang
A. Hugh Ross:
“By definition, time is that dimension in which cause and effect phenomenon take place. If there is no time, there is no cause and effect. If time’s beginning is concurrent with the beginning of the universe, as the space-time theorem suggests, then the cause of the universe must be some entity operating in a time dimension completely independent of and preexistent to the time dimension of the cosmos. This conclusion is important in our understanding of who God is, and who or what God is not. It tells us that the Creator is transcendent, operating beyond the dimensional limits of the universe. It tells us that God is not the universe itself, nor is God contained within the universe.”
B. Leon Lederman, The God Particle
“In the very beginning there was a void, a very curious vacuum, a nothingness containing no space, no time, no matter, no light, no sound. Yet the laws of nature were in place and this curious vacuum held potential. A story logically begins at the beginning, but this story is about the beginning of the universe and unfortunately there are no data for that beginning; none, zero. We don’t know anything about the universe until it reaches a billionth of a trillionth of a second, a very short time after the creation in the Big Bang. When you read or hear anything about the birth of the universe someone is making it up; we are in the realm of philosophy. Only God knows what happened at the very beginning.”
C. Stephen Hawking, A Brief History of Time
“The actual point of creation lies outside the scope of the presently known laws of physics.”
“It is difficult to discuss the beginning of the universe without introducing the concept of God. My work on the origin of the universe is on the borderline between science and religion, but I try to stay on the scientific side of the border. It is quite possible that God acts in ways that cannot be described by scientific laws.”
Are science and Christianity competing philosophies? “Of course not. If that were true, then Isaac Newton would not have discovered the law of gravity.”
“Even if there is only one possible unified theory, it is just a set of rules and equations. What is it that breathes fire into the equations and makes the universe to describe them?”
“The idea that God might want to change his mind is an example of a fallacy, pointed out by Saint Augustine, of imagining God as a being existing in time. Time is a property only of the universe that God created; presumably he knew what he intended when he set it up.”
John 17:24; Eph. 1:4; 1 Pet. 1:20; Rev. 13:8
IV. Stephen Hawking and the Quantum Mechanical Model
A. Explained
He takes a very simplified model of the universe that uses imaginary time. In his model, the universe does not have a sharp point of beginning but a rounded point, so that there is no single point of beginning.
B. Refuted
Imaginary time is useful for solving mathematical equations, but it cannot be used to describe the real world. It is not valuable scientifically because it has no empirical basis, makes no scientific predictions that are not made by simpler models, and it has no research agenda. It simply seeks to evade the cosmological argument, cause and effect, the fact that if there is a beginning of the universe there must be a creator.
“When we go back to the real time in which we live we will encounter singularities.”
V. Science and Christianity: Scientists speak out
A. Alan Sandage
“The nature of God is not to be found within any part of the findings of science; for that one must turn to the Bible.”
Can a person be a scientist and also a Christian? “Yes. I am a Christian. The world is too complex in all its parts and inner connections to be due to chance alone. I am convinced that the existence of life, with all of its order in each of its organisms, is simply too well put together. I am staggered by the high information content of even the simplest biological self-replicating biochemical system.”
B. Donald Paige:
“The mathematical simplicity of the universe is possibly a reflection of the personal simplicity of the gospel message, that God sent His Son Jesus Christ to bridge the gap between Himself and each of us who have rejected God or what He wants for each of us by rebelling against His will and disobeying Him. This is a message simple enough to be understood even by children, quantum cosmologists and the rest.”
C. Chris Eischam:
“The God of Christianity is not only the ground of being, He is also incarnate. Essential therein is the vision of the resurrection of Jesus Christ as the new creation out of the old order and the profound notion of the redemption of time, through the life and death of Jesus Christ. I think it will be a very long time before particle physics has anything to add to that. What I have found in Jesus Christ is infinitely more profound than anything I have found in particle physics, or expect to find.”
Conclusion
1. The universe began at a point in time in the Big Bang. This was an immensely powerful, yet a very carefully controlled and planned release of matter, space, energy and time. It was very carefully fine-tuned and operated within the laws and constraints that govern the physical universe. The power and care of this explosion exceeds human ability and potential by multiple orders of magnitude.
2. A creator must exist. The Big Bang ripples, Red Shift, and Background Radiation point to a creation ex nihilo. The big Bang is consistent with the creation event described in the first few chapters of the book of Genesis.
3. This creator must have awesome power and wisdom. The quantity of material and energy within the universe are truly immense, and the information and intricacy manifested in any part of the universe, and especially in a living organism, is beyond our ability to comprehend. And what we do see is only what God has shown us within the four dimensions of space-time that we inhabit.
4. If the universe has been created, then there is a creator. If there is a creator, then we are his creatures, owned by him and subject to him. Therefore, the purpose of life is to know and love our creator and glorify him by living in conformity with his nature and will.
Privileged Planet
Intelligent Design in the Cosmos
1. Privileged Planet: Optimized for Life
A. The Denial of Privileged Status
• The Copernican Principle: “The earth occupies no preferred place in the universe”
• The Principle of Mediocrity: “Our position and status in the universe are mediocre, they are unexceptional.”
• Hubble Telescope: The magnificence of the Universe
• SETI: Search for Extra-Terrestrial Intelligence
• Astrobiology: Are habitable planets rare or common in the universe?
• But does life on earth really exist for no reason or purpose?
• The number of stars vs. the number of factors necessary for life…
B. Factors Necessary for Life
1) Liquid Water
2) A planet’s distance from its star: the circumstellar habitable zone
3) Orbiting main sequence G2 dwarf star
4) Protected by gas giant planets
5) Within galactic habitable zone
6) Nearly circular orbit
7) Oxygen-rich atmosphere
8) Correct mass
9) Orbited by large moon
10) Magnetic field generated by a liquid iron core
11) Plate tectonics
12) Ratio of liquid water and continents
13) Terrestrial planet
14) Moderate rate of rotation
All these factors have to be met at one place and time in the galaxy
N x fsg x fghz x fcr x fsp x fchz x np x fj x fc x fo x fm x fcp x fmn x fw x ft x fl x fi x fr x flc x flt
1011 1/10 x 1/10 x 1/10 x 1/10 x 1/10 x 1/10 x 1/10 x 1/10 x 1/10 x 1/10 x 1/10 x 1/10 x 1/10 x 1/10 = 10-15
1
1,000,000,000,000,000
Why did this happen? Is chance a reasonable explanation?
2. Privileged Planet: Optimized for Observation
• The factors that make observation possible coincide with the factors that make complex life possible
• “The same narrow circumstances that allow us to exist also provide us with the best overall setting for making scientific discoveries.”
1) The relative size and distances of the sun and moon to the earth make life possible and also allow us to discover
2) The atmosphere of the earth supports life and allows us to see into space
3) The visible part of the electromagnetic spectrum essential for life also is most informative for discovery is abundantly produced by the sun and allowed to reach the surface of the earth by the atmosphere
4) The center of the galaxy is too hostile to life while the edge of the galaxy would not provide enough heavy elements necessary for life. Likewise, observation would be impossible at the center or edge of the galaxy.
“The most incomprehensible thing about the universe is that it is comprehensible.” Albert Einstein
The laws and forces of the universe must be precisely balanced for complex life to exist:
1) Electron mass
2) Atomic mass
3) Proton mass
4) Strong nuclear force
5) Weak nuclear force
6) Electromagnetic force
7) Speed of light
8) Cosmological constant
9) Gravity
10) Mass of the universe
11) Panck’s constant
12) Boltzmann’s constant
The universe is the product of an intelligent mind
1. Privileged Planet: Optimized for Life
A. The Denial of Privileged Status
• The Copernican Principle: “The earth occupies no preferred place in the universe”
• The Principle of Mediocrity: “Our position and status in the universe are mediocre, they are unexceptional.”
• Hubble Telescope: The magnificence of the Universe
• SETI: Search for Extra-Terrestrial Intelligence
• Astrobiology: Are habitable planets rare or common in the universe?
• But does life on earth really exist for no reason or purpose?
• The number of stars vs. the number of factors necessary for life…
B. Factors Necessary for Life
1) Liquid Water
2) A planet’s distance from its star: the circumstellar habitable zone
3) Orbiting main sequence G2 dwarf star
4) Protected by gas giant planets
5) Within galactic habitable zone
6) Nearly circular orbit
7) Oxygen-rich atmosphere
8) Correct mass
9) Orbited by large moon
10) Magnetic field generated by a liquid iron core
11) Plate tectonics
12) Ratio of liquid water and continents
13) Terrestrial planet
14) Moderate rate of rotation
All these factors have to be met at one place and time in the galaxy
N x fsg x fghz x fcr x fsp x fchz x np x fj x fc x fo x fm x fcp x fmn x fw x ft x fl x fi x fr x flc x flt
1011 1/10 x 1/10 x 1/10 x 1/10 x 1/10 x 1/10 x 1/10 x 1/10 x 1/10 x 1/10 x 1/10 x 1/10 x 1/10 x 1/10 = 10-15
1
1,000,000,000,000,000
Why did this happen? Is chance a reasonable explanation?
2. Privileged Planet: Optimized for Observation
• The factors that make observation possible coincide with the factors that make complex life possible
• “The same narrow circumstances that allow us to exist also provide us with the best overall setting for making scientific discoveries.”
1) The relative size and distances of the sun and moon to the earth make life possible and also allow us to discover
2) The atmosphere of the earth supports life and allows us to see into space
3) The visible part of the electromagnetic spectrum essential for life also is most informative for discovery is abundantly produced by the sun and allowed to reach the surface of the earth by the atmosphere
4) The center of the galaxy is too hostile to life while the edge of the galaxy would not provide enough heavy elements necessary for life. Likewise, observation would be impossible at the center or edge of the galaxy.
“The most incomprehensible thing about the universe is that it is comprehensible.” Albert Einstein
The laws and forces of the universe must be precisely balanced for complex life to exist:
1) Electron mass
2) Atomic mass
3) Proton mass
4) Strong nuclear force
5) Weak nuclear force
6) Electromagnetic force
7) Speed of light
8) Cosmological constant
9) Gravity
10) Mass of the universe
11) Panck’s constant
12) Boltzmann’s constant
The universe is the product of an intelligent mind
Science vs. Faith 2
Science versus Faith
Introduction
1. “Science has disproved the Bible. Anyone who believes in the Bible is an idiot.”
2. How do you handle such claims? How do you stand firm when all your teachers, leaders and friends think you have lost your mind?
I. Science grew out of Christianity
A. Non-Christian cultures did not develop a scientific mindset
1. Superstitious cultures viewed the world as chaotic and controlled by capricious forces
2. Since events were capricious and uncertain, it is impossible to determine how and why they occur
3. Magic, the occult and fortunetelling kept science from emerging as a way of understanding the world
B. Christians developed science based on a theistic world view
1. If God created the world, then it is orderly and follows fixed laws set up by God
2. The more I know about the world, the more I know about God
3. History is moving in a logical direction, directed by God, towards an end or goal
II. Some misguided Christians have made crazy statements
A. Some have misread the Bible and made dogmatic statements
1. Bishop Ussher dated the Bible and said the world was created in 4004 BC
2. Some Catholics refused to believe the earth revolved around the sun
B. Some have tied theology and Biblical interpretation to scientific theories
III. Some misguided Scientists have made crazy statements
A. You must distinguish between facts and interpretation; laws and theories
1. There are many ways to interpret scientific data; everyone is biased, especially scientists
2. Theories are working hypotheses while laws have been verified by repeatable experiments
3. Carl Sagan in U.S. News & World Report interview:
“The cosmos is all that is or ever was or ever will be. Whatever significance we humans have is that which we make ourselves. If we must worship a power greater than ourselves, does it not make sense to worship the sun and the stars?”
B. Scientists cannot make credible statements outside their expertise
1. A biologist has no special credibility when making statements about geology
2. A scientist has no special credibility when making statements about theology or philosophy
3. Science cannot make value judgments
4. Explaining how something works is not the same as explaining why it works, nor does it mean we are capable of making it work
C. Science does not make faith irrelevant
1. Not all truth can be discovered by the scientific method
2. You cannot do experiments to discover truth about history, love, logic, existence of truth
3. All scientists have faith
a. The universe is orderly and understandable
b. Truth exists and is knowable
c. The senses are a reliable source of information about the external world
d. Laboratory experiments are repeatable and verifiable
4. William Paley and the watchmaker; everyone would assume a watch was made
5. Richard Dawkins:
“We are survival machines—robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish molecules (of DNA which survived) known as genes.” In his book, The Blind Watchmaker, he says of natural selection, “It has no mind and no mind’s eye. It does not plan for the future. It has no vision, no foresight, no sight at all. If it can be said to play the role of watchmaker in nature, It is the blind watchmaker.”
IV. Science and Faith should be able to exist side by side
A. All truth is God’s truth
1. Ultimately scientific truth and biblical truth will not conflict
2. We need both to develop a full understanding of the world and how to live in a way that is pleasing to God and ultimately fulfilling to us
3. Conflicts are the result of incomplete information on both sides
B. Humility and patience must be exercised by both sides
1. Christians must realize that we don’t have all the answers
2. When faith and science appear to conflict, be patient and wait for more evidence from science and better interpretation from Christians
In 1861 the French Academy of Science published a book stating 51 scientific facts that prove the Bible is wrong. Today, there isn’t a single scientist who believes any one of those 51 “scientific facts”.
3. Science is a developing field that only can produce probabilities, not absolute certainties and much is superceded or revised by later findings
Newton’s laws of gravity, Einstein’s theory of relativity, quantum mechanics
Conclusion
1. Jesus is the truth, speaks the truth and reveals the truth (John)
2. Rejecting God means turning your back on truth (Romans)
3. Those who truly desire to know the truth will find Jesus and believe in him
4. Don’t let anyone shake your faith in Jesus by saying science refutes faith; it doesn’t
5. Learn how to discern truth from error, fact from interpretation, laws from theories, opinions from truth
6. Faith is essential to life; the question is not, “Do you have faith?” but “What have you placed your faith in?”
7. Be humble and patient; wait until all the facts are in before making a final decision
8. Don’t be afraid of the truth; seek after it, love it, study it, commit to it. Jesus is Truth
Introduction
1. “Science has disproved the Bible. Anyone who believes in the Bible is an idiot.”
2. How do you handle such claims? How do you stand firm when all your teachers, leaders and friends think you have lost your mind?
I. Science grew out of Christianity
A. Non-Christian cultures did not develop a scientific mindset
1. Superstitious cultures viewed the world as chaotic and controlled by capricious forces
2. Since events were capricious and uncertain, it is impossible to determine how and why they occur
3. Magic, the occult and fortunetelling kept science from emerging as a way of understanding the world
B. Christians developed science based on a theistic world view
1. If God created the world, then it is orderly and follows fixed laws set up by God
2. The more I know about the world, the more I know about God
3. History is moving in a logical direction, directed by God, towards an end or goal
II. Some misguided Christians have made crazy statements
A. Some have misread the Bible and made dogmatic statements
1. Bishop Ussher dated the Bible and said the world was created in 4004 BC
2. Some Catholics refused to believe the earth revolved around the sun
B. Some have tied theology and Biblical interpretation to scientific theories
III. Some misguided Scientists have made crazy statements
A. You must distinguish between facts and interpretation; laws and theories
1. There are many ways to interpret scientific data; everyone is biased, especially scientists
2. Theories are working hypotheses while laws have been verified by repeatable experiments
3. Carl Sagan in U.S. News & World Report interview:
“The cosmos is all that is or ever was or ever will be. Whatever significance we humans have is that which we make ourselves. If we must worship a power greater than ourselves, does it not make sense to worship the sun and the stars?”
B. Scientists cannot make credible statements outside their expertise
1. A biologist has no special credibility when making statements about geology
2. A scientist has no special credibility when making statements about theology or philosophy
3. Science cannot make value judgments
4. Explaining how something works is not the same as explaining why it works, nor does it mean we are capable of making it work
C. Science does not make faith irrelevant
1. Not all truth can be discovered by the scientific method
2. You cannot do experiments to discover truth about history, love, logic, existence of truth
3. All scientists have faith
a. The universe is orderly and understandable
b. Truth exists and is knowable
c. The senses are a reliable source of information about the external world
d. Laboratory experiments are repeatable and verifiable
4. William Paley and the watchmaker; everyone would assume a watch was made
5. Richard Dawkins:
“We are survival machines—robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish molecules (of DNA which survived) known as genes.” In his book, The Blind Watchmaker, he says of natural selection, “It has no mind and no mind’s eye. It does not plan for the future. It has no vision, no foresight, no sight at all. If it can be said to play the role of watchmaker in nature, It is the blind watchmaker.”
IV. Science and Faith should be able to exist side by side
A. All truth is God’s truth
1. Ultimately scientific truth and biblical truth will not conflict
2. We need both to develop a full understanding of the world and how to live in a way that is pleasing to God and ultimately fulfilling to us
3. Conflicts are the result of incomplete information on both sides
B. Humility and patience must be exercised by both sides
1. Christians must realize that we don’t have all the answers
2. When faith and science appear to conflict, be patient and wait for more evidence from science and better interpretation from Christians
In 1861 the French Academy of Science published a book stating 51 scientific facts that prove the Bible is wrong. Today, there isn’t a single scientist who believes any one of those 51 “scientific facts”.
3. Science is a developing field that only can produce probabilities, not absolute certainties and much is superceded or revised by later findings
Newton’s laws of gravity, Einstein’s theory of relativity, quantum mechanics
Conclusion
1. Jesus is the truth, speaks the truth and reveals the truth (John)
2. Rejecting God means turning your back on truth (Romans)
3. Those who truly desire to know the truth will find Jesus and believe in him
4. Don’t let anyone shake your faith in Jesus by saying science refutes faith; it doesn’t
5. Learn how to discern truth from error, fact from interpretation, laws from theories, opinions from truth
6. Faith is essential to life; the question is not, “Do you have faith?” but “What have you placed your faith in?”
7. Be humble and patient; wait until all the facts are in before making a final decision
8. Don’t be afraid of the truth; seek after it, love it, study it, commit to it. Jesus is Truth
Science vs. Faith
Science vs. Faith
1. A Brief History of Science
1600-1750 1750-1940 1940-1960 [WWII] 1960-Present
Discovery Control Use Consumption
“Think God’s thoughts” Manipulate and control Massive production Enjoy life-enhancing technologies
Worship Convenience Productivity
Efficiency Choice
Science is founded on the Christian worldview
Almost all scientists for the first 200 years were Christians
Christians began to abdicate their place and allowed non-Christians to take over
Modern World: Choice + Efficiency —> Convenience [no place for God]
2. Science vs. Scientism
Science: discovery based on careful observation and analysis
Scientism: philosophical and religious claims about science
Science Fiction: reconstructions and hypotheses that have no evidence
There are limits to scientific knowledge, things it cannot know
Scientific knowledge is probabilistic and not absolute
Be skeptical about “scientific” claims that are outside the realm of science
3. Don’t Fall for the False Dichotomy of Science vs. Faith
Truth is Truth no matter who finds it
Christians should never fear Truth no matter where it comes from
Differences between Science and Faith must be handled with care:
• Scientific data may be incomplete
• Interpretation of the Bible may be inaccurate
• Scientific theories may conflict with Biblical interpretation
The “War” between Faith and Science is a fabrication
Fight bad science with better science not with appeals to faith
4. We Need More Excellent Christian Scientists
Science is a calling just as important as a pastor or missionary
A Christian scientist can have more influence than a pastor or missionary
You need to have a Christian mindset if you are to be effective:
• A passion to know God and discover his creation
• A commitment to Truth even when it is not accepted
• The boldness to speak the Truth even opposed
1. A Brief History of Science
1600-1750 1750-1940 1940-1960 [WWII] 1960-Present
Discovery Control Use Consumption
“Think God’s thoughts” Manipulate and control Massive production Enjoy life-enhancing technologies
Worship Convenience Productivity
Efficiency Choice
Science is founded on the Christian worldview
Almost all scientists for the first 200 years were Christians
Christians began to abdicate their place and allowed non-Christians to take over
Modern World: Choice + Efficiency —> Convenience [no place for God]
2. Science vs. Scientism
Science: discovery based on careful observation and analysis
Scientism: philosophical and religious claims about science
Science Fiction: reconstructions and hypotheses that have no evidence
There are limits to scientific knowledge, things it cannot know
Scientific knowledge is probabilistic and not absolute
Be skeptical about “scientific” claims that are outside the realm of science
3. Don’t Fall for the False Dichotomy of Science vs. Faith
Truth is Truth no matter who finds it
Christians should never fear Truth no matter where it comes from
Differences between Science and Faith must be handled with care:
• Scientific data may be incomplete
• Interpretation of the Bible may be inaccurate
• Scientific theories may conflict with Biblical interpretation
The “War” between Faith and Science is a fabrication
Fight bad science with better science not with appeals to faith
4. We Need More Excellent Christian Scientists
Science is a calling just as important as a pastor or missionary
A Christian scientist can have more influence than a pastor or missionary
You need to have a Christian mindset if you are to be effective:
• A passion to know God and discover his creation
• A commitment to Truth even when it is not accepted
• The boldness to speak the Truth even opposed
Conformed to His Image
CONFORMED TO HIS IMAGE
Biblical and Practical Approaches to Spiritual Formation
KENNETH BOA
ANNOTATED CONTENTS
Preface
Introduction: A Gem with Many Facets
FACET 1
Relational Spirituality: Loving God Completely, Ourselves Correctly, and Others Compassionately
As a communion of three persons, God is a relational being. He originates a personal rela¬tionship with us, and our high and holy calling is to respond to his loving initiatives. By lov¬ing God completely, we discover who and whose we are as we come to see ourselves as God sees us. In this way, we become secure enough to become others-centered rather than self¬-centered, and this enables us to become givers rather than grabbers.
FACET 2
Paradigm Spirituality: Cultivating an Eternal versus a Temporal Perspective
This section contrasts the temporal and eternal value systems and emphasizes the need for a paradigm shift from a cultural to a biblical way of seeing life. The experience of our mortality can help us transfer our hope from the seen to the unseen and realize the preciousness of present opportunities. Our presuppositions shape our perspective, our perspective shapes our priorities, and our priorities shape our practice.
FACET 3
Disciplined Spirituality: Engaging in the Historical Disciplines
There has been a resurgence of interest in the classical disciplines of the spiritual life, and this section looks at the reasons for this trend and the benefits of the various disciplines. It also focuses on the needed balance between radical dependence on God and personal discipline and discusses the dynamics of obedience and application.
FACET 4
Exchanged Life Spirituality: Grasping Our True Identity in Christ
The nineteenth and twentieth centuries saw the growth of an experiential approach to the spiritual life that is based on the believer's new identity in Christ. Identification with Christ in his crucifixion and resurrection (Romans 6; Galatians 2:20) means that our old life has been exchanged for the life of Christ. This approach to spirituality moves from a works to a grace orientation and from legalism to liberty because it centers on our acknowledgment that Christ's life is our life.
FACET 5
Motivated Spirituality: A Set of Biblical Incentives
People are motivated to satisfy their needs for security, significance, and fulfillment, but they turn to the wrong places to have their needs met. This section presents the option of looking to Christ rather than the world to meet our needs. A study of Scripture reveals a number of biblical motivators: these include fear, love and gratitude, rewards, identity, purpose and hope, and longing for God. Our task is to be more motivated by the things God declares to be impor¬tant than by the things the world says are important.
FACET 6
Devotional Spirituality: Falling in Love with God
What are the keys to loving God, and how can we cultivate a growing intimacy with him? This section explores what it means to enjoy God and to trust in him. Henry Scougal observed that "the worth and excellency of a soul is to be measured by the object of its love." We are most satisfied when we seek God's pleasure above our own, and we gradually become conformed to what we most love and admire.
FACET 7
Holistic Spirituality: Every Component of Life under the Lordship of Christ
There is a general tendency to treat Christianity as a component of life along with other com¬ponents such as family, work, and finances. This compartmentalization fosters a dichotomy between the secular and the spiritual. The biblical alternative is to understand the implica¬tions of Christ's lordship over every aspect of life in such a way that even the most mundane components of life can become expressions of the life of Christ in us.
FACET 8
Process Spirituality: Process versus Product, Being versus Doing
In our culture, we increasingly tend to be human doings rather than human beings. The world tells us that what we achieve and accomplish determines who we are, but the Scriptures teach that who we are in Christ should be the basis for what we do. The dynamics of growth are inside out rather than outside in. This section talks about becoming faithful to the process of life rather than living from one product to the next. It also focuses on what it means to abide in Christ and to practice his presence.
FACET 9
Spirit-Filled Spirituality: Walking in the Power of the Spirit
Although there are divergent views of spiritual gifts, Spirit-centered believers and Word¬-centered believers agree that until recently, the role of the Holy Spirit has been somewhat neg¬lected as a central dynamic of the spiritual life. This section considers how to appropriate the love, wisdom, and power of the Spirit and stresses the biblical implications of the Holy Spirit as a personal presence rather than a mere force.
FACET 10
Warfare Spirituality: The World, the Flesh, and the Devil
Spiritual warfare is not optional for believers in Christ. Scripture teaches and illustrates the dynamics of this warfare on the three fronts of the world, the flesh, and the devil. The worldly and demonic systems are external to the believer, but they entice and provide opportunities for the flesh, which is the capacity for sin within the believer. This section outlines a biblical strategy for dealing with each of these barriers to spiritual growth.
FACET 11
Nurturing Spirituality: A Lifestyle of Evangelism and Discipleship
The believer's highest call in ministry is to reproduce the life of Christ in others. Reproduction takes the form of evangelism for those who do not know Christ and edification for those who do. This section develops a philosophy of discipleship and evangelism and looks at edifica¬tion and evangelism as a way of life; lifestyle discipleship and evangelism are the most effec¬tive and realistic approaches to unbelievers and believers within our sphere of influence.
FACET 12
Corporate Spirituality: Encouragement, Accountability, and Worship
We come to faith as individuals, but we grow in community. This section discusses the need for community, challenges and creators of community, the nature and purpose of the church, soul care, servant leadership, accountability, and renewal.
CONCLUSION
Continuing on the Journey
What does it take to stay in the race? This concluding chapter considers a variety of issues related to finishing well, including intimacy with Christ, fidelity in the spiritual disciplines, a biblical perspective on the circumstances of life, teachability, personal purpose, healthy rela¬tionships, and ongoing ministry.
APPENDIX A:
The Need for Diversity
This appendix portrays the current hunger for spirituality and the reasons for this hunger. There are a variety of approaches to the spiritual life, but these are facets of a larger gem that is greater than the sum of its parts. Conformed to His Image takes a broader, more synthetic approach by looking at all of these facets and seeing how each can contribute to the whole. Some people are attracted to different facets, and this relates in part to our personality profile (the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator is a valuable tool for this purpose). Readers are asked to identify the ones they are most and least attracted to and are encour¬aged to stretch themselves by trying one they would normally not pursue.
APPENDIX B:
The Richness of Our Heritage
This appendix outlines a brief history of spirituality by tracing prominent approaches to the spiritual life through the ancient, medieval, and modern churches. This provides a broader perspective and a sense of continuity with others who have pursued intimacy with God before us. Twelve recurring issues and extremes emerge from this overview, and this appen¬dix concludes with a word about the variety of approaches that can illuminate our journey.
Biblical and Practical Approaches to Spiritual Formation
KENNETH BOA
ANNOTATED CONTENTS
Preface
Introduction: A Gem with Many Facets
FACET 1
Relational Spirituality: Loving God Completely, Ourselves Correctly, and Others Compassionately
As a communion of three persons, God is a relational being. He originates a personal rela¬tionship with us, and our high and holy calling is to respond to his loving initiatives. By lov¬ing God completely, we discover who and whose we are as we come to see ourselves as God sees us. In this way, we become secure enough to become others-centered rather than self¬-centered, and this enables us to become givers rather than grabbers.
FACET 2
Paradigm Spirituality: Cultivating an Eternal versus a Temporal Perspective
This section contrasts the temporal and eternal value systems and emphasizes the need for a paradigm shift from a cultural to a biblical way of seeing life. The experience of our mortality can help us transfer our hope from the seen to the unseen and realize the preciousness of present opportunities. Our presuppositions shape our perspective, our perspective shapes our priorities, and our priorities shape our practice.
FACET 3
Disciplined Spirituality: Engaging in the Historical Disciplines
There has been a resurgence of interest in the classical disciplines of the spiritual life, and this section looks at the reasons for this trend and the benefits of the various disciplines. It also focuses on the needed balance between radical dependence on God and personal discipline and discusses the dynamics of obedience and application.
FACET 4
Exchanged Life Spirituality: Grasping Our True Identity in Christ
The nineteenth and twentieth centuries saw the growth of an experiential approach to the spiritual life that is based on the believer's new identity in Christ. Identification with Christ in his crucifixion and resurrection (Romans 6; Galatians 2:20) means that our old life has been exchanged for the life of Christ. This approach to spirituality moves from a works to a grace orientation and from legalism to liberty because it centers on our acknowledgment that Christ's life is our life.
FACET 5
Motivated Spirituality: A Set of Biblical Incentives
People are motivated to satisfy their needs for security, significance, and fulfillment, but they turn to the wrong places to have their needs met. This section presents the option of looking to Christ rather than the world to meet our needs. A study of Scripture reveals a number of biblical motivators: these include fear, love and gratitude, rewards, identity, purpose and hope, and longing for God. Our task is to be more motivated by the things God declares to be impor¬tant than by the things the world says are important.
FACET 6
Devotional Spirituality: Falling in Love with God
What are the keys to loving God, and how can we cultivate a growing intimacy with him? This section explores what it means to enjoy God and to trust in him. Henry Scougal observed that "the worth and excellency of a soul is to be measured by the object of its love." We are most satisfied when we seek God's pleasure above our own, and we gradually become conformed to what we most love and admire.
FACET 7
Holistic Spirituality: Every Component of Life under the Lordship of Christ
There is a general tendency to treat Christianity as a component of life along with other com¬ponents such as family, work, and finances. This compartmentalization fosters a dichotomy between the secular and the spiritual. The biblical alternative is to understand the implica¬tions of Christ's lordship over every aspect of life in such a way that even the most mundane components of life can become expressions of the life of Christ in us.
FACET 8
Process Spirituality: Process versus Product, Being versus Doing
In our culture, we increasingly tend to be human doings rather than human beings. The world tells us that what we achieve and accomplish determines who we are, but the Scriptures teach that who we are in Christ should be the basis for what we do. The dynamics of growth are inside out rather than outside in. This section talks about becoming faithful to the process of life rather than living from one product to the next. It also focuses on what it means to abide in Christ and to practice his presence.
FACET 9
Spirit-Filled Spirituality: Walking in the Power of the Spirit
Although there are divergent views of spiritual gifts, Spirit-centered believers and Word¬-centered believers agree that until recently, the role of the Holy Spirit has been somewhat neg¬lected as a central dynamic of the spiritual life. This section considers how to appropriate the love, wisdom, and power of the Spirit and stresses the biblical implications of the Holy Spirit as a personal presence rather than a mere force.
FACET 10
Warfare Spirituality: The World, the Flesh, and the Devil
Spiritual warfare is not optional for believers in Christ. Scripture teaches and illustrates the dynamics of this warfare on the three fronts of the world, the flesh, and the devil. The worldly and demonic systems are external to the believer, but they entice and provide opportunities for the flesh, which is the capacity for sin within the believer. This section outlines a biblical strategy for dealing with each of these barriers to spiritual growth.
FACET 11
Nurturing Spirituality: A Lifestyle of Evangelism and Discipleship
The believer's highest call in ministry is to reproduce the life of Christ in others. Reproduction takes the form of evangelism for those who do not know Christ and edification for those who do. This section develops a philosophy of discipleship and evangelism and looks at edifica¬tion and evangelism as a way of life; lifestyle discipleship and evangelism are the most effec¬tive and realistic approaches to unbelievers and believers within our sphere of influence.
FACET 12
Corporate Spirituality: Encouragement, Accountability, and Worship
We come to faith as individuals, but we grow in community. This section discusses the need for community, challenges and creators of community, the nature and purpose of the church, soul care, servant leadership, accountability, and renewal.
CONCLUSION
Continuing on the Journey
What does it take to stay in the race? This concluding chapter considers a variety of issues related to finishing well, including intimacy with Christ, fidelity in the spiritual disciplines, a biblical perspective on the circumstances of life, teachability, personal purpose, healthy rela¬tionships, and ongoing ministry.
APPENDIX A:
The Need for Diversity
This appendix portrays the current hunger for spirituality and the reasons for this hunger. There are a variety of approaches to the spiritual life, but these are facets of a larger gem that is greater than the sum of its parts. Conformed to His Image takes a broader, more synthetic approach by looking at all of these facets and seeing how each can contribute to the whole. Some people are attracted to different facets, and this relates in part to our personality profile (the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator is a valuable tool for this purpose). Readers are asked to identify the ones they are most and least attracted to and are encour¬aged to stretch themselves by trying one they would normally not pursue.
APPENDIX B:
The Richness of Our Heritage
This appendix outlines a brief history of spirituality by tracing prominent approaches to the spiritual life through the ancient, medieval, and modern churches. This provides a broader perspective and a sense of continuity with others who have pursued intimacy with God before us. Twelve recurring issues and extremes emerge from this overview, and this appen¬dix concludes with a word about the variety of approaches that can illuminate our journey.
Saturday, January 31, 2009
Flight
Not the Way It’s Supposed to Be: A Breviary of Sin
Cornelius Plantinga Jr.
10. Flight
“The West has finally achieved the rights of man, but man’s sense of responsibility to God and society has grown dimmer and dimmer.” Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn.
Stanley Milgram
65% continued shocking when the subject pounded on the wall.
62% continued shocking when the subject’s cries could be heard.
40% continued shocking when the subject was in the same room.
30% shocked the subject even when they had to force his hand onto the shock plate, and still shocked the subject up to 450 volts.
Virtually all of hem, when interviewed, stated their opposition, in principle, to hurting innocent people. Yet, what they rejected in principle they did in practice, however distressed they felt about it. They did it because somebody in a laboratory coat told them they had no choice.
Living Tools
Human beings’ tendency to obey helps keep order and stability in society but can also be transformed into a tool of evil.
When a person is in a hierarchical structure he no longer thinks of himself as a responsible moral subject but an agent of others, an instrument or a tool, not a responsible moral agent.
When he finds himself bound to a morally deteriorating situation that he wants to abandon, he cannot find a good, clean place to break off.
Franz Stangl, commandant of Treblinka, trained men to become ruthless by giving officers more difficult assignments, such as the mercy killing of nursing home patients, and when they began to balk he would remind them of what they had already done. Finally, his loyalty to the Nazi party would be questioned and he would be threatened with the same fate of the prisoners if he refused. Obedience got him his position, and cowardice pinned him to it.
A German priest absolved Stangl of all his guilt: “Before God and my conscience, if I had been in Franz’s place I would have done the same. I absolve him of all guilt.”
Rudolf Höss, ordered to carry out mass exterminations at Auschwitz, later stated, “I had been given an order, and I had to carry it out. Whether this mass extermination of the Jews was necessary or not was something on which I could not allow myself to form an opinion, for I lacked the necessary breadth of view.”
Multiple Evasions
Conforming
Lakewood, CA 1993 and the “Spur Posse” that sexually exploited a large number of girls in a contest for who could have sex with the most girls. Parents didn’t blame the boys at all.
Conniving
To shut one’s eyes to an injustice, to look the other way, to pretend ignorance of evil, is to connive.
Kitty Genovese, March 13, 1964 in Queens was brutally raped and murdered and no one helped.
Leaving Town
Winston Churchill could not convince Europe’s leaders to take action to oppose Hitler.
Specializing
In Stanley Milgram’s experiment, some people dealt with the stress by doing their task with the utmost care in order to avoid the moral dilemma.
Minimizing
Apologize instead of repent, show kindness instead of love, seek happiness instead of joy, talk instead of do.
Going Limp
Making a career of nothing robs the community of our gifts and energies and shapes life into a yawn at the God and savior of the world, and in effect says to God, “You have made nothing of interest and redeemed no one of consequence, including me.”
Cocooning
Some people retreat into the small world of their friends, work, church, and family.
Amusing Ourselves to Death
Our flights of amusement cost us more than time and money. They also may cost us our grasp of the general distinction between reality and illusion.
Neil Postman says, on TV, “everything that makes religion an historic, profound and sacred human activity is stripped away; there is no ritual, no dogma, no tradition, no theology, and above all, no sense of spiritual transcendence. On these shows, the preacher is tops. God comes out as second banana.”
The Flight from Shalom
At the heart of all evasions lies two others: He has turned his back on his neighbor and his God, and in some way, on himself. By refusing his calling, he extracts his own core, hollowing himself out to a shell of a human being, without weight or substance. He has made himself an alien to the gospel and a stranger to Jesus Christ. To sell a neighbor short is to sell God short.
The gifts of God—vitality, love, forgiveness, courage, joy, and everything that flows the work of Christ—may be found only in the company of God. And we keep company with God only by adopting God’s purposes for us and following through on them even when it is difficult or initially painful to do so.
Many people have fallen into a “functional godlessness.”
Life with God is not mainly a matter of knuckling under to our superior. Rather, we trust and obey because these responses are fitting.
We must trust and obey to rise to the full stature of sons and daughters, to mature into the image of God, to grow into adult roles in the drama of redeeming the world. God wants not slaves but intelligent children. God wants form us not numb obedience but devoted freedom creativity, and energy. In short, we are to become responsible beings, people to whom God can entrust deep and worthy assignments, expecting us to make something significant of them—expecting us to make something significant of our lives.
God has called us, graced us, to delight in our lives, to feel their irony and angularity, to make something sturdy and even lovely of them. We have to find the emotional and spiritual energy for these tasks from the very God who assigns them, turning our faces to God’s light so that we may be drawn to it, warmed by it, revitalized by it. To be a responsible person is to find one’s own role and then, empowered by the grace of God, to fill this role and to delight in it.
Epilogue
Evil rolls across the ages, but so does good.
Creation is stronger than sin and grace stronger still.
God wants Shalom and will pay any price to get it back.
Human sin is stubborn, but not as stubborn as the grace of God and not half so persistent, not half so ready to suffer to win its way.
Cornelius Plantinga Jr.
10. Flight
“The West has finally achieved the rights of man, but man’s sense of responsibility to God and society has grown dimmer and dimmer.” Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn.
Stanley Milgram
65% continued shocking when the subject pounded on the wall.
62% continued shocking when the subject’s cries could be heard.
40% continued shocking when the subject was in the same room.
30% shocked the subject even when they had to force his hand onto the shock plate, and still shocked the subject up to 450 volts.
Virtually all of hem, when interviewed, stated their opposition, in principle, to hurting innocent people. Yet, what they rejected in principle they did in practice, however distressed they felt about it. They did it because somebody in a laboratory coat told them they had no choice.
Living Tools
Human beings’ tendency to obey helps keep order and stability in society but can also be transformed into a tool of evil.
When a person is in a hierarchical structure he no longer thinks of himself as a responsible moral subject but an agent of others, an instrument or a tool, not a responsible moral agent.
When he finds himself bound to a morally deteriorating situation that he wants to abandon, he cannot find a good, clean place to break off.
Franz Stangl, commandant of Treblinka, trained men to become ruthless by giving officers more difficult assignments, such as the mercy killing of nursing home patients, and when they began to balk he would remind them of what they had already done. Finally, his loyalty to the Nazi party would be questioned and he would be threatened with the same fate of the prisoners if he refused. Obedience got him his position, and cowardice pinned him to it.
A German priest absolved Stangl of all his guilt: “Before God and my conscience, if I had been in Franz’s place I would have done the same. I absolve him of all guilt.”
Rudolf Höss, ordered to carry out mass exterminations at Auschwitz, later stated, “I had been given an order, and I had to carry it out. Whether this mass extermination of the Jews was necessary or not was something on which I could not allow myself to form an opinion, for I lacked the necessary breadth of view.”
Multiple Evasions
Conforming
Lakewood, CA 1993 and the “Spur Posse” that sexually exploited a large number of girls in a contest for who could have sex with the most girls. Parents didn’t blame the boys at all.
Conniving
To shut one’s eyes to an injustice, to look the other way, to pretend ignorance of evil, is to connive.
Kitty Genovese, March 13, 1964 in Queens was brutally raped and murdered and no one helped.
Leaving Town
Winston Churchill could not convince Europe’s leaders to take action to oppose Hitler.
Specializing
In Stanley Milgram’s experiment, some people dealt with the stress by doing their task with the utmost care in order to avoid the moral dilemma.
Minimizing
Apologize instead of repent, show kindness instead of love, seek happiness instead of joy, talk instead of do.
Going Limp
Making a career of nothing robs the community of our gifts and energies and shapes life into a yawn at the God and savior of the world, and in effect says to God, “You have made nothing of interest and redeemed no one of consequence, including me.”
Cocooning
Some people retreat into the small world of their friends, work, church, and family.
Amusing Ourselves to Death
Our flights of amusement cost us more than time and money. They also may cost us our grasp of the general distinction between reality and illusion.
Neil Postman says, on TV, “everything that makes religion an historic, profound and sacred human activity is stripped away; there is no ritual, no dogma, no tradition, no theology, and above all, no sense of spiritual transcendence. On these shows, the preacher is tops. God comes out as second banana.”
The Flight from Shalom
At the heart of all evasions lies two others: He has turned his back on his neighbor and his God, and in some way, on himself. By refusing his calling, he extracts his own core, hollowing himself out to a shell of a human being, without weight or substance. He has made himself an alien to the gospel and a stranger to Jesus Christ. To sell a neighbor short is to sell God short.
The gifts of God—vitality, love, forgiveness, courage, joy, and everything that flows the work of Christ—may be found only in the company of God. And we keep company with God only by adopting God’s purposes for us and following through on them even when it is difficult or initially painful to do so.
Many people have fallen into a “functional godlessness.”
Life with God is not mainly a matter of knuckling under to our superior. Rather, we trust and obey because these responses are fitting.
We must trust and obey to rise to the full stature of sons and daughters, to mature into the image of God, to grow into adult roles in the drama of redeeming the world. God wants not slaves but intelligent children. God wants form us not numb obedience but devoted freedom creativity, and energy. In short, we are to become responsible beings, people to whom God can entrust deep and worthy assignments, expecting us to make something significant of them—expecting us to make something significant of our lives.
God has called us, graced us, to delight in our lives, to feel their irony and angularity, to make something sturdy and even lovely of them. We have to find the emotional and spiritual energy for these tasks from the very God who assigns them, turning our faces to God’s light so that we may be drawn to it, warmed by it, revitalized by it. To be a responsible person is to find one’s own role and then, empowered by the grace of God, to fill this role and to delight in it.
Epilogue
Evil rolls across the ages, but so does good.
Creation is stronger than sin and grace stronger still.
God wants Shalom and will pay any price to get it back.
Human sin is stubborn, but not as stubborn as the grace of God and not half so persistent, not half so ready to suffer to win its way.
Attack
Not the Way It’s Supposed to Be: A Breviary of Sin
Cornelius Plantinga Jr.
9. Attack
“He hath a daily beauty in his life that makes me ugly.” Iago in Othello.
The complex character of Lyndon Baines Johnson who was both one of our greatest politicians and our greatest liars. He not only had trouble “telling” the truth but in “seeing” it. He was a master of using lies to attack his opponents.
Attack and Flight
Sin alternates between attack and flight. Sinners assault other human beings or else they ignore them. They invade somebody else’s life or they flee their responsibility for it. They transgress God’s prohibitions and avoid God’s requirements. They may even treat themselves with self-abuse or self-neglect.
This approach/avoidance pattern lies deep within Scripture. There are those who attack the light of God, and are consumed by his heat, and there are those who turn their backs on the light of God, and freeze in the cold darkness.
We use lies to avoid our responsibilities and to assault other human beings.
A Select History of Envy
In Iowa, Miss Harvest Queen strangled Miss Homecoming Queen with a leather belt.
High school yearbook editor in Indiana draws facial hair, underarm hair, blackens teeth of girls she envies just before sending it to the printer.
An African-American girl in Oakland works hard to get into medical school but is ridiculed and scorned by her peers.
In Chicago, subordinates spread lies about a publishing executive that cause him to be fired.
In Texas a mother of a thirteen-year-old cheerleader hired a hit man to kill the mother of a rival cheerleader to disrupt her ability to do well at tryouts.
An envier doesn’t care whether you have earned part of your success or whether some golden parachute from heaven has dropped into your lap; to an envier, your advantage is totally unfair either way.
Envy is nastier than covetousness in that what envy wants is not what another has; what an envier wants is for another not to have it.
To covet is to want somebody else’s good so strongly that one is tempted to steal it while envy is to resent somebody else’s good so much that one is tempted to destroy it.
Resentment, Pride, and Destruction
The advantages of others makes the envious angry. Envy is a corrupted form of anger. Resentment is a protracted form of anger.
The envier resents another’s good because it scuffs his pride.
The envier usually resents someone that is slightly superior to him or equal to him.
The proud envier keeps running for the office of God.
Enviers also rejoice in the misfortunes of others (Schadenfreude).
Envy poisons the envier and introduces gangrene into his own soul.
Enviers want to be envied.
Cornelius Plantinga Jr.
9. Attack
“He hath a daily beauty in his life that makes me ugly.” Iago in Othello.
The complex character of Lyndon Baines Johnson who was both one of our greatest politicians and our greatest liars. He not only had trouble “telling” the truth but in “seeing” it. He was a master of using lies to attack his opponents.
Attack and Flight
Sin alternates between attack and flight. Sinners assault other human beings or else they ignore them. They invade somebody else’s life or they flee their responsibility for it. They transgress God’s prohibitions and avoid God’s requirements. They may even treat themselves with self-abuse or self-neglect.
This approach/avoidance pattern lies deep within Scripture. There are those who attack the light of God, and are consumed by his heat, and there are those who turn their backs on the light of God, and freeze in the cold darkness.
We use lies to avoid our responsibilities and to assault other human beings.
A Select History of Envy
In Iowa, Miss Harvest Queen strangled Miss Homecoming Queen with a leather belt.
High school yearbook editor in Indiana draws facial hair, underarm hair, blackens teeth of girls she envies just before sending it to the printer.
An African-American girl in Oakland works hard to get into medical school but is ridiculed and scorned by her peers.
In Chicago, subordinates spread lies about a publishing executive that cause him to be fired.
In Texas a mother of a thirteen-year-old cheerleader hired a hit man to kill the mother of a rival cheerleader to disrupt her ability to do well at tryouts.
An envier doesn’t care whether you have earned part of your success or whether some golden parachute from heaven has dropped into your lap; to an envier, your advantage is totally unfair either way.
Envy is nastier than covetousness in that what envy wants is not what another has; what an envier wants is for another not to have it.
To covet is to want somebody else’s good so strongly that one is tempted to steal it while envy is to resent somebody else’s good so much that one is tempted to destroy it.
Resentment, Pride, and Destruction
The advantages of others makes the envious angry. Envy is a corrupted form of anger. Resentment is a protracted form of anger.
The envier resents another’s good because it scuffs his pride.
The envier usually resents someone that is slightly superior to him or equal to him.
The proud envier keeps running for the office of God.
Enviers also rejoice in the misfortunes of others (Schadenfreude).
Envy poisons the envier and introduces gangrene into his own soul.
Enviers want to be envied.
The Tragedy of Addiction
Not the Way It’s Supposed to Be: A Breviary of Sin
Cornelius Plantinga Jr.
8. The Tragedy of Addiction
Goethe: “Master, I am in great distress! The spirits that I conjured up I cannot now get rid of.”
The Wide World of Addiction
There is undoubtedly a spiritual dimension to addiction that all recovering addicts readily admit.
What drives addiction is longing—a longing not just of the brain, belly or loins, but of the heart.
Addictions eventually center in distress and in the self-defeating choice of an agent to relive the distress. In fact, trying to cure distress with the same thing that caused it is typically the mechanism that closes the trap on an addict. Then every time you meet a demand, it escalates and any good is sapped away by this parasite.
The Deadly Spiral
What converts a delinquent to an addict is when he tries to relieve the despair by indulging his obsession all over again, thereby initiating a new round of addiction.
The same culture that that encourages self-indulgences also punishes the indulgent with scorn fit for a failed god.
Addictions flourish by feeding on human attempts to master them.
An addict stands a chance of recovery only if he is finally willing to tell himself the truth. He must admit that he is helpless.
Sin or Symptom?
Not all addictions are sin.
Perhaps the addict is responsible for his addiction since he made choices before he became addicted that ultimately led to his addiction. We are also responsible for our addictions once we get them in that we must choose to seek help.
Perhaps a better category to use would be “tragedy” since it implies the fall of someone who is responsible and significant, someone who is naturally great but whose greatness has been compromised and finally crushed by a mix of forces, including personal agency, that work together for evil in a way that seems simultaneously surprising and predictable, preventable and inevitable.
Addicts are sinners like everyone else but also tragic figures whose fall is often owed to a combination of factors so numerous, complex and elusive that we cannot fully understand them.
Overlapping Circles
Dynamics of Addiction
Addiction is about our hungers and thirsts, about our ultimate concern, about the clinging and longing of our hearts, and about giving ourselves over to these things.
When it is in full cry, addiction is finally about idolatry, where the addict will do anything for his idol, including dying for it.
The addict needs to turn to God because the “hardness of God is kinder than the softness of man, and hIs compulsion is our liberation.”
Cornelius Plantinga Jr.
8. The Tragedy of Addiction
Goethe: “Master, I am in great distress! The spirits that I conjured up I cannot now get rid of.”
The Wide World of Addiction
There is undoubtedly a spiritual dimension to addiction that all recovering addicts readily admit.
What drives addiction is longing—a longing not just of the brain, belly or loins, but of the heart.
Addictions eventually center in distress and in the self-defeating choice of an agent to relive the distress. In fact, trying to cure distress with the same thing that caused it is typically the mechanism that closes the trap on an addict. Then every time you meet a demand, it escalates and any good is sapped away by this parasite.
The Deadly Spiral
What converts a delinquent to an addict is when he tries to relieve the despair by indulging his obsession all over again, thereby initiating a new round of addiction.
The same culture that that encourages self-indulgences also punishes the indulgent with scorn fit for a failed god.
Addictions flourish by feeding on human attempts to master them.
An addict stands a chance of recovery only if he is finally willing to tell himself the truth. He must admit that he is helpless.
Sin or Symptom?
Not all addictions are sin.
Perhaps the addict is responsible for his addiction since he made choices before he became addicted that ultimately led to his addiction. We are also responsible for our addictions once we get them in that we must choose to seek help.
Perhaps a better category to use would be “tragedy” since it implies the fall of someone who is responsible and significant, someone who is naturally great but whose greatness has been compromised and finally crushed by a mix of forces, including personal agency, that work together for evil in a way that seems simultaneously surprising and predictable, preventable and inevitable.
Addicts are sinners like everyone else but also tragic figures whose fall is often owed to a combination of factors so numerous, complex and elusive that we cannot fully understand them.
Overlapping Circles
Dynamics of Addiction
Addiction is about our hungers and thirsts, about our ultimate concern, about the clinging and longing of our hearts, and about giving ourselves over to these things.
When it is in full cry, addiction is finally about idolatry, where the addict will do anything for his idol, including dying for it.
The addict needs to turn to God because the “hardness of God is kinder than the softness of man, and hIs compulsion is our liberation.”
Masquerade
Not the Way It’s Supposed to Be: A Breviary of Sin
Cornelius Plantinga Jr.
6. Masquerade
La Rochenfoucauld: “Hypocrisy is an homage that vice pays to virtue.”
The Mask of Sanity
Psychopaths are often intelligent, attractive, and charismatic. They wear the mask of a genial and trustworthy human being, but underneath it everything is self-protective chaos.
The lack of a sense of guilt is both dangerous and deviant.
To do its worse evil must look its best. Vices have to masquerade as virtues. Satan must appear as an angel of light.
Most people seek at least the form of godliness while denying its power. They do not want to be good but merely appear to be good.
Evil people are simultaneously aware of their evil and desperately trying to resist that awareness.
A Public Resistance Movement
For the educational elite, moral tolerance is the only good, and moral intolerance the only evil.
Self-Swindling
Self-deception is a shadowy phenomenon by which we pull the wool over some part of our own psyche.
Self-deception is “corrupted consciousness. First we deceive ourselves and then we convince ourselves that we are not deceiving ourselves.”
When we are most religious we my be most at risk of losing touch with God.
There is a vast difference between the truth of religion and the use of religion.
Many believers do not really believe in God but merely some deified image of themselves.
Even when we are at worship the wolves may be howling in our souls.
Cornelius Plantinga Jr.
6. Masquerade
La Rochenfoucauld: “Hypocrisy is an homage that vice pays to virtue.”
The Mask of Sanity
Psychopaths are often intelligent, attractive, and charismatic. They wear the mask of a genial and trustworthy human being, but underneath it everything is self-protective chaos.
The lack of a sense of guilt is both dangerous and deviant.
To do its worse evil must look its best. Vices have to masquerade as virtues. Satan must appear as an angel of light.
Most people seek at least the form of godliness while denying its power. They do not want to be good but merely appear to be good.
Evil people are simultaneously aware of their evil and desperately trying to resist that awareness.
A Public Resistance Movement
For the educational elite, moral tolerance is the only good, and moral intolerance the only evil.
Self-Swindling
Self-deception is a shadowy phenomenon by which we pull the wool over some part of our own psyche.
Self-deception is “corrupted consciousness. First we deceive ourselves and then we convince ourselves that we are not deceiving ourselves.”
When we are most religious we my be most at risk of losing touch with God.
There is a vast difference between the truth of religion and the use of religion.
Many believers do not really believe in God but merely some deified image of themselves.
Even when we are at worship the wolves may be howling in our souls.
Sin and Folly
Not the Way It’s Supposed to Be: A Breviary of Sin
Cornelius Plantinga Jr.
7. Sin and Folly
When we say an act was senseless, stupid, tragic, shortsighted, mistaken, unfortunate, miscalculated, erring, regrettable, or out of line, we are agreeing with the Bible that it was “foolish.”
Fitting into the World
Wisdom is the knowledge of God’s world and the knack of fitting oneself into it.
The Bible is a book about the way the world really is, not merely the way it should be.
To be wise is to discern reality, to love it, and then to live according to it.
To discern realities at their deeper levels we have to become engaged with them.
The wise accommodate themselves to reality.
Against the Grain
Borneo: government used DDT to kill houseflies, geckos got sick from eating poisoned flies, cats died from eating poisoned geckos, rats infested the houses and brought the plague.
Folly is the lack of understanding of the world and living contrary to reality.
Intelligence and education are only the raw materials for good judgment.
Folly includes poor judgment, lack of discernment, inattentiveness.
The Main Event
Not all that is folly is sin, but all sin is folly. Sin is both wrong and dumb. Sin is finally futile.
Pride is futile because self-fascination is so often unrequited. The more self-absorbed we are the less there is to find absorbing.
Idolatry is not only treacherous but also futile.
People hungry for love, people who want to “connect,” will often open up a sequence of shallow, self-seeking relationships with other shallow self-seeking persons and find that at the end of the day they are emptier than when they began.
Folly is swimming against the stream of the universe.
It is not only wrong but foolish to offend God because God is our final good, our maker and savior, the one in whom alone our restless heats come to rest.
Those who turn their back on God can find only “black-market substitutes”: instead of joy, they only get excitement; instead of self-giving love they get sex with strangers; instead of unconditional acceptance they get a professional therapist.
Rebellion against God and flight from God only remove us from the sphere of blessing, cutting us off from our only invisible means of support.
Sin is a form of self-abuse. It disqualifies us from the true good: promiscuity keeps us from enjoying intimacy, lack of trust means we condemn ourselves to social superficiality, cheating brings distrust, enmity and suspicion, envy traps us in torment, pride aborts the very possibility of real friendship and communion.
Pride renders fools unteachable. Folly causes a great deal of misery and also prevents the fool from escaping from it.
A proud person tries to reinvent reality.
A fool is essentially out of touch with reality.
Only a fool would describe a meeting with God as “fun.”
Cornelius Plantinga Jr.
7. Sin and Folly
When we say an act was senseless, stupid, tragic, shortsighted, mistaken, unfortunate, miscalculated, erring, regrettable, or out of line, we are agreeing with the Bible that it was “foolish.”
Fitting into the World
Wisdom is the knowledge of God’s world and the knack of fitting oneself into it.
The Bible is a book about the way the world really is, not merely the way it should be.
To be wise is to discern reality, to love it, and then to live according to it.
To discern realities at their deeper levels we have to become engaged with them.
The wise accommodate themselves to reality.
Against the Grain
Borneo: government used DDT to kill houseflies, geckos got sick from eating poisoned flies, cats died from eating poisoned geckos, rats infested the houses and brought the plague.
Folly is the lack of understanding of the world and living contrary to reality.
Intelligence and education are only the raw materials for good judgment.
Folly includes poor judgment, lack of discernment, inattentiveness.
The Main Event
Not all that is folly is sin, but all sin is folly. Sin is both wrong and dumb. Sin is finally futile.
Pride is futile because self-fascination is so often unrequited. The more self-absorbed we are the less there is to find absorbing.
Idolatry is not only treacherous but also futile.
People hungry for love, people who want to “connect,” will often open up a sequence of shallow, self-seeking relationships with other shallow self-seeking persons and find that at the end of the day they are emptier than when they began.
Folly is swimming against the stream of the universe.
It is not only wrong but foolish to offend God because God is our final good, our maker and savior, the one in whom alone our restless heats come to rest.
Those who turn their back on God can find only “black-market substitutes”: instead of joy, they only get excitement; instead of self-giving love they get sex with strangers; instead of unconditional acceptance they get a professional therapist.
Rebellion against God and flight from God only remove us from the sphere of blessing, cutting us off from our only invisible means of support.
Sin is a form of self-abuse. It disqualifies us from the true good: promiscuity keeps us from enjoying intimacy, lack of trust means we condemn ourselves to social superficiality, cheating brings distrust, enmity and suspicion, envy traps us in torment, pride aborts the very possibility of real friendship and communion.
Pride renders fools unteachable. Folly causes a great deal of misery and also prevents the fool from escaping from it.
A proud person tries to reinvent reality.
A fool is essentially out of touch with reality.
Only a fool would describe a meeting with God as “fun.”
Parasite
Not the Way It’s Supposed to Be: A Breviary of Sin
Cornelius Plantinga Jr.
5. Parasite
Bernard Shaw: “You cannot have the power for good without having power for evil too. Even mother’s milk nourishes murderers as well as heroes.”
During the civil rights movement, some blacks figured out ways to defraud their own movement.
Ironies and Hybrids
Saints bring dirty weapons to holy wars.
Reform needs constant reform; rescuers need to be rescued.
Evil contaminates every scalpel designed to remove it.
Human beings are extremely complex creatures where great good and great evil often cohabit, sometimes in separate, well-insulated compartments, but sometimes in an intimacy so deep and twisted that we never get to see the one moral quality without the other.
Until the Enlightenment, sinful human pride was widely regarded as the first of the seven deadly sins. Now it is no longer viewed with alarm.
Theology has become therapy, holiness is replaced by happiness, truth by feeling, ethics by self-esteem.
The main problem with pride is that it recognizes neither sin nor grace.
Hubris is a hybrid that can be either titanic or pathetic and it can afflict the great and the would-be great.
Often humility has been used as a club to beat other races, women, children, etc. into submission.
The proud love humility in others.
The humbled sometimes reply by usurping the very pride they had hated.
Privation and Parasite
Even when sin is depressingly familiar, it is never normal; it is unknown, irrational, alien; it is a departure from the norm.
Sin is deviant and perverse, an in-justice, in-iquity, in-gratitude, dis-order, dis-obedience, faith-lessness, law-lessness, god-lessness.
Sin is both the overstepping of a line and the missing of a mark.
Sin is an intruder, a gate-crasher, that has gotten into God’s world uninvited.
Sin is a parasite; nothing about sin is its own: all its power, persistence, and plausibility are stolen goods.
Sin is a spoiler of entities—there must be something good first before it can be spoiled.
C.S. Lewis: “Goodness, so to speak, is itself; badness is only spoiled goodness. And there must be something good first before it can be spoiled.’
Good is original, independent, and constructive; evil is derivative, dependent, and destructive.
Evil wants good; it needs good to be evil. It merely wants the good without God.
Sin is fruitful because, like a virus, it attaches to the life force and dynamics of its host. It attaches and converts them to a new use.
We are often drawn to men who commit bold evil, not because we love the evil but because we love the boldness and audacity and freedom. Sin is only attractive when it is vital. But these very qualities are borrowed and not original, because the very boldness, imagination, and creativity come from the very God it attacks.
Often we focus on the “good” aspects of evil while choosing not to notice the negative fallout it creates. We only see the vitality of the parasite, glowing with stolen life.
Cornelius Plantinga Jr.
5. Parasite
Bernard Shaw: “You cannot have the power for good without having power for evil too. Even mother’s milk nourishes murderers as well as heroes.”
During the civil rights movement, some blacks figured out ways to defraud their own movement.
Ironies and Hybrids
Saints bring dirty weapons to holy wars.
Reform needs constant reform; rescuers need to be rescued.
Evil contaminates every scalpel designed to remove it.
Human beings are extremely complex creatures where great good and great evil often cohabit, sometimes in separate, well-insulated compartments, but sometimes in an intimacy so deep and twisted that we never get to see the one moral quality without the other.
Until the Enlightenment, sinful human pride was widely regarded as the first of the seven deadly sins. Now it is no longer viewed with alarm.
Theology has become therapy, holiness is replaced by happiness, truth by feeling, ethics by self-esteem.
The main problem with pride is that it recognizes neither sin nor grace.
Hubris is a hybrid that can be either titanic or pathetic and it can afflict the great and the would-be great.
Often humility has been used as a club to beat other races, women, children, etc. into submission.
The proud love humility in others.
The humbled sometimes reply by usurping the very pride they had hated.
Privation and Parasite
Even when sin is depressingly familiar, it is never normal; it is unknown, irrational, alien; it is a departure from the norm.
Sin is deviant and perverse, an in-justice, in-iquity, in-gratitude, dis-order, dis-obedience, faith-lessness, law-lessness, god-lessness.
Sin is both the overstepping of a line and the missing of a mark.
Sin is an intruder, a gate-crasher, that has gotten into God’s world uninvited.
Sin is a parasite; nothing about sin is its own: all its power, persistence, and plausibility are stolen goods.
Sin is a spoiler of entities—there must be something good first before it can be spoiled.
C.S. Lewis: “Goodness, so to speak, is itself; badness is only spoiled goodness. And there must be something good first before it can be spoiled.’
Good is original, independent, and constructive; evil is derivative, dependent, and destructive.
Evil wants good; it needs good to be evil. It merely wants the good without God.
Sin is fruitful because, like a virus, it attaches to the life force and dynamics of its host. It attaches and converts them to a new use.
We are often drawn to men who commit bold evil, not because we love the evil but because we love the boldness and audacity and freedom. Sin is only attractive when it is vital. But these very qualities are borrowed and not original, because the very boldness, imagination, and creativity come from the very God it attacks.
Often we focus on the “good” aspects of evil while choosing not to notice the negative fallout it creates. We only see the vitality of the parasite, glowing with stolen life.
The Progress of Corruption
Not the Way It’s Supposed to Be: A Breviary of Sin
Cornelius Plantinga Jr.
4. The Progress of Corruption
Mesillat Yesharim: “If a man is allured by the things of this world and is estranged from his Creator, it is not he alone who is corrupted, but the whole world is corrupted with him.”
One moral misstep leads to another.
Sin yields more and more sin; each episode of sin gets triggered by trouble from the last.
Sin is a plague that spreads its contagion.
People rarely commit single sins.
Unarrested, sin despoils even its own agents, eventually causing the very death of the soul.
History Echoes
Sin is both fatal and fertile.
Like cancer, sin kills because it reproduces.
Victims of crime are dangerous because they are unlikely to exercise self-control in their attempt to get even.
Most people believe they are a victims and are merely returning fire, never firing the first shot.
Motives, Contexts, and Causes
People have long memories and short fuses when it comes to grievances.
Injustice enrages people and makes them vengeful.
Those who have been abused are more likely to abuse others.
It is easier to chose the short-term stress reliever, that puts long-term stress on our hearts and bodies.
Human beings want security, and our main problem is that we seek security in the wrong places and in the wrong ways because we fail to trust God to take care of us.
Unbelief produces anxiety which produces pride and sensuality.
“The heart wants what it wants.”
The human heart, when it ignores God, turns in on itself, trying to lift itself, please itself, and ends up debasing itself. When we want God’s gifts without God, we end up sagging and contracting into a little wad.
Motives may be mixed, making it difficult to discern them.
There are also social contexts to consider. Society must take some of the blame for sins committed because of injustice and abuse.
Even if we could understand all the motives, contexts, and forces, we would still not be able to fully understand why a certain sin was committed.
Failure to blame people for their sins is dehumanizing. In the Soviet Union the concept of blame disappeared and people were no longer treated as fully human.
The Great Law of Returns
Paul called this “the mystery of iniquity” (2 Thess. 2:7)
At the bottom, the heart wants what it wants, and it has its reasons that even reason does not know.
“The heart is sinful and desperately wicked; who can know it?”
People not only reap what they sow, they also sow what they reap.
George F. Will: “America’s slide into the sewer is greased by praise.”
Other Causes?
Secrecy fertilizes evil.
God created us to live Shalom and to please Him, but we mysteriously live against the purpose of our existence.
Satan does not take any ground that we do not give him.
Satan seduces only those who want to be seduced.
Sin is not only personal but also interpersonal and suprapersonal.
Sin becomes a living, powerful force with a life all its own.
Cornelius Plantinga Jr.
4. The Progress of Corruption
Mesillat Yesharim: “If a man is allured by the things of this world and is estranged from his Creator, it is not he alone who is corrupted, but the whole world is corrupted with him.”
One moral misstep leads to another.
Sin yields more and more sin; each episode of sin gets triggered by trouble from the last.
Sin is a plague that spreads its contagion.
People rarely commit single sins.
Unarrested, sin despoils even its own agents, eventually causing the very death of the soul.
History Echoes
Sin is both fatal and fertile.
Like cancer, sin kills because it reproduces.
Victims of crime are dangerous because they are unlikely to exercise self-control in their attempt to get even.
Most people believe they are a victims and are merely returning fire, never firing the first shot.
Motives, Contexts, and Causes
People have long memories and short fuses when it comes to grievances.
Injustice enrages people and makes them vengeful.
Those who have been abused are more likely to abuse others.
It is easier to chose the short-term stress reliever, that puts long-term stress on our hearts and bodies.
Human beings want security, and our main problem is that we seek security in the wrong places and in the wrong ways because we fail to trust God to take care of us.
Unbelief produces anxiety which produces pride and sensuality.
“The heart wants what it wants.”
The human heart, when it ignores God, turns in on itself, trying to lift itself, please itself, and ends up debasing itself. When we want God’s gifts without God, we end up sagging and contracting into a little wad.
Motives may be mixed, making it difficult to discern them.
There are also social contexts to consider. Society must take some of the blame for sins committed because of injustice and abuse.
Even if we could understand all the motives, contexts, and forces, we would still not be able to fully understand why a certain sin was committed.
Failure to blame people for their sins is dehumanizing. In the Soviet Union the concept of blame disappeared and people were no longer treated as fully human.
The Great Law of Returns
Paul called this “the mystery of iniquity” (2 Thess. 2:7)
At the bottom, the heart wants what it wants, and it has its reasons that even reason does not know.
“The heart is sinful and desperately wicked; who can know it?”
People not only reap what they sow, they also sow what they reap.
George F. Will: “America’s slide into the sewer is greased by praise.”
Other Causes?
Secrecy fertilizes evil.
God created us to live Shalom and to please Him, but we mysteriously live against the purpose of our existence.
Satan does not take any ground that we do not give him.
Satan seduces only those who want to be seduced.
Sin is not only personal but also interpersonal and suprapersonal.
Sin becomes a living, powerful force with a life all its own.
Perversion, Pollution, and Disintegration
Not the Way It’s Supposed to Be: A Breviary of Sin
Cornelius Plantinga Jr.
3. Perversion, Pollution, and Disintegration
Seneca: “Devotion to what is wrong is complex and admits of infinite variations.”
Anatole France: “It is only the poor who are forbidden to beg.”
Perversion
Perversion is an ends-and-purposes disease. It is the turning of loyalty, energy, and desire away from God and God’s purpose in the world so that energy and resources are wasted on unworthy ends or wrong ends.
Spiritual hygiene requires us to be able to recognize and assess goods, to pursue them with appropriate degrees of interest, and to enjoy them with the appropriate level of pleasure. Ignorance and self-deception often skew our judgments about what is worth longing for in the first place.
Any return to greatness requires a reappraisal of what the primary purpose of man is, his spiritual nature, and his responsibility to God and others.
Pollution
When a church uses hymns or praise songs primarily for entertainment, it simultaneously perverts the hymns and pollutes worship.
To pollute is to defile, to weaken a whole entity by introducing a foreign element.
Idolatry is pollution in that a third party gets in between God and the worshipper, adulterating an exclusive loyalty.
Ingratitude fouls our character and our relation to God.
Dividedness and Disintegration
Idolatry both contaminates and divides proper loyalty to God.
A pure heart is an undivided heart.
When the foundation is cracked the building will crumble.
Sin tends to disintegrate both its victims and its perpetrators.
Amor Mortis
Sin has caused deterioration to spread through our soul and our psychic governing center, making it internally lawless.
Sinners who lose spiritual purpose and control eventually descend into a spiral of increasingly grave assaults on civic and personal integrity.
Sin both numbs us and hollows us out.
Sin eventually creates an upside down morality, showing that evil has crossed some wire within them so that their moral polarity has switched.
“Wealth has made us greedy, and self-indulgence has brought us, through every form of sensual excess, to be in love with death.”
Cornelius Plantinga Jr.
3. Perversion, Pollution, and Disintegration
Seneca: “Devotion to what is wrong is complex and admits of infinite variations.”
Anatole France: “It is only the poor who are forbidden to beg.”
Perversion
Perversion is an ends-and-purposes disease. It is the turning of loyalty, energy, and desire away from God and God’s purpose in the world so that energy and resources are wasted on unworthy ends or wrong ends.
Spiritual hygiene requires us to be able to recognize and assess goods, to pursue them with appropriate degrees of interest, and to enjoy them with the appropriate level of pleasure. Ignorance and self-deception often skew our judgments about what is worth longing for in the first place.
Any return to greatness requires a reappraisal of what the primary purpose of man is, his spiritual nature, and his responsibility to God and others.
Pollution
When a church uses hymns or praise songs primarily for entertainment, it simultaneously perverts the hymns and pollutes worship.
To pollute is to defile, to weaken a whole entity by introducing a foreign element.
Idolatry is pollution in that a third party gets in between God and the worshipper, adulterating an exclusive loyalty.
Ingratitude fouls our character and our relation to God.
Dividedness and Disintegration
Idolatry both contaminates and divides proper loyalty to God.
A pure heart is an undivided heart.
When the foundation is cracked the building will crumble.
Sin tends to disintegrate both its victims and its perpetrators.
Amor Mortis
Sin has caused deterioration to spread through our soul and our psychic governing center, making it internally lawless.
Sinners who lose spiritual purpose and control eventually descend into a spiral of increasingly grave assaults on civic and personal integrity.
Sin both numbs us and hollows us out.
Sin eventually creates an upside down morality, showing that evil has crossed some wire within them so that their moral polarity has switched.
“Wealth has made us greedy, and self-indulgence has brought us, through every form of sensual excess, to be in love with death.”
Spiritual Hygiene and Corruption
Not the Way It’s Supposed to Be: A Breviary of Sin
Cornelius Plantinga Jr.
2. Spiritual Hygiene and Corruption
Oliver Stone: “I don’t want integrity to block my creative growth.”
Sin corrupts: it puts asunder what God has joined together.
Sin despoils: it removes that which preserves integrity. (The Nazis not only tried to kill the body but also the spirit, and not only to slay the spirit but to corrupt it so that it would recriminate and slay itself. They tried to strip away everything that holds a being together and what joins other beings in an atmosphere of hospitality, justice and delight.)
Spiritual Hygiene
A spiritually whole person longs for God and the beauty of God, for Christ, for Christ-likeness, for the Holy Spirit, for spiritual maturity, for other human beings, for love, for justice, for nature, for beauty.
Spiritually whole people long for character, virtue and goodness.
Most of what we long for cannot be had by trying to get it. The more we pursue these things the more elusive they become. We will find what we long for only when we seek for God.
Cornelius Plantinga Jr.
2. Spiritual Hygiene and Corruption
Oliver Stone: “I don’t want integrity to block my creative growth.”
Sin corrupts: it puts asunder what God has joined together.
Sin despoils: it removes that which preserves integrity. (The Nazis not only tried to kill the body but also the spirit, and not only to slay the spirit but to corrupt it so that it would recriminate and slay itself. They tried to strip away everything that holds a being together and what joins other beings in an atmosphere of hospitality, justice and delight.)
Spiritual Hygiene
A spiritually whole person longs for God and the beauty of God, for Christ, for Christ-likeness, for the Holy Spirit, for spiritual maturity, for other human beings, for love, for justice, for nature, for beauty.
Spiritually whole people long for character, virtue and goodness.
Most of what we long for cannot be had by trying to get it. The more we pursue these things the more elusive they become. We will find what we long for only when we seek for God.
Vandalism of Shalom
Not the Way It’s Supposed to Be: A Breviary of Sin
Cornelius Plantinga Jr.
Introduction
Walker Percy: Boredom is “the self being stuffed with itself.”
The main human trouble is desperately difficult to fix; sin is the longest-running of human emergencies.
1. Vandalism of Shalom
Jonathan Dimbleby filmed a documentary about the hunger in Ethiopia and found that the government required the aid workers to pay a tariff on the emergency food relief they were bringing in for the starving people.
Shalom
The webbing together of God, humans, and all creation in justice, fulfillment, and delight.
A universal flourishing, wholeness and delight.
Sin: A Definition
Sin is both a religious and a moral concept.
It is a breaking of the Law as well as the breaking of the Covenant
Sin is first and foremost a Godward force; any thought, desire, emotion, word, or deed that displeases God and deserves blame.
Includes both acts and dispositions.
Sin is a culpable and personal affront to God.
Sin violates Shalom and interferes with the way things are supposed to be.
Sin is unoriginal in that it disrupts the good and harmonious like an intruder.
Sin offends God because it bereaves or assaults God directly or what God has made.
If there is no God, then there is no violation of God’s Law or an affront to Him.
Interscholastic and Intramural Distinctions
Crime is statute-relative while sin is not.
The relationship between sin and immorality is knotty and complex.
We need grace for our sin but mercy and healing for our diseases.
Do not confuse sin with mere error.
Sin is both objective and subjective; objective sin breaks the peace while subjective sin is when we feel we have broken the peace, whether we have or not.
All sin is equally wrong, but not all sin is equally bad. The badness of a sin depends partly on what kind and how much damage it has done.
There may be mitigating circumstances that need to be taken into account, but involuntariness may mitigate but it doesn’t necessarily excuse. If the sin was acquired in some way through some fault of our own, then we are culpable.
Evil social structures and habits may contribute to a sin, making it more difficult to assess the culpability of a sin.
Cornelius Plantinga Jr.
Introduction
Walker Percy: Boredom is “the self being stuffed with itself.”
The main human trouble is desperately difficult to fix; sin is the longest-running of human emergencies.
1. Vandalism of Shalom
Jonathan Dimbleby filmed a documentary about the hunger in Ethiopia and found that the government required the aid workers to pay a tariff on the emergency food relief they were bringing in for the starving people.
Shalom
The webbing together of God, humans, and all creation in justice, fulfillment, and delight.
A universal flourishing, wholeness and delight.
Sin: A Definition
Sin is both a religious and a moral concept.
It is a breaking of the Law as well as the breaking of the Covenant
Sin is first and foremost a Godward force; any thought, desire, emotion, word, or deed that displeases God and deserves blame.
Includes both acts and dispositions.
Sin is a culpable and personal affront to God.
Sin violates Shalom and interferes with the way things are supposed to be.
Sin is unoriginal in that it disrupts the good and harmonious like an intruder.
Sin offends God because it bereaves or assaults God directly or what God has made.
If there is no God, then there is no violation of God’s Law or an affront to Him.
Interscholastic and Intramural Distinctions
Crime is statute-relative while sin is not.
The relationship between sin and immorality is knotty and complex.
We need grace for our sin but mercy and healing for our diseases.
Do not confuse sin with mere error.
Sin is both objective and subjective; objective sin breaks the peace while subjective sin is when we feel we have broken the peace, whether we have or not.
All sin is equally wrong, but not all sin is equally bad. The badness of a sin depends partly on what kind and how much damage it has done.
There may be mitigating circumstances that need to be taken into account, but involuntariness may mitigate but it doesn’t necessarily excuse. If the sin was acquired in some way through some fault of our own, then we are culpable.
Evil social structures and habits may contribute to a sin, making it more difficult to assess the culpability of a sin.
Monday, December 1, 2008
Strategic Motivations for the Mumbai Attack
Strategic Motivations for the Mumbai Attack
December 1, 2008
By George Friedman
Last Wednesday evening, a group of Islamist operatives carried out a complex terror operation in the Indian city of Mumbai. The attack was not complex because of the weapons used or its size, but in the apparent training, multiple methods of approaching the city and excellent operational security and discipline in the final phases of the operation, when the last remaining attackers held out in the Taj Mahal hotel for several days. The operational goal of the attack clearly was to cause as many casualties as possible, particularly among Jews and well-to-do guests of five-star hotels. But attacks on various other targets, from railroad stations to hospitals, indicate that the more general purpose was to spread terror in a major Indian city.
While it is not clear precisely who carried out the Mumbai attack, two separate units apparently were involved. One group, possibly consisting of Indian Muslims, was established in Mumbai ahead of the attacks. The second group appears to have just arrived. It traveled via ship from Karachi, Pakistan, later hijacked a small Indian vessel to get past Indian coastal patrols, and ultimately landed near Mumbai.
Extensive preparations apparently had been made, including surveillance of the targets. So while the precise number of attackers remains unclear, the attack clearly was well-planned and well-executed.
Evidence and logic suggest that radical Pakistani Islamists carried out the attack. These groups have a highly complex and deliberately amorphous structure. Rather than being centrally controlled, ad hoc teams are created with links to one or more groups. Conceivably, they might have lacked links to any group, but this is hard to believe. Too much planning and training were involved in this attack for it to have been conceived by a bunch of guys in a garage. While precisely which radical Pakistani Islamist group or groups were involved is unknown, the Mumbai attack appears to have originated in Pakistan. It could have been linked to al Qaeda prime or its various franchises and/or to Kashmiri insurgents.
More important than the question of the exact group that carried out the attack, however, is the attackers’ strategic end. There is a tendency to regard terror attacks as ends in themselves, carried out simply for the sake of spreading terror. In the highly politicized atmosphere of Pakistan’s radical Islamist factions, however, terror frequently has a more sophisticated and strategic purpose. Whoever invested the time and took the risk in organizing this attack had a reason to do so. Let’s work backward to that reason by examining the logical outcomes following this attack.
An End to New Delhi’s Restraint
The most striking aspect of the Mumbai attack is the challenge it presents to the Indian government — a challenge almost impossible for New Delhi to ignore. A December 2001 Islamist attack on the Indian parliament triggered an intense confrontation between India and Pakistan. Since then, New Delhi has not responded in a dramatic fashion to numerous Islamist attacks against India that were traceable to Pakistan. The Mumbai attack, by contrast, aimed to force a response from New Delhi by being so grievous that any Indian government showing only a muted reaction to it would fall.
India’s restrained response to Islamist attacks (even those originating in Pakistan) in recent years has come about because New Delhi has understood that, for a host of reasons, Islamabad has been unable to control radical Pakistani Islamist groups. India did not want war with Pakistan; it felt it had more important issues to deal with. New Delhi therefore accepted Islamabad’s assurances that Pakistan would do its best to curb terror attacks, and after suitable posturing, allowed tensions originating from Islamist attacks to pass.
This time, however, the attackers struck in such a way that New Delhi couldn’t allow the incident to pass. As one might expect, public opinion in India is shifting from stunned to furious. India’s Congress party-led government is politically weak and nearing the end of its life span. It lacks the political power to ignore the attack, even if it were inclined to do so. If it ignored the attack, it would fall, and a more intensely nationalist government would take its place. It is therefore very difficult to imagine circumstances under which the Indians could respond to this attack in the same manner they have to recent Islamist attacks.
What the Indians actually will do is not clear. In 2001-2002, New Delhi responded to the attack on the Indian parliament by moving forces close to the Pakistani border and the Line of Control that separates Indian- and Pakistani-controlled Kashmir, engaging in artillery duels along the front, and bringing its nuclear forces to a high level of alert. The Pakistanis made a similar response. Whether India ever actually intended to attack Pakistan remains unclear, but either way, New Delhi created an intense crisis in Pakistan.
The U.S. and the Indo-Pakistani Crisis
The United States used this crisis for its own ends. Having just completed the first phase of its campaign in Afghanistan, Washington was intensely pressuring Pakistan’s then-Musharraf government to expand cooperation with the United States; purge its intelligence organization, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), of radical Islamists; and crack down on al Qaeda and the Taliban in the Afghan-Pakistani border region. Former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf had been reluctant to cooperate with Washington, as doing so inevitably would spark a massive domestic backlash against his government.
The crisis with India produced an opening for the United States. Eager to get India to stand down from the crisis, the Pakistanis looked to the Americans to mediate. And the price for U.S. mediation was increased cooperation from Pakistan with the United States. The Indians, not eager for war, backed down from the crisis after guarantees that Islamabad would impose stronger controls on Islamist groups in Kashmir.
In 2001-2002, the Indo-Pakistani crisis played into American hands. In 2008, the new Indo-Pakistani crisis might play differently. The United States recently has demanded increased Pakistani cooperation along the Afghan border. Meanwhile, President-elect Barack Obama has stated his intention to focus on Afghanistan and pressure the Pakistanis.
Therefore, one of Islamabad’s first responses to the new Indo-Pakistani crisis was to announce that if the Indians increased their forces along Pakistan’s eastern border, Pakistan would be forced to withdraw 100,000 troops from its western border with Afghanistan. In other words, threats from India would cause Pakistan to dramatically reduce its cooperation with the United States in the Afghan war. The Indian foreign minister is flying to the United States to meet with Obama; obviously, this matter will be discussed among others.
We expect the United States to pressure India not to create a crisis, in order to avoid this outcome. As we have said, the problem is that it is unclear whether politically the Indians can afford restraint. At the very least, New Delhi must demand that the Pakistani government take steps to make the ISI and Pakistan’s other internal security apparatus more effective. Even if the Indians concede that there was no ISI involvement in the attack, they will argue that the ISI is incapable of stopping such attacks. They will demand a purge and reform of the ISI as a sign of Pakistani commitment. Barring that, New Delhi will move troops to the Indo-Pakistani frontier to intimidate Pakistan and placate Indian public opinion.
Dilemmas for Islamabad, New Delhi and Washington
At that point, Islamabad will have a serious problem. The Pakistani government is even weaker than the Indian government. Pakistan’s civilian regime does not control the Pakistani military, and therefore does not control the ISI. The civilians can’t decide to transform Pakistani security, and the military is not inclined to make this transformation. (Pakistan’s military has had ample opportunity to do so if it wished.)
Pakistan faces the challenge, just one among many, that its civilian and even military leadership lack the ability to reach deep into the ISI and security services to transform them. In some ways, these agencies operate under their own rules. Add to this the reality that the ISI and security forces — even if they are acting more assertively, as Islamabad claims — are demonstrably incapable of controlling radical Islamists in Pakistan. If they were capable, the attack on Mumbai would have been thwarted in Pakistan. The simple reality is that in Pakistan’s case, the will to make this transformation does not seem to be present, and even if it were, the ability to suppress terror attacks isn’t there.
The United States might well want to limit New Delhi’s response. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is on her way to India to discuss just this. But the politics of India’s situation make it unlikely that the Indians can do anything more than listen. It is more than simply a political issue for New Delhi; the Indians have no reason to believe that the Mumbai operation was one of a kind. Further operations like the Mumbai attack might well be planned. Unless the Pakistanis shift their posture inside Pakistan, India has no way of knowing whether other such attacks can be stymied. The Indians will be sympathetic to Washington’s plight in Afghanistan and the need to keep Pakistani troops at the Afghan border. But New Delhi will need something that the Americans — and in fact the Pakistanis — can’t deliver: a guarantee that there will be no more attacks like this one.
The Indian government cannot chance inaction. It probably would fall if it did. Moreover, in the event of inactivity and another attack, Indian public opinion probably will swing to an uncontrollable extreme. If an attack takes place but India has moved toward crisis posture with Pakistan, at least no one can argue that the Indian government remained passive in the face of threats to national security. Therefore, India is likely to refuse American requests for restraint.
It is possible that New Delhi will make a radical proposal to Rice, however. Given that the Pakistani government is incapable of exercising control in its own country, and given that Pakistan now represents a threat to both U.S. and Indian national security, the Indians might suggest a joint operation with the Americans against Pakistan.
What that joint operation might entail is uncertain, but regardless, this is something that Rice would reject out of hand and that Obama would reject in January 2009. Pakistan has a huge population and nuclear weapons, and the last thing Bush or Obama wants is to practice nation-building in Pakistan. The Indians, of course, will anticipate this response. The truth is that New Delhi itself does not want to engage deep in Pakistan to strike at militant training camps and other Islamist sites. That would be a nightmare. But if Rice shows up with a request for Indian restraint and no concrete proposal — or willingness to entertain a proposal — for solving the Pakistani problem, India will be able to refuse on the grounds that the Americans are asking India to absorb a risk (more Mumbai-style attacks) without the United States’ willingness to share in the risk.
Setting the Stage for a New Indo-Pakistani Confrontation
That will set the stage for another Indo-Pakistani confrontation. India will push forces forward all along the Indo-Pakistani frontier, move its nuclear forces to an alert level, begin shelling Pakistan, and perhaps — given the seriousness of the situation — attack short distances into Pakistan and even carry out airstrikes deep in Pakistan. India will demand greater transparency for New Delhi in Pakistani intelligence operations. The Indians will not want to occupy Pakistan; they will want to occupy Pakistan’s security apparatus.
Naturally, the Pakistanis will refuse that. There is no way they can give India, their main adversary, insight into Pakistani intelligence operations. But without that access, India has no reason to trust Pakistan. This will leave the Indians in an odd position: They will be in a near-war posture, but will have made no demands of Pakistan that Islamabad can reasonably deliver and that would benefit India. In one sense, India will be gesturing. In another sense, India will be trapped by making a gesture on which Pakistan cannot deliver. The situation thus could get out of hand.
In the meantime, the Pakistanis certainly will withdraw forces from western Pakistan and deploy them in eastern Pakistan. That will mean that one leg of the Petraeus and Obama plans would collapse. Washington’s expectation of greater Pakistani cooperation along the Afghan border will disappear along with the troops. This will free the Taliban from whatever limits the Pakistani army had placed on it. The Taliban’s ability to fight would increase, while the motivation for any of the Taliban to enter talks — as Afghan President Hamid Karzai has suggested — would decline. U.S. forces, already stretched to the limit, would face an increasingly difficult situation, while pressure on al Qaeda in the tribal areas would decrease.
Now, step back and consider the situation the Mumbai attackers have created. First, the Indian government faces an internal political crisis driving it toward a confrontation it didn’t plan on. Second, the minimum Pakistani response to a renewed Indo-Pakistani crisis will be withdrawing forces from western Pakistan, thereby strengthening the Taliban and securing al Qaeda. Third, sufficient pressure on Pakistan’s civilian government could cause it to collapse, opening the door to a military-Islamist government — or it could see Pakistan collapse into chaos, giving Islamists security in various regions and an opportunity to reshape Pakistan. Finally, the United States’ situation in Afghanistan has now become enormously more complex.
By staging an attack the Indian government can’t ignore, the Mumbai attackers have set in motion an existential crisis for Pakistan. The reality of Pakistan cannot be transformed, trapped as the country is between the United States and India. Almost every evolution from this point forward benefits Islamists. Strategically, the attack on Mumbai was a precise blow struck to achieve uncertain but favorable political outcomes for the Islamists.
Rice’s trip to India now becomes the crucial next step. She wants Indian restraint. She does not want the western Pakistani border to collapse. But she cannot guarantee what India must have: assurance of no further terror attacks on India originating in Pakistan. Without that, India must do something. No Indian government could survive without some kind of action. So it is up to Rice, in one of her last acts as secretary of state, to come up with a miraculous solution to head off a final, catastrophic crisis for the Bush administration — and a defining first crisis for the new Obama administration. Former U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld once said that the enemy gets a vote. The Islamists cast their ballot in Mumbai.
Taken from Stratfor.com
December 1, 2008
By George Friedman
Last Wednesday evening, a group of Islamist operatives carried out a complex terror operation in the Indian city of Mumbai. The attack was not complex because of the weapons used or its size, but in the apparent training, multiple methods of approaching the city and excellent operational security and discipline in the final phases of the operation, when the last remaining attackers held out in the Taj Mahal hotel for several days. The operational goal of the attack clearly was to cause as many casualties as possible, particularly among Jews and well-to-do guests of five-star hotels. But attacks on various other targets, from railroad stations to hospitals, indicate that the more general purpose was to spread terror in a major Indian city.
While it is not clear precisely who carried out the Mumbai attack, two separate units apparently were involved. One group, possibly consisting of Indian Muslims, was established in Mumbai ahead of the attacks. The second group appears to have just arrived. It traveled via ship from Karachi, Pakistan, later hijacked a small Indian vessel to get past Indian coastal patrols, and ultimately landed near Mumbai.
Extensive preparations apparently had been made, including surveillance of the targets. So while the precise number of attackers remains unclear, the attack clearly was well-planned and well-executed.
Evidence and logic suggest that radical Pakistani Islamists carried out the attack. These groups have a highly complex and deliberately amorphous structure. Rather than being centrally controlled, ad hoc teams are created with links to one or more groups. Conceivably, they might have lacked links to any group, but this is hard to believe. Too much planning and training were involved in this attack for it to have been conceived by a bunch of guys in a garage. While precisely which radical Pakistani Islamist group or groups were involved is unknown, the Mumbai attack appears to have originated in Pakistan. It could have been linked to al Qaeda prime or its various franchises and/or to Kashmiri insurgents.
More important than the question of the exact group that carried out the attack, however, is the attackers’ strategic end. There is a tendency to regard terror attacks as ends in themselves, carried out simply for the sake of spreading terror. In the highly politicized atmosphere of Pakistan’s radical Islamist factions, however, terror frequently has a more sophisticated and strategic purpose. Whoever invested the time and took the risk in organizing this attack had a reason to do so. Let’s work backward to that reason by examining the logical outcomes following this attack.
An End to New Delhi’s Restraint
The most striking aspect of the Mumbai attack is the challenge it presents to the Indian government — a challenge almost impossible for New Delhi to ignore. A December 2001 Islamist attack on the Indian parliament triggered an intense confrontation between India and Pakistan. Since then, New Delhi has not responded in a dramatic fashion to numerous Islamist attacks against India that were traceable to Pakistan. The Mumbai attack, by contrast, aimed to force a response from New Delhi by being so grievous that any Indian government showing only a muted reaction to it would fall.
India’s restrained response to Islamist attacks (even those originating in Pakistan) in recent years has come about because New Delhi has understood that, for a host of reasons, Islamabad has been unable to control radical Pakistani Islamist groups. India did not want war with Pakistan; it felt it had more important issues to deal with. New Delhi therefore accepted Islamabad’s assurances that Pakistan would do its best to curb terror attacks, and after suitable posturing, allowed tensions originating from Islamist attacks to pass.
This time, however, the attackers struck in such a way that New Delhi couldn’t allow the incident to pass. As one might expect, public opinion in India is shifting from stunned to furious. India’s Congress party-led government is politically weak and nearing the end of its life span. It lacks the political power to ignore the attack, even if it were inclined to do so. If it ignored the attack, it would fall, and a more intensely nationalist government would take its place. It is therefore very difficult to imagine circumstances under which the Indians could respond to this attack in the same manner they have to recent Islamist attacks.
What the Indians actually will do is not clear. In 2001-2002, New Delhi responded to the attack on the Indian parliament by moving forces close to the Pakistani border and the Line of Control that separates Indian- and Pakistani-controlled Kashmir, engaging in artillery duels along the front, and bringing its nuclear forces to a high level of alert. The Pakistanis made a similar response. Whether India ever actually intended to attack Pakistan remains unclear, but either way, New Delhi created an intense crisis in Pakistan.
The U.S. and the Indo-Pakistani Crisis
The United States used this crisis for its own ends. Having just completed the first phase of its campaign in Afghanistan, Washington was intensely pressuring Pakistan’s then-Musharraf government to expand cooperation with the United States; purge its intelligence organization, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), of radical Islamists; and crack down on al Qaeda and the Taliban in the Afghan-Pakistani border region. Former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf had been reluctant to cooperate with Washington, as doing so inevitably would spark a massive domestic backlash against his government.
The crisis with India produced an opening for the United States. Eager to get India to stand down from the crisis, the Pakistanis looked to the Americans to mediate. And the price for U.S. mediation was increased cooperation from Pakistan with the United States. The Indians, not eager for war, backed down from the crisis after guarantees that Islamabad would impose stronger controls on Islamist groups in Kashmir.
In 2001-2002, the Indo-Pakistani crisis played into American hands. In 2008, the new Indo-Pakistani crisis might play differently. The United States recently has demanded increased Pakistani cooperation along the Afghan border. Meanwhile, President-elect Barack Obama has stated his intention to focus on Afghanistan and pressure the Pakistanis.
Therefore, one of Islamabad’s first responses to the new Indo-Pakistani crisis was to announce that if the Indians increased their forces along Pakistan’s eastern border, Pakistan would be forced to withdraw 100,000 troops from its western border with Afghanistan. In other words, threats from India would cause Pakistan to dramatically reduce its cooperation with the United States in the Afghan war. The Indian foreign minister is flying to the United States to meet with Obama; obviously, this matter will be discussed among others.
We expect the United States to pressure India not to create a crisis, in order to avoid this outcome. As we have said, the problem is that it is unclear whether politically the Indians can afford restraint. At the very least, New Delhi must demand that the Pakistani government take steps to make the ISI and Pakistan’s other internal security apparatus more effective. Even if the Indians concede that there was no ISI involvement in the attack, they will argue that the ISI is incapable of stopping such attacks. They will demand a purge and reform of the ISI as a sign of Pakistani commitment. Barring that, New Delhi will move troops to the Indo-Pakistani frontier to intimidate Pakistan and placate Indian public opinion.
Dilemmas for Islamabad, New Delhi and Washington
At that point, Islamabad will have a serious problem. The Pakistani government is even weaker than the Indian government. Pakistan’s civilian regime does not control the Pakistani military, and therefore does not control the ISI. The civilians can’t decide to transform Pakistani security, and the military is not inclined to make this transformation. (Pakistan’s military has had ample opportunity to do so if it wished.)
Pakistan faces the challenge, just one among many, that its civilian and even military leadership lack the ability to reach deep into the ISI and security services to transform them. In some ways, these agencies operate under their own rules. Add to this the reality that the ISI and security forces — even if they are acting more assertively, as Islamabad claims — are demonstrably incapable of controlling radical Islamists in Pakistan. If they were capable, the attack on Mumbai would have been thwarted in Pakistan. The simple reality is that in Pakistan’s case, the will to make this transformation does not seem to be present, and even if it were, the ability to suppress terror attacks isn’t there.
The United States might well want to limit New Delhi’s response. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is on her way to India to discuss just this. But the politics of India’s situation make it unlikely that the Indians can do anything more than listen. It is more than simply a political issue for New Delhi; the Indians have no reason to believe that the Mumbai operation was one of a kind. Further operations like the Mumbai attack might well be planned. Unless the Pakistanis shift their posture inside Pakistan, India has no way of knowing whether other such attacks can be stymied. The Indians will be sympathetic to Washington’s plight in Afghanistan and the need to keep Pakistani troops at the Afghan border. But New Delhi will need something that the Americans — and in fact the Pakistanis — can’t deliver: a guarantee that there will be no more attacks like this one.
The Indian government cannot chance inaction. It probably would fall if it did. Moreover, in the event of inactivity and another attack, Indian public opinion probably will swing to an uncontrollable extreme. If an attack takes place but India has moved toward crisis posture with Pakistan, at least no one can argue that the Indian government remained passive in the face of threats to national security. Therefore, India is likely to refuse American requests for restraint.
It is possible that New Delhi will make a radical proposal to Rice, however. Given that the Pakistani government is incapable of exercising control in its own country, and given that Pakistan now represents a threat to both U.S. and Indian national security, the Indians might suggest a joint operation with the Americans against Pakistan.
What that joint operation might entail is uncertain, but regardless, this is something that Rice would reject out of hand and that Obama would reject in January 2009. Pakistan has a huge population and nuclear weapons, and the last thing Bush or Obama wants is to practice nation-building in Pakistan. The Indians, of course, will anticipate this response. The truth is that New Delhi itself does not want to engage deep in Pakistan to strike at militant training camps and other Islamist sites. That would be a nightmare. But if Rice shows up with a request for Indian restraint and no concrete proposal — or willingness to entertain a proposal — for solving the Pakistani problem, India will be able to refuse on the grounds that the Americans are asking India to absorb a risk (more Mumbai-style attacks) without the United States’ willingness to share in the risk.
Setting the Stage for a New Indo-Pakistani Confrontation
That will set the stage for another Indo-Pakistani confrontation. India will push forces forward all along the Indo-Pakistani frontier, move its nuclear forces to an alert level, begin shelling Pakistan, and perhaps — given the seriousness of the situation — attack short distances into Pakistan and even carry out airstrikes deep in Pakistan. India will demand greater transparency for New Delhi in Pakistani intelligence operations. The Indians will not want to occupy Pakistan; they will want to occupy Pakistan’s security apparatus.
Naturally, the Pakistanis will refuse that. There is no way they can give India, their main adversary, insight into Pakistani intelligence operations. But without that access, India has no reason to trust Pakistan. This will leave the Indians in an odd position: They will be in a near-war posture, but will have made no demands of Pakistan that Islamabad can reasonably deliver and that would benefit India. In one sense, India will be gesturing. In another sense, India will be trapped by making a gesture on which Pakistan cannot deliver. The situation thus could get out of hand.
In the meantime, the Pakistanis certainly will withdraw forces from western Pakistan and deploy them in eastern Pakistan. That will mean that one leg of the Petraeus and Obama plans would collapse. Washington’s expectation of greater Pakistani cooperation along the Afghan border will disappear along with the troops. This will free the Taliban from whatever limits the Pakistani army had placed on it. The Taliban’s ability to fight would increase, while the motivation for any of the Taliban to enter talks — as Afghan President Hamid Karzai has suggested — would decline. U.S. forces, already stretched to the limit, would face an increasingly difficult situation, while pressure on al Qaeda in the tribal areas would decrease.
Now, step back and consider the situation the Mumbai attackers have created. First, the Indian government faces an internal political crisis driving it toward a confrontation it didn’t plan on. Second, the minimum Pakistani response to a renewed Indo-Pakistani crisis will be withdrawing forces from western Pakistan, thereby strengthening the Taliban and securing al Qaeda. Third, sufficient pressure on Pakistan’s civilian government could cause it to collapse, opening the door to a military-Islamist government — or it could see Pakistan collapse into chaos, giving Islamists security in various regions and an opportunity to reshape Pakistan. Finally, the United States’ situation in Afghanistan has now become enormously more complex.
By staging an attack the Indian government can’t ignore, the Mumbai attackers have set in motion an existential crisis for Pakistan. The reality of Pakistan cannot be transformed, trapped as the country is between the United States and India. Almost every evolution from this point forward benefits Islamists. Strategically, the attack on Mumbai was a precise blow struck to achieve uncertain but favorable political outcomes for the Islamists.
Rice’s trip to India now becomes the crucial next step. She wants Indian restraint. She does not want the western Pakistani border to collapse. But she cannot guarantee what India must have: assurance of no further terror attacks on India originating in Pakistan. Without that, India must do something. No Indian government could survive without some kind of action. So it is up to Rice, in one of her last acts as secretary of state, to come up with a miraculous solution to head off a final, catastrophic crisis for the Bush administration — and a defining first crisis for the new Obama administration. Former U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld once said that the enemy gets a vote. The Islamists cast their ballot in Mumbai.
Taken from Stratfor.com
Tuesday, October 7, 2008
Renunciation and Rebirth
Renunciation and Rebirth
In regard to the last of the above, it may seem to many that the ultimate requirement-to give up one's self and one's life -represents a kind of cruelty on the part of God or fate, which makes our existence a sort of bad joke and which can never be completely accepted, This attitude is particularly true in present-day Western culture, in which the self is held sacred and death is considered an unspeakable insult. Yet the exact opposite is the reality, It is in the giving up of self that human beings can find the most ecstatic and, lasting, solid, durable joy of life. And it is death that provides life with all its meaning. This "secret" is the central wisdom of religion.
The process of giving up the self (which is related to the phenomenon of love, as will be discussed in the next section of this book) is for most of us a gradual process which we get into by a series of fits and starts. One form of temporary giving up of the self deserves special mention because its practice is an absolute requirement for significant learning during adulthood, and therefore for significant growth of the human spirit. I am referring to a subtype of the discipline of balancing which I call "bracketing." Bracketing is essentially the act of balancing the need for stability and assertion of the self with the need for new knowledge and greater understanding by temporarily giving up one's self-putting one's self aside, so to speak-so as to make room for the incorporation of new material into the self.
The discipline of bracketing illustrates the most consequential fact of giving up and of discipline in general: namely, that for all that is given up even more is gained, Self-discipline is a self-enlarging process. The pain of giving up is the pain of death, but death of the old is birth of the new. The pain of death is the pain of birth, and the pain of birth is the pain of death. For us to develop a new and better idea, concept, theory or understanding means that an old idea, concept, theory or understanding must die.
This lifetime is a series of simultaneous deaths and births. "Throughout the whole of life one must continue to learn to live," said Seneca two millennia ago, "and what will amaze you even more, throughout life one must learn to die. "t It is also clear that the farther one travels on the journey of life, the more births one will experience, and therefore the more deaths, the more joy and the more pain.
This raises the question of whether it is ever possible to become free from emotional pain in this life. Or, putting it more mildly, is it possible to spiritually evolve to a level of consciousness at which the pain of living is at least diminished? The answer is yes and no. The answer is yes, because once suffering is completely accepted, it ceases in a sense to be suffering. It is also yes because the unceasing practice of discipline leads to mastery, and the spiritually evolved person is masterful in the same sense that the adult is masterful in relation to the child. Matters that present great problems for the child and cause it great pain may be of no consequence to the adult at all. Finally, the answer is yes because the spiritually evolved individual is, as will be elaborated in the next section, an extraordinarily loving individual, and with his or her extraordinary love comes extraordinary joy.
The answer is no, however, because there is a vacuum of competence in the world which must be filled. In a world crying out in desperate need for competence, an extraordinarily competent and loving person can no more withhold his or her competence than such a person could deny food to a' hungry infant. Spiritually evolved people, by virtue of their discipline, mastery and love, are people of extraordinary competence, and in their competence they are called on to serve the world, and in their love they answer the call. They are inevitably, therefore, people of great power, although the world may generally behold them as quite ordinary people, since more often than not they will exercise their power in quiet or even hidden ways. Nonetheless, exercise power they do, and in this exercise they suffer greatly, even dreadfully. For to exercise power is to make decisions, and the process of making decisions with total awareness is often infinitely more painful than making decisions with limited or blunted awareness (which is the way most decisions are made and why they are ultimately proved wrong). Imagine two generals, each having to decide whether or not to commit a division of ten thousand men to battle. To one the division is but a thing, a unit of personnel, an instrument of strategy and nothing more. To the other it is these things, but he is also aware of each and everyone of the ten thousand lives and the lives of the families of each of the ten thousand. For whom is the decision easier? It is easier for the general who has blunted his awareness precisely because he cannot tolerate the pain of a more nearly complete awareness. It may be tempting to say, "Ah, but a spiritually evolved man would never become a general in the first place." But the same issue is involved in being a corporation president, a physician, a teacher, a parent. Decisions affecting the lives of others must always be made. The best decision-makers are those who are willing to suffer the most over their decisions but still retain their ability to be decisive. One measure-and perhaps the best measure-of a person's greatness is the capacity for suffering. Yet the great are also joyful.
So if your goal is to avoid pain and escape suffering, I would not advise you to seek higher levels of consciousness or spiritual evolution. First, you cannot achieve them without suffering, and second, insofar as you do achieve them, you are likely to be called on to serve in ways more painful to you, or at least demanding of you, than you can now imagine. Then why desire to evolve at all, you may ask. If you ask this question, perhaps you do not know enough of joy. Perhaps you may find an answer in the remainder of this book; perhaps you will not.
A final word on the discipline of balancing and its essence of giving up: you must have something in order to give it up. You cannot give up anything you have not already gotten. If you give up winning without ever having won, you are where you were at the beginning: a loser. You must forge for yourself an identity before you can give it up. You must develop an ego before you can lose it. This may seem incredibly elementary, but I think it is necessary to say it, since there are many people I know who possess a vision of evolution yet seem to lack the will for it. They want, and believe it is possible, to skip over the discipline, to find an easy short-cut to sainthood. Often they attempt to attain it by simply imitating the superficialities of saints, retiring to the desert or taking up carpentry. Some even believe that by such imitation they have really become saints and' prophets, and are unable to acknowledge that they are still children and face the painful fact that they must start at the beginning and go through the middle.
Discipline has been defined as a system of techniques of dealing constructively with the pain of problem-solving instead of avoiding that pain-in such a way that all of life's problems can be solved. Four basic techniques have been distinguished and elaborated: delaying gratification, assumption of responsibility, dedication to the truth or reality, and balancing. Discipline is a system of techniques, because these techniques are very much interrelated. In a single act one may utilize two, three or even all of the techniques at the same, time and in such a way that they may be distinguishable from each other.
Taken from M. Scott Peck, The Road Less Traveled
In regard to the last of the above, it may seem to many that the ultimate requirement-to give up one's self and one's life -represents a kind of cruelty on the part of God or fate, which makes our existence a sort of bad joke and which can never be completely accepted, This attitude is particularly true in present-day Western culture, in which the self is held sacred and death is considered an unspeakable insult. Yet the exact opposite is the reality, It is in the giving up of self that human beings can find the most ecstatic and, lasting, solid, durable joy of life. And it is death that provides life with all its meaning. This "secret" is the central wisdom of religion.
The process of giving up the self (which is related to the phenomenon of love, as will be discussed in the next section of this book) is for most of us a gradual process which we get into by a series of fits and starts. One form of temporary giving up of the self deserves special mention because its practice is an absolute requirement for significant learning during adulthood, and therefore for significant growth of the human spirit. I am referring to a subtype of the discipline of balancing which I call "bracketing." Bracketing is essentially the act of balancing the need for stability and assertion of the self with the need for new knowledge and greater understanding by temporarily giving up one's self-putting one's self aside, so to speak-so as to make room for the incorporation of new material into the self.
The discipline of bracketing illustrates the most consequential fact of giving up and of discipline in general: namely, that for all that is given up even more is gained, Self-discipline is a self-enlarging process. The pain of giving up is the pain of death, but death of the old is birth of the new. The pain of death is the pain of birth, and the pain of birth is the pain of death. For us to develop a new and better idea, concept, theory or understanding means that an old idea, concept, theory or understanding must die.
This lifetime is a series of simultaneous deaths and births. "Throughout the whole of life one must continue to learn to live," said Seneca two millennia ago, "and what will amaze you even more, throughout life one must learn to die. "t It is also clear that the farther one travels on the journey of life, the more births one will experience, and therefore the more deaths, the more joy and the more pain.
This raises the question of whether it is ever possible to become free from emotional pain in this life. Or, putting it more mildly, is it possible to spiritually evolve to a level of consciousness at which the pain of living is at least diminished? The answer is yes and no. The answer is yes, because once suffering is completely accepted, it ceases in a sense to be suffering. It is also yes because the unceasing practice of discipline leads to mastery, and the spiritually evolved person is masterful in the same sense that the adult is masterful in relation to the child. Matters that present great problems for the child and cause it great pain may be of no consequence to the adult at all. Finally, the answer is yes because the spiritually evolved individual is, as will be elaborated in the next section, an extraordinarily loving individual, and with his or her extraordinary love comes extraordinary joy.
The answer is no, however, because there is a vacuum of competence in the world which must be filled. In a world crying out in desperate need for competence, an extraordinarily competent and loving person can no more withhold his or her competence than such a person could deny food to a' hungry infant. Spiritually evolved people, by virtue of their discipline, mastery and love, are people of extraordinary competence, and in their competence they are called on to serve the world, and in their love they answer the call. They are inevitably, therefore, people of great power, although the world may generally behold them as quite ordinary people, since more often than not they will exercise their power in quiet or even hidden ways. Nonetheless, exercise power they do, and in this exercise they suffer greatly, even dreadfully. For to exercise power is to make decisions, and the process of making decisions with total awareness is often infinitely more painful than making decisions with limited or blunted awareness (which is the way most decisions are made and why they are ultimately proved wrong). Imagine two generals, each having to decide whether or not to commit a division of ten thousand men to battle. To one the division is but a thing, a unit of personnel, an instrument of strategy and nothing more. To the other it is these things, but he is also aware of each and everyone of the ten thousand lives and the lives of the families of each of the ten thousand. For whom is the decision easier? It is easier for the general who has blunted his awareness precisely because he cannot tolerate the pain of a more nearly complete awareness. It may be tempting to say, "Ah, but a spiritually evolved man would never become a general in the first place." But the same issue is involved in being a corporation president, a physician, a teacher, a parent. Decisions affecting the lives of others must always be made. The best decision-makers are those who are willing to suffer the most over their decisions but still retain their ability to be decisive. One measure-and perhaps the best measure-of a person's greatness is the capacity for suffering. Yet the great are also joyful.
So if your goal is to avoid pain and escape suffering, I would not advise you to seek higher levels of consciousness or spiritual evolution. First, you cannot achieve them without suffering, and second, insofar as you do achieve them, you are likely to be called on to serve in ways more painful to you, or at least demanding of you, than you can now imagine. Then why desire to evolve at all, you may ask. If you ask this question, perhaps you do not know enough of joy. Perhaps you may find an answer in the remainder of this book; perhaps you will not.
A final word on the discipline of balancing and its essence of giving up: you must have something in order to give it up. You cannot give up anything you have not already gotten. If you give up winning without ever having won, you are where you were at the beginning: a loser. You must forge for yourself an identity before you can give it up. You must develop an ego before you can lose it. This may seem incredibly elementary, but I think it is necessary to say it, since there are many people I know who possess a vision of evolution yet seem to lack the will for it. They want, and believe it is possible, to skip over the discipline, to find an easy short-cut to sainthood. Often they attempt to attain it by simply imitating the superficialities of saints, retiring to the desert or taking up carpentry. Some even believe that by such imitation they have really become saints and' prophets, and are unable to acknowledge that they are still children and face the painful fact that they must start at the beginning and go through the middle.
Discipline has been defined as a system of techniques of dealing constructively with the pain of problem-solving instead of avoiding that pain-in such a way that all of life's problems can be solved. Four basic techniques have been distinguished and elaborated: delaying gratification, assumption of responsibility, dedication to the truth or reality, and balancing. Discipline is a system of techniques, because these techniques are very much interrelated. In a single act one may utilize two, three or even all of the techniques at the same, time and in such a way that they may be distinguishable from each other.
Taken from M. Scott Peck, The Road Less Traveled
Healthiness of Depression
The Healthiness of Depression
The foregoing is a minor example of what those people with the courage to call themselves patients must go through in more, major ways, and often many times, in the process of psychotherapy. The period of intensive psychotherapy is a period of intensive growth, during which the patient may undergo more changes than some people experience in a lifetime. For this growth spurt to occur, a proportionate amount of "the old self' must be given up. It is an inevitable part of successful psychotherapy. In fact, this process of giving up usually begins before the patient has his first appointment with the psychotherapist. Frequently, for instance, the act of deciding to seek psychiatric attention in itself represents a giving up of the self-image "I'm OK." This giving up may be particularly difficult for males in our culture for whom "I'm not OK and I need assistance to understand why I'm not OK and how to become OK" is frequently and sadly equated with "I'm weak, unmasculine and inadequate."
Recently we have been hearing of the "mid-life crisis." Actually, this is but one of many "crises," or critical stages of development, in life, as Erik Erikson taught us thirty years ago. (Erikson delineated eight crises; perhaps there are more.) What makes crises of these transition periods in the life cycle -that is, problematic and painful-is that in successfully working our way through them we must give up cherished notions and old ways of doing and looking at things. 'Many people are either unwilling or unable to suffer the pain of 'l giving up the outgrown which needs to be forsaken. Consequently they cling, often forever, to their old patterns of thinking and behaving, thus failing to negotiate any crisis, to truly grow up, and to experience the joyful sense of rebirth that accompanies the successful transition into greater maturity. Although an entire book could be written about each one, let me simply list, roughly in order of their occurrence, some of the major conditions, desires and attitudes that must be given up in the course of a wholly successful evolving lifetime:
The state of infancy, in which no external demands need be responded to
The fantasy of omnipotence
The desire for total (including sexual) possession of one's parents
The dependency of childhood Distorted images of one's parents
The omnipotentiality of adolescence
The "freedom" of uncommitment
The agility of youth
The sexual attractiveness and/or potency of youth
The fantasy of immortality
Authority over one's children
Various forms of temporal power
The independence of physical health
And ultimately the self and life itself.
Taken from M. Scott Peck, The Road Less Traveled
The foregoing is a minor example of what those people with the courage to call themselves patients must go through in more, major ways, and often many times, in the process of psychotherapy. The period of intensive psychotherapy is a period of intensive growth, during which the patient may undergo more changes than some people experience in a lifetime. For this growth spurt to occur, a proportionate amount of "the old self' must be given up. It is an inevitable part of successful psychotherapy. In fact, this process of giving up usually begins before the patient has his first appointment with the psychotherapist. Frequently, for instance, the act of deciding to seek psychiatric attention in itself represents a giving up of the self-image "I'm OK." This giving up may be particularly difficult for males in our culture for whom "I'm not OK and I need assistance to understand why I'm not OK and how to become OK" is frequently and sadly equated with "I'm weak, unmasculine and inadequate."
Recently we have been hearing of the "mid-life crisis." Actually, this is but one of many "crises," or critical stages of development, in life, as Erik Erikson taught us thirty years ago. (Erikson delineated eight crises; perhaps there are more.) What makes crises of these transition periods in the life cycle -that is, problematic and painful-is that in successfully working our way through them we must give up cherished notions and old ways of doing and looking at things. 'Many people are either unwilling or unable to suffer the pain of 'l giving up the outgrown which needs to be forsaken. Consequently they cling, often forever, to their old patterns of thinking and behaving, thus failing to negotiate any crisis, to truly grow up, and to experience the joyful sense of rebirth that accompanies the successful transition into greater maturity. Although an entire book could be written about each one, let me simply list, roughly in order of their occurrence, some of the major conditions, desires and attitudes that must be given up in the course of a wholly successful evolving lifetime:
The state of infancy, in which no external demands need be responded to
The fantasy of omnipotence
The desire for total (including sexual) possession of one's parents
The dependency of childhood Distorted images of one's parents
The omnipotentiality of adolescence
The "freedom" of uncommitment
The agility of youth
The sexual attractiveness and/or potency of youth
The fantasy of immortality
Authority over one's children
Various forms of temporal power
The independence of physical health
And ultimately the self and life itself.
Taken from M. Scott Peck, The Road Less Traveled
Balancing
Balancing
By this time I hope it is becoming clear that the exercise of discipline is not only a demanding but also a complex task, requiring both flexibility and judgment. Courageous people must continually push themselves to be completely honest, yet must also possess the capacity to withhold the whole truth when appropriate. To be free people we must assume total responsibility for ourselves, but in doing so must possess the capacity to reject responsibility that is not truly ours. To be organized and efficient, to live wisely, we must daily delay gratification and keep an eye on the future; yet to live joyously we must also possess the capacity, when it is not destructive, to live in the present and act spontaneously. In other words, discipline itself must be disciplined. The type of discipline required to discipline discipline is what I call balancing, and it is the fourth and final type that I would like to discuss here.
Balancing is the discipline that gives us flexibility. Extraordinary flexibility is required for successful living in all spheres of activity. To use but one example, let us consider the matter of anger and its expression. Anger is an emotion bred into us (and into less evolved organisms) by countless generations of evolution in order that our survival may be encouraged. We experience anger whenever we perceive another organism attempting to encroach upon our geographical or psychological territory or trying, one way or another, to put us down. It leads us to fight back. Without our anger we would indeed be continually stepped on, until we were totally squashed and exterminated. Only with anger can we survive. Yet, more often than not, when we initially perceive others as attempting to encroach on us, we realize upon closer examination that that is not what they intend to do at all. Or even when we determine that people are truly intending to encroach on us, we may realize that, for one reason or another, it is not in our best interests to respond to that imposition with anger. Thus it is necessary that the higher centers of our brain (judgment) be able to regulate and modulate the lower centers (emotion). To function successfully in our complex world it is necessary for us to possess the capacity not only to express our anger but also not to express it. Moreover, we must possess the capacity to express our anger in different ways. At times, for instance, it is necessary to express it only after much deliberation and self-evaluation. At other times it is more to our benefit to express it immediately and spontaneously. Sometimes it is best to express it coldly and calmly; at other times loudly and hotly. We therefore not only need to know how to deal with our anger in different ways at different times but also how most appropriately to match the right time with the right style of expression. To handle our anger with full adequacy and competence, an elaborate, flexible response system is required. It is no wonder, then, that to learn to handle our anger is a complex task which usually cannot be completed before adulthood, or even mid-life, and which often is never completed.
Mature mental health demands, then, an extraordinary capacity to flexibly strike and continually restrike a delicate balance between conflicting needs, goals, duties, responsibilities, directions, et cetera. The essence of this discipline of balancing is "giving up." Balancing is a discipline precisely because the act of giving something up is painful.
Taken from M. Scott Peck, The Road Less Traveled
By this time I hope it is becoming clear that the exercise of discipline is not only a demanding but also a complex task, requiring both flexibility and judgment. Courageous people must continually push themselves to be completely honest, yet must also possess the capacity to withhold the whole truth when appropriate. To be free people we must assume total responsibility for ourselves, but in doing so must possess the capacity to reject responsibility that is not truly ours. To be organized and efficient, to live wisely, we must daily delay gratification and keep an eye on the future; yet to live joyously we must also possess the capacity, when it is not destructive, to live in the present and act spontaneously. In other words, discipline itself must be disciplined. The type of discipline required to discipline discipline is what I call balancing, and it is the fourth and final type that I would like to discuss here.
Balancing is the discipline that gives us flexibility. Extraordinary flexibility is required for successful living in all spheres of activity. To use but one example, let us consider the matter of anger and its expression. Anger is an emotion bred into us (and into less evolved organisms) by countless generations of evolution in order that our survival may be encouraged. We experience anger whenever we perceive another organism attempting to encroach upon our geographical or psychological territory or trying, one way or another, to put us down. It leads us to fight back. Without our anger we would indeed be continually stepped on, until we were totally squashed and exterminated. Only with anger can we survive. Yet, more often than not, when we initially perceive others as attempting to encroach on us, we realize upon closer examination that that is not what they intend to do at all. Or even when we determine that people are truly intending to encroach on us, we may realize that, for one reason or another, it is not in our best interests to respond to that imposition with anger. Thus it is necessary that the higher centers of our brain (judgment) be able to regulate and modulate the lower centers (emotion). To function successfully in our complex world it is necessary for us to possess the capacity not only to express our anger but also not to express it. Moreover, we must possess the capacity to express our anger in different ways. At times, for instance, it is necessary to express it only after much deliberation and self-evaluation. At other times it is more to our benefit to express it immediately and spontaneously. Sometimes it is best to express it coldly and calmly; at other times loudly and hotly. We therefore not only need to know how to deal with our anger in different ways at different times but also how most appropriately to match the right time with the right style of expression. To handle our anger with full adequacy and competence, an elaborate, flexible response system is required. It is no wonder, then, that to learn to handle our anger is a complex task which usually cannot be completed before adulthood, or even mid-life, and which often is never completed.
Mature mental health demands, then, an extraordinary capacity to flexibly strike and continually restrike a delicate balance between conflicting needs, goals, duties, responsibilities, directions, et cetera. The essence of this discipline of balancing is "giving up." Balancing is a discipline precisely because the act of giving something up is painful.
Taken from M. Scott Peck, The Road Less Traveled
Withholding Truth
Withholding Truth
Lying can be divided into two types: white lies and black lies. A black lie is a statement we make that we know is false. A white lie is a statement we make that is not in itself false but that leaves out a significant part of the truth. The fact that a lie is white does not in itself make it any less of a lie or any more excusable. White lies may be every bit as destructive as black ones. A government that withholds essential information from its people by censorship is no more democratic than one that speaks falsely. The patient who neglected to mention that she had overdrawn the family bank account was impeding her growth in therapy no less than if she had lied directly~ Indeed, because it may seem less reprehensible, the withholding of essential information is the most common form of lying, and because it may be the more difficult to detect and confront, it is often even more pernicious than black-lying.
White-lying is considered socially acceptable in many of our relationships because "we don't want to hurt peoples' feelings." Yet we may bemoan the fact that our social relationships are generally superficial. For parents to feed their children a pap of white lies is not only considered acceptable but is thought to be loving and beneficent. Even husbands and wives who have been brave enough to be open with each other find it difficult often to be open with their children.
They do not tell their children that they smoke marijuana, or that they fought with each other the night before concerning their relationship, or that they resent the grandparents for their manipulativeness, or that the doctor has told one or both that they have psychosomatic disorders, or that they are making a risky financial investment or even how much money they have in the bank. Usually such withholding and lack of openness is rationalized on the basis of a loving desire to protect and shield their children from unnecessary worries. Yet more often than not such "protection" is unsuccessful. The children know anyway that Mommy and Daddy smoke pot, that they had a fight the night before, that the grandparents are resented, that Mommy is nervous and that Daddy is losing money. The result, then, is not protection but deprivation. The children are deprived of the knowledge they might gain about money, illness, drugs, sex, marriage, their parents, their grandparents and people in general. They are also deprived of the reassurance they might receive if these topics were discussed more openly. Finally, they are deprived of role models of openness and honesty, and are provided instead with role models of partial honesty, incomplete openness and limited courage. For some parents the desire to "protect" their children is motivated by genuine albeit misguided love. For others, however, the "loving" desire to protect their children serves more as a cover-up and rationalization of a desire to avoid being challenged by their children, and a desire to maintain their authority over them. Such parents are saying in effect, "Look, kids, you go on being children with childish concerns and leave the adult concerns up to us. See us as strong and loving caretakers. Such an image is good for both of us, so don't challenge it. It allows us to feel strong and you to feel safe, and it will be easier for all of us if we don't look into these things too deeply."
Nonetheless, a real conflict may arise when the desire for total honesty is opposed by the needs of some people for certain kinds of protection. For instance, even parents with excellent marriages may occasionally consider divorce as one of their possible options, but to inform their children of this at a time when they are not at all likely to opt for divorce is to place an unnecessary burden upon the children. The idea of divorce is extremely threatening to a child's sense of security -indeed, so threatening that children do not have the capacity to perceive it with much perspective. They are seriously threatened by the possibility of divorce even when it is remote. If their parents' marriage is definitely on the rocks, then children will be dealing with the threatening possibility of divorce whether or not their parents talk about it. But if the marriage is basically sound, parents woul.d indeed be doing their children a disservice if they said with complete openness, "Mommy and Daddy were talking last night about getting a divorce, but we're not at all serious about it at this time." As another instance, it is frequently necessary for psychotherapists to withhold their own thoughts, opinions and insights from patients in the earlier stages of psychotherapy because the patients are not yet ready to receive or deal with them. During my first year of psychiatric training a patient on his fourth visit to me recounted a dream that obviously expressed a concern with homosexuality. In my desire to appear t9 be a brilliant therapist and make rapid progress I told him, "Your dream indicates that you are concerned with worries that you might be homosexual." He grew visibly anxious, and he did not keep his next three appointments. Only with a good deal of work and an even greater amount of luck was I able to persuade him to return to therapy. We had another twenty sessions before he had to move from the area because of a business reassignment. These sessions were of considerable benefit to him despite the fact that we never again raised the issue of homosexuality. The fact that his unconscious was concerned with the issue did not mean that he was at all ready to deal with it on a conscious level, and by not withholding my insight from him I did him a grave disservice, almost losing him not only as my patient but as anyone's patient.
So the expression of opinions, feelings, ideas and even knowledge must be suppressed from time to time in these and many other circumstances in the course of human affairs. What rules, then, can one follow if one is dedicated to the truth? First, never speak falsehood. Second, bear in mind that the act of withholding the truth is always potentially a lie, and that in each instance in which the truth is withheld a significant moral decision is required. Third, the decision to withhold the truth should never be based on personal needs, such as a need for power, a need to be liked or a need to protect one's map from challenge. Fourth, and conversely, the decision to withhold the truth must always be based entirely upon the needs of the person or people from whom the truth is being withheld. Fifth, the assessment of another's needs is an act of responsibility which is so complex that it can only be executed wisely when one operates with genuine love for the other. Sixth, the primary factor in the assessment of another's needs is the assessment of that person's capacity to utilize the truth for his or her own spiritual growth. Finally, in assessing the capacity of another to utilize the truth for personal spiritual growth, it should be borne in mind that our tendency is generally to underestimate rather than overestimate this capacity.
All this might seem like an extraordinary task, impossible to ever perfectly complete, a chronic and never-ending burden, a real drag. And it is indeed a never-ending burden of self-discipline, which is why most people opt for a life of very limited honesty and openness and relative closedness, hiding themselves and their maps from the world. It is easier that way. Yet the rewards of the difficult life of honesty and dedication to the truth are more than commensurate with the demands. By virtue of the fact that their maps are continually being challenged, open people are continually growing people. Through their openness they can establish and maintain intimate relationships far more effectively than more closed people. Because they never speak falsely they can be secure and proud in the knowledge that they have done nothing to contribute to the confusion of the world, but have served as sources of illumination and clarification. Finally, they are totally free to be. They are not burdened by any need to hide. They do not have to slink around in the shadows. They do not have to construct new lies to hide old ones. They need waste no effort covering tracks or maintaining disguises. And ultimately they find that the energy required for the self~ discipline of honesty is far less than the energy required for secretiveness. The more honest one is, the easier it is to continue being honest, just as the more lies one has told, the more necessary it is to lie again. By their openness, people dedicated to the truth live in the open, and through the exercise of their courage to live in the open, they become free from fear.
Taken from M. Scott Peck, The Road Less Traveled
Lying can be divided into two types: white lies and black lies. A black lie is a statement we make that we know is false. A white lie is a statement we make that is not in itself false but that leaves out a significant part of the truth. The fact that a lie is white does not in itself make it any less of a lie or any more excusable. White lies may be every bit as destructive as black ones. A government that withholds essential information from its people by censorship is no more democratic than one that speaks falsely. The patient who neglected to mention that she had overdrawn the family bank account was impeding her growth in therapy no less than if she had lied directly~ Indeed, because it may seem less reprehensible, the withholding of essential information is the most common form of lying, and because it may be the more difficult to detect and confront, it is often even more pernicious than black-lying.
White-lying is considered socially acceptable in many of our relationships because "we don't want to hurt peoples' feelings." Yet we may bemoan the fact that our social relationships are generally superficial. For parents to feed their children a pap of white lies is not only considered acceptable but is thought to be loving and beneficent. Even husbands and wives who have been brave enough to be open with each other find it difficult often to be open with their children.
They do not tell their children that they smoke marijuana, or that they fought with each other the night before concerning their relationship, or that they resent the grandparents for their manipulativeness, or that the doctor has told one or both that they have psychosomatic disorders, or that they are making a risky financial investment or even how much money they have in the bank. Usually such withholding and lack of openness is rationalized on the basis of a loving desire to protect and shield their children from unnecessary worries. Yet more often than not such "protection" is unsuccessful. The children know anyway that Mommy and Daddy smoke pot, that they had a fight the night before, that the grandparents are resented, that Mommy is nervous and that Daddy is losing money. The result, then, is not protection but deprivation. The children are deprived of the knowledge they might gain about money, illness, drugs, sex, marriage, their parents, their grandparents and people in general. They are also deprived of the reassurance they might receive if these topics were discussed more openly. Finally, they are deprived of role models of openness and honesty, and are provided instead with role models of partial honesty, incomplete openness and limited courage. For some parents the desire to "protect" their children is motivated by genuine albeit misguided love. For others, however, the "loving" desire to protect their children serves more as a cover-up and rationalization of a desire to avoid being challenged by their children, and a desire to maintain their authority over them. Such parents are saying in effect, "Look, kids, you go on being children with childish concerns and leave the adult concerns up to us. See us as strong and loving caretakers. Such an image is good for both of us, so don't challenge it. It allows us to feel strong and you to feel safe, and it will be easier for all of us if we don't look into these things too deeply."
Nonetheless, a real conflict may arise when the desire for total honesty is opposed by the needs of some people for certain kinds of protection. For instance, even parents with excellent marriages may occasionally consider divorce as one of their possible options, but to inform their children of this at a time when they are not at all likely to opt for divorce is to place an unnecessary burden upon the children. The idea of divorce is extremely threatening to a child's sense of security -indeed, so threatening that children do not have the capacity to perceive it with much perspective. They are seriously threatened by the possibility of divorce even when it is remote. If their parents' marriage is definitely on the rocks, then children will be dealing with the threatening possibility of divorce whether or not their parents talk about it. But if the marriage is basically sound, parents woul.d indeed be doing their children a disservice if they said with complete openness, "Mommy and Daddy were talking last night about getting a divorce, but we're not at all serious about it at this time." As another instance, it is frequently necessary for psychotherapists to withhold their own thoughts, opinions and insights from patients in the earlier stages of psychotherapy because the patients are not yet ready to receive or deal with them. During my first year of psychiatric training a patient on his fourth visit to me recounted a dream that obviously expressed a concern with homosexuality. In my desire to appear t9 be a brilliant therapist and make rapid progress I told him, "Your dream indicates that you are concerned with worries that you might be homosexual." He grew visibly anxious, and he did not keep his next three appointments. Only with a good deal of work and an even greater amount of luck was I able to persuade him to return to therapy. We had another twenty sessions before he had to move from the area because of a business reassignment. These sessions were of considerable benefit to him despite the fact that we never again raised the issue of homosexuality. The fact that his unconscious was concerned with the issue did not mean that he was at all ready to deal with it on a conscious level, and by not withholding my insight from him I did him a grave disservice, almost losing him not only as my patient but as anyone's patient.
So the expression of opinions, feelings, ideas and even knowledge must be suppressed from time to time in these and many other circumstances in the course of human affairs. What rules, then, can one follow if one is dedicated to the truth? First, never speak falsehood. Second, bear in mind that the act of withholding the truth is always potentially a lie, and that in each instance in which the truth is withheld a significant moral decision is required. Third, the decision to withhold the truth should never be based on personal needs, such as a need for power, a need to be liked or a need to protect one's map from challenge. Fourth, and conversely, the decision to withhold the truth must always be based entirely upon the needs of the person or people from whom the truth is being withheld. Fifth, the assessment of another's needs is an act of responsibility which is so complex that it can only be executed wisely when one operates with genuine love for the other. Sixth, the primary factor in the assessment of another's needs is the assessment of that person's capacity to utilize the truth for his or her own spiritual growth. Finally, in assessing the capacity of another to utilize the truth for personal spiritual growth, it should be borne in mind that our tendency is generally to underestimate rather than overestimate this capacity.
All this might seem like an extraordinary task, impossible to ever perfectly complete, a chronic and never-ending burden, a real drag. And it is indeed a never-ending burden of self-discipline, which is why most people opt for a life of very limited honesty and openness and relative closedness, hiding themselves and their maps from the world. It is easier that way. Yet the rewards of the difficult life of honesty and dedication to the truth are more than commensurate with the demands. By virtue of the fact that their maps are continually being challenged, open people are continually growing people. Through their openness they can establish and maintain intimate relationships far more effectively than more closed people. Because they never speak falsely they can be secure and proud in the knowledge that they have done nothing to contribute to the confusion of the world, but have served as sources of illumination and clarification. Finally, they are totally free to be. They are not burdened by any need to hide. They do not have to slink around in the shadows. They do not have to construct new lies to hide old ones. They need waste no effort covering tracks or maintaining disguises. And ultimately they find that the energy required for the self~ discipline of honesty is far less than the energy required for secretiveness. The more honest one is, the easier it is to continue being honest, just as the more lies one has told, the more necessary it is to lie again. By their openness, people dedicated to the truth live in the open, and through the exercise of their courage to live in the open, they become free from fear.
Taken from M. Scott Peck, The Road Less Traveled
Sunday, October 5, 2008
Dedication to the Truth
Dedication to the Truth
The third tool of discipline or technique of dealing with the pain of problem-solving, which must continually be employed if our lives are to be healthy and our spirits are to grow, is dedication to the truth. Superficially, this should be obvious. For truth is reality. That which is false is unreal. The more clearly we see the reality of the world, the better equipped we are to deal with the world. The less clearly we see the reality of the world--the more our minds are befuddled by falsehood, misperceptions and illusions--the less able we will be to determine correct courses of action and make wise decisions. Our view of reality is like a map with which to negotiate the terrain of life. If the map is true and, accurate, we will generally know where we are, and if we have decided where we want to go, we will generally know how to get there. If the map is false and inaccurate, we generally will be lost.
While this is obvious, it is something that most people to a greater or lesser degree choose to ignore. They ignore it because our route to reality is not easy. First of all, we are not born with maps; we have to make them, and the making requires effort. The more effort we make to appreciate and perceive reality, the larger and more accurate our maps will be. But many 'do not want to make this effort. Some stop making it by the end of adolescence. Their maps are small and sketchy, their views of the world narrow and misleading.
By the end of middle age most people have given up the effort. They feel certain that their maps are complete and their Weltanschauung is correct (indeed, even sacrosanct), and they are no longer interested in new information. It is as if they are tired. Only a relative and fortunate few continue until the moment of death exploring the mystery of reality, ever enlarging and refining and redefining their understanding of the world and what is true.
But the biggest problem of map-making is not that we have to start from scratch, but that if our maps are to be accurate we have to continually revise them. The world itself is constantly changing. Glaciers come, glaciers go. Cultures come, cultures go. There is too little technology, there is too much technology. Even more dramatically, the vantage point from which we view the world is constantly and quite rapidly changing. When we are children we are dependent, powerless. As adults we may be powerful. Yet in illness or an infirm old age we may become powerless and dependent again. When we have children to care for, the world looks different. from when we have none; when we are raising infants, the world seems different from when we are raising adolescents. When we are poor, the world looks different from when we are rich. We are daily bombarded with new information as to the nature of reality. If we are to incorporate this information, we must continually revise our maps, and sometimes when enough new information has accumulated, we must make very major revisions. The process of making revisions, particularly major revisions, is painful, sometimes excruciatingly painful. And herein lies the major source of many of the ills of mankind.
What happens when one has striven long and hard to develop a working view of the world, a seemingly useful, workable map, and then is confronted with new information suggesting that that view is wrong and the map needs to be largely redrawn? The painful effort required seems frightening, almost overwhelming. What we do more often than not, and usually unconsciously, is to ignore the new information.
Often this act of ignoring is much more than passive. We may denounce the new information as false, dangerous, heretical, the work of the devil. We may actually crusade against it, and even attempt to manipulate the world so as to make it conform to our view of reality. Rather than try to change the map, an individual may try to destroy the new reality. Sadly, such a person may expend much more energy ultimately in defending an outmoded view of the world than would have been required to revise and correct it in the first place.
Transference: The Outdated Map
This process of active clinging to an outmoded view of reality is the basis for much mental illness. Psychiatrists refer to it as transference. There are probably as many subtle variations of, the definition of transference as there are psychiatrists. My own definition is: Transference is that set of ways of perceiving and responding to the world which is developed in childhood and which is usually entirely appropriate to the childhood environment (indeed, often life-saving) but which is inappropriately transferred into the adult environment.
When problems of transference are involved, as they usually are, psychotherapy is, among other things, a process of map-revising. Patients come to therapy because their maps are clearly not working. But how they may cling to them and fight the process every step of the way! Frequently their need to cling to their maps and fight against losing them is so great that therapy becomes impossible.
Truth or reality is avoided when it is painful. We can revise our maps only when we have the discipline to overcome that pain. To have such discipline, we must be totally dedicated to truth. That is to say that we must always hold truth, as best we can determine it, to be more important, more vital to our self-interest, than our comfort. Conversely, we must always consider our personal discomfort relatively unimportant and, indeed, even welcome it in the service of the search for truth. Mental health is an ongoing process of dedication to reality at all costs.
Openness to Challenge
What does a life of total dedication to the truth mean? It means, first of all, a life of continuous and never-ending stringent self-examination. We know the world only through our relationship to it. Therefore, to know the world, we must not only examine it but we must simultaneously examine the examiner. Psychiatrists are taught this in their training and know that it is impossible to realistically understand the conflicts and transferences of their patients without understanding their own transferences and conflicts. For this reason psychiatrists are encouraged to receive their own psychotherapy or psychoanalysis as part of their training and development. Unfortunately, not all psychiatrists respond to this encouragement. There are many, psychiatrists among them, who stringently examine the world but not so stringently examine themselves. They may be competent individuals as the world judges competence, but they are never wise. The life of wisdom must be a life of contemplation combined with action. In the past in American culture, contemplation has not been held in high regard. In the 1950s people labeled Adlai Stevenson an "egghead" and believed he would not make a good President precisely because he was a contemplative man, given to deep thinking and self-doubts. I have heard parents tell their adolescent children in all seriousness, "You think too much." What an absurdity this is, given the fact that it is our frontal lobes; our capacity to think and to examine ourselves that most makes us human. Fortunately, such attitudes seem to be changing, and we are beginning to realize that the sources of danger to the world lie more within us than
outside, and that the process of constant self-examination and contemplation is essential for ultimate survival. Still, I am talking of relatively small numbers of people who are changing their attitudes. Examination of the world without is never as personally painful as examination of the world within, and it is certainly because of the pain involved in a life of genuine self-examination that the majority steer away from it. Yet when one is dedicated to the truth this pain seems relatively unimportant-and less and less important (and therefore less and less painful) the farther one proceeds on the path of self-examination.
A life of total dedication to the truth also means a life of willingness to be personally challenged. The only way that we can be certain that our map of reality is valid is to expose it to the criticism and challenge of other map-makers. Otherwise we live in a closed system--within a bell jar, to use Sylvia Plath's analogy, rebreathing only our own fetid air, more and more subject to delusion. Yet, because of the pain inherent in the process of revising our map of reality, we mostly seek to avoid or ward off any challenges to its validity. To our children we say, "Don't talk back to me, I'm your parent." To our spouse we give the message, "Let's live and let live. If you criticize me, I'll be a bitch to live with, and you'll regret it." To their families and the world the elderly give the message, "I am old and fragile. If you challenge me I may die or at least you will bear upon your head the responsibility for making my last days on earth miserable." To our employees we communicate, "If you are bold enough to challenge me at all, you had best do so very circumspectly indeed or else you'll find yourself looking for another job."
The tendency to avoid challenge is so omnipresent in human beings that it can properly be considered a characteristic of human nature. But calling it natural does not mean it is essential or beneficial or unchangeable behavior. It is also natural to defecate in our pants and never brush our teeth. Yet we teach ourselves to do the unnatural until the unnatural becomes itself second nature. Indeed, all self-discipline might be defined as teaching ourselves to do the unnatural. Another characteristic of human nature--perhaps the one that makes us most human--is our capacity to do the unnatural, to transcend and hence transform our own nature.
For individuals and organizations to be open to challenge, it is necessary that their maps of reality be truly open for inspection by the public. More than press conferences are required. The, third thing that a life of total dedication to the truth means, therefore, is a life of total honesty. It means a continuous and never-ending process of self-monitoring to assure that our communications--not only the words that we say but also the way we say them--invariably reflect as accurately as humanly possible the truth or reality as we know it.
Taken from The Road Less Traveled by M. Scott Peck
The third tool of discipline or technique of dealing with the pain of problem-solving, which must continually be employed if our lives are to be healthy and our spirits are to grow, is dedication to the truth. Superficially, this should be obvious. For truth is reality. That which is false is unreal. The more clearly we see the reality of the world, the better equipped we are to deal with the world. The less clearly we see the reality of the world--the more our minds are befuddled by falsehood, misperceptions and illusions--the less able we will be to determine correct courses of action and make wise decisions. Our view of reality is like a map with which to negotiate the terrain of life. If the map is true and, accurate, we will generally know where we are, and if we have decided where we want to go, we will generally know how to get there. If the map is false and inaccurate, we generally will be lost.
While this is obvious, it is something that most people to a greater or lesser degree choose to ignore. They ignore it because our route to reality is not easy. First of all, we are not born with maps; we have to make them, and the making requires effort. The more effort we make to appreciate and perceive reality, the larger and more accurate our maps will be. But many 'do not want to make this effort. Some stop making it by the end of adolescence. Their maps are small and sketchy, their views of the world narrow and misleading.
By the end of middle age most people have given up the effort. They feel certain that their maps are complete and their Weltanschauung is correct (indeed, even sacrosanct), and they are no longer interested in new information. It is as if they are tired. Only a relative and fortunate few continue until the moment of death exploring the mystery of reality, ever enlarging and refining and redefining their understanding of the world and what is true.
But the biggest problem of map-making is not that we have to start from scratch, but that if our maps are to be accurate we have to continually revise them. The world itself is constantly changing. Glaciers come, glaciers go. Cultures come, cultures go. There is too little technology, there is too much technology. Even more dramatically, the vantage point from which we view the world is constantly and quite rapidly changing. When we are children we are dependent, powerless. As adults we may be powerful. Yet in illness or an infirm old age we may become powerless and dependent again. When we have children to care for, the world looks different. from when we have none; when we are raising infants, the world seems different from when we are raising adolescents. When we are poor, the world looks different from when we are rich. We are daily bombarded with new information as to the nature of reality. If we are to incorporate this information, we must continually revise our maps, and sometimes when enough new information has accumulated, we must make very major revisions. The process of making revisions, particularly major revisions, is painful, sometimes excruciatingly painful. And herein lies the major source of many of the ills of mankind.
What happens when one has striven long and hard to develop a working view of the world, a seemingly useful, workable map, and then is confronted with new information suggesting that that view is wrong and the map needs to be largely redrawn? The painful effort required seems frightening, almost overwhelming. What we do more often than not, and usually unconsciously, is to ignore the new information.
Often this act of ignoring is much more than passive. We may denounce the new information as false, dangerous, heretical, the work of the devil. We may actually crusade against it, and even attempt to manipulate the world so as to make it conform to our view of reality. Rather than try to change the map, an individual may try to destroy the new reality. Sadly, such a person may expend much more energy ultimately in defending an outmoded view of the world than would have been required to revise and correct it in the first place.
Transference: The Outdated Map
This process of active clinging to an outmoded view of reality is the basis for much mental illness. Psychiatrists refer to it as transference. There are probably as many subtle variations of, the definition of transference as there are psychiatrists. My own definition is: Transference is that set of ways of perceiving and responding to the world which is developed in childhood and which is usually entirely appropriate to the childhood environment (indeed, often life-saving) but which is inappropriately transferred into the adult environment.
When problems of transference are involved, as they usually are, psychotherapy is, among other things, a process of map-revising. Patients come to therapy because their maps are clearly not working. But how they may cling to them and fight the process every step of the way! Frequently their need to cling to their maps and fight against losing them is so great that therapy becomes impossible.
Truth or reality is avoided when it is painful. We can revise our maps only when we have the discipline to overcome that pain. To have such discipline, we must be totally dedicated to truth. That is to say that we must always hold truth, as best we can determine it, to be more important, more vital to our self-interest, than our comfort. Conversely, we must always consider our personal discomfort relatively unimportant and, indeed, even welcome it in the service of the search for truth. Mental health is an ongoing process of dedication to reality at all costs.
Openness to Challenge
What does a life of total dedication to the truth mean? It means, first of all, a life of continuous and never-ending stringent self-examination. We know the world only through our relationship to it. Therefore, to know the world, we must not only examine it but we must simultaneously examine the examiner. Psychiatrists are taught this in their training and know that it is impossible to realistically understand the conflicts and transferences of their patients without understanding their own transferences and conflicts. For this reason psychiatrists are encouraged to receive their own psychotherapy or psychoanalysis as part of their training and development. Unfortunately, not all psychiatrists respond to this encouragement. There are many, psychiatrists among them, who stringently examine the world but not so stringently examine themselves. They may be competent individuals as the world judges competence, but they are never wise. The life of wisdom must be a life of contemplation combined with action. In the past in American culture, contemplation has not been held in high regard. In the 1950s people labeled Adlai Stevenson an "egghead" and believed he would not make a good President precisely because he was a contemplative man, given to deep thinking and self-doubts. I have heard parents tell their adolescent children in all seriousness, "You think too much." What an absurdity this is, given the fact that it is our frontal lobes; our capacity to think and to examine ourselves that most makes us human. Fortunately, such attitudes seem to be changing, and we are beginning to realize that the sources of danger to the world lie more within us than
outside, and that the process of constant self-examination and contemplation is essential for ultimate survival. Still, I am talking of relatively small numbers of people who are changing their attitudes. Examination of the world without is never as personally painful as examination of the world within, and it is certainly because of the pain involved in a life of genuine self-examination that the majority steer away from it. Yet when one is dedicated to the truth this pain seems relatively unimportant-and less and less important (and therefore less and less painful) the farther one proceeds on the path of self-examination.
A life of total dedication to the truth also means a life of willingness to be personally challenged. The only way that we can be certain that our map of reality is valid is to expose it to the criticism and challenge of other map-makers. Otherwise we live in a closed system--within a bell jar, to use Sylvia Plath's analogy, rebreathing only our own fetid air, more and more subject to delusion. Yet, because of the pain inherent in the process of revising our map of reality, we mostly seek to avoid or ward off any challenges to its validity. To our children we say, "Don't talk back to me, I'm your parent." To our spouse we give the message, "Let's live and let live. If you criticize me, I'll be a bitch to live with, and you'll regret it." To their families and the world the elderly give the message, "I am old and fragile. If you challenge me I may die or at least you will bear upon your head the responsibility for making my last days on earth miserable." To our employees we communicate, "If you are bold enough to challenge me at all, you had best do so very circumspectly indeed or else you'll find yourself looking for another job."
The tendency to avoid challenge is so omnipresent in human beings that it can properly be considered a characteristic of human nature. But calling it natural does not mean it is essential or beneficial or unchangeable behavior. It is also natural to defecate in our pants and never brush our teeth. Yet we teach ourselves to do the unnatural until the unnatural becomes itself second nature. Indeed, all self-discipline might be defined as teaching ourselves to do the unnatural. Another characteristic of human nature--perhaps the one that makes us most human--is our capacity to do the unnatural, to transcend and hence transform our own nature.
For individuals and organizations to be open to challenge, it is necessary that their maps of reality be truly open for inspection by the public. More than press conferences are required. The, third thing that a life of total dedication to the truth means, therefore, is a life of total honesty. It means a continuous and never-ending process of self-monitoring to assure that our communications--not only the words that we say but also the way we say them--invariably reflect as accurately as humanly possible the truth or reality as we know it.
Taken from The Road Less Traveled by M. Scott Peck
Sunday, September 28, 2008
McCain's Foreign Policy Stance
McCain's Foreign Policy Stance
By George Friedman
John McCain is the Republican candidate for president. This means he is embedded in the Republican tradition. That tradition has two roots, which are somewhat at odds with each other: One root is found in Theodore Roosevelt’s variety of internationalism, and the other in Henry Cabot Lodge’s opposition to the League of Nations. Those roots still exist in the Republican Party. But accommodations to the reality the Democrats created after World War II — and that Eisenhower, Nixon and, to some extent, Reagan followed — have overlain them. In many ways, the Republican tradition of foreign policy is therefore more complex than the Democratic tradition.
Roosevelt and the United States as Great Power
More than any other person, Roosevelt introduced the United States to the idea that it had become a great power. During the Spanish-American War, in which he had enthusiastically participated, the United States took control of the remnants of the Spanish empire. During his presidency a few years later, Roosevelt authorized the first global tour by a U.S. fleet, which was designed to announce the arrival of the United States with authority. The fleet was both impressive and surprising to many great powers, which at the time tended to dismiss the United States.
For Roosevelt, having the United States take its place among the great powers served two purposes. First, it protected American maritime interests. The United States was a major trading power, so control of the seas was a practical imperative. But there was also an element of deep pride — to the point of ideology. Roosevelt saw the emergence of the United States as a validation of the American experiment with democracy and a testament to America as an exceptional country and regime. Realistic protection of national interest joined forces with an ideology of entitlement. The Panama Canal, which was begun in Roosevelt’s administration, served both interests.
The Panama Canal highlights the fact that for Roosevelt — heavily influenced by theories of sea power — the Pacific Ocean was at least as important as the Atlantic. The most important imperial U.S. holding at the time was the Pacific territory of the Philippines, which U.S. policy focused on protecting. Also reflecting Roosevelt’s interest in the Pacific, he brokered the peace treaty ending the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 and increased U.S. interests in China. (Overall, the Democratic Party focused on Europe, while the Republican Party showed a greater interest in Asia.)
The second strand of Republicanism emerged after World War I, when Lodge, a Republican senator, defeated President Woodrow Wilson’s plan for U.S. entry into the League of Nations. Lodge had supported the Spanish-American War and U.S. involvement in World War I, but he opposed league membership because he felt it would compel the United States to undertake obligations it should not commit to. Moreover, he had a deep distrust of the Europeans, whom he believed would drag the United States into another war.
The foundations of Republican foreign policy early in the 20th century therefore consisted of three elements:
. A willingness to engage in foreign policy and foreign wars when this serves U.S. interests.
.
. An unwillingness to enter into multilateral organizations or alliances, as this would deprive the United States of the right to act unilaterally and would commit it to fight on behalf of regimes it might have no interest in defending.
.
. A deep suspicion of the diplomacy of European states grounded on a sense that they were too duplicitous and unstable to trust and that treaties with them would result in burdens on — but not benefits for — the United States.
.
Isolationism
This gave rise to what has been called the “isolationist” strand in the Republican Party, although the term “isolation” is not by itself proper. The isolationists opposed involvement in the diplomacy and politics of Europe. In their view, the U.S. intervention in World War I had achieved little. The Europeans needed to achieve some stable outcome on their own, and the United States did not have the power to impose — or an interest in — that outcome. Underlying this was a belief that, as hostile as the Germans and Soviets were, the French and British were not decidedly better.
Opposition to involvement in a European war did not translate to indifference to the outcome in the Pacific. The isolationists regarded Japan with deep suspicion, and saw China as a potential ally and counterweight to Japan. They were prepared to support the Chinese and even have some military force present, just as they were prepared to garrison the Philippines.
There was a consistent position here. First, adherents of this strand believed that waging war on the mainland of Eurasia, either in China or in Europe, was beyond U.S. means and was dangerous. Second, they believed heavily in sea power, and that control of the sea would protect the United States against aggression and protect U.S. maritime trade. This made them suspicious of other maritime powers, including Japan and the United Kingdom. Third, and last, the isolationists deeply opposed alliances that committed the United States to any involvement in war. They felt that the decision to make war should depend on time and place — not a general commitment. Therefore, the broader any proposed alliance involving the United States, the more vigorously the isolationists opposed it.
Republican foreign policy — a product of the realist and isolationist strands — thus rejected the idea that the United States had a moral responsibility to police the world, while accepting the idea that the United States was morally exceptional. It was prepared to engage in global politics but only when it affected the direct interests of the United States. It regarded the primary interest of the United States to be protecting itself from the wars raging in the world and saw naval supremacy as the means toward that end. It regarded alliances as a potential trap and, in particular, saw the Europeans as dangerous and potentially irresponsible after World War I — and wanted to protect the United States from the consequences of European conflict. In foreign policy, Republicans were realists first, moralists a distant second.
Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the German declaration of war on the United States in 1941, the realist strand in Republican foreign policy appeared to be replaced with a new strand. World War II, and Franklin D. Roosevelt’s approach to waging it, created a new reality. Republican isolationists were discredited politically; their realism was seen as a failure to grasp global realities. Moreover, the war was fought within an alliance structure. Parts of that alliance structure were retained, and supplemented grandly, after the war. The United States joined the United Nations, and the means chosen to contain the Soviet Union was an alliance system, with NATO — and hence the Europeans — as the centerpiece.
Moralism vs. Realism
The Republicans were torn between two wings after the war. On the one hand, there was Robert Taft, who spoke for the prewar isolationist foreign policy. On the other hand, there was Eisenhower, who had commanded the European coalition and had an utterly different view of alliances and of the Europeans. In the struggle between Taft and Eisenhower for the nomination in 1952, Eisenhower won decisively. The Republican Party reoriented itself fundamentally, or so it appeared.
The Republicans’ move toward alliances and precommitments was coupled with a shift in moral emphasis. From the unwillingness to take moral responsibility for the world, the Republicans moved toward a moral opposition to the Soviet Union and communism. Both Republicans and Democrats objected morally to the communists. But for the Republicans, moral revulsion justified a sea change in their core foreign policy; anti-communism became a passion that justified changing lesser principles.
Yet the old Republican realism wasn’t quite dead. At root, Eisenhower was never a moralist. His anti-communism represented a strategic fear of the Soviet Union more than a moral crusade. Indeed, the Republican right condemned him for this. As his presidency progressed, the old realism re-emerged, now in the context of alliance systems.
But there was a key difference in Eisenhower’s approach to alliances and multilateral institutions: He supported them when they enabled the United States to achieve its strategic ends; he did not support them as ends in themselves. Whereas Eleanor Roosevelt, for example, saw the United Nations as a way to avoid war, Eisenhower saw it as a forum for pursuing American interests. Eisenhower didn’t doubt the idea of American exceptionalism, but his obsession was with the national interest. Thus, when the right wanted him to be more aggressive and liberate Eastern Europe, he was content to contain the Soviets and leave the Eastern Europeans to deal with their own problems.
The realist version of Republican foreign policy showed itself even more clearly in the Nixon presidency and in Henry Kissinger’s execution of it. The single act that defined this was Nixon’s decision to visit China, meet Mao Zedong, and form what was, in effect, an alliance with Communist China against the Soviet Union. The Vietnam War weakened the United States and strengthened the Soviet Union; China and the United States shared a common interest in containing the Soviet Union. An alliance was in the interests of both Beijing and Washington, and ideology was irrelevant. (The alliance with China also revived the old Republican interest in Asia.)
With that single action, Nixon and Kissinger reaffirmed the principle that U.S. foreign policy was not about moralism — of keeping the peace or fighting communism — but about pursuing the national interest. Alliances might be necessary, but they did not need to have a moral component.
While the Democrats were torn between the traditionalists and the anti-war movement, the Republicans became divided between realists who traced their tradition back to the beginning of the century and moralists whose passionate anti-communism began in earnest after World War II. Balancing the idea of foreign policy as a moral mission fighting evil and the idea of foreign policy as the pursuit of national interest and security defined the fault line within the Republican Party.
Reagan and the Post-Cold War World
Ronald Reagan tried to straddle this fault line. Very much rooted in the moral tradition of his party, he defined the Soviet Union as an “evil empire.” At the same time, he recognized that moralism was insufficient. Foreign policy ends had to be coupled with extremely flexible means. Thus, Reagan maintained the relationship with China. He also played a complex game of negotiation, manipulation and intimidation with the Soviets. To fund the Contras — guerrillas fighting the Marxist government of Nicaragua — his administration was prepared to sell weapons to Iran, which at that time was fighting a war with Iraq. In other words, Reagan embedded the anti-communism of the Republicans of the 1950s with the realism of Nixon and Kissinger. To this, he added a hearty disdain for Europe, where in return he was reviled as a cowboy. The antecedents of this distrust of the Europeans, particularly the French, went back to the World War I era.
The collapse of communism left the Republicans with a dilemma. The moral mission was gone; realism was all that was left. This was the dilemma that George H. W. Bush had to deal with. Bush was a realist to the core, yet he seemed incapable of articulating that as a principle. Instead, he announced the “New World Order,” which really was a call for multilateral institutions and the transformation of the anti-communist alliance structure into an all-inclusive family of democratic nations. In short, at the close of the Cold War, the first President Bush adopted the essence of Democratic foreign policy. This helps explain Ross Perot’s run for the presidency and Bush’s loss to Bill Clinton. Perot took away the faction of the Republican Party that retained the traditional aversion to multilateralism — in the form of NAFTA, for example.
It was never clear what form George W. Bush’s foreign policy would have taken without 9/11. After Sept. 11, 2001, Bush tried to re-create Reagan’s foreign policy. Rather than defining the war as a battle against jihadists, he defined it as a battle against terrorism, as if this were the ideological equivalent of communism. He defined an “Axis of Evil” redolent of Reagan’s “Evil Empire.” Within the confines of this moral mission, he attempted to execute a systematic war designed to combat terrorism.
It is important to bear in mind the complexity of George W. Bush’s foreign policy compared to the simplicity of its stated moral mission, which first was defined as fighting terrorism and later as bringing democracy to the Middle East. In the war in Afghanistan, Bush initially sought and received Russian and Iranian assistance. In Iraq, he ultimately reached an agreement with the Sunni insurgents whom he had formerly fought. In between was a complex array of covert operations, alliances and betrayals, and wars large and small throughout the region. Bush faced a far more complex situation than Reagan did — a situation that, in many instances, lacked solutions by available means.
McCain: Moralist or Realist?
Which brings us to McCain and the most important questions he would have to answer in his presidency: To what extent would he adopt an overriding moral mission, and how would he apply available resources to that mission? Would McCain tend toward the Nixon-Kissinger model of a realist Republican president, or to the more moralist Reagan-Bush model?
Though the answers to these questions will not emerge during campaign season, a President McCain would have to answer them almost immediately. For example, in dealing with the Afghan situation, one of the options will be a deal with the Taliban paralleling the U.S. deal with the Iraqi Sunni insurgents. Would McCain be prepared to take this step in the Reagan-Bush tradition, or would he reject it on rigid moral principles? And would McCain be prepared to recognize a sphere of influence for Russia in the former Soviet Union, or would he reject the concept as violating moral principles of national sovereignty and rights?
McCain has said the United States should maintain a presence in Iraq for as long as necessary to stabilize the country, although he clearly believes that, with the situation stabilizing, the drawdown of troops can be more rapid. In discussing Afghanistan, it is clear that he sees the need for more troops. But his real focus is on Pakistan, about which he said in July: “We must strengthen local tribes in the border areas who are willing to fight the foreign terrorists there. We must also empower the new civilian government of Pakistan to defeat radicalism with greater support for development, health, and education.”
McCain understands that the key to dealing with Afghanistan lies in Pakistan, and he implies that solving the problem in Pakistan requires forming a closer relationship with tribes in the Afghan-Pakistani border region. What McCain has not said — and what he cannot say for political and strategic reasons — is how far he would go in making agreements with the Pashtun tribes in the area that have been close collaborators with al Qaeda.
A similar question comes up in the context of Russia and its relations with other parts of the former Soviet Union. Shortly after the Russian invasion of Georgia, McCain said, “The implications of Russian actions go beyond their threat to the territorial integrity and independence of a democratic Georgia. Russia is using violence against Georgia, in part, to intimidate other neighbors such as Ukraine for choosing to associate with the West and adhering to Western political and economic values. As such, the fate of Georgia should be of grave concern to Americans and all people who welcomed the end of a divided Europe, and the independence of former Soviet republics. The international response to this crisis will determine how Russia manages its relationships with other neighbors.”
McCain has presented Russia’s actions in moral terms. He also has said international diplomatic action must be taken to deal with Russia, and he has supported NATO expansion. So he has combined a moral approach with a coalition approach built around the Europeans. In short, his public statements draw from moral and multilateral sources. What is not clear is the degree to which he will adhere to realist principles in pursuing these ends. He clearly will not be a Nixon.
Whether he will be like Reagan, or more like George W. Bush — that is, Reagan without Reagan’s craft — or a rigid moralist indifferent to consequences remains in question.
It is difficult to believe McCain would adopt the third option. He takes a strong moral stance, but is capable of calibrating his tactics. This is particularly clear when you consider his position on working with the Europeans. In 1999 — quite a ways back in foreign policy terms — McCain said of NATO, “As we approach the 50th anniversary of NATO, the Atlantic Alliance is in pretty bad shape. Our allies are spending far too little on their own defense to maintain the alliance as an effective military force.”
Since then, Europe’s defense spending has not soared, to say the least. McCain’s August 2008 statement that “NATO’s North Atlantic Council should convene in emergency session to demand a cease-fire and begin discussions on both the deployment of an international peacekeeping force to South Ossetia” must be viewed in this context.
In this statement, McCain called for a NATO peacekeeping force to South Ossetia. A decade before, he was decrying NATO’s lack of military preparedness, which few dispute is still an extremely significant issue.
But remember that presidential campaigns are not where forthright strategic thinking should be expected, and moral goals must be subordinate to the realities of power. While McCain would need to define the mix of moralism and realism in his foreign policy, he made his evaluation of NATO’s weakness clear in 1999. Insofar as he believes this evaluation still holds true, he would not have to face the first issue that Barack Obama likely would — namely, what to do when the Europeans fail to cooperate. McCain already believes that they will not (or cannot).
Instead, McCain would have to answer another question, which ultimately is the same as Obama’s question: Where will the resources come from to keep forces in Iraq, manage the war in Afghanistan, involve Pakistanis in that conflict and contain Russia? In some sense, McCain has created a tougher political position for himself by casting all these issues in a moral light. But, in the Reagan tradition, a moral position has value only if it can be pursued, and pursuing those actions requires both moral commitment and Machiavellian virtue.
Therefore, McCain will be pulled in two directions. First, like Obama, he would not be able to pursue his ends without a substantial budget increase or abandoning one or more theaters of operation. The rubber band just won’t stretch without reinforcements. Second, while those reinforcements are mustered — or in lieu of reinforcements — he will have to execute a complex series of tactical operations. This will involve holding the line in Iraq, creating a political framework for settlement in Afghanistan and scraping enough forces together to provide some pause to the Russians as they pressure their periphery.
McCain’s foreign policy — like Obama’s — would devolve into complex tactics, where the devil is in the details, and the details will require constant attention.
The Global Landscape and the Next President
Ultimately, it is the global landscape that determines a president’s foreign policy choices, and the traditions presidents come from can guide them only so far. Whoever becomes president in January 2009 will face the same landscape and limited choices. The winner will require substantial virtue, and neither candidate should be judged on what he says now, since no one can anticipate either the details the winner will confront or the surprises the world will throw at him.
We can describe the world. We can seek to divine the candidates’ intentions by looking at their political traditions. We can understand the intellectual and moral tensions they face. But in the end, we know no more about the virtue of these two men than anyone else. We do know that, given the current limits of U.S. power and the breadth of U.S. commitments, it will take a very clever and devious president to pursue the national interest, however that is defined.
Taken from www.stratfor.com
By George Friedman
John McCain is the Republican candidate for president. This means he is embedded in the Republican tradition. That tradition has two roots, which are somewhat at odds with each other: One root is found in Theodore Roosevelt’s variety of internationalism, and the other in Henry Cabot Lodge’s opposition to the League of Nations. Those roots still exist in the Republican Party. But accommodations to the reality the Democrats created after World War II — and that Eisenhower, Nixon and, to some extent, Reagan followed — have overlain them. In many ways, the Republican tradition of foreign policy is therefore more complex than the Democratic tradition.
Roosevelt and the United States as Great Power
More than any other person, Roosevelt introduced the United States to the idea that it had become a great power. During the Spanish-American War, in which he had enthusiastically participated, the United States took control of the remnants of the Spanish empire. During his presidency a few years later, Roosevelt authorized the first global tour by a U.S. fleet, which was designed to announce the arrival of the United States with authority. The fleet was both impressive and surprising to many great powers, which at the time tended to dismiss the United States.
For Roosevelt, having the United States take its place among the great powers served two purposes. First, it protected American maritime interests. The United States was a major trading power, so control of the seas was a practical imperative. But there was also an element of deep pride — to the point of ideology. Roosevelt saw the emergence of the United States as a validation of the American experiment with democracy and a testament to America as an exceptional country and regime. Realistic protection of national interest joined forces with an ideology of entitlement. The Panama Canal, which was begun in Roosevelt’s administration, served both interests.
The Panama Canal highlights the fact that for Roosevelt — heavily influenced by theories of sea power — the Pacific Ocean was at least as important as the Atlantic. The most important imperial U.S. holding at the time was the Pacific territory of the Philippines, which U.S. policy focused on protecting. Also reflecting Roosevelt’s interest in the Pacific, he brokered the peace treaty ending the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 and increased U.S. interests in China. (Overall, the Democratic Party focused on Europe, while the Republican Party showed a greater interest in Asia.)
The second strand of Republicanism emerged after World War I, when Lodge, a Republican senator, defeated President Woodrow Wilson’s plan for U.S. entry into the League of Nations. Lodge had supported the Spanish-American War and U.S. involvement in World War I, but he opposed league membership because he felt it would compel the United States to undertake obligations it should not commit to. Moreover, he had a deep distrust of the Europeans, whom he believed would drag the United States into another war.
The foundations of Republican foreign policy early in the 20th century therefore consisted of three elements:
. A willingness to engage in foreign policy and foreign wars when this serves U.S. interests.
.
. An unwillingness to enter into multilateral organizations or alliances, as this would deprive the United States of the right to act unilaterally and would commit it to fight on behalf of regimes it might have no interest in defending.
.
. A deep suspicion of the diplomacy of European states grounded on a sense that they were too duplicitous and unstable to trust and that treaties with them would result in burdens on — but not benefits for — the United States.
.
Isolationism
This gave rise to what has been called the “isolationist” strand in the Republican Party, although the term “isolation” is not by itself proper. The isolationists opposed involvement in the diplomacy and politics of Europe. In their view, the U.S. intervention in World War I had achieved little. The Europeans needed to achieve some stable outcome on their own, and the United States did not have the power to impose — or an interest in — that outcome. Underlying this was a belief that, as hostile as the Germans and Soviets were, the French and British were not decidedly better.
Opposition to involvement in a European war did not translate to indifference to the outcome in the Pacific. The isolationists regarded Japan with deep suspicion, and saw China as a potential ally and counterweight to Japan. They were prepared to support the Chinese and even have some military force present, just as they were prepared to garrison the Philippines.
There was a consistent position here. First, adherents of this strand believed that waging war on the mainland of Eurasia, either in China or in Europe, was beyond U.S. means and was dangerous. Second, they believed heavily in sea power, and that control of the sea would protect the United States against aggression and protect U.S. maritime trade. This made them suspicious of other maritime powers, including Japan and the United Kingdom. Third, and last, the isolationists deeply opposed alliances that committed the United States to any involvement in war. They felt that the decision to make war should depend on time and place — not a general commitment. Therefore, the broader any proposed alliance involving the United States, the more vigorously the isolationists opposed it.
Republican foreign policy — a product of the realist and isolationist strands — thus rejected the idea that the United States had a moral responsibility to police the world, while accepting the idea that the United States was morally exceptional. It was prepared to engage in global politics but only when it affected the direct interests of the United States. It regarded the primary interest of the United States to be protecting itself from the wars raging in the world and saw naval supremacy as the means toward that end. It regarded alliances as a potential trap and, in particular, saw the Europeans as dangerous and potentially irresponsible after World War I — and wanted to protect the United States from the consequences of European conflict. In foreign policy, Republicans were realists first, moralists a distant second.
Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the German declaration of war on the United States in 1941, the realist strand in Republican foreign policy appeared to be replaced with a new strand. World War II, and Franklin D. Roosevelt’s approach to waging it, created a new reality. Republican isolationists were discredited politically; their realism was seen as a failure to grasp global realities. Moreover, the war was fought within an alliance structure. Parts of that alliance structure were retained, and supplemented grandly, after the war. The United States joined the United Nations, and the means chosen to contain the Soviet Union was an alliance system, with NATO — and hence the Europeans — as the centerpiece.
Moralism vs. Realism
The Republicans were torn between two wings after the war. On the one hand, there was Robert Taft, who spoke for the prewar isolationist foreign policy. On the other hand, there was Eisenhower, who had commanded the European coalition and had an utterly different view of alliances and of the Europeans. In the struggle between Taft and Eisenhower for the nomination in 1952, Eisenhower won decisively. The Republican Party reoriented itself fundamentally, or so it appeared.
The Republicans’ move toward alliances and precommitments was coupled with a shift in moral emphasis. From the unwillingness to take moral responsibility for the world, the Republicans moved toward a moral opposition to the Soviet Union and communism. Both Republicans and Democrats objected morally to the communists. But for the Republicans, moral revulsion justified a sea change in their core foreign policy; anti-communism became a passion that justified changing lesser principles.
Yet the old Republican realism wasn’t quite dead. At root, Eisenhower was never a moralist. His anti-communism represented a strategic fear of the Soviet Union more than a moral crusade. Indeed, the Republican right condemned him for this. As his presidency progressed, the old realism re-emerged, now in the context of alliance systems.
But there was a key difference in Eisenhower’s approach to alliances and multilateral institutions: He supported them when they enabled the United States to achieve its strategic ends; he did not support them as ends in themselves. Whereas Eleanor Roosevelt, for example, saw the United Nations as a way to avoid war, Eisenhower saw it as a forum for pursuing American interests. Eisenhower didn’t doubt the idea of American exceptionalism, but his obsession was with the national interest. Thus, when the right wanted him to be more aggressive and liberate Eastern Europe, he was content to contain the Soviets and leave the Eastern Europeans to deal with their own problems.
The realist version of Republican foreign policy showed itself even more clearly in the Nixon presidency and in Henry Kissinger’s execution of it. The single act that defined this was Nixon’s decision to visit China, meet Mao Zedong, and form what was, in effect, an alliance with Communist China against the Soviet Union. The Vietnam War weakened the United States and strengthened the Soviet Union; China and the United States shared a common interest in containing the Soviet Union. An alliance was in the interests of both Beijing and Washington, and ideology was irrelevant. (The alliance with China also revived the old Republican interest in Asia.)
With that single action, Nixon and Kissinger reaffirmed the principle that U.S. foreign policy was not about moralism — of keeping the peace or fighting communism — but about pursuing the national interest. Alliances might be necessary, but they did not need to have a moral component.
While the Democrats were torn between the traditionalists and the anti-war movement, the Republicans became divided between realists who traced their tradition back to the beginning of the century and moralists whose passionate anti-communism began in earnest after World War II. Balancing the idea of foreign policy as a moral mission fighting evil and the idea of foreign policy as the pursuit of national interest and security defined the fault line within the Republican Party.
Reagan and the Post-Cold War World
Ronald Reagan tried to straddle this fault line. Very much rooted in the moral tradition of his party, he defined the Soviet Union as an “evil empire.” At the same time, he recognized that moralism was insufficient. Foreign policy ends had to be coupled with extremely flexible means. Thus, Reagan maintained the relationship with China. He also played a complex game of negotiation, manipulation and intimidation with the Soviets. To fund the Contras — guerrillas fighting the Marxist government of Nicaragua — his administration was prepared to sell weapons to Iran, which at that time was fighting a war with Iraq. In other words, Reagan embedded the anti-communism of the Republicans of the 1950s with the realism of Nixon and Kissinger. To this, he added a hearty disdain for Europe, where in return he was reviled as a cowboy. The antecedents of this distrust of the Europeans, particularly the French, went back to the World War I era.
The collapse of communism left the Republicans with a dilemma. The moral mission was gone; realism was all that was left. This was the dilemma that George H. W. Bush had to deal with. Bush was a realist to the core, yet he seemed incapable of articulating that as a principle. Instead, he announced the “New World Order,” which really was a call for multilateral institutions and the transformation of the anti-communist alliance structure into an all-inclusive family of democratic nations. In short, at the close of the Cold War, the first President Bush adopted the essence of Democratic foreign policy. This helps explain Ross Perot’s run for the presidency and Bush’s loss to Bill Clinton. Perot took away the faction of the Republican Party that retained the traditional aversion to multilateralism — in the form of NAFTA, for example.
It was never clear what form George W. Bush’s foreign policy would have taken without 9/11. After Sept. 11, 2001, Bush tried to re-create Reagan’s foreign policy. Rather than defining the war as a battle against jihadists, he defined it as a battle against terrorism, as if this were the ideological equivalent of communism. He defined an “Axis of Evil” redolent of Reagan’s “Evil Empire.” Within the confines of this moral mission, he attempted to execute a systematic war designed to combat terrorism.
It is important to bear in mind the complexity of George W. Bush’s foreign policy compared to the simplicity of its stated moral mission, which first was defined as fighting terrorism and later as bringing democracy to the Middle East. In the war in Afghanistan, Bush initially sought and received Russian and Iranian assistance. In Iraq, he ultimately reached an agreement with the Sunni insurgents whom he had formerly fought. In between was a complex array of covert operations, alliances and betrayals, and wars large and small throughout the region. Bush faced a far more complex situation than Reagan did — a situation that, in many instances, lacked solutions by available means.
McCain: Moralist or Realist?
Which brings us to McCain and the most important questions he would have to answer in his presidency: To what extent would he adopt an overriding moral mission, and how would he apply available resources to that mission? Would McCain tend toward the Nixon-Kissinger model of a realist Republican president, or to the more moralist Reagan-Bush model?
Though the answers to these questions will not emerge during campaign season, a President McCain would have to answer them almost immediately. For example, in dealing with the Afghan situation, one of the options will be a deal with the Taliban paralleling the U.S. deal with the Iraqi Sunni insurgents. Would McCain be prepared to take this step in the Reagan-Bush tradition, or would he reject it on rigid moral principles? And would McCain be prepared to recognize a sphere of influence for Russia in the former Soviet Union, or would he reject the concept as violating moral principles of national sovereignty and rights?
McCain has said the United States should maintain a presence in Iraq for as long as necessary to stabilize the country, although he clearly believes that, with the situation stabilizing, the drawdown of troops can be more rapid. In discussing Afghanistan, it is clear that he sees the need for more troops. But his real focus is on Pakistan, about which he said in July: “We must strengthen local tribes in the border areas who are willing to fight the foreign terrorists there. We must also empower the new civilian government of Pakistan to defeat radicalism with greater support for development, health, and education.”
McCain understands that the key to dealing with Afghanistan lies in Pakistan, and he implies that solving the problem in Pakistan requires forming a closer relationship with tribes in the Afghan-Pakistani border region. What McCain has not said — and what he cannot say for political and strategic reasons — is how far he would go in making agreements with the Pashtun tribes in the area that have been close collaborators with al Qaeda.
A similar question comes up in the context of Russia and its relations with other parts of the former Soviet Union. Shortly after the Russian invasion of Georgia, McCain said, “The implications of Russian actions go beyond their threat to the territorial integrity and independence of a democratic Georgia. Russia is using violence against Georgia, in part, to intimidate other neighbors such as Ukraine for choosing to associate with the West and adhering to Western political and economic values. As such, the fate of Georgia should be of grave concern to Americans and all people who welcomed the end of a divided Europe, and the independence of former Soviet republics. The international response to this crisis will determine how Russia manages its relationships with other neighbors.”
McCain has presented Russia’s actions in moral terms. He also has said international diplomatic action must be taken to deal with Russia, and he has supported NATO expansion. So he has combined a moral approach with a coalition approach built around the Europeans. In short, his public statements draw from moral and multilateral sources. What is not clear is the degree to which he will adhere to realist principles in pursuing these ends. He clearly will not be a Nixon.
Whether he will be like Reagan, or more like George W. Bush — that is, Reagan without Reagan’s craft — or a rigid moralist indifferent to consequences remains in question.
It is difficult to believe McCain would adopt the third option. He takes a strong moral stance, but is capable of calibrating his tactics. This is particularly clear when you consider his position on working with the Europeans. In 1999 — quite a ways back in foreign policy terms — McCain said of NATO, “As we approach the 50th anniversary of NATO, the Atlantic Alliance is in pretty bad shape. Our allies are spending far too little on their own defense to maintain the alliance as an effective military force.”
Since then, Europe’s defense spending has not soared, to say the least. McCain’s August 2008 statement that “NATO’s North Atlantic Council should convene in emergency session to demand a cease-fire and begin discussions on both the deployment of an international peacekeeping force to South Ossetia” must be viewed in this context.
In this statement, McCain called for a NATO peacekeeping force to South Ossetia. A decade before, he was decrying NATO’s lack of military preparedness, which few dispute is still an extremely significant issue.
But remember that presidential campaigns are not where forthright strategic thinking should be expected, and moral goals must be subordinate to the realities of power. While McCain would need to define the mix of moralism and realism in his foreign policy, he made his evaluation of NATO’s weakness clear in 1999. Insofar as he believes this evaluation still holds true, he would not have to face the first issue that Barack Obama likely would — namely, what to do when the Europeans fail to cooperate. McCain already believes that they will not (or cannot).
Instead, McCain would have to answer another question, which ultimately is the same as Obama’s question: Where will the resources come from to keep forces in Iraq, manage the war in Afghanistan, involve Pakistanis in that conflict and contain Russia? In some sense, McCain has created a tougher political position for himself by casting all these issues in a moral light. But, in the Reagan tradition, a moral position has value only if it can be pursued, and pursuing those actions requires both moral commitment and Machiavellian virtue.
Therefore, McCain will be pulled in two directions. First, like Obama, he would not be able to pursue his ends without a substantial budget increase or abandoning one or more theaters of operation. The rubber band just won’t stretch without reinforcements. Second, while those reinforcements are mustered — or in lieu of reinforcements — he will have to execute a complex series of tactical operations. This will involve holding the line in Iraq, creating a political framework for settlement in Afghanistan and scraping enough forces together to provide some pause to the Russians as they pressure their periphery.
McCain’s foreign policy — like Obama’s — would devolve into complex tactics, where the devil is in the details, and the details will require constant attention.
The Global Landscape and the Next President
Ultimately, it is the global landscape that determines a president’s foreign policy choices, and the traditions presidents come from can guide them only so far. Whoever becomes president in January 2009 will face the same landscape and limited choices. The winner will require substantial virtue, and neither candidate should be judged on what he says now, since no one can anticipate either the details the winner will confront or the surprises the world will throw at him.
We can describe the world. We can seek to divine the candidates’ intentions by looking at their political traditions. We can understand the intellectual and moral tensions they face. But in the end, we know no more about the virtue of these two men than anyone else. We do know that, given the current limits of U.S. power and the breadth of U.S. commitments, it will take a very clever and devious president to pursue the national interest, however that is defined.
Taken from www.stratfor.com
Obama's Foreign Policy Stance
Obama's Foreign Policy Stance
Senator Obama has issued position papers and made statements about his intended foreign policy. Like all Presidents, he would also be getting input from a variety of others, principally from his own party. This second analysis analyzes the foreign policy position of Sen. Obama and the Democratic Party.
By George Friedman
Barack Obama is the Democratic candidate for president. His advisers in foreign policy are generally Democrats. Together they carry with them an institutional memory of the Democratic Party’s approach to foreign policy, and are an expression of the complexity and divisions of that approach. Like the their Republican counterparts, in many ways they are going to be severely constrained as to what they can do both by the nature of the global landscape and American resources. But to some extent, they will also be constrained and defined by the tradition they come from. Understanding that tradition and Obama’s place is useful in understanding what an Obama presidency would look like in foreign affairs.
The most striking thing about the Democratic tradition is that it presided over the beginnings of the three great conflicts that defined the 20th century: Woodrow Wilson and World War I, Franklin Delano Roosevelt and World War II, and Harry S. Truman and the Cold War. (At this level of analysis, we will treat the episodes of the Cold War such as Korea, Vietnam or Grenada as simply subsets of one conflict.) This is most emphatically not to say that had Republicans won the presidency in 1916, 1940 or 1948, U.S. involvement in those wars could have been avoided.
Patterns in Democratic Foreign Policy
But it does give us a framework for considering persistent patterns of Democratic foreign policy. When we look at the conflicts, four things become apparent.
First, in all three conflicts, Democrats postponed the initiation of direct combat as long as possible. In only one, World War I, did Wilson decide to join the war without prior direct attack. Roosevelt maneuvered near war but did not enter the war until after Pearl Harbor. Truman also maneuvered near war but did not get into direct combat until after the North Korean invasion of South Korea. Indeed, even Wilson chose to go to war to protect free passage on the Atlantic. More important, he sought to prevent Germany from defeating the Russians and the Anglo-French alliance and to stop the subsequent German domination of Europe, which appeared possible. In other words, the Democratic approach to war was reactive. All three presidents reacted to events on the surface, while trying to shape them underneath the surface.
Second, all three wars were built around coalitions. The foundation of the three wars was that other nations were at risk and that the United States used a predisposition to resist (Germany in the first two wars, the Soviet Union in the last) as a framework for involvement. The United States under Democrats did not involve itself in war unilaterally. At the same time, the United States under Democrats made certain that the major burdens were shared by allies. Millions died in World War I, but the United States suffered 100,000 dead. In World War II, the United States suffered 500,000 dead in a war where perhaps 50 million soldiers and civilians died. In the Cold War, U.S. losses in direct combat were less than 100,000 while the losses to Chinese, Vietnamese, Koreans and others towered over that toll. The allies had a complex appreciation of the United States. On the one hand, they were grateful for the U.S. presence. On the other hand, they resented the disproportionate amounts of blood and effort shed. Some of the roots of anti-Americanism are to be found in this strategy.
Third, each of these wars ended with a Democratic president attempting to create a system of international institutions designed to limit the recurrence of war without directly transferring sovereignty to those institutions. Wilson championed the League of Nations. Roosevelt the United Nations. Bill Clinton, who presided over most of the post-Cold War world, constantly sought international institutions to validate U.S. actions. Thus, when the United Nations refused to sanction the Kosovo War, he designated NATO as an alternative international organization with the right to approve conflict. Indeed, Clinton championed a range of multilateral organizations during the 1990s, including everything from the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and later the World Trade Organization. All these presidents were deeply committed to multinational organizations to define permissible and impermissible actions.
And fourth, there is a focus on Europe in the Democratic view of the world. Roosevelt regarded Germany as the primary threat instead of the Pacific theater in World War II. And in spite of two land wars in Asia during the Cold War, the centerpiece of strategy remained NATO and Europe. The specific details have evolved over the last century, but the Democratic Party — and particularly the Democratic foreign policy establishment — historically has viewed Europe as a permanent interest and partner for the United States.
Thus, the main thrust of the Democratic tradition is deeply steeped in fighting wars, but approaches this task with four things in mind:
. Wars should not begin until the last possible moment and ideally should be initiated by the enemy.
.
. Wars must be fought in a coalition with much of the burden borne by partners.
.
. The outcome of wars should be an institutional legal framework to manage the peace, with the United States being the most influential force within this multilateral framework.
.
. Any such framework must be built on a trans-Atlantic relationship.
.
Democratic Party Fractures
That is one strand of Democratic foreign policy. A second strand emerged in the context of the Vietnam War. That war began under the Kennedy administration and was intensified by Lyndon Baines Johnson, particularly after 1964. The war did not go as expected. As the war progressed, the Democratic Party began to fragment. There were three factions involved in this.
The first faction consisted of foreign policy professionals and politicians who were involved in the early stages of war planning but turned against the war after 1967 when it clearly diverged from plans. The leading political figure of this faction was Robert F. Kennedy, who initially supported the war but eventually turned against it.
The second faction was more definitive. It consisted of people on the left wing of the Democratic Party — and many who went far to the left of the Democrats. This latter group not only turned against the war, it developed a theory of the U.S. role in the war that as a mass movement was unprecedented in the century. The view (it can only be sketched here) maintained that the United States was an inherently imperialist power. Rather than the benign image that Wilson, Roosevelt and Truman had of their actions, this faction reinterpreted American history going back into the 19th century as violent, racist and imperialist (in the most extreme faction’s view). Just as the United States annihilated the Native Americans, the United States was now annihilating the Vietnamese.
A third, more nuanced, faction argued that rather than an attempt to contain Soviet aggression, the Cold War was actually initiated by the United States out of irrational fear of the Soviets and out of imperialist ambitions. They saw the bombing of Hiroshima as a bid to intimidate the Soviet Union rather than an effort to end World War II, and the creation of NATO as having triggered the Cold War.
These three factions thus broke down into Democratic politicians such as RFK and George McGovern (who won the presidential nomination in 1972), radicals in the street who were not really Democrats, and revisionist scholars who for the most part were on the party’s left wing.
Ultimately, the Democratic Party split into two camps. Hubert Humphrey led the first along with Henry Jackson, who rejected the left’s interpretation of the U.S. role in Vietnam and claimed to speak for the Wilson-FDR-Truman strand in Democratic politics. McGovern led the second. His camp largely comprised the party’s left wing, which did not necessarily go as far as the most extreme critics of that tradition but was extremely suspicious of anti-communist ideology, the military and intelligence communities, and increased defense spending. The two camps conducted extended political warfare throughout the 1970s.
The presidency of Jimmy Carter symbolized the tensions. He came to power wanting to move beyond Vietnam, slashing and changing the CIA, controlling defense spending and warning the country of “an excessive fear of Communism.” But following the fall of the Shah of Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, he allowed Zbigniew Brzezinski, his national security adviser and now an adviser to Obama, to launch a guerrilla war against the Soviets using Islamist insurgents from across the Muslim world in Afghanistan. Carter moved from concern with anti-Communism to coalition warfare against the Soviets by working with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Afghan resistance fighters.
Carter was dealing with the realities of U.S. geopolitics, but the tensions within the Democratic tradition shaped his responses. During the Clinton administration, these internal tensions subsided to a great degree. In large part this was because there was no major war, and the military action that did occur — as in Haiti and Kosovo — was framed as humanitarian actions rather than as the pursuit of national power. That soothed the anti-war Democrats to a great deal, since their perspective was less pacifistic than suspicious of using war to enhance national power.
The Democrats Since 9/11
Since the Democrats have not held the presidency during the last eight years, judging how they might have responded to events is speculative. Statements made while in opposition are not necessarily predictive of what an administration might do. Nevertheless, Obama’s foreign policy outlook was shaped by the last eight years of Democrats struggling with the U.S.-jihadist war.
The Democrats responded to events of the last eight years as they traditionally do when the United States is attacked directly: The party’s anti-war faction contracted and the old Democratic tradition reasserted itself. This was particularly true of the decision to go to war in Afghanistan. Obviously, the war was a response to an attack and, given the mood of the country after 9/11, was an unassailable decision. But it had another set of characteristics that made it attractive to the Democrats. The military action in Afghanistan was taking place in the context of broad international support and within a coalition forming at all levels, from on the ground in Afghanistan to NATO and the United Nations. Second, U.S. motives did not appear to involve national self-interest, like increasing power or getting oil. It was not a war for national advantage, but a war of national self-defense.
The Democrats were much less comfortable with the Iraq war than they were with Afghanistan. The old splits reappeared, with many Democrats voting for the invasion and others against. There were complex and mixed reasons why each Democrat voted the way they did — some strategic, some purely political, some moral. Under the pressure of voting on the war, the historically fragile Democratic consensus broke apart, not so much in conflict as in disarray. One of the most important reasons for this was the sense of isolation from major European powers — particularly the French and Germans, whom the Democrats regarded as fundamental elements of any coalition. Without those countries, the Democrats regarded the United States as diplomatically isolated.
The intraparty conflict came later. As the war went badly, the anti-war movement in the party re-energized itself. They were joined later by many who had formerly voted for the war but were upset by the human and material cost and by the apparent isolation of the United States and so on. Both factions of the Democratic Party had reasons to oppose the Iraq war even while they supported the Afghan war.
Understanding Obama’s Foreign Policy
It is in light of this distinction that we can begin to understand Obama’s foreign policy. On Aug. 1, Obama said the following: “It is time to turn the page. When I am President, we will wage the war that has to be won, with a comprehensive strategy with five elements: getting out of Iraq and on to the right battlefield in Afghanistan and Pakistan; developing the capabilities and partnerships we need to take out the terrorists and the world’s most deadly weapons; engaging the world to dry up support for terror and extremism; restoring our values; and securing a more resilient homeland.”
Obama’s view of the Iraq war is that it should not have been fought in the first place, and that the current success in the war does not justify it or its cost. In this part, he speaks to the anti-war tradition in the party. He adds that Afghanistan and Pakistan are the correct battlefields, since this is where the attack emanated from. It should be noted that on several occasions Obama has pointed to Pakistan as part of the Afghan problem, and has indicated a willingness to intervene there if needed while demanding Pakistani cooperation. Moreover, Obama emphasizes the need for partnerships — for example, coalition partners — rather than unilateral action in Afghanistan and globally.
Responding to attack rather than pre-emptive attack, coalition warfare and multinational postwar solutions are central to Obama’s policy in the Islamic world. He therefore straddles the divide within the Democratic Party. He opposes the war in Iraq as pre-emptive, unilateral and outside the bounds of international organizations while endorsing the Afghan war and promising to expand it.
Obama’s problem would be applying these principles to the emerging landscape. He shaped his foreign policy preferences when the essential choices remained within the Islamic world — between dealing with Iraq and Afghanistan simultaneously versus focusing on Afghanistan primarily. After the Russian invasion of Georgia, Obama would face a more complex set of choices between the Islamic world and dealing with the Russian challenge.
Obama’s position on Georgia tracked with traditional Democratic approaches:
“Georgia’s economic recovery is an urgent strategic priority that demands the focused attention of the United States and our allies. That is why Senator Biden and I have called for $1 billion in reconstruction assistance to help the people of Georgia in this time of great trial. I also welcome NATO’s decision to establish a NATO-Georgia Commission and applaud the new French and German initiatives to continue work on these issues within the EU. The Bush administration should call for a U.S.-EU-Georgia summit in September that focuses on strategies for preserving Georgia’s territorial integrity and advancing its economic recovery.”
Obama avoided militaristic rhetoric and focused on multinational approaches to dealing with the problem, particularly via NATO and the European Union. In this and in Afghanistan, he has returned to a Democratic fundamental: the centrality of the U.S.-European relationship. In this sense, it is not accidental that he took a preconvention trip to Europe. It was both natural and a signal to the Democratic foreign policy establishment that he understands the pivotal position of Europe.
This view on multilateralism and NATO is summed up in a critical statement by Obama in a position paper:
“Today it’s become fashionable to disparage the United Nations, the World Bank, and other international organizations. In fact, reform of these bodies is urgently needed if they are to keep pace with the fast-moving threats we face. Such real reform will not come, however, by dismissing the value of these institutions, or by bullying other countries to ratify changes we have drafted in isolation. Real reform will come because we convince others that they too have a stake in change — that such reforms will make their world, and not just ours, more secure.
“Our alliances also require constant management and revision if they are to remain effective and relevant. For example, over the last 15 years, NATO has made tremendous strides in transforming from a Cold War security structure to a dynamic partnership for peace.
“Today, NATO’s challenge in Afghanistan has become a test case, in the words of Dick Lugar, of whether the alliance can ‘overcome the growing discrepancy between NATO’s expanding missions and its lagging capabilities.’”
Obama’s European Problem
The last paragraph represents the key challenge to Obama’s foreign policy, and where his first challenge would come from. Obama wants a coalition with Europe and wants Europe to strengthen itself. But Europe is deeply divided, and averse to increasing its defense spending or substantially increasing its military participation in coalition warfare. Obama’s multilateralism and Europeanism will quickly encounter the realities of Europe.
This would immediately affect his jihadist policy. At this point, Obama’s plan for a 16-month drawdown from Iraq is quite moderate, and the idea of focusing on Afghanistan and Pakistan is a continuation of Bush administration policy. But his challenge would be to increase NATO involvement. There is neither the will nor the capability to substantially increase Europe’s NATO participation in Afghanistan.
This problem would be even more difficult in dealing with Russia. Europe has no objection in principle to the Afghan war; it merely lacks the resources to substantially increase its presence there. But in the case of Russia, there is no European consensus. The Germans are dependent on the Russians for energy and do not want to risk that relationship; the French are more vocal but lack military capability, though they have made efforts to increase their commitment to Afghanistan. Obama says he wants to rely on multilateral agencies to address the Russian situation. That is possible diplomatically, but if the Russians press the issue further, as we expect, a stronger response will be needed. NATO will be unlikely to provide that response.
Obama would therefore face the problem of shifting the focus to Afghanistan and the added problem of balancing between an Islamic focus and a Russian focus. This will be a general problem of U.S. diplomacy. But Obama as a Democrat would have a more complex problem. Averse to unilateral actions and focused on Europe, Obama would face his first crisis in dealing with the limited support Europe can provide.
That will pose serious problems in both Afghanistan and Russia, which Obama would have to deal with. There is a hint in his thoughts on this when he says, “And as we strengthen NATO, we should also seek to build new alliances and relationships in other regions important to our interests in the 21st century.” The test would be whether these new coalitions will differ from, and be more effective than, the coalition of the willing.
Obama would face similar issues in dealing with the Iranians. His approach is to create a coalition to confront the Iranians and force them to abandon their nuclear program. He has been clear that he opposes that program, although less clear on other aspects of Iranian foreign policy. But again, his solution is to use a coalition to control Iran. That coalition disintegrated to a large extent after Russia and China both indicated that they had no interest in sanctions.
But the coalition Obama plans to rely on will have to be dramatically revived by unknown means, or an alternative coalition must be created, or the United States will have to deal with Afghanistan and Pakistan unilaterally. This reality places a tremendous strain on the core principles of Democratic foreign policy. To reconcile the tensions, he would have to rapidly come to an understanding with the Europeans in NATO on expanding their military forces. Since reaching out to the Europeans would be among his first steps, his first test would come early.
The Europeans would probably balk, and, if not, they would demand that the United States expand its defense spending as well. Obama has shown no inclination toward doing this. In October 2007, he said the following on defense: “I will cut tens of billions of dollars in wasteful spending. I will cut investments in unproven missile defense systems. I will not weaponize space. I will slow our development of future combat systems, and I will institute an independent defense priorities board to ensure that the quadrennial defense review is not used to justify unnecessary spending.”
Russia, Afghanistan and Defense Spending
In this, Obama is reaching toward the anti-war faction in his party, which regards military expenditures with distrust. He focused on advanced war-fighting systems, but did not propose cutting spending on counterinsurgency. But the dilemma is that in dealing with both insurgency and the Russians, Obama would come under pressure to do what he doesn’t want to do — namely, increase U.S. defense spending on advanced systems.
Obama has been portrayed as radical. That is far from the case. He is well within a century-long tradition of the Democratic Party, with an element of loyalty to the anti-war faction. But that element is an undertone to his policy, not its core. The core of his policy would be coalition building and a focus on European allies, as well as the use of multilateral institutions and the avoidance of pre-emptive war. There is nothing radical or even new in these principles. His discomfort with military spending is the only thing that might link him to the party’s left wing.
The problem he would face is the shifting international landscape, which would make it difficult to implement some of his policies. First, the tremendous diversity of international challenges would make holding the defense budget in check difficult. Second, and more important, is the difficulty of coalition building and multilateral action with the Europeans. Obama thus lacks both the force and the coalition to carry out his missions. He therefore would have no choice but to deal with the Russians while confronting the Afghan/Pakistani question even if he withdrew more quickly than he says he would from Iraq.
The make-or-break moment for Obama will come early, when he confronts the Europeans. If he can persuade them to take concerted action, including increased defense spending, then much of his foreign policy rapidly falls into place, even if it is at the price of increasing U.S. defense spending. If the Europeans cannot come together (or be brought together) decisively, however, then he will have to improvise.
Obama would be the first Democrat in this century to take office inheriting a major war. Inheriting an ongoing war is perhaps the most difficult thing for a president to deal with. Its realities are already fixed and the penalties for defeat or compromise already defined. The war in Afghanistan has already been defined by U.S. President George W. Bush’s approach. Rewriting it will be enormously difficult, particularly when rewriting it depends on ending unilateralism and moving toward full coalition warfare when coalition partners are wary.
Obama’s problems are compounded by the fact that he does not only have to deal with an inherited war, but also a resurgent Russia. And he wants to depend on the same coalition for both. That will be enormously challenging for him, testing his diplomatic skills as well as geopolitical realities. As with all presidents, what he plans to do and what he would do are two different things. But it seems to us that his presidency would be defined by whether he can change the course of U.S.-European relations not by accepting European terms but by persuading them to accommodate U.S. interests.
An Obama presidency would not turn on this. There is no evidence that he lacks the ability to shift with reality — that he lacks Machiavellian virtue. But it still will be the first and critical test, one handed to him by the complex tensions of Democratic traditions and by a war he did not start.
Taken from www.stratfor.com
Senator Obama has issued position papers and made statements about his intended foreign policy. Like all Presidents, he would also be getting input from a variety of others, principally from his own party. This second analysis analyzes the foreign policy position of Sen. Obama and the Democratic Party.
By George Friedman
Barack Obama is the Democratic candidate for president. His advisers in foreign policy are generally Democrats. Together they carry with them an institutional memory of the Democratic Party’s approach to foreign policy, and are an expression of the complexity and divisions of that approach. Like the their Republican counterparts, in many ways they are going to be severely constrained as to what they can do both by the nature of the global landscape and American resources. But to some extent, they will also be constrained and defined by the tradition they come from. Understanding that tradition and Obama’s place is useful in understanding what an Obama presidency would look like in foreign affairs.
The most striking thing about the Democratic tradition is that it presided over the beginnings of the three great conflicts that defined the 20th century: Woodrow Wilson and World War I, Franklin Delano Roosevelt and World War II, and Harry S. Truman and the Cold War. (At this level of analysis, we will treat the episodes of the Cold War such as Korea, Vietnam or Grenada as simply subsets of one conflict.) This is most emphatically not to say that had Republicans won the presidency in 1916, 1940 or 1948, U.S. involvement in those wars could have been avoided.
Patterns in Democratic Foreign Policy
But it does give us a framework for considering persistent patterns of Democratic foreign policy. When we look at the conflicts, four things become apparent.
First, in all three conflicts, Democrats postponed the initiation of direct combat as long as possible. In only one, World War I, did Wilson decide to join the war without prior direct attack. Roosevelt maneuvered near war but did not enter the war until after Pearl Harbor. Truman also maneuvered near war but did not get into direct combat until after the North Korean invasion of South Korea. Indeed, even Wilson chose to go to war to protect free passage on the Atlantic. More important, he sought to prevent Germany from defeating the Russians and the Anglo-French alliance and to stop the subsequent German domination of Europe, which appeared possible. In other words, the Democratic approach to war was reactive. All three presidents reacted to events on the surface, while trying to shape them underneath the surface.
Second, all three wars were built around coalitions. The foundation of the three wars was that other nations were at risk and that the United States used a predisposition to resist (Germany in the first two wars, the Soviet Union in the last) as a framework for involvement. The United States under Democrats did not involve itself in war unilaterally. At the same time, the United States under Democrats made certain that the major burdens were shared by allies. Millions died in World War I, but the United States suffered 100,000 dead. In World War II, the United States suffered 500,000 dead in a war where perhaps 50 million soldiers and civilians died. In the Cold War, U.S. losses in direct combat were less than 100,000 while the losses to Chinese, Vietnamese, Koreans and others towered over that toll. The allies had a complex appreciation of the United States. On the one hand, they were grateful for the U.S. presence. On the other hand, they resented the disproportionate amounts of blood and effort shed. Some of the roots of anti-Americanism are to be found in this strategy.
Third, each of these wars ended with a Democratic president attempting to create a system of international institutions designed to limit the recurrence of war without directly transferring sovereignty to those institutions. Wilson championed the League of Nations. Roosevelt the United Nations. Bill Clinton, who presided over most of the post-Cold War world, constantly sought international institutions to validate U.S. actions. Thus, when the United Nations refused to sanction the Kosovo War, he designated NATO as an alternative international organization with the right to approve conflict. Indeed, Clinton championed a range of multilateral organizations during the 1990s, including everything from the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and later the World Trade Organization. All these presidents were deeply committed to multinational organizations to define permissible and impermissible actions.
And fourth, there is a focus on Europe in the Democratic view of the world. Roosevelt regarded Germany as the primary threat instead of the Pacific theater in World War II. And in spite of two land wars in Asia during the Cold War, the centerpiece of strategy remained NATO and Europe. The specific details have evolved over the last century, but the Democratic Party — and particularly the Democratic foreign policy establishment — historically has viewed Europe as a permanent interest and partner for the United States.
Thus, the main thrust of the Democratic tradition is deeply steeped in fighting wars, but approaches this task with four things in mind:
. Wars should not begin until the last possible moment and ideally should be initiated by the enemy.
.
. Wars must be fought in a coalition with much of the burden borne by partners.
.
. The outcome of wars should be an institutional legal framework to manage the peace, with the United States being the most influential force within this multilateral framework.
.
. Any such framework must be built on a trans-Atlantic relationship.
.
Democratic Party Fractures
That is one strand of Democratic foreign policy. A second strand emerged in the context of the Vietnam War. That war began under the Kennedy administration and was intensified by Lyndon Baines Johnson, particularly after 1964. The war did not go as expected. As the war progressed, the Democratic Party began to fragment. There were three factions involved in this.
The first faction consisted of foreign policy professionals and politicians who were involved in the early stages of war planning but turned against the war after 1967 when it clearly diverged from plans. The leading political figure of this faction was Robert F. Kennedy, who initially supported the war but eventually turned against it.
The second faction was more definitive. It consisted of people on the left wing of the Democratic Party — and many who went far to the left of the Democrats. This latter group not only turned against the war, it developed a theory of the U.S. role in the war that as a mass movement was unprecedented in the century. The view (it can only be sketched here) maintained that the United States was an inherently imperialist power. Rather than the benign image that Wilson, Roosevelt and Truman had of their actions, this faction reinterpreted American history going back into the 19th century as violent, racist and imperialist (in the most extreme faction’s view). Just as the United States annihilated the Native Americans, the United States was now annihilating the Vietnamese.
A third, more nuanced, faction argued that rather than an attempt to contain Soviet aggression, the Cold War was actually initiated by the United States out of irrational fear of the Soviets and out of imperialist ambitions. They saw the bombing of Hiroshima as a bid to intimidate the Soviet Union rather than an effort to end World War II, and the creation of NATO as having triggered the Cold War.
These three factions thus broke down into Democratic politicians such as RFK and George McGovern (who won the presidential nomination in 1972), radicals in the street who were not really Democrats, and revisionist scholars who for the most part were on the party’s left wing.
Ultimately, the Democratic Party split into two camps. Hubert Humphrey led the first along with Henry Jackson, who rejected the left’s interpretation of the U.S. role in Vietnam and claimed to speak for the Wilson-FDR-Truman strand in Democratic politics. McGovern led the second. His camp largely comprised the party’s left wing, which did not necessarily go as far as the most extreme critics of that tradition but was extremely suspicious of anti-communist ideology, the military and intelligence communities, and increased defense spending. The two camps conducted extended political warfare throughout the 1970s.
The presidency of Jimmy Carter symbolized the tensions. He came to power wanting to move beyond Vietnam, slashing and changing the CIA, controlling defense spending and warning the country of “an excessive fear of Communism.” But following the fall of the Shah of Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, he allowed Zbigniew Brzezinski, his national security adviser and now an adviser to Obama, to launch a guerrilla war against the Soviets using Islamist insurgents from across the Muslim world in Afghanistan. Carter moved from concern with anti-Communism to coalition warfare against the Soviets by working with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Afghan resistance fighters.
Carter was dealing with the realities of U.S. geopolitics, but the tensions within the Democratic tradition shaped his responses. During the Clinton administration, these internal tensions subsided to a great degree. In large part this was because there was no major war, and the military action that did occur — as in Haiti and Kosovo — was framed as humanitarian actions rather than as the pursuit of national power. That soothed the anti-war Democrats to a great deal, since their perspective was less pacifistic than suspicious of using war to enhance national power.
The Democrats Since 9/11
Since the Democrats have not held the presidency during the last eight years, judging how they might have responded to events is speculative. Statements made while in opposition are not necessarily predictive of what an administration might do. Nevertheless, Obama’s foreign policy outlook was shaped by the last eight years of Democrats struggling with the U.S.-jihadist war.
The Democrats responded to events of the last eight years as they traditionally do when the United States is attacked directly: The party’s anti-war faction contracted and the old Democratic tradition reasserted itself. This was particularly true of the decision to go to war in Afghanistan. Obviously, the war was a response to an attack and, given the mood of the country after 9/11, was an unassailable decision. But it had another set of characteristics that made it attractive to the Democrats. The military action in Afghanistan was taking place in the context of broad international support and within a coalition forming at all levels, from on the ground in Afghanistan to NATO and the United Nations. Second, U.S. motives did not appear to involve national self-interest, like increasing power or getting oil. It was not a war for national advantage, but a war of national self-defense.
The Democrats were much less comfortable with the Iraq war than they were with Afghanistan. The old splits reappeared, with many Democrats voting for the invasion and others against. There were complex and mixed reasons why each Democrat voted the way they did — some strategic, some purely political, some moral. Under the pressure of voting on the war, the historically fragile Democratic consensus broke apart, not so much in conflict as in disarray. One of the most important reasons for this was the sense of isolation from major European powers — particularly the French and Germans, whom the Democrats regarded as fundamental elements of any coalition. Without those countries, the Democrats regarded the United States as diplomatically isolated.
The intraparty conflict came later. As the war went badly, the anti-war movement in the party re-energized itself. They were joined later by many who had formerly voted for the war but were upset by the human and material cost and by the apparent isolation of the United States and so on. Both factions of the Democratic Party had reasons to oppose the Iraq war even while they supported the Afghan war.
Understanding Obama’s Foreign Policy
It is in light of this distinction that we can begin to understand Obama’s foreign policy. On Aug. 1, Obama said the following: “It is time to turn the page. When I am President, we will wage the war that has to be won, with a comprehensive strategy with five elements: getting out of Iraq and on to the right battlefield in Afghanistan and Pakistan; developing the capabilities and partnerships we need to take out the terrorists and the world’s most deadly weapons; engaging the world to dry up support for terror and extremism; restoring our values; and securing a more resilient homeland.”
Obama’s view of the Iraq war is that it should not have been fought in the first place, and that the current success in the war does not justify it or its cost. In this part, he speaks to the anti-war tradition in the party. He adds that Afghanistan and Pakistan are the correct battlefields, since this is where the attack emanated from. It should be noted that on several occasions Obama has pointed to Pakistan as part of the Afghan problem, and has indicated a willingness to intervene there if needed while demanding Pakistani cooperation. Moreover, Obama emphasizes the need for partnerships — for example, coalition partners — rather than unilateral action in Afghanistan and globally.
Responding to attack rather than pre-emptive attack, coalition warfare and multinational postwar solutions are central to Obama’s policy in the Islamic world. He therefore straddles the divide within the Democratic Party. He opposes the war in Iraq as pre-emptive, unilateral and outside the bounds of international organizations while endorsing the Afghan war and promising to expand it.
Obama’s problem would be applying these principles to the emerging landscape. He shaped his foreign policy preferences when the essential choices remained within the Islamic world — between dealing with Iraq and Afghanistan simultaneously versus focusing on Afghanistan primarily. After the Russian invasion of Georgia, Obama would face a more complex set of choices between the Islamic world and dealing with the Russian challenge.
Obama’s position on Georgia tracked with traditional Democratic approaches:
“Georgia’s economic recovery is an urgent strategic priority that demands the focused attention of the United States and our allies. That is why Senator Biden and I have called for $1 billion in reconstruction assistance to help the people of Georgia in this time of great trial. I also welcome NATO’s decision to establish a NATO-Georgia Commission and applaud the new French and German initiatives to continue work on these issues within the EU. The Bush administration should call for a U.S.-EU-Georgia summit in September that focuses on strategies for preserving Georgia’s territorial integrity and advancing its economic recovery.”
Obama avoided militaristic rhetoric and focused on multinational approaches to dealing with the problem, particularly via NATO and the European Union. In this and in Afghanistan, he has returned to a Democratic fundamental: the centrality of the U.S.-European relationship. In this sense, it is not accidental that he took a preconvention trip to Europe. It was both natural and a signal to the Democratic foreign policy establishment that he understands the pivotal position of Europe.
This view on multilateralism and NATO is summed up in a critical statement by Obama in a position paper:
“Today it’s become fashionable to disparage the United Nations, the World Bank, and other international organizations. In fact, reform of these bodies is urgently needed if they are to keep pace with the fast-moving threats we face. Such real reform will not come, however, by dismissing the value of these institutions, or by bullying other countries to ratify changes we have drafted in isolation. Real reform will come because we convince others that they too have a stake in change — that such reforms will make their world, and not just ours, more secure.
“Our alliances also require constant management and revision if they are to remain effective and relevant. For example, over the last 15 years, NATO has made tremendous strides in transforming from a Cold War security structure to a dynamic partnership for peace.
“Today, NATO’s challenge in Afghanistan has become a test case, in the words of Dick Lugar, of whether the alliance can ‘overcome the growing discrepancy between NATO’s expanding missions and its lagging capabilities.’”
Obama’s European Problem
The last paragraph represents the key challenge to Obama’s foreign policy, and where his first challenge would come from. Obama wants a coalition with Europe and wants Europe to strengthen itself. But Europe is deeply divided, and averse to increasing its defense spending or substantially increasing its military participation in coalition warfare. Obama’s multilateralism and Europeanism will quickly encounter the realities of Europe.
This would immediately affect his jihadist policy. At this point, Obama’s plan for a 16-month drawdown from Iraq is quite moderate, and the idea of focusing on Afghanistan and Pakistan is a continuation of Bush administration policy. But his challenge would be to increase NATO involvement. There is neither the will nor the capability to substantially increase Europe’s NATO participation in Afghanistan.
This problem would be even more difficult in dealing with Russia. Europe has no objection in principle to the Afghan war; it merely lacks the resources to substantially increase its presence there. But in the case of Russia, there is no European consensus. The Germans are dependent on the Russians for energy and do not want to risk that relationship; the French are more vocal but lack military capability, though they have made efforts to increase their commitment to Afghanistan. Obama says he wants to rely on multilateral agencies to address the Russian situation. That is possible diplomatically, but if the Russians press the issue further, as we expect, a stronger response will be needed. NATO will be unlikely to provide that response.
Obama would therefore face the problem of shifting the focus to Afghanistan and the added problem of balancing between an Islamic focus and a Russian focus. This will be a general problem of U.S. diplomacy. But Obama as a Democrat would have a more complex problem. Averse to unilateral actions and focused on Europe, Obama would face his first crisis in dealing with the limited support Europe can provide.
That will pose serious problems in both Afghanistan and Russia, which Obama would have to deal with. There is a hint in his thoughts on this when he says, “And as we strengthen NATO, we should also seek to build new alliances and relationships in other regions important to our interests in the 21st century.” The test would be whether these new coalitions will differ from, and be more effective than, the coalition of the willing.
Obama would face similar issues in dealing with the Iranians. His approach is to create a coalition to confront the Iranians and force them to abandon their nuclear program. He has been clear that he opposes that program, although less clear on other aspects of Iranian foreign policy. But again, his solution is to use a coalition to control Iran. That coalition disintegrated to a large extent after Russia and China both indicated that they had no interest in sanctions.
But the coalition Obama plans to rely on will have to be dramatically revived by unknown means, or an alternative coalition must be created, or the United States will have to deal with Afghanistan and Pakistan unilaterally. This reality places a tremendous strain on the core principles of Democratic foreign policy. To reconcile the tensions, he would have to rapidly come to an understanding with the Europeans in NATO on expanding their military forces. Since reaching out to the Europeans would be among his first steps, his first test would come early.
The Europeans would probably balk, and, if not, they would demand that the United States expand its defense spending as well. Obama has shown no inclination toward doing this. In October 2007, he said the following on defense: “I will cut tens of billions of dollars in wasteful spending. I will cut investments in unproven missile defense systems. I will not weaponize space. I will slow our development of future combat systems, and I will institute an independent defense priorities board to ensure that the quadrennial defense review is not used to justify unnecessary spending.”
Russia, Afghanistan and Defense Spending
In this, Obama is reaching toward the anti-war faction in his party, which regards military expenditures with distrust. He focused on advanced war-fighting systems, but did not propose cutting spending on counterinsurgency. But the dilemma is that in dealing with both insurgency and the Russians, Obama would come under pressure to do what he doesn’t want to do — namely, increase U.S. defense spending on advanced systems.
Obama has been portrayed as radical. That is far from the case. He is well within a century-long tradition of the Democratic Party, with an element of loyalty to the anti-war faction. But that element is an undertone to his policy, not its core. The core of his policy would be coalition building and a focus on European allies, as well as the use of multilateral institutions and the avoidance of pre-emptive war. There is nothing radical or even new in these principles. His discomfort with military spending is the only thing that might link him to the party’s left wing.
The problem he would face is the shifting international landscape, which would make it difficult to implement some of his policies. First, the tremendous diversity of international challenges would make holding the defense budget in check difficult. Second, and more important, is the difficulty of coalition building and multilateral action with the Europeans. Obama thus lacks both the force and the coalition to carry out his missions. He therefore would have no choice but to deal with the Russians while confronting the Afghan/Pakistani question even if he withdrew more quickly than he says he would from Iraq.
The make-or-break moment for Obama will come early, when he confronts the Europeans. If he can persuade them to take concerted action, including increased defense spending, then much of his foreign policy rapidly falls into place, even if it is at the price of increasing U.S. defense spending. If the Europeans cannot come together (or be brought together) decisively, however, then he will have to improvise.
Obama would be the first Democrat in this century to take office inheriting a major war. Inheriting an ongoing war is perhaps the most difficult thing for a president to deal with. Its realities are already fixed and the penalties for defeat or compromise already defined. The war in Afghanistan has already been defined by U.S. President George W. Bush’s approach. Rewriting it will be enormously difficult, particularly when rewriting it depends on ending unilateralism and moving toward full coalition warfare when coalition partners are wary.
Obama’s problems are compounded by the fact that he does not only have to deal with an inherited war, but also a resurgent Russia. And he wants to depend on the same coalition for both. That will be enormously challenging for him, testing his diplomatic skills as well as geopolitical realities. As with all presidents, what he plans to do and what he would do are two different things. But it seems to us that his presidency would be defined by whether he can change the course of U.S.-European relations not by accepting European terms but by persuading them to accommodate U.S. interests.
An Obama presidency would not turn on this. There is no evidence that he lacks the ability to shift with reality — that he lacks Machiavellian virtue. But it still will be the first and critical test, one handed to him by the complex tensions of Democratic traditions and by a war he did not start.
Taken from www.stratfor.com
Tuesday, September 23, 2008
Questions to Ask the Presidential Candidates
The New President and the Global Landscape
By George Friedman
It has often been said that presidential elections are all about the economy. That just isn't true. Harry Truman's second election was all about Korea. John Kennedy's election focused on missiles, Cuba and Berlin. Lyndon Johnson's and Richard Nixon's elections were heavily about Vietnam. Ronald Reagan's first election pivoted on Iran. George W. Bush's second election was about Iraq. We won't argue that presidential elections are all about foreign policy, but they are not all about the economy. The 2008 election will certainly contain a massive component of foreign policy.
We have no wish to advise you how to vote. That's your decision. What we want to do is try to describe what the world will look like to the new president and consider how each candidate is likely to respond to the world. In trying to consider whether to vote for John McCain or Barack Obama, it is obviously necessary to consider their stands on foreign policy issues. But we have to be cautious about campaign assertions. Kennedy claimed that the Soviets had achieved superiority in missiles over the United States, knowing full well that there was no missile gap. Johnson attacked Barry Goldwater for wanting to escalate the war in Vietnam at the same time he was planning an escalation. Nixon won the 1968 presidential election by claiming that he had a secret plan to end the war in Vietnam. What a candidate says is not always an indicator of what the candidate is thinking.
It gets even trickier when you consider that many of the most important foreign policy issues are not even imagined during the election campaign. Truman did not expect that his second term would be dominated by a war in Korea. Kennedy did not expect to be remembered for the Cuban missile crisis. Jimmy Carter never imagined in 1976 that his presidency would be wrecked by the fall of the Shah of Iran and the hostage crisis. George H. W. Bush didn't expect to be presiding over the collapse of communism or a war over Kuwait. George W. Bush (regardless of conspiracy theories) never expected his entire presidency to be defined by 9/11. If you read all of these presidents' position papers in detail, you would never get a hint as to what the really important foreign policy issues would be in their presidencies.
Between the unreliability of campaign promises and the unexpected in foreign affairs, predicting what presidents will do is a complex business. The decisions a president must make once in office are neither scripted nor conveniently timed. They frequently present themselves to the president and require decisions in hours that can permanently define his (or her) administration. Ultimately, voters must judge, by whatever means they might choose, whether the candidate has the virtue needed to make those decisions well.
Virtue, as we are using it here, is a term that comes from Machiavelli. It means the opposite of its conventional usage. A virtuous leader is one who is clever, cunning, decisive, ruthless and, above all, effective. Virtue is the ability to face the unexpected and make the right decision, without position papers, time to reflect or even enough information. The virtuous leader can do that. Others cannot. It is a gut call for a voter, and a tough one.
This does not mean that all we can do is guess about a candidate's nature. There are three things we can draw on. First, there is the political tradition the candidate comes from. There are more things connecting Republican and Democratic foreign policy than some would like to think, but there are also clear differences. Since each candidate comes from a different political tradition - as do his advisers - these traditions can point to how each candidate might react to events in the world. Second, there are indications in the positions the candidates take on ongoing events that everyone knows about, such as Iraq. Having pointed out times in which candidates have been deceptive, we still believe there is value in looking at their positions and seeing whether they are coherent and relevant. Finally, we can look at the future and try to predict what the world will look like over the next four years. In other words, we can try to limit the surprises as much as possible.
In order to try to draw this presidential campaign into some degree of focus on foreign policy, we will proceed in three steps. First, we will try to outline the foreign policy issues that we think will confront the new president, with the understanding that history might well throw in a surprise. Second, we will sketch the traditions and positions of both Obama and McCain to try to predict how they would respond to these events. Finally, after the foreign policy debate is over, we will try to analyze what they actually said within the framework we created.
Let me emphasize that this is not a partisan exercise. The best guarantee of objectivity is that there are members of our staff who are passionately (we might even say irrationally) committed to each of the candidates. They will be standing by to crush any perceived unfairness. It is Stratfor's core belief that it is possible to write about foreign policy, and even an election, without becoming partisan or polemical. It is a difficult task and we doubt we can satisfy everyone, but it is our goal and commitment.
The Post 9/11 World
Ever since 9/11 U.S. foreign policy has focused on the Islamic world. Starting in late 2002, the focus narrowed to Iraq. When the 2008 campaign for president began a year ago, it appeared Iraq would define the election almost to the exclusion of all other matters. Clearly, this is no longer the case, pointing to the dynamism of foreign affairs and opening the door to a range of other issues.
Iraq remains an issue, but it interacts with a range of other issues. Among these are the future of U.S.-Iranian relations; U.S. military strategy in Afghanistan and the availability of troops in Iraq for that mission; the future of U.S.-Pakistani relations and their impact on Afghanistan; the future of U.S.-Russian relations and the extent to which they will interfere in the region; resources available to contain Russian expansion; the future of the U.S. relationship with the Europeans and with NATO in the context of growing Russian power and the war in Afghanistan; Israel's role, caught as it is between Russia and Iran; and a host of only marginally related issues. Iraq may be subsiding, but that simply complicates the world facing the new president.
The list of problems facing the new president will be substantially larger than the problems facing George W. Bush, in breadth if not in intensity. The resources he will have to work with, military, political and economic, will not be larger for the first year at least. In terms of military capacity, much will hang on the degree to which Iraq continues to bog down more than a dozen U.S. brigade combat teams. Even thereafter, the core problem facing the next president will be the allocation of limited resources to an expanding number of challenges. The days when it was all about Iraq is over. It is now all about how to make the rubber band stretch without breaking.
Iraq remains the place to begin, however, since the shifts there help define the world the new president will face. To understand the international landscape the new president will face, it is essential to begin by understanding what happened in Iraq, and why Iraq is no longer the defining issue of this campaign.
A Stabilized Iraq and the U.S. Troop Dilemma
In 2006, it appeared that the situation in Iraq was both out of control and hopeless. Sunni insurgents were waging war against the United States, Shiite militias were taking shots at the Americans as well, and Sunnis and Shia were waging a war against each other. There seemed to be no way to bring the war to anything resembling a satisfactory solution.
When the Democrats took control of Congress in the 2006 elections, it appeared inevitable that the United States would begin withdrawing forces from Iraq. U.S expectations aside, this was the expectation by all parties in Iraq. Given that the United States was not expected to remain a decisive force in Iraq, all Iraqi parties discounted the Americans and maneuvered for position in anticipation of a post-American Iraq. The Iranians in particular saw an opportunity to limit a Sunni return to Iraq's security forces, thus reshaping the geopolitics of the region. U.S. fighting with Iraqi Sunnis intensified in preparation for the anticipated American withdrawal.
Bush's decision to increase forces rather than withdraw them dramatically changed the psychology of Iraq. It was assumed he had lost control of the situation. Bush's decision to surge forces in Iraq, regardless by how many troops, established two things. First, Bush remained in control of U.S. policy. Second, the assumption that the Americans were leaving was untrue. And suddenly, no one was certain that there would be a vacuum to be filled.
The deployment of forces proved helpful, as did the change in how the troops were used; recent leaks indicate that new weapon systems also played a key role. The most important factor, however, was the realization that the Americans were not leaving on Bush's watch. Since no one was sure who the next U.S. president would be, or what his policies might be, it was thus uncertain that the Americans would leave at all.
Everyone in Iraq suddenly recalculated. If the Americans weren't leaving, one option would be to make a deal with Bush, seen as weak and looking for historical validation. Alternatively, they could wait for Bush's successor. Iran remembers - without fondness - its decision not to seal a deal with Carter, instead preferring to wait for Reagan. Similarly, seeing foreign jihadists encroaching in Sunni regions and the Shia shaping the government in Baghdad, the Sunni insurgents began a fundamental reconsideration of their strategy.
Apart from reversing Iraq's expectations about the United States, part of Washington's general strategy was supplementing military operations with previously unthinkable political negotiations. First, the United States began talking to Iraq's Sunni nationalist insurgents, and found common ground with them. Neither the Sunni nationalists nor the United States liked the jihadists, and both wanted the Shia to form a coalition government. Second, back-channel U.S.-Iranian talks clearly took place. The Iranians realized that the possibility of a pro-Iranian government in Baghdad was evaporating. Iran's greatest fear was a Sunni Iraqi government armed and backed by the United States, recreating a version of the Hussein regime that had waged war with Iran for almost a decade. The Iranians decided that a neutral, coalition government was the best they could achieve, so they reined in the Shiite militia.
The net result of this was that the jihadists were marginalized and broken, and an uneasy coalition government was created in Baghdad, balanced between Iran and the United States. The Americans failed to create a pro-American government in Baghdad, but had blocked the emergence of a pro-Iranian government. Iraqi society remained fragmented and fragile, but a degree of peace unthinkable in 2006 had been created.
The first problem facing the next U.S. president will be deciding when and how many U.S. troops will be withdrawn from Iraq. Unlike 2006, this issue will not be framed by Iraq alone. First, there will be the urgency of increasing the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Second, there will be the need to create a substantial strategic reserve to deal with potential requirements in Pakistan, and just as important, responding to events in the former Soviet Union like the recent conflict in Georgia.
At the same time, too precipitous a U.S. withdrawal not only could destabilize the situation internally in Iraq, it could convince Iran that its dream of a pro-Iranian Iraq is not out of the question. In short, too rapid a withdrawal could lead to resumption of war in Iraq. But too slow a withdrawal could make the situation in Afghanistan untenable and open the door for other crises.
The foreign policy test for the next U.S. president will be calibrating three urgent requirements with a military force that is exhausted by five years of warfare in Iraq and seven in Afghanistan. This force was not significantly expanded since Sept. 11, making this the first global war the United States has ever fought without a substantial military expansion. Nothing the new president does will change this reality for several years, so he will be forced immediately into juggling insufficient forces without the option of precipitous withdrawal from Iraq unless he is prepared to accept the consequences, particularly of a more powerful Iran.
The Nuclear Chip and a Stable U.S.-Iranian Understanding
The nuclear issue has divided the United States and Iran for several years. The issue seems to come and go depending on events elsewhere. Thus, what was enormously urgent just prior to the Russo-Georgian war became much less pressing during and after it. This is not unreasonable in our point of view, because we regard Iran as much farther from nuclear weapons than others might, and we suspect that the Bush administration agrees given its recent indifference to the question.
Certainly, Iran is enriching uranium, and with that uranium, it could possibly explode a nuclear device. But the gap between a nuclear device and weapon is substantial, and all the enriched uranium in the world will not give the Iranians a weapon. To have a weapon, it must be ruggedized and miniaturized to fit on a rocket or to be carried on an attack aircraft. The technologies needed for that range from material science to advanced electronics to quality assurance. Creating a weapon is a huge project. In our view, Iran does not have the depth of integrated technical skills needed to achieve that goal.
As for North Korea, for Iran a very public nuclear program is a bargaining chip designed to extract concessions, particularly from the Americans. The Iranians have continued the program very publicly in spite of threats of Israeli and American attacks because it made the United States less likely to dismiss Iranian wishes in Tehran's true area of strategic interest, Iraq.
The United States must draw down its forces in Iraq to fight in Afghanistan. The Iranians have no liking for the Taliban, having nearly gone to war with them in 1998, and having aided the United States in Afghanistan in 2001. The United States needs Iran's commitment to a neutral Iraq to withdraw U.S. forces since Iran could destabilize Iraq overnight, though Tehran's ability to spin up Shiite proxies in Iraq has declined over the past year.
Therefore, the next president very quickly will face the question of how to deal with Iran. The Bush administration solution - relying on quiet understandings alongside public hostility - is one model. It is not necessarily a bad one, so long as forces remain in Iraq to control the situation. If the first decision the new U.S. president will have to make is how to transfer forces in Iraq elsewhere, the second decision will be how to achieve a more stable understanding with Iran.
This is particularly pressing in the context of a more assertive Russia that might reach out to Iran. The United States will need Iran more than Iran needs the United States under these circumstances. Washington will need Iran to abstain from action in Iraq but to act in Afghanistan. More significantly, the United States will need Iran not to enter into an understanding with Russia. The next president will have to figure out how to achieve all these things without giving away more than he needs to, and without losing his domestic political base in the process.
Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Taliban
The U.S. president also will have to come up with an Afghan policy, which really doesn't exist at this moment. The United States and its NATO allies have deployed about 50,000 troops in Afghanistan. To benchmark this, the Russians deployed around 120,000 by the mid-1980s, and were unable to pacify the country. Therefore the possibility of 60,000 troops - or even a few additional brigades on top of that - pacifying Afghanistan is minimal. The primary task of troops in Afghanistan now is to defend the Kabul regime and other major cities, and to try to keep the major roads open. More troops will make this easier, but by itself, it will not end the war.
The problem in Afghanistan is twofold. First, the Taliban defeated their rivals in Afghanistan during the civil war of the 1990s because they were the most cohesive force in the country, were politically adept and enjoyed Pakistani support. The Taliban's victory was not accidental; and all other things being equal, without the U.S. presence, they could win again. The United States never defeated the Taliban. Instead, the Taliban refused to engage in massed warfare against American airpower, retreated, dispersed and regrouped. In most senses, it is the same force that won the Afghan civil war.
The United States can probably block the Taliban from taking the cities, but to do more it must do three things. First, it must deny the Taliban sanctuary and lines of supply running from Pakistan. These two elements allowed the mujahideen to outlast the Soviets. They helped bring the Taliban to power. And they are fueling the Taliban today. Second, the United States must form effective coalitions with tribal groups hostile to the Taliban. To do this it needs the help of Iran, and more important, Washington must convince the tribes that it will remain in Afghanistan indefinitely - not an easy task. And third - the hardest task for the new president - the United States will have to engage the Taliban themselves, or at least important factions in the Taliban movement, in a political process. When we recall that the United States negotiated with the Sunni insurgents in Iraq, this is not as far-fetched as it appears.
The most challenging aspect to deal with in all this is Pakistan. The United States has two issues in the South Asian country. The first is the presence of al Qaeda in northern Pakistan. Al Qaeda has not carried out a successful operation in the United States since 2001, nor in Europe since 2005. Groups who use the al Qaeda label continue to operate in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, but they use the name to legitimize or celebrate their activities - they are not the same people who carried out 9/11. Most of al Qaeda prime's operatives are dead or scattered, and its main leaders, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, are not functional. The United States would love to capture bin Laden so as to close the books on al Qaeda, but the level of effort needed - assuming he is even alive - might outstrip U.S. capabilities.
The most difficult step politically for the new U.S. president will be to close the book on al Qaeda. This does not mean that a new group of operatives won't grow from the same soil, and it doesn't mean that Islamist terrorism is dead by any means. But it does mean that the particular entity the United States has been pursuing has effectively been destroyed, and the parts regenerating under its name are not as dangerous. Asserting victory will be extremely difficult for the new U.S. president. But without that step, a massive friction point between the United States and Pakistan will persist - one that isn't justified geopolitically and undermines a much more pressing goal.
The United States needs the Pakistani army to attack the Taliban in Pakistan, or failing that, permit the United States to attack them without hindrance from the Pakistani military. Either of these are nightmarishly difficult things for a Pakistani government to agree to, and harder still to carry out. Nevertheless, without cutting the line of supply to Pakistan, like Vietnam and the Ho Chi Minh Trail, Afghanistan cannot be pacified. Therefore, the new president will face the daunting task of persuading or coercing the Pakistanis to carry out an action that will massively destabilize their country without allowing the United States to get bogged down in a Pakistan it cannot hope to stabilize.
At the same time, the United States must begin the political process of creating some sort of coalition in Afghanistan that it can live with. The fact of the matter is that the United States has no long-term interest in Afghanistan except in ensuring that radical jihadists with global operational reach are not given sanctuary there. Getting an agreement to that effect will be hard. Guaranteeing compliance will be virtually impossible. Nevertheless, that is the task the next president must undertake.
There are too many moving parts in Afghanistan to be sanguine about the outcome. It is a much more complex situation than Iraq, if for no other reason than because the Taliban are a far more effective fighting force than anything the United States encountered in Iraq, the terrain far more unfavorable for the U.S. military, and the political actors much more cynical about American capabilities.
The next U.S. president will have to make a painful decision. He must either order a long-term holding action designed to protect the Karzai government, launch a major offensive that includes Pakistan but has insufficient forces, or withdraw. Geopolitically, withdrawal makes a great deal of sense. Psychologically, it could unhinge the region and regenerate al Qaeda-like forces. Politically, it would not be something a new president could do. But as he ponders Iraq, the future president will have to address Afghanistan. And as he ponders Afghanistan, he will have to think about the Russians.
The Russian Resurgence
When the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001, the Russians were allied with the United States. They facilitated the U.S. relationship with the Northern Alliance, and arranged for air bases in Central Asia. The American view of Russia was formed in the 1990s. It was seen as disintegrating, weak and ultimately insignificant to the global balance. The United States expanded NATO into the former Soviet Union in the Baltic states and said it wanted to expand it into Ukraine and Georgia. The Russians made it clear that they regarded this as a direct threat to their national security, resulting in the 2008 Georgian conflict.
The question now is where U.S.-Russian relations are going. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin called the collapse of the Soviet Union a geopolitical catastrophe. After Ukraine and Georgia, it is clear he does not trust the United States and that he intends to reassert his sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union. Georgia was lesson one. The current political crisis in Ukraine is the second lesson unfolding.
The re-emergence of a Russian empire in some form or another represents a far greater threat to the United States than the Islamic world. The Islamic world is divided and in chaos. It cannot coalesce into the caliphate that al Qaeda wanted to create by triggering a wave of revolutions in the Islamic world. Islamic terrorism remains a threat, but the geopolitical threat of a unifying Islamic power is not going to happen.
Russia is a different matter. The Soviet Union and the Russian empire both posed strategic threats because they could threaten Europe, the Middle East and China simultaneously. While this overstates the threat, it does provide some context. A united Eurasia is always powerful, and threatens to dominate the Eastern Hemisphere. Therefore, preventing Russia from reasserting its power in the former Soviet Union should take precedence over all other considerations.
The problem is that the United States and NATO together presently do not have the force needed to stop the Russians. The Russian army is not particularly powerful or effective, but it is facing forces that are far less powerful and effective. The United States has its forces tied down in Iraq and Afghanistan so that when the war in Georgia broke out, sending ground forces was simply not an option. The Russians are extremely aware of this window of opportunity, and are clearly taking advantage of it.
The Russians have two main advantages in this aside from American resource deficits. First, the Europeans are heavily dependent on Russian natural gas; German energy dependence on Moscow is particularly acute. The Europeans are in no military or economic position to take any steps against the Russians, as the resulting disruption would be disastrous. Second, as the United States maneuvers with Iran, the Russians can provide support to Iran, politically and in terms of military technology, that not only would challenge the United States, it might embolden the Iranians to try for a better deal in Iraq by destabilizing Iraq again. Finally, the Russians can pose lesser challenges in the Caribbean with Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba, as well as potentially supporting Middle Eastern terrorist groups and left-wing Latin American groups.
At this moment, the Russians have far more options than the Americans have. Therefore, the new U.S. president will have to design a policy for dealing with the Russians with few options at hand. This is where his decisions on Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan will intersect and compete with his decisions on Russia. Ideally, the United States would put forces in the Baltics - which are part of NATO - as well as in Ukraine and Georgia. But that is not an option and won't be for more than a year under the best of circumstances.
The United States therefore must attempt a diplomatic solution with Russia with very few sticks. The new president will need to try to devise a package of carrots - e.g., economic incentives - plus the long-term threat of a confrontation with the United States to persuade Moscow not to use its window of opportunity to reassert Russian regional hegemony. Since regional hegemony allows Russia to control its own destiny, the carrots will have to be very tempting, while the threat has to be particularly daunting. The president's task will be crafting the package and then convincing the Russians it has value.
European Disunity and Military Weakness
One of the problems the United States will face in these negotiations will be the Europeans. There is no such thing as a European foreign policy; there are only the foreign policies of the separate countries. The Germans, for example, do not want a confrontation with Russia under any circumstances. The United Kingdom, by contrast, is more willing to take a confrontational approach to Moscow. And the European military capability, massed and focused, is meager. The Europeans have badly neglected their military over the past 15 years. What deployable, expeditionary forces they have are committed to the campaign in Afghanistan. That means that in dealing with Russia, the Americans do not have united European support and certainly no meaningful military weight. This will make any diplomacy with the Russians extremely difficult.
One of the issues the new president eventually will have to face is the value of NATO and the Europeans as a whole. This was an academic matter while the Russians were prostrate. With the Russians becoming active, it will become an urgent issue. NATO expansion - and NATO itself - has lived in a world in which it faced no military threats. Therefore, it did not have to look at itself militarily. After Georgia, NATO's military power becomes very important, and without European commitment, NATO's military power independent of the United States - and the ability to deploy it - becomes minimal. If Germany opts out of confrontation, then NATO will be paralyzed legally, since it requires consensus, and geographically. For the United States alone cannot protect the Baltics without German participation.
The president really will have one choice affecting Europe: Accept the resurgence of Russia, or resist. If the president resists, he will have to limit his commitment to the Islamic world severely, rebalance the size and shape of the U.S. military and revitalize and galvanize NATO. If he cannot do all of those things, he will face some stark choices in Europe.
Israel, Turkey, China, and Latin America
Russian pressure is already reshaping aspects of the global system. The Israelis have approached Georgia very differently from the United States. They halted weapon sales to Georgia the week before the war, and have made it clear to Moscow that Israel does not intend to challenge Russia. The Russians met with Syrian President Bashar al Assad immediately after the war. This signaled the Israelis that Moscow was prepared to support Syria with weapons and with Russian naval ships in the port of Tartus if Israel supports Georgia, and other countries in the former Soviet Union, we assume. The Israelis appear to have let the Russians know that they would not do so, separating themselves from the U.S. position. The next president will have to re-examine the U.S. relationship with Israel if this breach continues to widen.
In the same way, the United States will have to address its relationship with Turkey. A long-term ally, Turkey has participated logistically in the Iraq occupation, but has not been enthusiastic. Turkey's economy is booming, its military is substantial and Turkish regional influence is growing. Turkey is extremely wary of being caught in a new Cold War between Russia and the United States, but this will be difficult to avoid. Turkey's interests are very threatened by a Russian resurgence, and Turkey is the U.S. ally with the most tools for countering Russia. Both sides will pressure Ankara mercilessly. More than Israel, Turkey will be critical both in the Islamic world and with the Russians. The new president will have to address U.S.-Turkish relations both in context and independent of Russia fairly quickly.
In some ways, China is the great beneficiary of all of this. In the early days of the Bush administration, there were some confrontations with China. As the war in Iraq calmed down, Washington seemed to be increasing its criticisms of China, perhaps even tacitly supporting Tibetan independence. With the re-emergence of Russia, the United States is now completely distracted. Contrary to perceptions, China is not a global military power. Its army is primarily locked in by geography and its navy is in no way an effective blue-water force. For its part, the United States is in no position to land troops on mainland China. Therefore, there is no U.S. geopolitical competition with China. The next president will have to deal with economic issues with China, but in the end, China will sell goods to the United States, and the United States will buy them.
Latin America has been a region of minimal interest to the United States in the last decade or longer. So long as no global power was using its territory, the United States did not care what presidents Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua - or even the Castros in Cuba - were doing. But with the Russians back in the Caribbean, at least symbolically, all of these countries suddenly become more important. At the moment, the United States has no Latin American policy worth noting; the new president will have to develop one.
Quite apart from the Russians, the future U.S. president will need to address Mexico. The security situation in Mexico is deteriorating substantially, and the U.S.-Mexican border remains porous. The cartels stretch from Mexico to the streets of American cities where their customers live. What happens in Mexico, apart from immigration issues, is obviously of interest to the United States. If the current trajectory continues, at some point in his administration, the new U.S. president will have to address Mexico - potentially in terms never before considered.
The U.S. Defense Budget
The single issue touching on all of these is the U.S. defense budget. The focus of defense spending over the past eight years has been the Army and Marine Corps - albeit with great reluctance. Former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was not an advocate of a heavy Army, favoring light forces and air power, but reality forced his successors to reallocate resources. In spite of this, the size of the Army remained the same - and insufficient for the broader challenges emerging.
The focus of defense spending was Fourth Generation warfare, essentially counterinsurgency. It became dogma in the military that we would not see peer-to-peer warfare for a long time. The re-emergence of Russia, however, obviously raises the specter of peer-to-peer warfare, which in turn means money for the Air Force as well as naval rearmament. All of these programs will take a decade or more to implement, so if Russia is to be a full-blown challenge by 2020, spending must begin now.
If we assume that the United States will not simply pull out of Iraq and Afghanistan, but will also commit troops to allies on Russia's periphery while retaining a strategic reserve - able to, for example, protect the U.S.-Mexican border - then we are assuming substantially increased spending on ground forces. But that will not be enough. The budgets for the Air Force and Navy will also have to begin rising.
U.S. national strategy is expressed in the defense budget. Every strategic decision the president makes has to be expressed in budget dollars with congressional approval. Without that, all of this is theoretical. The next president will have to start drafting his first defense budget shortly after taking office. If he chooses to engage all of the challenges, he must be prepared to increase defense spending. If he is not prepared to do that, he must concede that some areas of the world are beyond management. And he will have to decide which areas these are. In light of the foregoing, as we head toward the debate, 10 questions should be asked of the candidates:
1. If the United States removes its forces from Iraq slowly as both of you advocate, where will the troops come from to deal with Afghanistan and protect allies in the former Soviet Union?
2. The Russians sent 120,000 troops to Afghanistan and failed to pacify the country. How many troops do you think are necessary?
3. Do you believe al Qaeda prime is still active and worth pursuing?
4. Do you believe the Iranians are capable of producing a deliverable nuclear weapon during your term in office?
5. How do you plan to persuade the Pakistani government to go after the Taliban, and what support can you provide them if they do?
6. Do you believe the United States should station troops in the Baltic states, in Ukraine and Georgia as well as in other friendly countries to protect them from Russia?
7. Do you feel that NATO remains a viable alliance, and are the Europeans carrying enough of the burden?
8. Do you believe that Mexico represents a national security issue for the United States?
9. Do you believe that China represents a strategic challenge to the United States?
10. Do you feel that there has been tension between the United States and Israel over the Georgia issue?
Taken from www.stratfor.com
By George Friedman
It has often been said that presidential elections are all about the economy. That just isn't true. Harry Truman's second election was all about Korea. John Kennedy's election focused on missiles, Cuba and Berlin. Lyndon Johnson's and Richard Nixon's elections were heavily about Vietnam. Ronald Reagan's first election pivoted on Iran. George W. Bush's second election was about Iraq. We won't argue that presidential elections are all about foreign policy, but they are not all about the economy. The 2008 election will certainly contain a massive component of foreign policy.
We have no wish to advise you how to vote. That's your decision. What we want to do is try to describe what the world will look like to the new president and consider how each candidate is likely to respond to the world. In trying to consider whether to vote for John McCain or Barack Obama, it is obviously necessary to consider their stands on foreign policy issues. But we have to be cautious about campaign assertions. Kennedy claimed that the Soviets had achieved superiority in missiles over the United States, knowing full well that there was no missile gap. Johnson attacked Barry Goldwater for wanting to escalate the war in Vietnam at the same time he was planning an escalation. Nixon won the 1968 presidential election by claiming that he had a secret plan to end the war in Vietnam. What a candidate says is not always an indicator of what the candidate is thinking.
It gets even trickier when you consider that many of the most important foreign policy issues are not even imagined during the election campaign. Truman did not expect that his second term would be dominated by a war in Korea. Kennedy did not expect to be remembered for the Cuban missile crisis. Jimmy Carter never imagined in 1976 that his presidency would be wrecked by the fall of the Shah of Iran and the hostage crisis. George H. W. Bush didn't expect to be presiding over the collapse of communism or a war over Kuwait. George W. Bush (regardless of conspiracy theories) never expected his entire presidency to be defined by 9/11. If you read all of these presidents' position papers in detail, you would never get a hint as to what the really important foreign policy issues would be in their presidencies.
Between the unreliability of campaign promises and the unexpected in foreign affairs, predicting what presidents will do is a complex business. The decisions a president must make once in office are neither scripted nor conveniently timed. They frequently present themselves to the president and require decisions in hours that can permanently define his (or her) administration. Ultimately, voters must judge, by whatever means they might choose, whether the candidate has the virtue needed to make those decisions well.
Virtue, as we are using it here, is a term that comes from Machiavelli. It means the opposite of its conventional usage. A virtuous leader is one who is clever, cunning, decisive, ruthless and, above all, effective. Virtue is the ability to face the unexpected and make the right decision, without position papers, time to reflect or even enough information. The virtuous leader can do that. Others cannot. It is a gut call for a voter, and a tough one.
This does not mean that all we can do is guess about a candidate's nature. There are three things we can draw on. First, there is the political tradition the candidate comes from. There are more things connecting Republican and Democratic foreign policy than some would like to think, but there are also clear differences. Since each candidate comes from a different political tradition - as do his advisers - these traditions can point to how each candidate might react to events in the world. Second, there are indications in the positions the candidates take on ongoing events that everyone knows about, such as Iraq. Having pointed out times in which candidates have been deceptive, we still believe there is value in looking at their positions and seeing whether they are coherent and relevant. Finally, we can look at the future and try to predict what the world will look like over the next four years. In other words, we can try to limit the surprises as much as possible.
In order to try to draw this presidential campaign into some degree of focus on foreign policy, we will proceed in three steps. First, we will try to outline the foreign policy issues that we think will confront the new president, with the understanding that history might well throw in a surprise. Second, we will sketch the traditions and positions of both Obama and McCain to try to predict how they would respond to these events. Finally, after the foreign policy debate is over, we will try to analyze what they actually said within the framework we created.
Let me emphasize that this is not a partisan exercise. The best guarantee of objectivity is that there are members of our staff who are passionately (we might even say irrationally) committed to each of the candidates. They will be standing by to crush any perceived unfairness. It is Stratfor's core belief that it is possible to write about foreign policy, and even an election, without becoming partisan or polemical. It is a difficult task and we doubt we can satisfy everyone, but it is our goal and commitment.
The Post 9/11 World
Ever since 9/11 U.S. foreign policy has focused on the Islamic world. Starting in late 2002, the focus narrowed to Iraq. When the 2008 campaign for president began a year ago, it appeared Iraq would define the election almost to the exclusion of all other matters. Clearly, this is no longer the case, pointing to the dynamism of foreign affairs and opening the door to a range of other issues.
Iraq remains an issue, but it interacts with a range of other issues. Among these are the future of U.S.-Iranian relations; U.S. military strategy in Afghanistan and the availability of troops in Iraq for that mission; the future of U.S.-Pakistani relations and their impact on Afghanistan; the future of U.S.-Russian relations and the extent to which they will interfere in the region; resources available to contain Russian expansion; the future of the U.S. relationship with the Europeans and with NATO in the context of growing Russian power and the war in Afghanistan; Israel's role, caught as it is between Russia and Iran; and a host of only marginally related issues. Iraq may be subsiding, but that simply complicates the world facing the new president.
The list of problems facing the new president will be substantially larger than the problems facing George W. Bush, in breadth if not in intensity. The resources he will have to work with, military, political and economic, will not be larger for the first year at least. In terms of military capacity, much will hang on the degree to which Iraq continues to bog down more than a dozen U.S. brigade combat teams. Even thereafter, the core problem facing the next president will be the allocation of limited resources to an expanding number of challenges. The days when it was all about Iraq is over. It is now all about how to make the rubber band stretch without breaking.
Iraq remains the place to begin, however, since the shifts there help define the world the new president will face. To understand the international landscape the new president will face, it is essential to begin by understanding what happened in Iraq, and why Iraq is no longer the defining issue of this campaign.
A Stabilized Iraq and the U.S. Troop Dilemma
In 2006, it appeared that the situation in Iraq was both out of control and hopeless. Sunni insurgents were waging war against the United States, Shiite militias were taking shots at the Americans as well, and Sunnis and Shia were waging a war against each other. There seemed to be no way to bring the war to anything resembling a satisfactory solution.
When the Democrats took control of Congress in the 2006 elections, it appeared inevitable that the United States would begin withdrawing forces from Iraq. U.S expectations aside, this was the expectation by all parties in Iraq. Given that the United States was not expected to remain a decisive force in Iraq, all Iraqi parties discounted the Americans and maneuvered for position in anticipation of a post-American Iraq. The Iranians in particular saw an opportunity to limit a Sunni return to Iraq's security forces, thus reshaping the geopolitics of the region. U.S. fighting with Iraqi Sunnis intensified in preparation for the anticipated American withdrawal.
Bush's decision to increase forces rather than withdraw them dramatically changed the psychology of Iraq. It was assumed he had lost control of the situation. Bush's decision to surge forces in Iraq, regardless by how many troops, established two things. First, Bush remained in control of U.S. policy. Second, the assumption that the Americans were leaving was untrue. And suddenly, no one was certain that there would be a vacuum to be filled.
The deployment of forces proved helpful, as did the change in how the troops were used; recent leaks indicate that new weapon systems also played a key role. The most important factor, however, was the realization that the Americans were not leaving on Bush's watch. Since no one was sure who the next U.S. president would be, or what his policies might be, it was thus uncertain that the Americans would leave at all.
Everyone in Iraq suddenly recalculated. If the Americans weren't leaving, one option would be to make a deal with Bush, seen as weak and looking for historical validation. Alternatively, they could wait for Bush's successor. Iran remembers - without fondness - its decision not to seal a deal with Carter, instead preferring to wait for Reagan. Similarly, seeing foreign jihadists encroaching in Sunni regions and the Shia shaping the government in Baghdad, the Sunni insurgents began a fundamental reconsideration of their strategy.
Apart from reversing Iraq's expectations about the United States, part of Washington's general strategy was supplementing military operations with previously unthinkable political negotiations. First, the United States began talking to Iraq's Sunni nationalist insurgents, and found common ground with them. Neither the Sunni nationalists nor the United States liked the jihadists, and both wanted the Shia to form a coalition government. Second, back-channel U.S.-Iranian talks clearly took place. The Iranians realized that the possibility of a pro-Iranian government in Baghdad was evaporating. Iran's greatest fear was a Sunni Iraqi government armed and backed by the United States, recreating a version of the Hussein regime that had waged war with Iran for almost a decade. The Iranians decided that a neutral, coalition government was the best they could achieve, so they reined in the Shiite militia.
The net result of this was that the jihadists were marginalized and broken, and an uneasy coalition government was created in Baghdad, balanced between Iran and the United States. The Americans failed to create a pro-American government in Baghdad, but had blocked the emergence of a pro-Iranian government. Iraqi society remained fragmented and fragile, but a degree of peace unthinkable in 2006 had been created.
The first problem facing the next U.S. president will be deciding when and how many U.S. troops will be withdrawn from Iraq. Unlike 2006, this issue will not be framed by Iraq alone. First, there will be the urgency of increasing the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Second, there will be the need to create a substantial strategic reserve to deal with potential requirements in Pakistan, and just as important, responding to events in the former Soviet Union like the recent conflict in Georgia.
At the same time, too precipitous a U.S. withdrawal not only could destabilize the situation internally in Iraq, it could convince Iran that its dream of a pro-Iranian Iraq is not out of the question. In short, too rapid a withdrawal could lead to resumption of war in Iraq. But too slow a withdrawal could make the situation in Afghanistan untenable and open the door for other crises.
The foreign policy test for the next U.S. president will be calibrating three urgent requirements with a military force that is exhausted by five years of warfare in Iraq and seven in Afghanistan. This force was not significantly expanded since Sept. 11, making this the first global war the United States has ever fought without a substantial military expansion. Nothing the new president does will change this reality for several years, so he will be forced immediately into juggling insufficient forces without the option of precipitous withdrawal from Iraq unless he is prepared to accept the consequences, particularly of a more powerful Iran.
The Nuclear Chip and a Stable U.S.-Iranian Understanding
The nuclear issue has divided the United States and Iran for several years. The issue seems to come and go depending on events elsewhere. Thus, what was enormously urgent just prior to the Russo-Georgian war became much less pressing during and after it. This is not unreasonable in our point of view, because we regard Iran as much farther from nuclear weapons than others might, and we suspect that the Bush administration agrees given its recent indifference to the question.
Certainly, Iran is enriching uranium, and with that uranium, it could possibly explode a nuclear device. But the gap between a nuclear device and weapon is substantial, and all the enriched uranium in the world will not give the Iranians a weapon. To have a weapon, it must be ruggedized and miniaturized to fit on a rocket or to be carried on an attack aircraft. The technologies needed for that range from material science to advanced electronics to quality assurance. Creating a weapon is a huge project. In our view, Iran does not have the depth of integrated technical skills needed to achieve that goal.
As for North Korea, for Iran a very public nuclear program is a bargaining chip designed to extract concessions, particularly from the Americans. The Iranians have continued the program very publicly in spite of threats of Israeli and American attacks because it made the United States less likely to dismiss Iranian wishes in Tehran's true area of strategic interest, Iraq.
The United States must draw down its forces in Iraq to fight in Afghanistan. The Iranians have no liking for the Taliban, having nearly gone to war with them in 1998, and having aided the United States in Afghanistan in 2001. The United States needs Iran's commitment to a neutral Iraq to withdraw U.S. forces since Iran could destabilize Iraq overnight, though Tehran's ability to spin up Shiite proxies in Iraq has declined over the past year.
Therefore, the next president very quickly will face the question of how to deal with Iran. The Bush administration solution - relying on quiet understandings alongside public hostility - is one model. It is not necessarily a bad one, so long as forces remain in Iraq to control the situation. If the first decision the new U.S. president will have to make is how to transfer forces in Iraq elsewhere, the second decision will be how to achieve a more stable understanding with Iran.
This is particularly pressing in the context of a more assertive Russia that might reach out to Iran. The United States will need Iran more than Iran needs the United States under these circumstances. Washington will need Iran to abstain from action in Iraq but to act in Afghanistan. More significantly, the United States will need Iran not to enter into an understanding with Russia. The next president will have to figure out how to achieve all these things without giving away more than he needs to, and without losing his domestic political base in the process.
Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Taliban
The U.S. president also will have to come up with an Afghan policy, which really doesn't exist at this moment. The United States and its NATO allies have deployed about 50,000 troops in Afghanistan. To benchmark this, the Russians deployed around 120,000 by the mid-1980s, and were unable to pacify the country. Therefore the possibility of 60,000 troops - or even a few additional brigades on top of that - pacifying Afghanistan is minimal. The primary task of troops in Afghanistan now is to defend the Kabul regime and other major cities, and to try to keep the major roads open. More troops will make this easier, but by itself, it will not end the war.
The problem in Afghanistan is twofold. First, the Taliban defeated their rivals in Afghanistan during the civil war of the 1990s because they were the most cohesive force in the country, were politically adept and enjoyed Pakistani support. The Taliban's victory was not accidental; and all other things being equal, without the U.S. presence, they could win again. The United States never defeated the Taliban. Instead, the Taliban refused to engage in massed warfare against American airpower, retreated, dispersed and regrouped. In most senses, it is the same force that won the Afghan civil war.
The United States can probably block the Taliban from taking the cities, but to do more it must do three things. First, it must deny the Taliban sanctuary and lines of supply running from Pakistan. These two elements allowed the mujahideen to outlast the Soviets. They helped bring the Taliban to power. And they are fueling the Taliban today. Second, the United States must form effective coalitions with tribal groups hostile to the Taliban. To do this it needs the help of Iran, and more important, Washington must convince the tribes that it will remain in Afghanistan indefinitely - not an easy task. And third - the hardest task for the new president - the United States will have to engage the Taliban themselves, or at least important factions in the Taliban movement, in a political process. When we recall that the United States negotiated with the Sunni insurgents in Iraq, this is not as far-fetched as it appears.
The most challenging aspect to deal with in all this is Pakistan. The United States has two issues in the South Asian country. The first is the presence of al Qaeda in northern Pakistan. Al Qaeda has not carried out a successful operation in the United States since 2001, nor in Europe since 2005. Groups who use the al Qaeda label continue to operate in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, but they use the name to legitimize or celebrate their activities - they are not the same people who carried out 9/11. Most of al Qaeda prime's operatives are dead or scattered, and its main leaders, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, are not functional. The United States would love to capture bin Laden so as to close the books on al Qaeda, but the level of effort needed - assuming he is even alive - might outstrip U.S. capabilities.
The most difficult step politically for the new U.S. president will be to close the book on al Qaeda. This does not mean that a new group of operatives won't grow from the same soil, and it doesn't mean that Islamist terrorism is dead by any means. But it does mean that the particular entity the United States has been pursuing has effectively been destroyed, and the parts regenerating under its name are not as dangerous. Asserting victory will be extremely difficult for the new U.S. president. But without that step, a massive friction point between the United States and Pakistan will persist - one that isn't justified geopolitically and undermines a much more pressing goal.
The United States needs the Pakistani army to attack the Taliban in Pakistan, or failing that, permit the United States to attack them without hindrance from the Pakistani military. Either of these are nightmarishly difficult things for a Pakistani government to agree to, and harder still to carry out. Nevertheless, without cutting the line of supply to Pakistan, like Vietnam and the Ho Chi Minh Trail, Afghanistan cannot be pacified. Therefore, the new president will face the daunting task of persuading or coercing the Pakistanis to carry out an action that will massively destabilize their country without allowing the United States to get bogged down in a Pakistan it cannot hope to stabilize.
At the same time, the United States must begin the political process of creating some sort of coalition in Afghanistan that it can live with. The fact of the matter is that the United States has no long-term interest in Afghanistan except in ensuring that radical jihadists with global operational reach are not given sanctuary there. Getting an agreement to that effect will be hard. Guaranteeing compliance will be virtually impossible. Nevertheless, that is the task the next president must undertake.
There are too many moving parts in Afghanistan to be sanguine about the outcome. It is a much more complex situation than Iraq, if for no other reason than because the Taliban are a far more effective fighting force than anything the United States encountered in Iraq, the terrain far more unfavorable for the U.S. military, and the political actors much more cynical about American capabilities.
The next U.S. president will have to make a painful decision. He must either order a long-term holding action designed to protect the Karzai government, launch a major offensive that includes Pakistan but has insufficient forces, or withdraw. Geopolitically, withdrawal makes a great deal of sense. Psychologically, it could unhinge the region and regenerate al Qaeda-like forces. Politically, it would not be something a new president could do. But as he ponders Iraq, the future president will have to address Afghanistan. And as he ponders Afghanistan, he will have to think about the Russians.
The Russian Resurgence
When the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001, the Russians were allied with the United States. They facilitated the U.S. relationship with the Northern Alliance, and arranged for air bases in Central Asia. The American view of Russia was formed in the 1990s. It was seen as disintegrating, weak and ultimately insignificant to the global balance. The United States expanded NATO into the former Soviet Union in the Baltic states and said it wanted to expand it into Ukraine and Georgia. The Russians made it clear that they regarded this as a direct threat to their national security, resulting in the 2008 Georgian conflict.
The question now is where U.S.-Russian relations are going. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin called the collapse of the Soviet Union a geopolitical catastrophe. After Ukraine and Georgia, it is clear he does not trust the United States and that he intends to reassert his sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union. Georgia was lesson one. The current political crisis in Ukraine is the second lesson unfolding.
The re-emergence of a Russian empire in some form or another represents a far greater threat to the United States than the Islamic world. The Islamic world is divided and in chaos. It cannot coalesce into the caliphate that al Qaeda wanted to create by triggering a wave of revolutions in the Islamic world. Islamic terrorism remains a threat, but the geopolitical threat of a unifying Islamic power is not going to happen.
Russia is a different matter. The Soviet Union and the Russian empire both posed strategic threats because they could threaten Europe, the Middle East and China simultaneously. While this overstates the threat, it does provide some context. A united Eurasia is always powerful, and threatens to dominate the Eastern Hemisphere. Therefore, preventing Russia from reasserting its power in the former Soviet Union should take precedence over all other considerations.
The problem is that the United States and NATO together presently do not have the force needed to stop the Russians. The Russian army is not particularly powerful or effective, but it is facing forces that are far less powerful and effective. The United States has its forces tied down in Iraq and Afghanistan so that when the war in Georgia broke out, sending ground forces was simply not an option. The Russians are extremely aware of this window of opportunity, and are clearly taking advantage of it.
The Russians have two main advantages in this aside from American resource deficits. First, the Europeans are heavily dependent on Russian natural gas; German energy dependence on Moscow is particularly acute. The Europeans are in no military or economic position to take any steps against the Russians, as the resulting disruption would be disastrous. Second, as the United States maneuvers with Iran, the Russians can provide support to Iran, politically and in terms of military technology, that not only would challenge the United States, it might embolden the Iranians to try for a better deal in Iraq by destabilizing Iraq again. Finally, the Russians can pose lesser challenges in the Caribbean with Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba, as well as potentially supporting Middle Eastern terrorist groups and left-wing Latin American groups.
At this moment, the Russians have far more options than the Americans have. Therefore, the new U.S. president will have to design a policy for dealing with the Russians with few options at hand. This is where his decisions on Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan will intersect and compete with his decisions on Russia. Ideally, the United States would put forces in the Baltics - which are part of NATO - as well as in Ukraine and Georgia. But that is not an option and won't be for more than a year under the best of circumstances.
The United States therefore must attempt a diplomatic solution with Russia with very few sticks. The new president will need to try to devise a package of carrots - e.g., economic incentives - plus the long-term threat of a confrontation with the United States to persuade Moscow not to use its window of opportunity to reassert Russian regional hegemony. Since regional hegemony allows Russia to control its own destiny, the carrots will have to be very tempting, while the threat has to be particularly daunting. The president's task will be crafting the package and then convincing the Russians it has value.
European Disunity and Military Weakness
One of the problems the United States will face in these negotiations will be the Europeans. There is no such thing as a European foreign policy; there are only the foreign policies of the separate countries. The Germans, for example, do not want a confrontation with Russia under any circumstances. The United Kingdom, by contrast, is more willing to take a confrontational approach to Moscow. And the European military capability, massed and focused, is meager. The Europeans have badly neglected their military over the past 15 years. What deployable, expeditionary forces they have are committed to the campaign in Afghanistan. That means that in dealing with Russia, the Americans do not have united European support and certainly no meaningful military weight. This will make any diplomacy with the Russians extremely difficult.
One of the issues the new president eventually will have to face is the value of NATO and the Europeans as a whole. This was an academic matter while the Russians were prostrate. With the Russians becoming active, it will become an urgent issue. NATO expansion - and NATO itself - has lived in a world in which it faced no military threats. Therefore, it did not have to look at itself militarily. After Georgia, NATO's military power becomes very important, and without European commitment, NATO's military power independent of the United States - and the ability to deploy it - becomes minimal. If Germany opts out of confrontation, then NATO will be paralyzed legally, since it requires consensus, and geographically. For the United States alone cannot protect the Baltics without German participation.
The president really will have one choice affecting Europe: Accept the resurgence of Russia, or resist. If the president resists, he will have to limit his commitment to the Islamic world severely, rebalance the size and shape of the U.S. military and revitalize and galvanize NATO. If he cannot do all of those things, he will face some stark choices in Europe.
Israel, Turkey, China, and Latin America
Russian pressure is already reshaping aspects of the global system. The Israelis have approached Georgia very differently from the United States. They halted weapon sales to Georgia the week before the war, and have made it clear to Moscow that Israel does not intend to challenge Russia. The Russians met with Syrian President Bashar al Assad immediately after the war. This signaled the Israelis that Moscow was prepared to support Syria with weapons and with Russian naval ships in the port of Tartus if Israel supports Georgia, and other countries in the former Soviet Union, we assume. The Israelis appear to have let the Russians know that they would not do so, separating themselves from the U.S. position. The next president will have to re-examine the U.S. relationship with Israel if this breach continues to widen.
In the same way, the United States will have to address its relationship with Turkey. A long-term ally, Turkey has participated logistically in the Iraq occupation, but has not been enthusiastic. Turkey's economy is booming, its military is substantial and Turkish regional influence is growing. Turkey is extremely wary of being caught in a new Cold War between Russia and the United States, but this will be difficult to avoid. Turkey's interests are very threatened by a Russian resurgence, and Turkey is the U.S. ally with the most tools for countering Russia. Both sides will pressure Ankara mercilessly. More than Israel, Turkey will be critical both in the Islamic world and with the Russians. The new president will have to address U.S.-Turkish relations both in context and independent of Russia fairly quickly.
In some ways, China is the great beneficiary of all of this. In the early days of the Bush administration, there were some confrontations with China. As the war in Iraq calmed down, Washington seemed to be increasing its criticisms of China, perhaps even tacitly supporting Tibetan independence. With the re-emergence of Russia, the United States is now completely distracted. Contrary to perceptions, China is not a global military power. Its army is primarily locked in by geography and its navy is in no way an effective blue-water force. For its part, the United States is in no position to land troops on mainland China. Therefore, there is no U.S. geopolitical competition with China. The next president will have to deal with economic issues with China, but in the end, China will sell goods to the United States, and the United States will buy them.
Latin America has been a region of minimal interest to the United States in the last decade or longer. So long as no global power was using its territory, the United States did not care what presidents Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua - or even the Castros in Cuba - were doing. But with the Russians back in the Caribbean, at least symbolically, all of these countries suddenly become more important. At the moment, the United States has no Latin American policy worth noting; the new president will have to develop one.
Quite apart from the Russians, the future U.S. president will need to address Mexico. The security situation in Mexico is deteriorating substantially, and the U.S.-Mexican border remains porous. The cartels stretch from Mexico to the streets of American cities where their customers live. What happens in Mexico, apart from immigration issues, is obviously of interest to the United States. If the current trajectory continues, at some point in his administration, the new U.S. president will have to address Mexico - potentially in terms never before considered.
The U.S. Defense Budget
The single issue touching on all of these is the U.S. defense budget. The focus of defense spending over the past eight years has been the Army and Marine Corps - albeit with great reluctance. Former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was not an advocate of a heavy Army, favoring light forces and air power, but reality forced his successors to reallocate resources. In spite of this, the size of the Army remained the same - and insufficient for the broader challenges emerging.
The focus of defense spending was Fourth Generation warfare, essentially counterinsurgency. It became dogma in the military that we would not see peer-to-peer warfare for a long time. The re-emergence of Russia, however, obviously raises the specter of peer-to-peer warfare, which in turn means money for the Air Force as well as naval rearmament. All of these programs will take a decade or more to implement, so if Russia is to be a full-blown challenge by 2020, spending must begin now.
If we assume that the United States will not simply pull out of Iraq and Afghanistan, but will also commit troops to allies on Russia's periphery while retaining a strategic reserve - able to, for example, protect the U.S.-Mexican border - then we are assuming substantially increased spending on ground forces. But that will not be enough. The budgets for the Air Force and Navy will also have to begin rising.
U.S. national strategy is expressed in the defense budget. Every strategic decision the president makes has to be expressed in budget dollars with congressional approval. Without that, all of this is theoretical. The next president will have to start drafting his first defense budget shortly after taking office. If he chooses to engage all of the challenges, he must be prepared to increase defense spending. If he is not prepared to do that, he must concede that some areas of the world are beyond management. And he will have to decide which areas these are. In light of the foregoing, as we head toward the debate, 10 questions should be asked of the candidates:
1. If the United States removes its forces from Iraq slowly as both of you advocate, where will the troops come from to deal with Afghanistan and protect allies in the former Soviet Union?
2. The Russians sent 120,000 troops to Afghanistan and failed to pacify the country. How many troops do you think are necessary?
3. Do you believe al Qaeda prime is still active and worth pursuing?
4. Do you believe the Iranians are capable of producing a deliverable nuclear weapon during your term in office?
5. How do you plan to persuade the Pakistani government to go after the Taliban, and what support can you provide them if they do?
6. Do you believe the United States should station troops in the Baltic states, in Ukraine and Georgia as well as in other friendly countries to protect them from Russia?
7. Do you feel that NATO remains a viable alliance, and are the Europeans carrying enough of the burden?
8. Do you believe that Mexico represents a national security issue for the United States?
9. Do you believe that China represents a strategic challenge to the United States?
10. Do you feel that there has been tension between the United States and Israel over the Georgia issue?
Taken from www.stratfor.com
Tuesday, September 16, 2008
Deliver Greatness Every Day
VII. Summit Seven: Deliver Greatness, Every Day
“We give others the courage to do great things by our own example of doing great things.” Steve Ackerman
A. Witnessing Greatness Every Day
1. Who in your life do you currently most admire? Why? What does that person do, or demonstrate, that makes him worthy of your admiration?
2. Who do you currently most admire at work, at school, or in your community? Why? What does that person do, or demonstrate, that makes him worthy of your admiration?
3. Summit One: Take It On
a) How does that person take it on?
b) Where does that person fall on the Adversity Continuum?
c) If you had to guess, what assumptions do you think that person makes about adversity?
4. Summit Two: Summon Your Strengths
a) What is the toughest or most important thing you’ve seen that person pursue?
b) What skills did that person possess and develop to make it happen?
c) What strengths does that person summon in the face of adversity? Which ones do you most admire?
d) How do the teams that person assembles or joins complement his or her strengths to achieve a higher goal?
e) How does that person create positive interdependence, being roped together with others?
f) What does he bring to any team? Rate that person’s overall A Factor, W Factor, E Factor.
5. Summit Three: Engage Your CORE
a) Do you think that person has a high, moderate or low Adversity Quotient?
b) To what extent does that person tend to focus on what can be influenced (C), step up to make things better (O), contain bad things (R), and see or get past adverse events (E)?
c) On a scale of one to ten, how effectively does that person engage his CORE?
6. Summit Four: Pioneer Possibilities
a) What possibilities, big or small, has that person pioneered?
b) How does that person respond when someone says something import is impossible?
c) What Signature Systems have you seen that person apply?
7. Summit Five: Pack Light, Pack Right
a) On a scale of one to ten, where does that person score on Life Worth?
b) What examples can you think of when that person has forgone a desire in order to achieve something more important?
c) How effectively does that person strategically invest time, energy, and money on the things that matter most? To what extent does that person invest in his own well-being?
8. Summit Six: Suffer Well
a) What suffering, big or small, have you seen that person endure?
b) How did that person handle it? What effect did his approach to suffering have on others?
9. How would you describe that person’s relationship with adversity? Would you have chosen that person if he had never faced any adversity or had scored much lower on the Adversity Continuum?
B. Your Everyday Greatness Plan
1. Summit One: Take It On
a) Write down how you could take on and harness the adversity in a way that not only reduces your pain or achieves your goals, but also actually elevates others in the process. What lower level behavior do you need to stop? What’s the one thing that would have the most significant impact on your life and on those around you?
2. Summit Two: Summon Your Strengths
a) How can you summon your strengths to deliver greatness? What strengths do you have that will serve you best in this challenge and what strengths do you need to develop? Who do you need with you? Who must not be with you?
3. Summit Three: Engage Your CORE
a) How can you engage your CORE in a way that is uplifting to others?
4. Summit Four: Pioneer Possibilities
a) What challenges would most people consider impossible but would change the game if you could make them possible?
5. Summit Five: Pack Light, Pack Right
a) How can you pack light, pack right to have a positive impact on those around you?
6. Summit Six: Suffer Well
a) How can you respond to suffering in a way that encourages and empowers those around you?
From: The Adversity Advantage, Paul G. Stoltz and Erik Weihenmayer
“We give others the courage to do great things by our own example of doing great things.” Steve Ackerman
A. Witnessing Greatness Every Day
1. Who in your life do you currently most admire? Why? What does that person do, or demonstrate, that makes him worthy of your admiration?
2. Who do you currently most admire at work, at school, or in your community? Why? What does that person do, or demonstrate, that makes him worthy of your admiration?
3. Summit One: Take It On
a) How does that person take it on?
b) Where does that person fall on the Adversity Continuum?
c) If you had to guess, what assumptions do you think that person makes about adversity?
4. Summit Two: Summon Your Strengths
a) What is the toughest or most important thing you’ve seen that person pursue?
b) What skills did that person possess and develop to make it happen?
c) What strengths does that person summon in the face of adversity? Which ones do you most admire?
d) How do the teams that person assembles or joins complement his or her strengths to achieve a higher goal?
e) How does that person create positive interdependence, being roped together with others?
f) What does he bring to any team? Rate that person’s overall A Factor, W Factor, E Factor.
5. Summit Three: Engage Your CORE
a) Do you think that person has a high, moderate or low Adversity Quotient?
b) To what extent does that person tend to focus on what can be influenced (C), step up to make things better (O), contain bad things (R), and see or get past adverse events (E)?
c) On a scale of one to ten, how effectively does that person engage his CORE?
6. Summit Four: Pioneer Possibilities
a) What possibilities, big or small, has that person pioneered?
b) How does that person respond when someone says something import is impossible?
c) What Signature Systems have you seen that person apply?
7. Summit Five: Pack Light, Pack Right
a) On a scale of one to ten, where does that person score on Life Worth?
b) What examples can you think of when that person has forgone a desire in order to achieve something more important?
c) How effectively does that person strategically invest time, energy, and money on the things that matter most? To what extent does that person invest in his own well-being?
8. Summit Six: Suffer Well
a) What suffering, big or small, have you seen that person endure?
b) How did that person handle it? What effect did his approach to suffering have on others?
9. How would you describe that person’s relationship with adversity? Would you have chosen that person if he had never faced any adversity or had scored much lower on the Adversity Continuum?
B. Your Everyday Greatness Plan
1. Summit One: Take It On
a) Write down how you could take on and harness the adversity in a way that not only reduces your pain or achieves your goals, but also actually elevates others in the process. What lower level behavior do you need to stop? What’s the one thing that would have the most significant impact on your life and on those around you?
2. Summit Two: Summon Your Strengths
a) How can you summon your strengths to deliver greatness? What strengths do you have that will serve you best in this challenge and what strengths do you need to develop? Who do you need with you? Who must not be with you?
3. Summit Three: Engage Your CORE
a) How can you engage your CORE in a way that is uplifting to others?
4. Summit Four: Pioneer Possibilities
a) What challenges would most people consider impossible but would change the game if you could make them possible?
5. Summit Five: Pack Light, Pack Right
a) How can you pack light, pack right to have a positive impact on those around you?
6. Summit Six: Suffer Well
a) How can you respond to suffering in a way that encourages and empowers those around you?
From: The Adversity Advantage, Paul G. Stoltz and Erik Weihenmayer
Suffer Well
VI. Summit Six: Suffer Well
“I cannot imagine a fate more awful--a fate worse than death—than a life lived in perfect harmony and balance.” Carl Jung
The question in life is not whether you will ever have to suffer. Rather, it is this: When you do suffer, how will you suffer? Will you suffer poorly, or will you suffer well?
Suffering can be the highest-octane fuel for greatness. You need to learn to turn suffering into meaning and beauty, elevating everyone around you.
“Character cannot be developed in ease and quiet. Only through experience of trial and suffering can the soul be strengthened, vision cleared, ambition inspired, and success achieved.” Helen Keller
A. Suffering Defined
1. To suffer is to endure something painful. The more something means to you the more painful it may be. The power of suffering is its ability to STRIP away superficialities, ego, and distractions.
a) S: Severity—the magnitude of the pain
b) T: Time—how long you must endure the pain
c) R: Relativity—how severe your pain is when you are compared with those around you and your situation is compared with your own past or other hardships
d) I: Importance—how much the thing for which you are suffering matters
e) P: Price—how much you may or will lose as a result of the adversity
B. Ten Common Cracks and Chasms
1. Whining
a) Whining is irritating and drives others away. Often it occurs when there is a lack of merit in the whiner. It also implies inaction; the whiner is venting instead of trying to solve the problem.
2. Complaining
a) Complaining, expressing unhappiness about something, is slightly more constructive than whining. Sometimes it is good and beneficial to express our unhappiness in order to come to grips with it and to get past it. However, when overdone, it makes us weak, drains our energy, and lessens our determination. It is also contagious.
3. Blaming
a) When you blame others you give up control, taking the problem out of your power to change it. When you blame you also miss out on a vital piece of your own development. Learn from your mistakes and then move on.
4. Identifying
a) Identifying means to become one with your suffering in a bad way. You limit your potential when you label yourself according to your suffering, robbing you of the opportunity to grow through your suffering.
5. Anesthetizing
a) Often we shut down emotionally, use drugs or alcohol, become workaholics, or other electronic devices, such as TV, video games, the internet, and the like.
6. Escaping
a) You can run from suffering, but you can’t hide from it. Procrastination is one of the most popular forms of escape. We can also become driven, engage in risky behavior, or look for other socially unacceptable means to deal with our pain.
7. Rationalizing
a) Overextended strengths can become weaknesses. We can explain away almost anything. It is healthy when it helps you make sense of your life so you can come to grips with the compromises you made that got you where you are. It is unhealthy when you reason yourself out of what is possible so we don’t take responsibility for our own choices.
8. Denying
a) Denying refuses to acknowledge the pain so we don’t have to deal with it. Our culture sets up standards for what are acceptable and unacceptable ways of dealing with pain and suffering, so be careful not to evaluate someone else’s response to suffering based on your cultural standards. Denial occurs when we fail to completely accept the full magnitude of our suffering, the resulting consequences, or the severity of the source. While denial can protect us, it also denies us the tremendous power and opportunity of our suffering.
9. Pretending
a) Pretending is acting as though what we know exists does not exist. Some pretending is good, such as smiling even when you are sad, and faking it until you make it, or putting on a good front so that others are not adversely affected by your suffering. However, if others discover your deception, it will hurt your credibility and you will lose their trust. Pretending is dangerous when it becomes a barrier between others and our suffering. It also denies others the opportunity to share in our suffering with us.
10. Whitewashing
a) This is a more subtle form of pretending where we embellish something to make it look better than it really is. Whitewashing can keep us from what is real, robbing us of the benefits suffering provides.
11. Principles to Keep in Mind
a) It is human nature to use these
b) To a point, most can be used positively and for good reasons
c) Overused, all become destructive
d) These are often used with the best of intentions
e) We all use them
f) If abused, they prevent us from suffering well
C. Types of Suffering
1. Physical Suffering
“Pain is God’s megaphone.” C. S. Lewis
2. Emotional Suffering
a) Emotional suffering gets less sympathy than physical suffering. It tends to be more contagious, one’s worries easily become the worries of another.
3. Mental Suffering
a) We suffer mentally when we can’t seem to figure out and resolve a matter of great importance. It manifests itself in conundrums, quandaries, confusion, and ignorance.
4. Spiritual Suffering
a) This is usually private and hidden and occurs when we feel adrift, faithless, purposeless, hopeless and unconnected. It often occurs when we have fallen short or done wrong in some matter of great importance.
“Suffering, cheerfully endured, ceases to be suffering and is transmuted into an ineffable joy.” Mahatma Gandhi
D. Suffer Check
1. Work and Life
a) What is your single greatest cause of suffering at work?
b) What is your single greatest cause of suffering in your life?
c) On a scale of 1 to 10, rate each based on the STRIP criteria:
(1) Severity, Time, Relativity, Importance, Price
(2) Score: 5-15 (little suffering), 16-30 (noticeable discomfort), 31-45 (real pain), 46-50 (extreme suffering)
E. Positive Pessimism
1. Help alleviate some of the pain by joking about it being worse than it really is: “I’m not the nicest guy in the world, but at least I’m stupid.” “We may be on a tight budget, but at least the heating bill doubled.”
F. Bad Suffering
1. Bad suffering occurs when it makes us less instead of more; bitter rather than better. When we become meaner, smaller, or more selfish as a result of our pain, that is bad suffering. Suffering can be the ultimate excuse to stop trying. It is dangerous because no one will blame you if you quit. Suffering badly can also become a cultural norm. Suffering poorly is your right, but suffering well is your opportunity.
G. Good Suffering
1. Good suffering is elevating. It happens when we allow suffering to make us better people because of what we’ve been through. Good suffering can help strip you of all that is not essential. It can sweep you clean of pettiness, making you more magnanimous and selfless. It can also spawn hope in others, giving them the courage they need to persevere through their difficulties.
“Suffering becomes beautiful when anyone bears calamities with cheerfulness, not through insensibility but through greatness of mind.” Aristotle
2. How to Suffer Well:
a) Use suffering to help and enrich others
b) Use it to become a better person by demonstrating your highest character and virtue in the face of pain
c) Turn inward and privately harness it to expand your capacity for hardship
d) Use and transcend it by attacking life with renewed determination
e) Be human and acknowledge when it’s hard or it hurts, refusing to pretend it does not exist, robbing yourself of the potential lessons
f) Ask for help when you need it
g) Turn your suffering into a cause
h) Be open about it, letting others learn from what you are going through
3. The Suffer Well
a) How?
(1) How am I going to elevate myself and others, starting now?
b) Who?
(1) Who is most affected by how I suffer?
c) What?
(1) What is my CORE with regard to your suffering? (Control, Ownership, Reach, Endurance)
d) Why?
(1) Why do I want to suffer well?
e) When?
(1) By when will I have said or done something that demonstrates my commitment to suffer well?
4. The Suffer Shifter
a) The one area in which I currently suffer the most is:
b) On the basis of all I have learned about suffering poorly, one specific thing I commit myself to stop doing or do less of is:
c) On the basis of all I have learned about suffering poorly, one specific thing I commit myself to start doing more of is:
d) As a result of these commitments, I and the people around me should enjoy the following benefits:
From: The Adversity Advantage, Paul G. Stoltz and Erik Weihenmayer
“I cannot imagine a fate more awful--a fate worse than death—than a life lived in perfect harmony and balance.” Carl Jung
The question in life is not whether you will ever have to suffer. Rather, it is this: When you do suffer, how will you suffer? Will you suffer poorly, or will you suffer well?
Suffering can be the highest-octane fuel for greatness. You need to learn to turn suffering into meaning and beauty, elevating everyone around you.
“Character cannot be developed in ease and quiet. Only through experience of trial and suffering can the soul be strengthened, vision cleared, ambition inspired, and success achieved.” Helen Keller
A. Suffering Defined
1. To suffer is to endure something painful. The more something means to you the more painful it may be. The power of suffering is its ability to STRIP away superficialities, ego, and distractions.
a) S: Severity—the magnitude of the pain
b) T: Time—how long you must endure the pain
c) R: Relativity—how severe your pain is when you are compared with those around you and your situation is compared with your own past or other hardships
d) I: Importance—how much the thing for which you are suffering matters
e) P: Price—how much you may or will lose as a result of the adversity
B. Ten Common Cracks and Chasms
1. Whining
a) Whining is irritating and drives others away. Often it occurs when there is a lack of merit in the whiner. It also implies inaction; the whiner is venting instead of trying to solve the problem.
2. Complaining
a) Complaining, expressing unhappiness about something, is slightly more constructive than whining. Sometimes it is good and beneficial to express our unhappiness in order to come to grips with it and to get past it. However, when overdone, it makes us weak, drains our energy, and lessens our determination. It is also contagious.
3. Blaming
a) When you blame others you give up control, taking the problem out of your power to change it. When you blame you also miss out on a vital piece of your own development. Learn from your mistakes and then move on.
4. Identifying
a) Identifying means to become one with your suffering in a bad way. You limit your potential when you label yourself according to your suffering, robbing you of the opportunity to grow through your suffering.
5. Anesthetizing
a) Often we shut down emotionally, use drugs or alcohol, become workaholics, or other electronic devices, such as TV, video games, the internet, and the like.
6. Escaping
a) You can run from suffering, but you can’t hide from it. Procrastination is one of the most popular forms of escape. We can also become driven, engage in risky behavior, or look for other socially unacceptable means to deal with our pain.
7. Rationalizing
a) Overextended strengths can become weaknesses. We can explain away almost anything. It is healthy when it helps you make sense of your life so you can come to grips with the compromises you made that got you where you are. It is unhealthy when you reason yourself out of what is possible so we don’t take responsibility for our own choices.
8. Denying
a) Denying refuses to acknowledge the pain so we don’t have to deal with it. Our culture sets up standards for what are acceptable and unacceptable ways of dealing with pain and suffering, so be careful not to evaluate someone else’s response to suffering based on your cultural standards. Denial occurs when we fail to completely accept the full magnitude of our suffering, the resulting consequences, or the severity of the source. While denial can protect us, it also denies us the tremendous power and opportunity of our suffering.
9. Pretending
a) Pretending is acting as though what we know exists does not exist. Some pretending is good, such as smiling even when you are sad, and faking it until you make it, or putting on a good front so that others are not adversely affected by your suffering. However, if others discover your deception, it will hurt your credibility and you will lose their trust. Pretending is dangerous when it becomes a barrier between others and our suffering. It also denies others the opportunity to share in our suffering with us.
10. Whitewashing
a) This is a more subtle form of pretending where we embellish something to make it look better than it really is. Whitewashing can keep us from what is real, robbing us of the benefits suffering provides.
11. Principles to Keep in Mind
a) It is human nature to use these
b) To a point, most can be used positively and for good reasons
c) Overused, all become destructive
d) These are often used with the best of intentions
e) We all use them
f) If abused, they prevent us from suffering well
C. Types of Suffering
1. Physical Suffering
“Pain is God’s megaphone.” C. S. Lewis
2. Emotional Suffering
a) Emotional suffering gets less sympathy than physical suffering. It tends to be more contagious, one’s worries easily become the worries of another.
3. Mental Suffering
a) We suffer mentally when we can’t seem to figure out and resolve a matter of great importance. It manifests itself in conundrums, quandaries, confusion, and ignorance.
4. Spiritual Suffering
a) This is usually private and hidden and occurs when we feel adrift, faithless, purposeless, hopeless and unconnected. It often occurs when we have fallen short or done wrong in some matter of great importance.
“Suffering, cheerfully endured, ceases to be suffering and is transmuted into an ineffable joy.” Mahatma Gandhi
D. Suffer Check
1. Work and Life
a) What is your single greatest cause of suffering at work?
b) What is your single greatest cause of suffering in your life?
c) On a scale of 1 to 10, rate each based on the STRIP criteria:
(1) Severity, Time, Relativity, Importance, Price
(2) Score: 5-15 (little suffering), 16-30 (noticeable discomfort), 31-45 (real pain), 46-50 (extreme suffering)
E. Positive Pessimism
1. Help alleviate some of the pain by joking about it being worse than it really is: “I’m not the nicest guy in the world, but at least I’m stupid.” “We may be on a tight budget, but at least the heating bill doubled.”
F. Bad Suffering
1. Bad suffering occurs when it makes us less instead of more; bitter rather than better. When we become meaner, smaller, or more selfish as a result of our pain, that is bad suffering. Suffering can be the ultimate excuse to stop trying. It is dangerous because no one will blame you if you quit. Suffering badly can also become a cultural norm. Suffering poorly is your right, but suffering well is your opportunity.
G. Good Suffering
1. Good suffering is elevating. It happens when we allow suffering to make us better people because of what we’ve been through. Good suffering can help strip you of all that is not essential. It can sweep you clean of pettiness, making you more magnanimous and selfless. It can also spawn hope in others, giving them the courage they need to persevere through their difficulties.
“Suffering becomes beautiful when anyone bears calamities with cheerfulness, not through insensibility but through greatness of mind.” Aristotle
2. How to Suffer Well:
a) Use suffering to help and enrich others
b) Use it to become a better person by demonstrating your highest character and virtue in the face of pain
c) Turn inward and privately harness it to expand your capacity for hardship
d) Use and transcend it by attacking life with renewed determination
e) Be human and acknowledge when it’s hard or it hurts, refusing to pretend it does not exist, robbing yourself of the potential lessons
f) Ask for help when you need it
g) Turn your suffering into a cause
h) Be open about it, letting others learn from what you are going through
3. The Suffer Well
a) How?
(1) How am I going to elevate myself and others, starting now?
b) Who?
(1) Who is most affected by how I suffer?
c) What?
(1) What is my CORE with regard to your suffering? (Control, Ownership, Reach, Endurance)
d) Why?
(1) Why do I want to suffer well?
e) When?
(1) By when will I have said or done something that demonstrates my commitment to suffer well?
4. The Suffer Shifter
a) The one area in which I currently suffer the most is:
b) On the basis of all I have learned about suffering poorly, one specific thing I commit myself to stop doing or do less of is:
c) On the basis of all I have learned about suffering poorly, one specific thing I commit myself to start doing more of is:
d) As a result of these commitments, I and the people around me should enjoy the following benefits:
From: The Adversity Advantage, Paul G. Stoltz and Erik Weihenmayer
Sunday, September 14, 2008
Pack Light, Pack Right
V. Summit Five: Pack Light, Pack Right
“It’s tough to climb a mountain if you pack too much or if pack incorrectly. Likewise, it’s tough to be agile and effective at harnessing numerous adversities each day if you’re weighed down by all the competing priorities vying for your focus. When this happens, everyday distractions bury the potential for everyday greatness.”
A. Packing Right
1. Stuff
“You can never get enough of what you don’t need to make you happy.” Eric Hoffer
“Everyday greatness means rising above mediocrity, even then the gravitational pull is enormous. It means moving forward and up, when everyone else is camping. Sometimes it can even mean escaping comfort and welcoming adversity.”
a) Why More Has Become Less
(1) More stuff leads to more complexity, which leads to less time, less peace of mind, and less capacity to take on more important challenges.
(2) Often, the more we add the weaker we become.
b) Which Stuff is the Right Stuff?
(1) What is mission-critical for your life?
(2) The right stuff is the stuff that most enables and least hinders your efforts to deliver your own version of everyday greatness--to do the things you are meant to do in life.
c) How Much is Enough?
(1) Since most of us live well beyond “need” and well within “want” most of what we have is unnecessary.
(2) Pleasures are not evil, but if they detract from your higher calling, or worse yet, become your calling, you have a problem.
(3) Your desires should enable you to achieve your highest efforts. If they don’t, then they must be cut out.
(4) How much is enough? Exactly as much as it takes todo the thing you have been created and called to do.
d) Net Worth vs. Life Worth
“The cost of a thing is the amount of … life which is required to be exchanged for it, immediately or in the long run.” Henry David Thereau
(1) Net Worth
(a) Net Worth is what is left when you subtract everything you owe from everything you have.
(2) Life Worth
(a) Life Worth is the value you get from and give to life. It includes the stuff you give to life (love, energy, charity, thoughtfulness, kindness, etc.) and the stuff you get as a result (fulfillment, peace, contentment, etc.). What is your life worth?
(3) Net Worth-Life Worth Grid
(a) Step One
(i) Put an X at the spot that represents the balance you are striving for.
(b) Step Two
(i) Put a dot at the spot that indicates where you are right now
(c) Step Three
(i) Draw an arrow indicating the direction you are moving
(d) Consider Your Grid
(i) What’s the ideal combination of net worth and Life Worth? Most chose more Life Worth than net worth, and some choose the maximum of both. Very few chose more net worth over Life Worth.
(ii) How happy are you with your current balance of net worth and Life Worth? How close is it to where you want to be at this stage in your life? Do you let the pursuit of comfort get in the way of your higher cause?
(e) The Role of Adversity in Life Worth
(i) Adversity forces you to make tough choices between net worth and Life Worth.
(f) Repacking for Life Worth
(i) Take some time to spring clean your life and get rid of what you don’t need and add what you do need. Consider keeping, or adding, things that enhance the three A’s: Agility, Alchemy, and Adversity. If something hinders your capacity and weighs you down, get rid of it.
(g) Pack Check: Stuff
(i) Evaluate everything in your life and find at least five things that you can eliminate from your life to lighten your load, improve your agility and increase your energy. Ask these questions: Does my stuff…
(a) Hurt or help my agility?
(b) Sap or fuel my energy?
(c) Makes me worse or better?
(d) Suffocate or maximize my Life Worth?
(ii) What is one significant change I can make in how I use my money that will most directly fund my Life Worth?
(iii) What is one challenge or adversity I will confront to lighten my burden and increase my Life Worth?
(iv) So far, the most important lesson I’ve learned about stuff is…?
2. Time
“How we spend our days is, of course, how we spend our lives.” Annie Dillard
a) Just as indifference is the enemy of passion, worthless time is the enemy of achieving everyday greatness, and it is the demon of any enterprise. What things in your life are stealing your time and keeping you from achieving the most important thing in your life? Spend time and relentlessly evaluate all the time wasters you engage in and cut them out of your life.
b) The Time Challenge
(1) Level One Challenge: The Basics
(a) Which items on your calendar are critical? Why?
(b) Which items on your calendar are least enriching? Why?
(c) What are two or three things you could shed from your week that would substantially increase your Life Worth?
(2) Level Two Challenge: Advanced
(a) On a blank sheet of paper list all of your roles in life on the left-hand side (father, son, brother, boss, employee, coworker, student, etc.)
(b) Next to each role list one thing you have on your calendar for the next week that will most enhance your Life Worth in that role.
(c) List one challenge or adversity you would like to take on in each role to become more effective in that role.
(d) List one simple thing next to each role that you will commit to do over the coming week that will enhance your Life Worth.
(3) Pack Check: Time
(a) Evaluate everything in your schedule and eliminate those that diminish your agility and sap your energy. Ask these questions: Do my obligations…
(i) Hurt or help my agility?
(ii) Sap or fuel my energy?
(iii) Make me worse or better?
(iv) Suffocate or maximize my Life Worth?
(b) What is one significant change I can make in how I use my time that will most directly fund my Life Worth?
(c) What is one challenge or adversity I will confront to lighten my burden and increase my Life Worth?
(d) So far, the most important lesson I’ve learned about my use of time is…?
3. Work
“I believe you are your work. Don’t trade the stuff of your life, time, for nothing more than dollars. That’s a rotten bargain.” Rita Mae Brown
a) Prime Time—The Human Energy Grid
(1) What are the prime energy years of a contributing person’s life? Age 25-55
(2) What are the prime energy hours of a contributing person’s day? 7 am to 3 pm
(3) What are the prime energy days of a contributing person’s week? Monday through Thursday
b) Elevating the Day Job
(1) The first way is to infuse your present job with more Life Worth. Find ways to give your best in ways that add value to the lives of others.
c) From Paycheck to Reality Check
(1) The second way is to choose a job that adds to your Life Worth by allowing you to do something that is deeply important and adds value to other people.
d) Pack Check: Work
(1) What adjustments could you make at work to enhance your Life Worth, lighten your load, improve your agility, and increase your energy?
(2) On a scale of one to ten, to what extent does your current work affect your agility, energy, and ability to achieve everyday greatness?
(3) Ask these questions: Does my current work…
(a) Hurt or help my agility?
(b) Sap or fuel my energy?
(c) Make me worse or better?
(d) Suffocate or maximize my Life Worth?
(4) What is one significant change I can make in my work that will most directly improve my Life Worth?
(5) What is one challenge or adversity I will add to my work to increase my Life Worth?
(6) So far, the most important lesson I’ve learned about my work is…?
4. Self
“Look to your health; and if you have it, praise God, and value it next to a good conscience; for health is the second blessing that we mortals are capable of, —a blessing that money can’t buy.” Izaak Walton
a) How far can you go in life if you are exhausted, out of shape, spiritually empty, and emotionally spent? You need to take time to invest in yourself and achieve your best so you can give your best to others. Schedule time into your life to refuel and rejuvenate so you can elevate your life to a higher level.
b) Pack Check: Self
(1) What adjustments could you make in the way you treat yourself to enhance your Life Worth, lighten your load, improve your agility, and increase your energy?
(2) On a scale of one to ten, to what extent does the way you treat yourself affect your agility, energy, and ability to achieve everyday greatness?
(3) Ask these questions: Does the way I treat myself …
(a) Hurt or help my agility?
(b) Sap or fuel my energy?
(c) Make me worse or better?
(d) Suffocate or maximize my Life Worth?
(4) What is one significant change I can make in the way I treat myself that will most directly improve my Life Worth?
(5) What is one challenge or adversity I will add to my week to refuel and increase my Life Worth?
(6) So far, the most important lesson I’ve learned about how to treat myself is…?
c) Life is too short and too precious to load it down with anything or anyone who depletes our potential to become and do our best. It is my moral obligation to myself as honed as possible so I can have the greatest impact on the areas that truly matter the most, including helping others increase their Life Worth.
B. The Adversity Advantage Packing List
1. Stuff
a) What item or items could you purchase or add that would improve your three A’s?
2. Time
a) What is a new obligation or something to add to your schedule that would improve your three A’s?
3. Work
a) What will you add to your work to make it richer in Life Worth?
4. Self
a) What will you add to your life to optimize your energy, your outlook, and the three A’s?
From: The Adversity Advantage, Paul G. Stoltz and Erik Weihenmayer
“It’s tough to climb a mountain if you pack too much or if pack incorrectly. Likewise, it’s tough to be agile and effective at harnessing numerous adversities each day if you’re weighed down by all the competing priorities vying for your focus. When this happens, everyday distractions bury the potential for everyday greatness.”
A. Packing Right
1. Stuff
“You can never get enough of what you don’t need to make you happy.” Eric Hoffer
“Everyday greatness means rising above mediocrity, even then the gravitational pull is enormous. It means moving forward and up, when everyone else is camping. Sometimes it can even mean escaping comfort and welcoming adversity.”
a) Why More Has Become Less
(1) More stuff leads to more complexity, which leads to less time, less peace of mind, and less capacity to take on more important challenges.
(2) Often, the more we add the weaker we become.
b) Which Stuff is the Right Stuff?
(1) What is mission-critical for your life?
(2) The right stuff is the stuff that most enables and least hinders your efforts to deliver your own version of everyday greatness--to do the things you are meant to do in life.
c) How Much is Enough?
(1) Since most of us live well beyond “need” and well within “want” most of what we have is unnecessary.
(2) Pleasures are not evil, but if they detract from your higher calling, or worse yet, become your calling, you have a problem.
(3) Your desires should enable you to achieve your highest efforts. If they don’t, then they must be cut out.
(4) How much is enough? Exactly as much as it takes todo the thing you have been created and called to do.
d) Net Worth vs. Life Worth
“The cost of a thing is the amount of … life which is required to be exchanged for it, immediately or in the long run.” Henry David Thereau
(1) Net Worth
(a) Net Worth is what is left when you subtract everything you owe from everything you have.
(2) Life Worth
(a) Life Worth is the value you get from and give to life. It includes the stuff you give to life (love, energy, charity, thoughtfulness, kindness, etc.) and the stuff you get as a result (fulfillment, peace, contentment, etc.). What is your life worth?
(3) Net Worth-Life Worth Grid
(a) Step One
(i) Put an X at the spot that represents the balance you are striving for.
(b) Step Two
(i) Put a dot at the spot that indicates where you are right now
(c) Step Three
(i) Draw an arrow indicating the direction you are moving
(d) Consider Your Grid
(i) What’s the ideal combination of net worth and Life Worth? Most chose more Life Worth than net worth, and some choose the maximum of both. Very few chose more net worth over Life Worth.
(ii) How happy are you with your current balance of net worth and Life Worth? How close is it to where you want to be at this stage in your life? Do you let the pursuit of comfort get in the way of your higher cause?
(e) The Role of Adversity in Life Worth
(i) Adversity forces you to make tough choices between net worth and Life Worth.
(f) Repacking for Life Worth
(i) Take some time to spring clean your life and get rid of what you don’t need and add what you do need. Consider keeping, or adding, things that enhance the three A’s: Agility, Alchemy, and Adversity. If something hinders your capacity and weighs you down, get rid of it.
(g) Pack Check: Stuff
(i) Evaluate everything in your life and find at least five things that you can eliminate from your life to lighten your load, improve your agility and increase your energy. Ask these questions: Does my stuff…
(a) Hurt or help my agility?
(b) Sap or fuel my energy?
(c) Makes me worse or better?
(d) Suffocate or maximize my Life Worth?
(ii) What is one significant change I can make in how I use my money that will most directly fund my Life Worth?
(iii) What is one challenge or adversity I will confront to lighten my burden and increase my Life Worth?
(iv) So far, the most important lesson I’ve learned about stuff is…?
2. Time
“How we spend our days is, of course, how we spend our lives.” Annie Dillard
a) Just as indifference is the enemy of passion, worthless time is the enemy of achieving everyday greatness, and it is the demon of any enterprise. What things in your life are stealing your time and keeping you from achieving the most important thing in your life? Spend time and relentlessly evaluate all the time wasters you engage in and cut them out of your life.
b) The Time Challenge
(1) Level One Challenge: The Basics
(a) Which items on your calendar are critical? Why?
(b) Which items on your calendar are least enriching? Why?
(c) What are two or three things you could shed from your week that would substantially increase your Life Worth?
(2) Level Two Challenge: Advanced
(a) On a blank sheet of paper list all of your roles in life on the left-hand side (father, son, brother, boss, employee, coworker, student, etc.)
(b) Next to each role list one thing you have on your calendar for the next week that will most enhance your Life Worth in that role.
(c) List one challenge or adversity you would like to take on in each role to become more effective in that role.
(d) List one simple thing next to each role that you will commit to do over the coming week that will enhance your Life Worth.
(3) Pack Check: Time
(a) Evaluate everything in your schedule and eliminate those that diminish your agility and sap your energy. Ask these questions: Do my obligations…
(i) Hurt or help my agility?
(ii) Sap or fuel my energy?
(iii) Make me worse or better?
(iv) Suffocate or maximize my Life Worth?
(b) What is one significant change I can make in how I use my time that will most directly fund my Life Worth?
(c) What is one challenge or adversity I will confront to lighten my burden and increase my Life Worth?
(d) So far, the most important lesson I’ve learned about my use of time is…?
3. Work
“I believe you are your work. Don’t trade the stuff of your life, time, for nothing more than dollars. That’s a rotten bargain.” Rita Mae Brown
a) Prime Time—The Human Energy Grid
(1) What are the prime energy years of a contributing person’s life? Age 25-55
(2) What are the prime energy hours of a contributing person’s day? 7 am to 3 pm
(3) What are the prime energy days of a contributing person’s week? Monday through Thursday
b) Elevating the Day Job
(1) The first way is to infuse your present job with more Life Worth. Find ways to give your best in ways that add value to the lives of others.
c) From Paycheck to Reality Check
(1) The second way is to choose a job that adds to your Life Worth by allowing you to do something that is deeply important and adds value to other people.
d) Pack Check: Work
(1) What adjustments could you make at work to enhance your Life Worth, lighten your load, improve your agility, and increase your energy?
(2) On a scale of one to ten, to what extent does your current work affect your agility, energy, and ability to achieve everyday greatness?
(3) Ask these questions: Does my current work…
(a) Hurt or help my agility?
(b) Sap or fuel my energy?
(c) Make me worse or better?
(d) Suffocate or maximize my Life Worth?
(4) What is one significant change I can make in my work that will most directly improve my Life Worth?
(5) What is one challenge or adversity I will add to my work to increase my Life Worth?
(6) So far, the most important lesson I’ve learned about my work is…?
4. Self
“Look to your health; and if you have it, praise God, and value it next to a good conscience; for health is the second blessing that we mortals are capable of, —a blessing that money can’t buy.” Izaak Walton
a) How far can you go in life if you are exhausted, out of shape, spiritually empty, and emotionally spent? You need to take time to invest in yourself and achieve your best so you can give your best to others. Schedule time into your life to refuel and rejuvenate so you can elevate your life to a higher level.
b) Pack Check: Self
(1) What adjustments could you make in the way you treat yourself to enhance your Life Worth, lighten your load, improve your agility, and increase your energy?
(2) On a scale of one to ten, to what extent does the way you treat yourself affect your agility, energy, and ability to achieve everyday greatness?
(3) Ask these questions: Does the way I treat myself …
(a) Hurt or help my agility?
(b) Sap or fuel my energy?
(c) Make me worse or better?
(d) Suffocate or maximize my Life Worth?
(4) What is one significant change I can make in the way I treat myself that will most directly improve my Life Worth?
(5) What is one challenge or adversity I will add to my week to refuel and increase my Life Worth?
(6) So far, the most important lesson I’ve learned about how to treat myself is…?
c) Life is too short and too precious to load it down with anything or anyone who depletes our potential to become and do our best. It is my moral obligation to myself as honed as possible so I can have the greatest impact on the areas that truly matter the most, including helping others increase their Life Worth.
B. The Adversity Advantage Packing List
1. Stuff
a) What item or items could you purchase or add that would improve your three A’s?
2. Time
a) What is a new obligation or something to add to your schedule that would improve your three A’s?
3. Work
a) What will you add to your work to make it richer in Life Worth?
4. Self
a) What will you add to your life to optimize your energy, your outlook, and the three A’s?
From: The Adversity Advantage, Paul G. Stoltz and Erik Weihenmayer
Wednesday, September 10, 2008
Commitment
Dennis Okholm, reviewing Kathleen Noris' book, Acedia & Me: A Marriage, Monks, and a Writer's Life, writes,
In a society where acedia results in relationships that are recycled more often than aluminum cans, Norris insists that what is most likely to maintain a marriage is not giddy romance but discipline, martyrdom, and obedience (which, at its etymological root, refers to hearing): "The very nature of marriage means saying yes before you know what it will cost. You may say the 'I do' of the wedding ritual in all sincerity, but it is the testing of that vow over time that makes you married." Good advice in a culture where that "five-o'clock somewhere" mirage always beckons.
Books & Culture, September/October 2008, Vol. 14, No. 5, Page 10.
In a society where acedia results in relationships that are recycled more often than aluminum cans, Norris insists that what is most likely to maintain a marriage is not giddy romance but discipline, martyrdom, and obedience (which, at its etymological root, refers to hearing): "The very nature of marriage means saying yes before you know what it will cost. You may say the 'I do' of the wedding ritual in all sincerity, but it is the testing of that vow over time that makes you married." Good advice in a culture where that "five-o'clock somewhere" mirage always beckons.
Books & Culture, September/October 2008, Vol. 14, No. 5, Page 10.
Thursday, September 4, 2008
Pioneering Possibilities
IV. Summit Four: Pioneer Possibilities
A. That’s Impossible
1. Thank people for being caring enough to look out for your best interests.
2. But then ask, “What if…? What if the thing you’ve always dreamed of doing is possible? How would it feel to be the one who made it happen? What if, by making the impossible possible, you opened a whole new world of opportunities for yourself, your organization, and the people around you?”
3. The first step to greatness is to select an adversity-rich, worthy challenge that will stretch you in new ways and represent new possibilities, if achieved.
4. The second step is to create a plan and engineer the systems that will be the key to helping you get there.
5. The third step is to practice to perfect so you can make those systems work when they count the most.
B. What is Pioneering?
1. Do you spend most of your time doing the tried and true or do you continually invent new ways of getting things done?
2. Plate: “The true creator is necessity, which is the mother of our invention.”
3. Three Steps of Pioneering:
a) Pick a worthy goal
b) Devise signature systems
c) Practice to perfect
C. Pick a Worthy Goal
1. Ask: What if I could do something that has never been done before?
2. Factors to consider:
a) Motivation: Why do you want to do it? Tie it to a higher, grander purpose.
b) Strengths: (Will + Skill = Strengths) To what extent would this goal leverage existing strengths or require the forging of new ones? Do you have the will necessary to achieve this goal?
c) Excitement: How excited does this goal make you?
D. Devise Signature Systems
1. You may need to invent new ways of doing things that are customized to your needs and situation. These solutions become uniquely yours.
2. “If necessity is the mother of invention, then adversity is the parent of our possibilities.”
3. The best solutions are PROPS:
a) Portable: you can take them from place to place.
b) Replicable or Repeatable: they can be readily rebuilt, reused or repeated.
c) Original: they tend to be clever and unique.
d) Personal: they fit and are adapted to you, your unique style and needs.
e) Simple: they require a minimum of steps, hassles, and resources.
E. Practice to Perfect
1. Adapt, revise and improve the systems until they are perfected. Don’t get discouraged but keep at it. Most ingenious systems are the result of tenacity, relentlessness and perseverance, not genius or brilliance.
2. Questions to ask:
a) What are the criteria for an effective Signature System or solution?
b) Where and how can you practice with the new system?
c) What will you try first?
d) How will you refine your solution?
e) Where or how else might you try it?
f) Who can give you helpful feedback?
g) When or how soon can you begin?
h) How long do you need to figure it out?
From: The Adversity Advantage, Paul G. Stoltz and Erik Weihenmayer
A. That’s Impossible
1. Thank people for being caring enough to look out for your best interests.
2. But then ask, “What if…? What if the thing you’ve always dreamed of doing is possible? How would it feel to be the one who made it happen? What if, by making the impossible possible, you opened a whole new world of opportunities for yourself, your organization, and the people around you?”
3. The first step to greatness is to select an adversity-rich, worthy challenge that will stretch you in new ways and represent new possibilities, if achieved.
4. The second step is to create a plan and engineer the systems that will be the key to helping you get there.
5. The third step is to practice to perfect so you can make those systems work when they count the most.
B. What is Pioneering?
1. Do you spend most of your time doing the tried and true or do you continually invent new ways of getting things done?
2. Plate: “The true creator is necessity, which is the mother of our invention.”
3. Three Steps of Pioneering:
a) Pick a worthy goal
b) Devise signature systems
c) Practice to perfect
C. Pick a Worthy Goal
1. Ask: What if I could do something that has never been done before?
2. Factors to consider:
a) Motivation: Why do you want to do it? Tie it to a higher, grander purpose.
b) Strengths: (Will + Skill = Strengths) To what extent would this goal leverage existing strengths or require the forging of new ones? Do you have the will necessary to achieve this goal?
c) Excitement: How excited does this goal make you?
D. Devise Signature Systems
1. You may need to invent new ways of doing things that are customized to your needs and situation. These solutions become uniquely yours.
2. “If necessity is the mother of invention, then adversity is the parent of our possibilities.”
3. The best solutions are PROPS:
a) Portable: you can take them from place to place.
b) Replicable or Repeatable: they can be readily rebuilt, reused or repeated.
c) Original: they tend to be clever and unique.
d) Personal: they fit and are adapted to you, your unique style and needs.
e) Simple: they require a minimum of steps, hassles, and resources.
E. Practice to Perfect
1. Adapt, revise and improve the systems until they are perfected. Don’t get discouraged but keep at it. Most ingenious systems are the result of tenacity, relentlessness and perseverance, not genius or brilliance.
2. Questions to ask:
a) What are the criteria for an effective Signature System or solution?
b) Where and how can you practice with the new system?
c) What will you try first?
d) How will you refine your solution?
e) Where or how else might you try it?
f) Who can give you helpful feedback?
g) When or how soon can you begin?
h) How long do you need to figure it out?
From: The Adversity Advantage, Paul G. Stoltz and Erik Weihenmayer
Rise of Russia, KGB and a New Cold War
The Second Cold War and Corporate Security
September 3, 2008
By Fred Burton and Scott Stewart
A lot has been written about last month’s conflict between Russia and Georgia, and the continuing tensions in the region. Certainly, there were many important lessons to be gleaned from the conflict relating to the Russian military, Russian foreign policy and the broader geopolitical balance of power.
One facet of the Russian operations in Georgia that has been somewhat overlooked is the intelligence aspect. Clearly, the speed with which the Russian military responded to the Georgian invasion of South Ossetia indicates that they were not caught off guard. They knew in advance what the Georgians were planning and had time to prepare their troops for a quick response to the Georgian offensive.
It is important to remember that the Russian operation in Georgia did not happen in a vacuum or without warning. It was a foreseeable outcome of the resurgence of Russian power that began in 1999 when Vladimir Putin came to power, and an outward demonstration of Russia’s increasing assertiveness. One important element of Russia’s ascendancy under Putin has been a resurgence of the Russian intelligence agencies. The excellent intelligence Russia had regarding Georgian intentions in South Ossetia is proof that the Russian intelligence agencies are indeed back in force. But Putin’s rise to power clearly demonstrates that while these intelligence elements may have been weakened, they were never totally gone.
As pressure continues to build between Russia and the West — and as we perhaps slip closer to a second Cold War — it is worth remembering that an actual armed conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact never took place despite military tension and some warfare between proxies. Rather, the Cold War was fought largely with intelligence services. Certainly, the Cold War led to the birth and rapid growth of huge intelligence agencies on both sides of the Iron Curtain. These intelligence agencies will also play a significant role in the current strain between Russia and the West.
The world has changed dramatically since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. In this age of globalization, e-commerce and outsourcing, there are many more Western companies with interests in Russia than during the Cold War. This means that an escalation of Cold War-type intelligence activity will have profound effects on multinational corporations.
Historical Context
The time period following the fall of the Soviet Union was catastrophic for Russia — workers went unpaid, social services collapsed and poverty was epidemic. The oligarchs seemingly stole everything that was not nailed down and organized crime groups became extremely powerful. Public corruption, which had been endemic (though somewhat predictable) in the old Soviet system, worsened dramatically. Many Russians were ashamed of what their country had become; others feared it would implode entirely.
Into this chaos came Vladimir Putin, a former Soviet intelligence officer who ascended in Russian politics due in part to his significant connections. But Putin’s rise was also largely aided by his firm handling of the second Chechen war in 1999 and the fact that he offered the Russian people hope that their national greatness could somehow be restored. While Putin left the Russian presidency in May 2008 and is now the prime minister again (as he was in the final months of the Yeltsin presidency), he continues to be immensely powerful and extremely popular. Most Russians believe Putin saved Russia from sure destruction.
A major part of Putin’s strategy to regain control over the government, economy, oligarchs and organized crime groups was his program to reorganize and strengthen the Russian intelligence agencies, which had been severely atrophied since the fall of the Soviet Union. During the 1990s, politicians such as Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin saw a powerful intelligence agency as a potential threat — with good reason. Because of this threat, laws were enacted to fracture and weaken the once-powerful agency. In 1991, the KGB was dismantled after a failed coup against Gorbachev in which some KGB units participated and tanks rolled onto Red Square.
Following additional failed coup attempts, the Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK), the KGB’s immediate successor, was split into several smaller agencies in 1995 under the perception that it remained too powerful. By creating competition among the smaller intelligence services, higher-ups hoped that additional coup attempts could be avoided. Following this shattering of the FSK, the counterintelligence core of the former KGB and FSK became known as the Federal Security Bureau (FSB). The foreign intelligence portion of the FSK became the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).
When Putin came into power, he instituted an ambitious plan to reconstitute the FSB. He has steadily worked to reconsolidate most of the splinter intelligence agencies back under the FSB, correcting much of the inefficiency that existed among the separate agencies and making the new combined agency stronger and more integrated. Moreover, since 1999, Putin has ensured that the FSB receive large funding increases to train, recruit and modernize after years of disregard. Currently, the SVR remains separate from the FSB, but other crucial components such as the Federal Border Service and Federal Guard Service have been reintegrated, as has the Federal Agency of Government Communications and Information (FAPSI), Russia’s equivalent of the U.S. National Security Agency.
Additionally, Putin has tapped many former KGB and current FSB members to fill positions within Russian big business, the Duma and other political posts. Putin’s initial reasoning was that those within the intelligence community thought of Russia the same way he did — as a great state domestically and internationally. Putin also knew that those within the intelligence community would not flinch at his sometimes brutal means of consolidating Russia politically, economically, socially and in other ways. It could be reasonably argued that Russia has become an “intelligence state” under Putin.
Since assuming power, Putin has also worked to strengthen the Russian military and the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence agency. The GRU was undoubtedly very involved in the operation in Georgia, as was the SVR. There are some who suggest that Russian agents of influence may have played a part in convincing Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili to attack South Ossetia and spring a trap the Russians had set.
Implications for Business
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, foreign corporations have been very busy in Russia as they scramble for market share, attempt to profit from Russia’s massive natural resources and seek to meet growing demand for consumer products. For these companies, growing Russian nationalism and tension with the West increases both the chance of regulatory and legal hassles and the possibility that Russian intelligence activity might be directed their way. In other words, as tensions rise, so could the risk for Western corporations.
Not all these problems are new. As a young KGB officer, Putin earned his living by stealing technology from the West. And he has since encouraged Russian intelligence agencies to expand their collection programs with the awareness that such information can assist the Russian economy and specifically the revival of the defense sector. While the Russians have an advanced weapons research and development infrastructure, they are very pragmatic. They do not see the need to spend the money to develop a technology from scratch when they can steal or buy it for a fraction of the cost and effort. This pragmatism was clearly demonstrated in their early nuclear weapons program.
Just as Russia’s reinvigorated intelligence collection efforts were gaining steam, the United States was hit by the 9/11 attacks. As a result, domestic intelligence agencies in the United States and many other Western nations focused on the counterterrorism mission and diverted counterintelligence resources to help in that fight. It would take several years for the domestic counterintelligence efforts to get back to their pre-9/11 levels, and like the Chinese, the Russian intelligence services took broad advantage of that window of opportunity to recruit sources and obtain critical information from foreign companies. Additionally, the Russians have gone to great lengths to steal intellectual property from foreign firms operating inside Russia, either by infiltrating their companies with agents or by recruiting employees.
The Russians are not only drawn to companies that produce sophisticated military equipment. Like the Chinese and others, they are interested in collecting information on emerging technology that is not yet classified but has potential military application. These sectors include materials research, nanotechnology, advanced electronics and information technology. Ultimately, however, they will not turn their backs on the opportunity to obtain sophisticated current weapons system data.
Russian collection and recruitment efforts will also not be confined to Russia or the United States. The Russians can gain as much information by recruiting an American businessman in Tokyo, Vienna or Mexico City as they can from one they recruit in New York or Seattle, if they choose their target wisely. The Soviets and Russians have long enjoyed operating out of third countries. During the Cold War, their primary platform for collecting intelligence against the United States was Mexico City, and their preferred platform to collect against European targets was Vienna.
Former KGB officers are also heavily involved in trafficking Russian and Eastern European women for prostitution in Tokyo, Dubai and Miami. These former KGB officers could easily utilize their positions of access to identify potential recruits for friends at their old agency, perhaps for a profit — consider how many former intelligence officers now are working as contractors for U.S. intelligence. The FSB/SVR might not be the KGB in name, but they clearly are the KGB in spirit and will not hesitate to use sexual or other blackmail if that is more effective than money, ideology or ego as a recruiting hook.
For Western companies operating inside Russia, an increase in tensions will, in all likelihood, mean an increased scrutiny of the companies’ activities as well as an increased focus on their expatriate employees in an effort to recruit sources and to locate Western intelligence officers. Like it or not, all intelligence agencies use nonofficial cover to get their officers into hostile countries — and corporate cover is widely used. Indeed, the Russians have long claimed that the United States and other countries have been using businesses and nongovernmental organizations to provide cover to intelligence officers seeking to undermine Russian influence in the former Soviet Union and to operate inside Russia itself.
Nonofficial cover officers (referred to as NOCs in intelligence parlance) are intelligence officers without visible links to their government and therefore not protected by diplomatic immunity. For this reason, NOC operations are somewhat riskier. Harder to identify as intelligence officers, NOCs are frequently assigned to sensitive tasks — those that a host country counterintelligence service would dearly love to learn about.
Keeping this in mind, Russian counterintelligence services will be carefully looking over the business visa applications of Western companies. Surveillance activities on expatriate employees will also likely increase as the Russians work to identify any potential undercover intelligence officers. They will also seek to recruit expatriate and local employees who can act as spotters to identify any potential intelligence officers.
This surveillance of Western businesses may apply to both corporate offices and employees’ residences. Businessmen may be physically surveilled and their residences subjected to technical surveillance and mail/garbage covers. Domestic workers may also be recruited in an effort to collect information on their employers. Known or suspected NOCs will be carefully watched and will likely even be overtly harassed.
So far, we have not heard of the Russians directing this type of aggressive surveillance activity against U.S. companies, or of U.S. companies having problems obtaining visas for their employees. But as the tensions increase between Russia and the United States, and as intelligence operations become increasingly hostile, it is only a matter of time before they do.
Taken from www.stratfor.com
September 3, 2008
By Fred Burton and Scott Stewart
A lot has been written about last month’s conflict between Russia and Georgia, and the continuing tensions in the region. Certainly, there were many important lessons to be gleaned from the conflict relating to the Russian military, Russian foreign policy and the broader geopolitical balance of power.
One facet of the Russian operations in Georgia that has been somewhat overlooked is the intelligence aspect. Clearly, the speed with which the Russian military responded to the Georgian invasion of South Ossetia indicates that they were not caught off guard. They knew in advance what the Georgians were planning and had time to prepare their troops for a quick response to the Georgian offensive.
It is important to remember that the Russian operation in Georgia did not happen in a vacuum or without warning. It was a foreseeable outcome of the resurgence of Russian power that began in 1999 when Vladimir Putin came to power, and an outward demonstration of Russia’s increasing assertiveness. One important element of Russia’s ascendancy under Putin has been a resurgence of the Russian intelligence agencies. The excellent intelligence Russia had regarding Georgian intentions in South Ossetia is proof that the Russian intelligence agencies are indeed back in force. But Putin’s rise to power clearly demonstrates that while these intelligence elements may have been weakened, they were never totally gone.
As pressure continues to build between Russia and the West — and as we perhaps slip closer to a second Cold War — it is worth remembering that an actual armed conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact never took place despite military tension and some warfare between proxies. Rather, the Cold War was fought largely with intelligence services. Certainly, the Cold War led to the birth and rapid growth of huge intelligence agencies on both sides of the Iron Curtain. These intelligence agencies will also play a significant role in the current strain between Russia and the West.
The world has changed dramatically since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. In this age of globalization, e-commerce and outsourcing, there are many more Western companies with interests in Russia than during the Cold War. This means that an escalation of Cold War-type intelligence activity will have profound effects on multinational corporations.
Historical Context
The time period following the fall of the Soviet Union was catastrophic for Russia — workers went unpaid, social services collapsed and poverty was epidemic. The oligarchs seemingly stole everything that was not nailed down and organized crime groups became extremely powerful. Public corruption, which had been endemic (though somewhat predictable) in the old Soviet system, worsened dramatically. Many Russians were ashamed of what their country had become; others feared it would implode entirely.
Into this chaos came Vladimir Putin, a former Soviet intelligence officer who ascended in Russian politics due in part to his significant connections. But Putin’s rise was also largely aided by his firm handling of the second Chechen war in 1999 and the fact that he offered the Russian people hope that their national greatness could somehow be restored. While Putin left the Russian presidency in May 2008 and is now the prime minister again (as he was in the final months of the Yeltsin presidency), he continues to be immensely powerful and extremely popular. Most Russians believe Putin saved Russia from sure destruction.
A major part of Putin’s strategy to regain control over the government, economy, oligarchs and organized crime groups was his program to reorganize and strengthen the Russian intelligence agencies, which had been severely atrophied since the fall of the Soviet Union. During the 1990s, politicians such as Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin saw a powerful intelligence agency as a potential threat — with good reason. Because of this threat, laws were enacted to fracture and weaken the once-powerful agency. In 1991, the KGB was dismantled after a failed coup against Gorbachev in which some KGB units participated and tanks rolled onto Red Square.
Following additional failed coup attempts, the Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK), the KGB’s immediate successor, was split into several smaller agencies in 1995 under the perception that it remained too powerful. By creating competition among the smaller intelligence services, higher-ups hoped that additional coup attempts could be avoided. Following this shattering of the FSK, the counterintelligence core of the former KGB and FSK became known as the Federal Security Bureau (FSB). The foreign intelligence portion of the FSK became the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).
When Putin came into power, he instituted an ambitious plan to reconstitute the FSB. He has steadily worked to reconsolidate most of the splinter intelligence agencies back under the FSB, correcting much of the inefficiency that existed among the separate agencies and making the new combined agency stronger and more integrated. Moreover, since 1999, Putin has ensured that the FSB receive large funding increases to train, recruit and modernize after years of disregard. Currently, the SVR remains separate from the FSB, but other crucial components such as the Federal Border Service and Federal Guard Service have been reintegrated, as has the Federal Agency of Government Communications and Information (FAPSI), Russia’s equivalent of the U.S. National Security Agency.
Additionally, Putin has tapped many former KGB and current FSB members to fill positions within Russian big business, the Duma and other political posts. Putin’s initial reasoning was that those within the intelligence community thought of Russia the same way he did — as a great state domestically and internationally. Putin also knew that those within the intelligence community would not flinch at his sometimes brutal means of consolidating Russia politically, economically, socially and in other ways. It could be reasonably argued that Russia has become an “intelligence state” under Putin.
Since assuming power, Putin has also worked to strengthen the Russian military and the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence agency. The GRU was undoubtedly very involved in the operation in Georgia, as was the SVR. There are some who suggest that Russian agents of influence may have played a part in convincing Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili to attack South Ossetia and spring a trap the Russians had set.
Implications for Business
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, foreign corporations have been very busy in Russia as they scramble for market share, attempt to profit from Russia’s massive natural resources and seek to meet growing demand for consumer products. For these companies, growing Russian nationalism and tension with the West increases both the chance of regulatory and legal hassles and the possibility that Russian intelligence activity might be directed their way. In other words, as tensions rise, so could the risk for Western corporations.
Not all these problems are new. As a young KGB officer, Putin earned his living by stealing technology from the West. And he has since encouraged Russian intelligence agencies to expand their collection programs with the awareness that such information can assist the Russian economy and specifically the revival of the defense sector. While the Russians have an advanced weapons research and development infrastructure, they are very pragmatic. They do not see the need to spend the money to develop a technology from scratch when they can steal or buy it for a fraction of the cost and effort. This pragmatism was clearly demonstrated in their early nuclear weapons program.
Just as Russia’s reinvigorated intelligence collection efforts were gaining steam, the United States was hit by the 9/11 attacks. As a result, domestic intelligence agencies in the United States and many other Western nations focused on the counterterrorism mission and diverted counterintelligence resources to help in that fight. It would take several years for the domestic counterintelligence efforts to get back to their pre-9/11 levels, and like the Chinese, the Russian intelligence services took broad advantage of that window of opportunity to recruit sources and obtain critical information from foreign companies. Additionally, the Russians have gone to great lengths to steal intellectual property from foreign firms operating inside Russia, either by infiltrating their companies with agents or by recruiting employees.
The Russians are not only drawn to companies that produce sophisticated military equipment. Like the Chinese and others, they are interested in collecting information on emerging technology that is not yet classified but has potential military application. These sectors include materials research, nanotechnology, advanced electronics and information technology. Ultimately, however, they will not turn their backs on the opportunity to obtain sophisticated current weapons system data.
Russian collection and recruitment efforts will also not be confined to Russia or the United States. The Russians can gain as much information by recruiting an American businessman in Tokyo, Vienna or Mexico City as they can from one they recruit in New York or Seattle, if they choose their target wisely. The Soviets and Russians have long enjoyed operating out of third countries. During the Cold War, their primary platform for collecting intelligence against the United States was Mexico City, and their preferred platform to collect against European targets was Vienna.
Former KGB officers are also heavily involved in trafficking Russian and Eastern European women for prostitution in Tokyo, Dubai and Miami. These former KGB officers could easily utilize their positions of access to identify potential recruits for friends at their old agency, perhaps for a profit — consider how many former intelligence officers now are working as contractors for U.S. intelligence. The FSB/SVR might not be the KGB in name, but they clearly are the KGB in spirit and will not hesitate to use sexual or other blackmail if that is more effective than money, ideology or ego as a recruiting hook.
For Western companies operating inside Russia, an increase in tensions will, in all likelihood, mean an increased scrutiny of the companies’ activities as well as an increased focus on their expatriate employees in an effort to recruit sources and to locate Western intelligence officers. Like it or not, all intelligence agencies use nonofficial cover to get their officers into hostile countries — and corporate cover is widely used. Indeed, the Russians have long claimed that the United States and other countries have been using businesses and nongovernmental organizations to provide cover to intelligence officers seeking to undermine Russian influence in the former Soviet Union and to operate inside Russia itself.
Nonofficial cover officers (referred to as NOCs in intelligence parlance) are intelligence officers without visible links to their government and therefore not protected by diplomatic immunity. For this reason, NOC operations are somewhat riskier. Harder to identify as intelligence officers, NOCs are frequently assigned to sensitive tasks — those that a host country counterintelligence service would dearly love to learn about.
Keeping this in mind, Russian counterintelligence services will be carefully looking over the business visa applications of Western companies. Surveillance activities on expatriate employees will also likely increase as the Russians work to identify any potential undercover intelligence officers. They will also seek to recruit expatriate and local employees who can act as spotters to identify any potential intelligence officers.
This surveillance of Western businesses may apply to both corporate offices and employees’ residences. Businessmen may be physically surveilled and their residences subjected to technical surveillance and mail/garbage covers. Domestic workers may also be recruited in an effort to collect information on their employers. Known or suspected NOCs will be carefully watched and will likely even be overtly harassed.
So far, we have not heard of the Russians directing this type of aggressive surveillance activity against U.S. companies, or of U.S. companies having problems obtaining visas for their employees. But as the tensions increase between Russia and the United States, and as intelligence operations become increasingly hostile, it is only a matter of time before they do.
Taken from www.stratfor.com
Wednesday, September 3, 2008
Russia Takes Advantage of U.S.'s Military Involvement in Middle East
The Medvedev Doctrine and American Strategy
September 2, 2008
By George Friedman
The United States has been fighting a war in the Islamic world since 2001. Its main theaters of operation are in Afghanistan and Iraq, but its politico-military focus spreads throughout the Islamic world, from Mindanao to Morocco. The situation on Aug. 7, 2008, was as follows:
The war in Iraq was moving toward an acceptable but not optimal solution. The government in Baghdad was not pro-American, but neither was it an Iranian puppet, and that was the best that could be hoped for. The United States anticipated pulling out troops, but not in a disorderly fashion.
The war in Afghanistan was deteriorating for the United States and NATO forces. The Taliban was increasingly effective, and large areas of the country were falling to its control. Force in Afghanistan was insufficient, and any troops withdrawn from Iraq would have to be deployed to Afghanistan to stabilize the situation. Political conditions in neighboring Pakistan were deteriorating, and that deterioration inevitably affected Afghanistan.
The United States had been locked in a confrontation with Iran over its nuclear program, demanding that Tehran halt enrichment of uranium or face U.S. action. The United States had assembled a group of six countries (the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany) that agreed with the U.S. goal, was engaged in negotiations with Iran, and had agreed at some point to impose sanctions on Iran if Tehran failed to comply. The United States was also leaking stories about impending air attacks on Iran by Israel or the United States if Tehran didn’t abandon its enrichment program. The United States had the implicit agreement of the group of six not to sell arms to Tehran, creating a real sense of isolation in Iran.
The Russian Resurgence
In short, the United States remained heavily committed to a region stretching from Iraq to Pakistan, with main force committed to Iraq and Afghanistan, and the possibility of commitments to Pakistan (and above all to Iran) on the table. U.S. ground forces were stretched to the limit, and U.S. airpower, naval and land-based forces had to stand by for the possibility of an air campaign in Iran — regardless of whether the U.S. planned an attack, since the credibility of a bluff depended on the availability of force.
The situation in this region actually was improving, but the United States had to remain committed there. It was therefore no accident that the Russians invaded Georgia on Aug. 8 following a Georgian attack on South Ossetia. Forgetting the details of who did what to whom, the United States had created a massive window of opportunity for the Russians: For the foreseeable future, the United States had no significant forces to spare to deploy elsewhere in the world, nor the ability to sustain them in extended combat. Moreover, the United States was relying on Russian cooperation both against Iran and potentially in Afghanistan, where Moscow’s influence with some factions remains substantial. The United States needed the Russians and couldn’t block the Russians. Therefore, the Russians inevitably chose this moment to strike.
On Sunday, Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev in effect ran up the Jolly Roger. Whatever the United States thought it was dealing with in Russia, Medvedev made the Russian position very clear. He stated Russian foreign policy in five succinct points, which we can think of as the Medvedev Doctrine (and which we see fit to quote here):
First, Russia recognizes the primacy of the fundamental principles of international law, which define the relations between civilized peoples. We will build our relations with other countries within the framework of these principles and this concept of international law.
Second, the world should be multipolar. A single-pole world is unacceptable. Domination is something we cannot allow. We cannot accept a world order in which one country makes all the decisions, even as serious and influential a country as the United States of America. Such a world is unstable and threatened by conflict.
Third, Russia does not want confrontation with any other country. Russia has no intention of isolating itself. We will develop friendly relations with Europe, the United States, and other countries, as much as is possible.
Fourth, protecting the lives and dignity of our citizens, wherever they may be, is an unquestionable priority for our country. Our foreign policy decisions will be based on this need. We will also protect the interests of our business community abroad. It should be clear to all that we will respond to any aggressive acts committed against us.
Finally, fifth, as is the case of other countries, there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests. These regions are home to countries with which we share special historical relations and are bound together as friends and good neighbors. We will pay particular attention to our work in these regions and build friendly ties with these countries, our close neighbors.
Medvedev concluded, “These are the principles I will follow in carrying out our foreign policy. As for the future, it depends not only on us but also on our friends and partners in the international community. They have a choice.”
The second point in this doctrine states that Russia does not accept the primacy of the United States in the international system. According to the third point, while Russia wants good relations with the United States and Europe, this depends on their behavior toward Russia and not just on Russia’s behavior. The fourth point states that Russia will protect the interests of Russians wherever they are — even if they live in the Baltic states or in Georgia, for example. This provides a doctrinal basis for intervention in such countries if Russia finds it necessary.
The fifth point is the critical one: “As is the case of other countries, there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests.” In other words, the Russians have special interests in the former Soviet Union and in friendly relations with these states. Intrusions by others into these regions that undermine pro-Russian regimes will be regarded as a threat to Russia’s “special interests.”
Thus, the Georgian conflict was not an isolated event — rather, Medvedev is saying that Russia is engaged in a general redefinition of the regional and global system. Locally, it would not be correct to say that Russia is trying to resurrect the Soviet Union or the Russian empire. It would be correct to say that Russia is creating a new structure of relations in the geography of its predecessors, with a new institutional structure with Moscow at its center. Globally, the Russians want to use this new regional power — and substantial Russian nuclear assets — to be part of a global system in which the United States loses its primacy.
These are ambitious goals, to say the least. But the Russians believe that the United States is off balance in the Islamic world and that there is an opportunity here, if they move quickly, to create a new reality before the United States is ready to respond. Europe has neither the military weight nor the will to actively resist Russia. Moreover, the Europeans are heavily dependent on Russian natural gas supplies over the coming years, and Russia can survive without selling it to them far better than the Europeans can survive without buying it. The Europeans are not a substantial factor in the equation, nor are they likely to become substantial.
This leaves the United States in an extremely difficult strategic position. The United States opposed the Soviet Union after 1945 not only for ideological reasons but also for geopolitical ones. If the Soviet Union had broken out of its encirclement and dominated all of Europe, the total economic power at its disposal, coupled with its population, would have allowed the Soviets to construct a navy that could challenge U.S. maritime hegemony and put the continental United States in jeopardy. It was U.S. policy during World Wars I and II and the Cold War to act militarily to prevent any power from dominating the Eurasian landmass. For the United States, this was the most important task throughout the 20th century.
The U.S.-jihadist war was waged in a strategic framework that assumed that the question of hegemony over Eurasia was closed. Germany’s defeat in World War II and the Soviet Union’s defeat in the Cold War meant that there was no claimant to Eurasia, and the United States was free to focus on what appeared to be the current priority — the defeat of radical Islamism. It appeared that the main threat to this strategy was the patience of the American public, not an attempt to resurrect a major Eurasian power.
The United States now faces a massive strategic dilemma, and it has limited military options against the Russians. It could choose a naval option, in which it would block the four Russian maritime outlets, the Sea of Japan and the Black, Baltic and Barents seas. The United States has ample military force with which to do this and could potentially do so without allied cooperation, which it would lack. It is extremely unlikely that the NATO council would unanimously support a blockade of Russia, which would be an act of war.
But while a blockade like this would certainly hurt the Russians, Russia is ultimately a land power. It is also capable of shipping and importing through third parties, meaning it could potentially acquire and ship key goods through European or Turkish ports (or Iranian ports, for that matter). The blockade option is thus more attractive on first glance than on deeper analysis.
More important, any overt U.S. action against Russia would result in counteractions. During the Cold War, the Soviets attacked American global interest not by sending Soviet troops, but by supporting regimes and factions with weapons and economic aid. Vietnam was the classic example: The Russians tied down 500,000 U.S. troops without placing major Russian forces at risk. Throughout the world, the Soviets implemented programs of subversion and aid to friendly regimes, forcing the United States either to accept pro-Soviet regimes, as with Cuba, or fight them at disproportionate cost.
In the present situation, the Russian response would strike at the heart of American strategy in the Islamic world. In the long run, the Russians have little interest in strengthening the Islamic world — but for the moment, they have substantial interest in maintaining American imbalance and sapping U.S. forces. The Russians have a long history of supporting Middle Eastern regimes with weapons shipments, and it is no accident that the first world leader they met with after invading Georgia was Syrian President Bashar al Assad. This was a clear signal that if the U.S. responded aggressively to Russia’s actions in Georgia, Moscow would ship a range of weapons to Syria — and far worse, to Iran. Indeed, Russia could conceivably send weapons to factions in Iraq that do not support the current regime, as well as to groups like Hezbollah. Moscow also could encourage the Iranians to withdraw their support for the Iraqi government and plunge Iraq back into conflict. Finally, Russia could ship weapons to the Taliban and work to further destabilize Pakistan.
At the moment, the United States faces the strategic problem that the Russians have options while the United States does not. Not only does the U.S. commitment of ground forces in the Islamic world leave the United States without strategic reserve, but the political arrangements under which these troops operate make them highly vulnerable to Russian manipulation — with few satisfactory U.S. counters.
The U.S. government is trying to think through how it can maintain its commitment in the Islamic world and resist the Russian reassertion of hegemony in the former Soviet Union. If the United States could very rapidly win its wars in the region, this would be possible. But the Russians are in a position to prolong these wars, and even without such agitation, the American ability to close off the conflicts is severely limited. The United States could massively increase the size of its army and make deployments into the Baltics, Ukraine and Central Asia to thwart Russian plans, but it would take years to build up these forces and the active cooperation of Europe to deploy them. Logistically, European support would be essential — but the Europeans in general, and the Germans in particular, have no appetite for this war. Expanding the U.S. Army is necessary, but it does not affect the current strategic reality.
This logistical issue might be manageable, but the real heart of this problem is not merely the deployment of U.S. forces in the Islamic world — it is the Russians’ ability to use weapons sales and covert means to deteriorate conditions dramatically. With active Russian hostility added to the current reality, the strategic situation in the Islamic world could rapidly spin out of control.
The United States is therefore trapped by its commitment to the Islamic world. It does not have sufficient forces to block Russian hegemony in the former Soviet Union, and if it tries to block the Russians with naval or air forces, it faces a dangerous riposte from the Russians in the Islamic world. If it does nothing, it creates a strategic threat that potentially towers over the threat in the Islamic world.
The United States now has to make a fundamental strategic decision. If it remains committed to its current strategy, it cannot respond to the Russians. If it does not respond to the Russians for five or 10 years, the world will look very much like it did from 1945 to 1992. There will be another Cold War at the very least, with a peer power much poorer than the United States but prepared to devote huge amounts of money to national defense.
There are four broad U.S. options:
Attempt to make a settlement with Iran that would guarantee the neutral stability of Iraq and permit the rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces there. Iran is the key here. The Iranians might also mistrust a re-emergent Russia, and while Tehran might be tempted to work with the Russians against the Americans, Iran might consider an arrangement with the United States — particularly if the United States refocuses its attentions elsewhere. On the upside, this would free the U.S. from Iraq. On the downside, the Iranians might not want —or honor — such a deal.
Enter into negotiations with the Russians, granting them the sphere of influence they want in the former Soviet Union in return for guarantees not to project Russian power into Europe proper. The Russians will be busy consolidating their position for years, giving the U.S. time to re-energize NATO. On the upside, this would free the United States to continue its war in the Islamic world. On the downside, it would create a framework for the re-emergence of a powerful Russian empire that would be as difficult to contain as the Soviet Union.
Refuse to engage the Russians and leave the problem to the Europeans. On the upside, this would allow the United States to continue war in the Islamic world and force the Europeans to act. On the downside, the Europeans are too divided, dependent on Russia and dispirited to resist the Russians. This strategy could speed up Russia’s re-emergence.
Rapidly disengage from Iraq, leaving a residual force there and in Afghanistan. The upside is that this creates a reserve force to reinforce the Baltics and Ukraine that might restrain Russia in the former Soviet Union. The downside is that it would create chaos in the Islamic world, threatening regimes that have sided with the United States and potentially reviving effective intercontinental terrorism. The trade-off is between a hegemonic threat from Eurasia and instability and a terror threat from the Islamic world.
We are pointing to very stark strategic choices. Continuing the war in the Islamic world has a much higher cost now than it did when it began, and Russia potentially poses a far greater threat to the United States than the Islamic world does. What might have been a rational policy in 2001 or 2003 has now turned into a very dangerous enterprise, because a hostile major power now has the option of making the U.S. position in the Middle East enormously more difficult.
If a U.S. settlement with Iran is impossible, and a diplomatic solution with the Russians that would keep them from taking a hegemonic position in the former Soviet Union cannot be reached, then the United States must consider rapidly abandoning its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and redeploying its forces to block Russian expansion. The threat posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War was far graver than the threat posed now by the fragmented Islamic world. In the end, the nations there will cancel each other out, and militant organizations will be something the United States simply has to deal with. This is not an ideal solution by any means, but the clock appears to have run out on the American war in the Islamic world.
We do not expect the United States to take this option. It is difficult to abandon a conflict that has gone on this long when it is not yet crystal clear that the Russians will actually be a threat later. (It is far easier for an analyst to make such suggestions than it is for a president to act on them.) Instead, the United States will attempt to bridge the Russian situation with gestures and half measures.
Nevertheless, American national strategy is in crisis. The United States has insufficient power to cope with two threats and must choose between the two. Continuing the current strategy means choosing to deal with the Islamic threat rather than the Russian one, and that is reasonable only if the Islamic threat represents a greater danger to American interests than the Russian threat does. It is difficult to see how the chaos of the Islamic world will cohere to form a global threat. But it is not difficult to imagine a Russia guided by the Medvedev Doctrine rapidly becoming a global threat and a direct danger to American interests.
We expect no immediate change in American strategic deployments — and we expect this to be regretted later. However, given U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney’s trip to the Caucasus region, now would be the time to see some movement in U.S. foreign policy. If Cheney isn’t going to be talking to the Russians, he needs to be talking to the Iranians. Otherwise, he will be writing checks in the region that the U.S. is in no position to cash.
Taken from: www.stratfor.com
September 2, 2008
By George Friedman
The United States has been fighting a war in the Islamic world since 2001. Its main theaters of operation are in Afghanistan and Iraq, but its politico-military focus spreads throughout the Islamic world, from Mindanao to Morocco. The situation on Aug. 7, 2008, was as follows:
The war in Iraq was moving toward an acceptable but not optimal solution. The government in Baghdad was not pro-American, but neither was it an Iranian puppet, and that was the best that could be hoped for. The United States anticipated pulling out troops, but not in a disorderly fashion.
The war in Afghanistan was deteriorating for the United States and NATO forces. The Taliban was increasingly effective, and large areas of the country were falling to its control. Force in Afghanistan was insufficient, and any troops withdrawn from Iraq would have to be deployed to Afghanistan to stabilize the situation. Political conditions in neighboring Pakistan were deteriorating, and that deterioration inevitably affected Afghanistan.
The United States had been locked in a confrontation with Iran over its nuclear program, demanding that Tehran halt enrichment of uranium or face U.S. action. The United States had assembled a group of six countries (the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany) that agreed with the U.S. goal, was engaged in negotiations with Iran, and had agreed at some point to impose sanctions on Iran if Tehran failed to comply. The United States was also leaking stories about impending air attacks on Iran by Israel or the United States if Tehran didn’t abandon its enrichment program. The United States had the implicit agreement of the group of six not to sell arms to Tehran, creating a real sense of isolation in Iran.
The Russian Resurgence
In short, the United States remained heavily committed to a region stretching from Iraq to Pakistan, with main force committed to Iraq and Afghanistan, and the possibility of commitments to Pakistan (and above all to Iran) on the table. U.S. ground forces were stretched to the limit, and U.S. airpower, naval and land-based forces had to stand by for the possibility of an air campaign in Iran — regardless of whether the U.S. planned an attack, since the credibility of a bluff depended on the availability of force.
The situation in this region actually was improving, but the United States had to remain committed there. It was therefore no accident that the Russians invaded Georgia on Aug. 8 following a Georgian attack on South Ossetia. Forgetting the details of who did what to whom, the United States had created a massive window of opportunity for the Russians: For the foreseeable future, the United States had no significant forces to spare to deploy elsewhere in the world, nor the ability to sustain them in extended combat. Moreover, the United States was relying on Russian cooperation both against Iran and potentially in Afghanistan, where Moscow’s influence with some factions remains substantial. The United States needed the Russians and couldn’t block the Russians. Therefore, the Russians inevitably chose this moment to strike.
On Sunday, Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev in effect ran up the Jolly Roger. Whatever the United States thought it was dealing with in Russia, Medvedev made the Russian position very clear. He stated Russian foreign policy in five succinct points, which we can think of as the Medvedev Doctrine (and which we see fit to quote here):
First, Russia recognizes the primacy of the fundamental principles of international law, which define the relations between civilized peoples. We will build our relations with other countries within the framework of these principles and this concept of international law.
Second, the world should be multipolar. A single-pole world is unacceptable. Domination is something we cannot allow. We cannot accept a world order in which one country makes all the decisions, even as serious and influential a country as the United States of America. Such a world is unstable and threatened by conflict.
Third, Russia does not want confrontation with any other country. Russia has no intention of isolating itself. We will develop friendly relations with Europe, the United States, and other countries, as much as is possible.
Fourth, protecting the lives and dignity of our citizens, wherever they may be, is an unquestionable priority for our country. Our foreign policy decisions will be based on this need. We will also protect the interests of our business community abroad. It should be clear to all that we will respond to any aggressive acts committed against us.
Finally, fifth, as is the case of other countries, there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests. These regions are home to countries with which we share special historical relations and are bound together as friends and good neighbors. We will pay particular attention to our work in these regions and build friendly ties with these countries, our close neighbors.
Medvedev concluded, “These are the principles I will follow in carrying out our foreign policy. As for the future, it depends not only on us but also on our friends and partners in the international community. They have a choice.”
The second point in this doctrine states that Russia does not accept the primacy of the United States in the international system. According to the third point, while Russia wants good relations with the United States and Europe, this depends on their behavior toward Russia and not just on Russia’s behavior. The fourth point states that Russia will protect the interests of Russians wherever they are — even if they live in the Baltic states or in Georgia, for example. This provides a doctrinal basis for intervention in such countries if Russia finds it necessary.
The fifth point is the critical one: “As is the case of other countries, there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests.” In other words, the Russians have special interests in the former Soviet Union and in friendly relations with these states. Intrusions by others into these regions that undermine pro-Russian regimes will be regarded as a threat to Russia’s “special interests.”
Thus, the Georgian conflict was not an isolated event — rather, Medvedev is saying that Russia is engaged in a general redefinition of the regional and global system. Locally, it would not be correct to say that Russia is trying to resurrect the Soviet Union or the Russian empire. It would be correct to say that Russia is creating a new structure of relations in the geography of its predecessors, with a new institutional structure with Moscow at its center. Globally, the Russians want to use this new regional power — and substantial Russian nuclear assets — to be part of a global system in which the United States loses its primacy.
These are ambitious goals, to say the least. But the Russians believe that the United States is off balance in the Islamic world and that there is an opportunity here, if they move quickly, to create a new reality before the United States is ready to respond. Europe has neither the military weight nor the will to actively resist Russia. Moreover, the Europeans are heavily dependent on Russian natural gas supplies over the coming years, and Russia can survive without selling it to them far better than the Europeans can survive without buying it. The Europeans are not a substantial factor in the equation, nor are they likely to become substantial.
This leaves the United States in an extremely difficult strategic position. The United States opposed the Soviet Union after 1945 not only for ideological reasons but also for geopolitical ones. If the Soviet Union had broken out of its encirclement and dominated all of Europe, the total economic power at its disposal, coupled with its population, would have allowed the Soviets to construct a navy that could challenge U.S. maritime hegemony and put the continental United States in jeopardy. It was U.S. policy during World Wars I and II and the Cold War to act militarily to prevent any power from dominating the Eurasian landmass. For the United States, this was the most important task throughout the 20th century.
The U.S.-jihadist war was waged in a strategic framework that assumed that the question of hegemony over Eurasia was closed. Germany’s defeat in World War II and the Soviet Union’s defeat in the Cold War meant that there was no claimant to Eurasia, and the United States was free to focus on what appeared to be the current priority — the defeat of radical Islamism. It appeared that the main threat to this strategy was the patience of the American public, not an attempt to resurrect a major Eurasian power.
The United States now faces a massive strategic dilemma, and it has limited military options against the Russians. It could choose a naval option, in which it would block the four Russian maritime outlets, the Sea of Japan and the Black, Baltic and Barents seas. The United States has ample military force with which to do this and could potentially do so without allied cooperation, which it would lack. It is extremely unlikely that the NATO council would unanimously support a blockade of Russia, which would be an act of war.
But while a blockade like this would certainly hurt the Russians, Russia is ultimately a land power. It is also capable of shipping and importing through third parties, meaning it could potentially acquire and ship key goods through European or Turkish ports (or Iranian ports, for that matter). The blockade option is thus more attractive on first glance than on deeper analysis.
More important, any overt U.S. action against Russia would result in counteractions. During the Cold War, the Soviets attacked American global interest not by sending Soviet troops, but by supporting regimes and factions with weapons and economic aid. Vietnam was the classic example: The Russians tied down 500,000 U.S. troops without placing major Russian forces at risk. Throughout the world, the Soviets implemented programs of subversion and aid to friendly regimes, forcing the United States either to accept pro-Soviet regimes, as with Cuba, or fight them at disproportionate cost.
In the present situation, the Russian response would strike at the heart of American strategy in the Islamic world. In the long run, the Russians have little interest in strengthening the Islamic world — but for the moment, they have substantial interest in maintaining American imbalance and sapping U.S. forces. The Russians have a long history of supporting Middle Eastern regimes with weapons shipments, and it is no accident that the first world leader they met with after invading Georgia was Syrian President Bashar al Assad. This was a clear signal that if the U.S. responded aggressively to Russia’s actions in Georgia, Moscow would ship a range of weapons to Syria — and far worse, to Iran. Indeed, Russia could conceivably send weapons to factions in Iraq that do not support the current regime, as well as to groups like Hezbollah. Moscow also could encourage the Iranians to withdraw their support for the Iraqi government and plunge Iraq back into conflict. Finally, Russia could ship weapons to the Taliban and work to further destabilize Pakistan.
At the moment, the United States faces the strategic problem that the Russians have options while the United States does not. Not only does the U.S. commitment of ground forces in the Islamic world leave the United States without strategic reserve, but the political arrangements under which these troops operate make them highly vulnerable to Russian manipulation — with few satisfactory U.S. counters.
The U.S. government is trying to think through how it can maintain its commitment in the Islamic world and resist the Russian reassertion of hegemony in the former Soviet Union. If the United States could very rapidly win its wars in the region, this would be possible. But the Russians are in a position to prolong these wars, and even without such agitation, the American ability to close off the conflicts is severely limited. The United States could massively increase the size of its army and make deployments into the Baltics, Ukraine and Central Asia to thwart Russian plans, but it would take years to build up these forces and the active cooperation of Europe to deploy them. Logistically, European support would be essential — but the Europeans in general, and the Germans in particular, have no appetite for this war. Expanding the U.S. Army is necessary, but it does not affect the current strategic reality.
This logistical issue might be manageable, but the real heart of this problem is not merely the deployment of U.S. forces in the Islamic world — it is the Russians’ ability to use weapons sales and covert means to deteriorate conditions dramatically. With active Russian hostility added to the current reality, the strategic situation in the Islamic world could rapidly spin out of control.
The United States is therefore trapped by its commitment to the Islamic world. It does not have sufficient forces to block Russian hegemony in the former Soviet Union, and if it tries to block the Russians with naval or air forces, it faces a dangerous riposte from the Russians in the Islamic world. If it does nothing, it creates a strategic threat that potentially towers over the threat in the Islamic world.
The United States now has to make a fundamental strategic decision. If it remains committed to its current strategy, it cannot respond to the Russians. If it does not respond to the Russians for five or 10 years, the world will look very much like it did from 1945 to 1992. There will be another Cold War at the very least, with a peer power much poorer than the United States but prepared to devote huge amounts of money to national defense.
There are four broad U.S. options:
Attempt to make a settlement with Iran that would guarantee the neutral stability of Iraq and permit the rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces there. Iran is the key here. The Iranians might also mistrust a re-emergent Russia, and while Tehran might be tempted to work with the Russians against the Americans, Iran might consider an arrangement with the United States — particularly if the United States refocuses its attentions elsewhere. On the upside, this would free the U.S. from Iraq. On the downside, the Iranians might not want —or honor — such a deal.
Enter into negotiations with the Russians, granting them the sphere of influence they want in the former Soviet Union in return for guarantees not to project Russian power into Europe proper. The Russians will be busy consolidating their position for years, giving the U.S. time to re-energize NATO. On the upside, this would free the United States to continue its war in the Islamic world. On the downside, it would create a framework for the re-emergence of a powerful Russian empire that would be as difficult to contain as the Soviet Union.
Refuse to engage the Russians and leave the problem to the Europeans. On the upside, this would allow the United States to continue war in the Islamic world and force the Europeans to act. On the downside, the Europeans are too divided, dependent on Russia and dispirited to resist the Russians. This strategy could speed up Russia’s re-emergence.
Rapidly disengage from Iraq, leaving a residual force there and in Afghanistan. The upside is that this creates a reserve force to reinforce the Baltics and Ukraine that might restrain Russia in the former Soviet Union. The downside is that it would create chaos in the Islamic world, threatening regimes that have sided with the United States and potentially reviving effective intercontinental terrorism. The trade-off is between a hegemonic threat from Eurasia and instability and a terror threat from the Islamic world.
We are pointing to very stark strategic choices. Continuing the war in the Islamic world has a much higher cost now than it did when it began, and Russia potentially poses a far greater threat to the United States than the Islamic world does. What might have been a rational policy in 2001 or 2003 has now turned into a very dangerous enterprise, because a hostile major power now has the option of making the U.S. position in the Middle East enormously more difficult.
If a U.S. settlement with Iran is impossible, and a diplomatic solution with the Russians that would keep them from taking a hegemonic position in the former Soviet Union cannot be reached, then the United States must consider rapidly abandoning its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and redeploying its forces to block Russian expansion. The threat posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War was far graver than the threat posed now by the fragmented Islamic world. In the end, the nations there will cancel each other out, and militant organizations will be something the United States simply has to deal with. This is not an ideal solution by any means, but the clock appears to have run out on the American war in the Islamic world.
We do not expect the United States to take this option. It is difficult to abandon a conflict that has gone on this long when it is not yet crystal clear that the Russians will actually be a threat later. (It is far easier for an analyst to make such suggestions than it is for a president to act on them.) Instead, the United States will attempt to bridge the Russian situation with gestures and half measures.
Nevertheless, American national strategy is in crisis. The United States has insufficient power to cope with two threats and must choose between the two. Continuing the current strategy means choosing to deal with the Islamic threat rather than the Russian one, and that is reasonable only if the Islamic threat represents a greater danger to American interests than the Russian threat does. It is difficult to see how the chaos of the Islamic world will cohere to form a global threat. But it is not difficult to imagine a Russia guided by the Medvedev Doctrine rapidly becoming a global threat and a direct danger to American interests.
We expect no immediate change in American strategic deployments — and we expect this to be regretted later. However, given U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney’s trip to the Caucasus region, now would be the time to see some movement in U.S. foreign policy. If Cheney isn’t going to be talking to the Russians, he needs to be talking to the Iranians. Otherwise, he will be writing checks in the region that the U.S. is in no position to cash.
Taken from: www.stratfor.com
Tuesday, September 2, 2008
Engage Your CORE
III. Summit Three: Engage Your CORE
“There is a mechanism or switch,, deep within you, which can be triggered whenever any type of adversity strikes. Engaging your CORE is about rewiring your response to adversity by using a new set of tools so you can take advantage of the hardships that accompany anything big and worthwhile.”
“Your CORE is derived from your Adversity Quotient (AQ), which is a measure of how you respond to adversity of all kinds—how you respond to the world around you. It predicts and drives a host of factors that are critical to success. High AQ people rise to the top and tend to outperform, outlast, outmaneuver, and outdo their low-AQ counterparts, in essentially all endeavors.”
A. Factors critical to success:
1. Performance
2. Resilience
3. Engagement
4. Innovation
5. Attitude, morale, outlook
6. Energy
7. Problem solving
8. Health
9. Entrepreneurism
10. Agility
11. Longevity
B. Standing Up to Adversity
1. Your Adversity “Posture” is ten percent genetic and ninety percent learned.
2. By age 12 your AQ Posture is highly formed and by age 16 it is hardwired for the rest of your life
3. You must become aware of it and choose to change it
C. Using AQ: Know Your CORE
1. C: Control
a) Control is often abused by authority figures.
b) In contrast, the Serenity Prayer shows that there are things that we can control and things we can’t.
c) The aspect of control that matters the most is Influence. The most important question is not whether you are in complete control but when adversity strikes, to what extent do you perceive that you can influence whatever happens next?
d) Control is the most robust in predicting health and longevity. Those who perceive they have more control over how they do what they do tend to live nearly a full decade longer than those who accept their lot in life.
e) Engage your CORE by asking, “What facets of this situation or adversity can I potentially influence?”
2. O: Ownership
a) Ask, “How likely are you to step up to do anything to improve the situation, regardless of your job description?”
b) Don’t waste energy trying to pinpoint blame or shoulder all the responsibility yourself.
c) Do something, no matter how small, to make things better.
d) Usually you need to step up and take ownership when you least feel like doing it.
e) Engage your CORE by asking, “What can I do to affect this situation r adversity immediately and positively?”
f) Don’t give away your power or momentum by waiting for others but focus on your realm, your ownership, and then watch others do the same.
3. R: Reach
a) How does one adversity affect other areas of your life? Many engage in catastrophizing, or allowing one thing that goes wrong to spill over into other areas. Seeing a setback as devastating will stop you, but seeing it as merely one small setback will give you the ability to pick up the pieces and keep moving forward.
b) The better you are at containing difficulties the lighter you feel and the more effective you will be. The bigger and worse everything appears the more suffocating life becomes, making it difficult to keep your footing.
c) Engage your CORE to limit the size, scope, and fallout of your adversities by asking, “What can I do to minimize or contain the downside of this situation?” and “What can I do to optimize the potential upside of this situation?”
d) Dreamy optimists are dangerous but engaged optimists are hopeful that their relentless, strategically focused efforts will increase the chance that things will turn out better over time.
e) The FAILURE FANTASY: Visualize in vivid detail the pain and agony that will result if you allow yourself to fail. This will motivate you to endure and not give up.
D. Building your CORE
1. The best way to build your CORE is through heightened awareness, with feedback from multiple sources.
2. The CORE Panorama
a) On a scale of one to ten, how effectively do I respond to adversity?
b) Am I more effective with certain kinds of adversities than others? If so, which one am I better or worse at? Am I better at dealing with big adversities or the small, day-to-day stuff?
c) Are there certain times when I deal better with adversity than others? If so, when? What have I observed?
d) What is the most positive or negative example of how I dealt with adversity?
e) If I drew a line or continuum ranging from “helpless” to “in control” where would I typically fall when adversity strikes?
f) When the tough stuff hits, how likely am I to step up to do even the smallest thing to make the situation better?
g) How well do you think I do at keeping the adversity in its place? Do I contain the adversity or do I tend to let it spill over into everything else?
h) How long do I tend to let adversities last?
i) What do I like best about the way I handle adversity? What do I like least? Why?
j) What would be an example of a time when I have done what I just described?
k) If I were coaching me on how to handle adversity more effectively, what is the one thing I’d like me to do more, less, or differently?
3. Consider Your CORE
a) When adversity strikes, make it a habit to ask, “What’s my CORE?”
b) How much Control am I feeling or indicating?
c) To what extent am I taking Ownership and stepping up to tackle this situation?
d) How far am I willing to let this Reach? How big am I letting it become?
e) How long do I see this Enduring? To what extent am I letting this drag on?
4. Recognizing CORE
a) Analyze other people’s situations to find instances of CORE or its absence.
5. Employ the CORE Strategy
a) Control
(1) What is everything beyond our control? What things do most people consider out of our control?
(2) Of those things listed, which ones are absolutely beyond our influence? Which ones can we influence, even in some small way?
(3) Of the things we could potentially influence in this situation, which two are the most important?
b) Ownership
(1) Where and how can we step up to make the most immediate positive difference in this situation?
c) Reach
(1) What is the worst thing that could happen?
(2) If we allowed ourselves to think outrageously, what is the best thing that could happen?
(3) What things can we do to minimize the potential downside of this situation?
(4) What things can we do to maximize the potential upside of this situation?
d) Endurance
(1) What do we want life to look like on the other side of this adversity?
(2) What else can we do to get there as quickly and completely as possible?
e) The Action Funnel
(1) Which actions first?
(2) By when?
(3) How will I do it?
(4) What is the most likely obstacle?
(5) How will I deal with it?
(6) If the first action fails or falls short, then what?
(7) By when?
(8) How?
From: The Adversity Advantage, Paul G. Stoltz and Erik Weihenmayer
“There is a mechanism or switch,, deep within you, which can be triggered whenever any type of adversity strikes. Engaging your CORE is about rewiring your response to adversity by using a new set of tools so you can take advantage of the hardships that accompany anything big and worthwhile.”
“Your CORE is derived from your Adversity Quotient (AQ), which is a measure of how you respond to adversity of all kinds—how you respond to the world around you. It predicts and drives a host of factors that are critical to success. High AQ people rise to the top and tend to outperform, outlast, outmaneuver, and outdo their low-AQ counterparts, in essentially all endeavors.”
A. Factors critical to success:
1. Performance
2. Resilience
3. Engagement
4. Innovation
5. Attitude, morale, outlook
6. Energy
7. Problem solving
8. Health
9. Entrepreneurism
10. Agility
11. Longevity
B. Standing Up to Adversity
1. Your Adversity “Posture” is ten percent genetic and ninety percent learned.
2. By age 12 your AQ Posture is highly formed and by age 16 it is hardwired for the rest of your life
3. You must become aware of it and choose to change it
C. Using AQ: Know Your CORE
1. C: Control
a) Control is often abused by authority figures.
b) In contrast, the Serenity Prayer shows that there are things that we can control and things we can’t.
c) The aspect of control that matters the most is Influence. The most important question is not whether you are in complete control but when adversity strikes, to what extent do you perceive that you can influence whatever happens next?
d) Control is the most robust in predicting health and longevity. Those who perceive they have more control over how they do what they do tend to live nearly a full decade longer than those who accept their lot in life.
e) Engage your CORE by asking, “What facets of this situation or adversity can I potentially influence?”
2. O: Ownership
a) Ask, “How likely are you to step up to do anything to improve the situation, regardless of your job description?”
b) Don’t waste energy trying to pinpoint blame or shoulder all the responsibility yourself.
c) Do something, no matter how small, to make things better.
d) Usually you need to step up and take ownership when you least feel like doing it.
e) Engage your CORE by asking, “What can I do to affect this situation r adversity immediately and positively?”
f) Don’t give away your power or momentum by waiting for others but focus on your realm, your ownership, and then watch others do the same.
3. R: Reach
a) How does one adversity affect other areas of your life? Many engage in catastrophizing, or allowing one thing that goes wrong to spill over into other areas. Seeing a setback as devastating will stop you, but seeing it as merely one small setback will give you the ability to pick up the pieces and keep moving forward.
b) The better you are at containing difficulties the lighter you feel and the more effective you will be. The bigger and worse everything appears the more suffocating life becomes, making it difficult to keep your footing.
c) Engage your CORE to limit the size, scope, and fallout of your adversities by asking, “What can I do to minimize or contain the downside of this situation?” and “What can I do to optimize the potential upside of this situation?”
d) Dreamy optimists are dangerous but engaged optimists are hopeful that their relentless, strategically focused efforts will increase the chance that things will turn out better over time.
4. E: Endurance
a) When adversity strikes, Endurance involves asking, “How long do you predict it will last or endure?”
b) High AQ people can see past the adversity and view the worst circumstances as temporary.
c) Engage your CORE by asking, “How can I get through this as quickly as possible?”
a) When adversity strikes, Endurance involves asking, “How long do you predict it will last or endure?”
b) High AQ people can see past the adversity and view the worst circumstances as temporary.
c) Engage your CORE by asking, “How can I get through this as quickly as possible?”
d) Play the SUMMIT GAME: See yourself as having already made it through the adversity and accomplished your goal. Visualize with as much detail as possible and you will be energized to endure the adversity.
e) The FAILURE FANTASY: Visualize in vivid detail the pain and agony that will result if you allow yourself to fail. This will motivate you to endure and not give up.
D. Building your CORE
1. The best way to build your CORE is through heightened awareness, with feedback from multiple sources.
2. The CORE Panorama
a) On a scale of one to ten, how effectively do I respond to adversity?
b) Am I more effective with certain kinds of adversities than others? If so, which one am I better or worse at? Am I better at dealing with big adversities or the small, day-to-day stuff?
c) Are there certain times when I deal better with adversity than others? If so, when? What have I observed?
d) What is the most positive or negative example of how I dealt with adversity?
e) If I drew a line or continuum ranging from “helpless” to “in control” where would I typically fall when adversity strikes?
f) When the tough stuff hits, how likely am I to step up to do even the smallest thing to make the situation better?
g) How well do you think I do at keeping the adversity in its place? Do I contain the adversity or do I tend to let it spill over into everything else?
h) How long do I tend to let adversities last?
i) What do I like best about the way I handle adversity? What do I like least? Why?
j) What would be an example of a time when I have done what I just described?
k) If I were coaching me on how to handle adversity more effectively, what is the one thing I’d like me to do more, less, or differently?
3. Consider Your CORE
a) When adversity strikes, make it a habit to ask, “What’s my CORE?”
b) How much Control am I feeling or indicating?
c) To what extent am I taking Ownership and stepping up to tackle this situation?
d) How far am I willing to let this Reach? How big am I letting it become?
e) How long do I see this Enduring? To what extent am I letting this drag on?
4. Recognizing CORE
a) Analyze other people’s situations to find instances of CORE or its absence.
5. Employ the CORE Strategy
a) Control
(1) What is everything beyond our control? What things do most people consider out of our control?
(2) Of those things listed, which ones are absolutely beyond our influence? Which ones can we influence, even in some small way?
(3) Of the things we could potentially influence in this situation, which two are the most important?
b) Ownership
(1) Where and how can we step up to make the most immediate positive difference in this situation?
c) Reach
(1) What is the worst thing that could happen?
(2) If we allowed ourselves to think outrageously, what is the best thing that could happen?
(3) What things can we do to minimize the potential downside of this situation?
(4) What things can we do to maximize the potential upside of this situation?
d) Endurance
(1) What do we want life to look like on the other side of this adversity?
(2) What else can we do to get there as quickly and completely as possible?
e) The Action Funnel
(1) Which actions first?
(2) By when?
(3) How will I do it?
(4) What is the most likely obstacle?
(5) How will I deal with it?
(6) If the first action fails or falls short, then what?
(7) By when?
(8) How?
From: The Adversity Advantage, Paul G. Stoltz and Erik Weihenmayer
Scientology
The Church of Scientology and Christianity
1. Introduction to Scientology
• Founded by Science Fiction writer L. Ron Hubbard in 1962
• Scientology is the study and handling of the spirit in relationship to itself, others and all of life
• In Scientology no one is asked to accept anything as belief or on faith. That which is true for you is what you have observed to be true. An individual discovers for himself that Scientology works by personally applying its principles and experiencing results
2. The Nature of Man
• Man is an immortal, spiritual being. His experience extends well beyond a single lifetime. His capabilities are unlimited
• Man consists of three parts. The first of these is the spirit, called the thetan, which is the individual himself.
• The second is the mind. The thetan uses his mind as a communication and control system between himself and his environment.
• The third of these parts is the body. The body is not the person
• The thetan has lived through many past lives and will continue to live beyond the death of the body.
• Through the Scientology process of "auditing," people can free themselves of traumatic incidents, ethical transgressions and bad decisions which are said to collectively restrict the person from reaching the state of "Clear" and "Operating Thetan." Each state is said to represent the recovery of native spiritual abilities and to confer mental and physical benefits.
• A person is basically good, but becomes "aberrated" by moments of pain and unconsciousness.
• Psychiatry and psychology are destructive and abusive practices
3. The Dynamics of Existence
• The basic command followed by all life, "Survive!" is subdivided into eight dynamics (dynamic meaning urge, drive or impulse). All activities in one’s varied life can be inspected, understood and harmonized with all others to increase survival.
• 8th Dynamic INFINITY, also commonly called God, the Supreme Being or Creator.
• 7th Dynamic SPIRITUAL dynamic — anything spiritual with or without identity, life source.
• 6th Dynamic PHYSICAL UNIVERSE with its four components of matter, energy, space and time.
• 5th Dynamic LIFE FORMS including all plant and animal life.
• 4th Dynamic MANKIND as a species.
• 3rd Dynamic GROUP SURVIVAL whether friends, a club, company, nation or race.
• 2nd Dynamic FAMILY and children and all other creativity.
• 1st Dynamic SELF — the individual, including his body, mind and immediate possessions.
• Through Scientology, a person realizes that his life and influence extend far beyond himself. By understanding each of these dynamics and their relationship, one to the other, he is able to do so, and thus increase survival on all of these dynamics
4. ARC, KRC and the Tone Scale
• The Scientology symbol contains two triangles which Hubbard called the "ARC triangle" and the "KRC triangle", respectively. The points of the lower triangle are said to represent Affinity (emotional responses), Reality (an agreement on what is real) and Communication. Improving one aspect of the triangle increases the level of the other two. The points of the upper triangle represent Knowledge, Responsibility and Control
• These two environments may not actually agree. Therefore, a therapy which asks man to adapt to the environment rather than adapt the environment to man is a slave philosophy and is unworkable simply because it is not true
• The tone scale places human moods and behaviors a scale from -40 ("Total Failure") to +40 ("Serenity of Being")
• Communication is the solution so a person will climb from the bottom to the top by improving his ability to communicate
5. The Auditing Session and the Bridge to Total Freedom
• Scientology practices are structured in sequential levels because rehabilitation takes place on a "gradient", that is, easier steps are taken first and only then greater complexities are handled
• In auditing, the member discloses specific traumatic incidents, prior ethical transgressions and bad decisions to his assistant
• Members are helped across this bridge by the help of an assistant who asks them many questions and assigns readings
• Most auditing requires an E-meter, a device that measures minute changes in electrical resistance through the body when a person holds electrodes, and a small current is passed through them; Scientology states that it helps locate an area of concern.
• Scientologists follow The Way to Happiness, which defines morals as "a code of good conduct laid down out of the experience of the race to serve as a uniform yardstick for the conduct of individuals and groups"
• An action must contain construction which outweighs the destruction it contains in order to be considered good. "Good is any action which brings the greatest construction to the greatest number of dynamics while bringing the least destruction
6. The States of Existence
• Exteriorization as it is known in Scientology is to "be three feet back of your head"
• In 1952, Hubbard reported he was able to stand as a unit of life independently of the physical body
• One being can attain several different states of existence in just one lifetime. Some savants amongst the Himalayas have worked in this direction, and Buddha spoke of it. Fifteen or twenty years of hard work were said to result in a nebulous conclusion. With Scientology, there are no such uncertainties. These higher states can be attained through Dianetics and Scientology auditing
7. Past Lives and Extraterrestrial Beings
• The cause of "aberrations" in a human mind was an accumulation of pain and unconscious memories of traumatic incidents, some of which predated the life of the human. He extended this view further in Scientology, declaring that "thetans" have existed for tens of trillions of years, during which time, they have been exposed to a vast number of traumatic incidents, and have made a great many decisions that influence their present state.
• Some past traumas may have been deliberately inflicted in the form of "implants" used by extraterrestrial dictatorships such as Helatrobus to brainwash and control the population. Hubbard's lectures and writings include a wide variety of accounts of complex extraterrestrial civilizations and alien interventions in earthly events, collectively described by Hubbard as "space opera."
• Xenu, an alien ruler of the "Galactic Confederacy," 75 million years ago brought billions of people to Earth in spacecraft, stacked them around volcanoes and blew them up with hydrogen bombs. Their souls then clustered together, stuck to the bodies of the living and continue to do this today. These clustered spirits are called" Body Thetans," and advanced-level Scientologists place considerable emphasis on isolating these alien souls and neutralizing their ill effects
• One can move through the levels of existence: Communication, Problems, Relief, Freedom, Ability, Power, Clear, Operating Thetan
• "Operating" in this context means "able to act and handle things" and a "thetan" is the spiritual being that is the basic self. An Operating Thetan then is an individual who could operate totally independently of his body whether or not he had one or didn't have one. He's now himself and is not dependent on the universe around him
8. The Aims of Scientology
• A civilization without insanity, without criminals and without war, where the able can prosper and honest beings can have rights, and where man is free to rise to greater heights
9. Scientology and Christianity
Books by L. Ron Hubbard
Fiction
Buckskin Brigades (1937), ISBN 0-88404-280-4
Final Blackout (1940), ISBN 0-88404-340-1
Fear (1951), ISBN 0-88404-599-4
Typewriter in the Sky (1951), ISBN 0-88404-933-7
Ole Doc Methuselah (1953), ISBN 0-88404-653-2
Battlefield Earth (1982), ISBN 0-312-06978-2
Mission Earth (1985-87), 10 vols.
Scientology and Dianetics
Dianetics: The Modern Science of Mental Health, New York 1950, ISBN 0-88404-416-5
Child Dianetics. Dianetic Processing for Children, Wichita, Kansas 1951, ISBN 0-88404-421-1
Scientology 8-8008, Phoenix, Arizona 1952, ISBN 0-88404-428-9
Dianetics 55!, Phoenix, Arizona 1954, ISBN 0-88404-417-3
Dianetics: The Evolution of a Science Phoenix, Arizona 1955, ISBN 1-4031-0538-3
Scientology: The Fundamentals of Thought, Washington, DC 1956, ISBN 0-88404-503-X
The Problems of Work, Washington, DC 1956, ISBN 0-88404-377-0
Have You Lived Before This Life, East Grinstead, Sussex 1960, ISBN 0-88404-447-5
Scientology: A New Slant on Life, East Grinstead, Sussex 1965, ISBN 1-57318-037-8
The Volunteer Minister's Handbook Los Angeles 1976, ISBN 0-88404-039-9
Research and Discovery Series, a chronological series collecting Hubbard's lectures. Vol 1, Copenhagen 1980, ISBN 0-88404-073-9
The Way to Happiness, Los Angeles 1981, ISBN 0-88404-411-4
Famous Scientologists
L. Ron Hubbard - best-selling science fiction author; founder of Scientology
John Travolta - actor
Chick Corea - influential American jazz pianist and composer
Brandy (Norwood) - R&B singer, actress
Tom Cruise - actor, movie star
Nancy Cartwright - voiceover artist best known as voice of "Bart Simpson" on The Simpsons
Jason Beghe - actor
Xavier Deluc - actor
Jason Dohring - actor
Michael Fairman - actor
Geoffrey Lewis - actor
Christopher Masterson - actor
Danny Masterson - actor
Haywood Nelson - actor
Eduardo Palomo - actor
Jeff Pomerantz - actor
Patrick Renna - actor
Giovanni Ribisi - (a.k.a. Vonni Ribisi) actor
Michael D. Roberts - actor
Bodhi Elfman - actor
Jason Lee - actor and professional skateboarder
Kirstie Alley - actress
Mimi Rogers - actress (2nd generation)
Anne Archer - actress
Jennifer Aspen - actress
Catherine Bell - actress
Erika Christensen - actress
Jenna Elfman - actress
Katie Holmes - actress
Kimberley Kates - actress
Juliette Lewis - actress
Priscilla Presley - actress
Leah Remini - actress
Marissa Ribisi - actress
Michelle Stafford - actress
Karen Black - actress
Kelly Preston - actress
Kate Ceberano - actress and musician
Judy Norton-Taylor - actress and musician
Lisa Marie Presley - singer; daughter of Elvis Presley
Billy Sheehan - rock and fusion bass player
David Campbell - musician
Dave Davies - musician
Isaac Hayes - musician
Nicky Hopkins - musician
Mark Isham - musician
David Pomeranz - musician
Rob Thomas - musician
Patrick Warren - musician
Edgar Winter - musician
Beck - singer (a.k.a. Beck Hansen)
Carina Ricco - singer, actress, composer
Gloria Rusch-Novello - singer, writer, composer
Karen Nelson Bell - producer, director and musician
Robert Zoller - author
Floyd Mutrux - screenwriter, director, producer
Terry Jastrow - TV producer and director
Peter Medak - film director
Carl W. Rohrig - (a.k.a. Pablo Roehrig) painter
Franca Cerveni - radio and television announcer
James T. Sorensen - photographer
Keith Code - motorcycle racing instructor
Megan Shields - physician and author of health books, incl. Arthritis: The Doctor's Cure, etc.
Chaka Khan - singer
Sonny Bono - singer ("Sonny and Cher"), U.S. Representative
Mary Bono - widow of Sonny Bono; U.S. Representative
Heber Jentzsch - President of the Church of Scientology
Ernest Lehman - screenwriter of The Sound of Music
Greta Van Susteren - host of On the Record with Greta Van Susteren new show on FOX TV
Werner Erhard - former Scientologist who founded est
David Miscavige - important Church of Scientology religious leader; chairman of the board for Religious Technology Center
Jim Johnson - owner and founder of Mr. Jim's Pizza chain
Lee Purcell - actress, Big Wednesday, etc.
Michael Wiserman - Predator 2, etc.
Gary Imhoff - actor; Thumbelina, etc.
Manu Tupou - actor and acting teacher; Hawaii
Dror Soref - director; The Seventh Coin, etc.
Amanda Ambrose - singer, vocal teacher
Milton Ketselas - one of Hollywood's most successful acting teachers, who heads the Beverly Hills Playhouse
Jim Rogers - celebrity producer, manager (ex-husband of Mimi Rogers)
Linda Blair - actress best known for The Exorcist
Arnaud Boetsch - tennis player
Darius Brubeck - musician, member of "Brubeck Band"
Sharon Case - actress
Glenn Zottola - trumpeter
Andrew Loog Oldham - writer
Dick Zimmerman - celebrity photographer
Jeffrey Tambor - actor
Eddie Deezen - actor
Corin Nemec - actor
Anita Mally - actress, screenwriter
Julia Migenes - opera singer
Lightfield Lewis - actor, director
Charles Lakes - Olympic gymnast
Laura Prepon - actress
Helga Wagner - jewelry designer; dated Prince Charles and Sen. Ted Kennedy
Deborah Rennard - actress
Sofia Milos - actress
Placido Domingo, Jr. - singer
Robert F. Lyons - actor and drama teacher
Carolyn Judd - ad writer and producer
Paul Haggis - screenwriter, story editor, TV producer
Josele Garza - racing car driver from Mexico
Lenny Macaluso - musician, songwriter, producer
Phillipe de Henning - racing driver, fashion designer
Milton Katselas - acting teacher, director
Maxine Nightingale - singer
Mario Feninger - composer and concert pianist
Jeffrey Scott - script writer, grandson of Moe Howard
Pamela Roberts - actress, clothes designer
Elena Roggero - Italian singer, songwriter
Karen Nelson-Bell - producer
Lamia Khashoggi - wife of wealthy and famous Saudi arms dealer Adnan Khashoggi
Noelle North - dancer, voice-over actress
Misha Segal - composer
Andrik Schapers - singer from Netherlands
Cass Warner - writer
Jason Lee - actor ("Chasing Amy")
Michelle Stafford - actress ("The Young and the Restless")
Denice Duff - actress ("The Young and the Restless")
Lynsey Bartilson - actress ("Grounded for Life")
Tom Fair - (a.k.a. Tom Feher) lyrcist for the 60s rock group the Left Banke
Moon Martin - rock star; "Bad Case of Lovin' You"
Clive Clerk - actor, singer
Jim McMullin - actor
Michael Wiseman - child actor ("Predator 2")
Ludwig Fisher - actor and artist
Ryan Paris - singer, musician
Michael Schnitzler - violinist
Peter Winsnes - actor
Eric Sherman - director
Peter Schless - composer, synthetisist and producer
Diana Venegas - beauty queen; Miss Venezuela; lace-gowns boutique in Beverly Hills
Jackson Sousa - Hollywood celebrity trainer
Michael Sellers - concert pianist
Susie Coelho - actress
Hans Gunter Arenz - race car driver
Fermin Sanchez - race car driver
Kit Carson - motorcycle racer
Al DiMeola - jazz musician
Janet Greeson - owner of Diet Centers
Willie B. Wilson - oil billionaire
Tony Morales - drummer with the Rippingtons
Hossam Ramzy - North African percussion ensemble leader, played with Peter Gabriel
Amanda Rice - (formerly "Raven") stripper; previously Kiefer Sutherland's girlfriend
Current Status in Scientology Is Unknown:
Bernadette Peters - actress
Jerry Seinfeld - comedian
Nicole Kidman - actress
Neil Gaiman - science fiction and comic book writer
Shirley MacLaine - actress (may have never been a member)
Harry Kipper - (a.k.a. Martin von Haselberg) performance artist, husband of singer Bette Midler
Amy Heckerling - director
Gottfried Helnwein - graphic artist
Wings Hauser - actor
Melanie - folk singer
Gloria Swanson - actress
Eden Vanning - violinist
Helena Rojo - Mexican singer
Sasha Malinin - Russian pop star
Helaine Lembeck - actress
Kim Yates - softcore "adult film" actress
Tony Jacklin - pro golfer
Past Adherents not Currently in Scientology:
Oliver Stone - film director
J.D. Salinger - popular, acclaimed novelist for his novel The Catcher in the Rye
Brad Pitt - actor
William S. Burroughs - author and Beat Generation icon
Christopher Reeve - actor who played "Superman"
Van Morrison - influential singer, songwriter, musician (lapsed)
Soleil Moon Frye - actress best known as "Punky Brewster"
Sharon Stone - actress
Peggy Lipton - actress
Mikhail Baryshnikov - ballet dancer
Patrick Swayze - actor
Kate Capshaw - actress, Steven Spielberg's wife
Rock Hudson - actor, movie star
Emilio Estevez - actor
John Brodie - football player
Don Simpson - producer, Top Gun, etc.
Candice Bergen - actress, star of TV series Murphy Brown, Boston Public, etc. (may have not actually been a member)
Leonard Cohen - songwriter, poet
Stanley Clarke - jazz bassist
Darby Crash - punk rocker
Ricky Martin - singer
Olivia D'Abo - actress
Cathy Lee Crosby - actress
Gloria Gaynor - singer and "disco queen"
Howard Wilkins - founder of Pizza Hut
Diana Canova - singer, actress
Raven de la Croix - stripper, psychic, actress
Gabor Szabo - jazz guitarist and composer (died 1982)
A.E. van Vogt - science fiction writer
Ingo Swann - writer, psychic, painter
Barbara Carrera - actress
Frank Stallone - actor, singer, songwriter; brother of Sylvester Stallone
Michael Garson - musician who toured with David Bowie
Michael Edwards - male model, former boyfriend of Priscilla Presley
Peter Lupus - actor (Mission Impossible TV series)
Al Jarreau - singer
Wendon Swift - Hollywood author, manager
Bobby Lipton - actor
Dini Petty - talk show host
Demi Moore - actress
Kalle Pohl - comedian
Bert Salzman - producer; won Academy Award in 1975 for a short film and thanked L. Ron Hubbard in speech
Bernhard Paul - clown, manager of "Circus Roncalli"
Harold Puthoff - mathematician, physicist, ESP researcher
The Incredible String Band - musicians, band
Lee Konitz - jazz musician
Stephen Boyd - actor
Joan Prather - actress
Leif Garrett - pop star
Carlos Palomino - athlete
Bruce Penhall - actor
Lou Rawls - soul music, jazz, and blues singer
John Dalmas - science fiction writer
Michael Lembeck - actor, director
Mickey McMeel - Three Dog Knight drummer
Cynthia Sikes - actress
Gordon Lightfoot - singer, composer, lyricist
Dale Haddon - actress, model
Chick Vennera - actor
Joan DiVito Vennera - actor
Flo Allen - major Hollywood agent
Hunter Carson - actor
Penny Perry - casting director
Ed Love -
Steven Boyd -
Lisa Blount - actress
Aldous Huxley - writer
Josh Dohnen - agent
Anne Francis - actress
Eileen Brennan - actress
Horst Buchholtz - actor
Tom Skeritt - actor
Nan Herst Bowers - celebrity, publicist
John Longenecker - Emmy Award-winning documentary filmmaker
Kathleen Brown - ran for governor of California (not clear if she was official member)
Maude Adams - actress, model
Charles Manson - infamous serial killer
1. Introduction to Scientology
• Founded by Science Fiction writer L. Ron Hubbard in 1962
• Scientology is the study and handling of the spirit in relationship to itself, others and all of life
• In Scientology no one is asked to accept anything as belief or on faith. That which is true for you is what you have observed to be true. An individual discovers for himself that Scientology works by personally applying its principles and experiencing results
2. The Nature of Man
• Man is an immortal, spiritual being. His experience extends well beyond a single lifetime. His capabilities are unlimited
• Man consists of three parts. The first of these is the spirit, called the thetan, which is the individual himself.
• The second is the mind. The thetan uses his mind as a communication and control system between himself and his environment.
• The third of these parts is the body. The body is not the person
• The thetan has lived through many past lives and will continue to live beyond the death of the body.
• Through the Scientology process of "auditing," people can free themselves of traumatic incidents, ethical transgressions and bad decisions which are said to collectively restrict the person from reaching the state of "Clear" and "Operating Thetan." Each state is said to represent the recovery of native spiritual abilities and to confer mental and physical benefits.
• A person is basically good, but becomes "aberrated" by moments of pain and unconsciousness.
• Psychiatry and psychology are destructive and abusive practices
3. The Dynamics of Existence
• The basic command followed by all life, "Survive!" is subdivided into eight dynamics (dynamic meaning urge, drive or impulse). All activities in one’s varied life can be inspected, understood and harmonized with all others to increase survival.
• 8th Dynamic INFINITY, also commonly called God, the Supreme Being or Creator.
• 7th Dynamic SPIRITUAL dynamic — anything spiritual with or without identity, life source.
• 6th Dynamic PHYSICAL UNIVERSE with its four components of matter, energy, space and time.
• 5th Dynamic LIFE FORMS including all plant and animal life.
• 4th Dynamic MANKIND as a species.
• 3rd Dynamic GROUP SURVIVAL whether friends, a club, company, nation or race.
• 2nd Dynamic FAMILY and children and all other creativity.
• 1st Dynamic SELF — the individual, including his body, mind and immediate possessions.
• Through Scientology, a person realizes that his life and influence extend far beyond himself. By understanding each of these dynamics and their relationship, one to the other, he is able to do so, and thus increase survival on all of these dynamics
4. ARC, KRC and the Tone Scale
• The Scientology symbol contains two triangles which Hubbard called the "ARC triangle" and the "KRC triangle", respectively. The points of the lower triangle are said to represent Affinity (emotional responses), Reality (an agreement on what is real) and Communication. Improving one aspect of the triangle increases the level of the other two. The points of the upper triangle represent Knowledge, Responsibility and Control
• These two environments may not actually agree. Therefore, a therapy which asks man to adapt to the environment rather than adapt the environment to man is a slave philosophy and is unworkable simply because it is not true
• The tone scale places human moods and behaviors a scale from -40 ("Total Failure") to +40 ("Serenity of Being")
• Communication is the solution so a person will climb from the bottom to the top by improving his ability to communicate
5. The Auditing Session and the Bridge to Total Freedom
• Scientology practices are structured in sequential levels because rehabilitation takes place on a "gradient", that is, easier steps are taken first and only then greater complexities are handled
• In auditing, the member discloses specific traumatic incidents, prior ethical transgressions and bad decisions to his assistant
• Members are helped across this bridge by the help of an assistant who asks them many questions and assigns readings
• Most auditing requires an E-meter, a device that measures minute changes in electrical resistance through the body when a person holds electrodes, and a small current is passed through them; Scientology states that it helps locate an area of concern.
• Scientologists follow The Way to Happiness, which defines morals as "a code of good conduct laid down out of the experience of the race to serve as a uniform yardstick for the conduct of individuals and groups"
• An action must contain construction which outweighs the destruction it contains in order to be considered good. "Good is any action which brings the greatest construction to the greatest number of dynamics while bringing the least destruction
6. The States of Existence
• Exteriorization as it is known in Scientology is to "be three feet back of your head"
• In 1952, Hubbard reported he was able to stand as a unit of life independently of the physical body
• One being can attain several different states of existence in just one lifetime. Some savants amongst the Himalayas have worked in this direction, and Buddha spoke of it. Fifteen or twenty years of hard work were said to result in a nebulous conclusion. With Scientology, there are no such uncertainties. These higher states can be attained through Dianetics and Scientology auditing
7. Past Lives and Extraterrestrial Beings
• The cause of "aberrations" in a human mind was an accumulation of pain and unconscious memories of traumatic incidents, some of which predated the life of the human. He extended this view further in Scientology, declaring that "thetans" have existed for tens of trillions of years, during which time, they have been exposed to a vast number of traumatic incidents, and have made a great many decisions that influence their present state.
• Some past traumas may have been deliberately inflicted in the form of "implants" used by extraterrestrial dictatorships such as Helatrobus to brainwash and control the population. Hubbard's lectures and writings include a wide variety of accounts of complex extraterrestrial civilizations and alien interventions in earthly events, collectively described by Hubbard as "space opera."
• Xenu, an alien ruler of the "Galactic Confederacy," 75 million years ago brought billions of people to Earth in spacecraft, stacked them around volcanoes and blew them up with hydrogen bombs. Their souls then clustered together, stuck to the bodies of the living and continue to do this today. These clustered spirits are called" Body Thetans," and advanced-level Scientologists place considerable emphasis on isolating these alien souls and neutralizing their ill effects
• One can move through the levels of existence: Communication, Problems, Relief, Freedom, Ability, Power, Clear, Operating Thetan
• "Operating" in this context means "able to act and handle things" and a "thetan" is the spiritual being that is the basic self. An Operating Thetan then is an individual who could operate totally independently of his body whether or not he had one or didn't have one. He's now himself and is not dependent on the universe around him
8. The Aims of Scientology
• A civilization without insanity, without criminals and without war, where the able can prosper and honest beings can have rights, and where man is free to rise to greater heights
9. Scientology and Christianity
Books by L. Ron Hubbard
Fiction
Buckskin Brigades (1937), ISBN 0-88404-280-4
Final Blackout (1940), ISBN 0-88404-340-1
Fear (1951), ISBN 0-88404-599-4
Typewriter in the Sky (1951), ISBN 0-88404-933-7
Ole Doc Methuselah (1953), ISBN 0-88404-653-2
Battlefield Earth (1982), ISBN 0-312-06978-2
Mission Earth (1985-87), 10 vols.
Scientology and Dianetics
Dianetics: The Modern Science of Mental Health, New York 1950, ISBN 0-88404-416-5
Child Dianetics. Dianetic Processing for Children, Wichita, Kansas 1951, ISBN 0-88404-421-1
Scientology 8-8008, Phoenix, Arizona 1952, ISBN 0-88404-428-9
Dianetics 55!, Phoenix, Arizona 1954, ISBN 0-88404-417-3
Dianetics: The Evolution of a Science Phoenix, Arizona 1955, ISBN 1-4031-0538-3
Scientology: The Fundamentals of Thought, Washington, DC 1956, ISBN 0-88404-503-X
The Problems of Work, Washington, DC 1956, ISBN 0-88404-377-0
Have You Lived Before This Life, East Grinstead, Sussex 1960, ISBN 0-88404-447-5
Scientology: A New Slant on Life, East Grinstead, Sussex 1965, ISBN 1-57318-037-8
The Volunteer Minister's Handbook Los Angeles 1976, ISBN 0-88404-039-9
Research and Discovery Series, a chronological series collecting Hubbard's lectures. Vol 1, Copenhagen 1980, ISBN 0-88404-073-9
The Way to Happiness, Los Angeles 1981, ISBN 0-88404-411-4
Famous Scientologists
L. Ron Hubbard - best-selling science fiction author; founder of Scientology
John Travolta - actor
Chick Corea - influential American jazz pianist and composer
Brandy (Norwood) - R&B singer, actress
Tom Cruise - actor, movie star
Nancy Cartwright - voiceover artist best known as voice of "Bart Simpson" on The Simpsons
Jason Beghe - actor
Xavier Deluc - actor
Jason Dohring - actor
Michael Fairman - actor
Geoffrey Lewis - actor
Christopher Masterson - actor
Danny Masterson - actor
Haywood Nelson - actor
Eduardo Palomo - actor
Jeff Pomerantz - actor
Patrick Renna - actor
Giovanni Ribisi - (a.k.a. Vonni Ribisi) actor
Michael D. Roberts - actor
Bodhi Elfman - actor
Jason Lee - actor and professional skateboarder
Kirstie Alley - actress
Mimi Rogers - actress (2nd generation)
Anne Archer - actress
Jennifer Aspen - actress
Catherine Bell - actress
Erika Christensen - actress
Jenna Elfman - actress
Katie Holmes - actress
Kimberley Kates - actress
Juliette Lewis - actress
Priscilla Presley - actress
Leah Remini - actress
Marissa Ribisi - actress
Michelle Stafford - actress
Karen Black - actress
Kelly Preston - actress
Kate Ceberano - actress and musician
Judy Norton-Taylor - actress and musician
Lisa Marie Presley - singer; daughter of Elvis Presley
Billy Sheehan - rock and fusion bass player
David Campbell - musician
Dave Davies - musician
Isaac Hayes - musician
Nicky Hopkins - musician
Mark Isham - musician
David Pomeranz - musician
Rob Thomas - musician
Patrick Warren - musician
Edgar Winter - musician
Beck - singer (a.k.a. Beck Hansen)
Carina Ricco - singer, actress, composer
Gloria Rusch-Novello - singer, writer, composer
Karen Nelson Bell - producer, director and musician
Robert Zoller - author
Floyd Mutrux - screenwriter, director, producer
Terry Jastrow - TV producer and director
Peter Medak - film director
Carl W. Rohrig - (a.k.a. Pablo Roehrig) painter
Franca Cerveni - radio and television announcer
James T. Sorensen - photographer
Keith Code - motorcycle racing instructor
Megan Shields - physician and author of health books, incl. Arthritis: The Doctor's Cure, etc.
Chaka Khan - singer
Sonny Bono - singer ("Sonny and Cher"), U.S. Representative
Mary Bono - widow of Sonny Bono; U.S. Representative
Heber Jentzsch - President of the Church of Scientology
Ernest Lehman - screenwriter of The Sound of Music
Greta Van Susteren - host of On the Record with Greta Van Susteren new show on FOX TV
Werner Erhard - former Scientologist who founded est
David Miscavige - important Church of Scientology religious leader; chairman of the board for Religious Technology Center
Jim Johnson - owner and founder of Mr. Jim's Pizza chain
Lee Purcell - actress, Big Wednesday, etc.
Michael Wiserman - Predator 2, etc.
Gary Imhoff - actor; Thumbelina, etc.
Manu Tupou - actor and acting teacher; Hawaii
Dror Soref - director; The Seventh Coin, etc.
Amanda Ambrose - singer, vocal teacher
Milton Ketselas - one of Hollywood's most successful acting teachers, who heads the Beverly Hills Playhouse
Jim Rogers - celebrity producer, manager (ex-husband of Mimi Rogers)
Linda Blair - actress best known for The Exorcist
Arnaud Boetsch - tennis player
Darius Brubeck - musician, member of "Brubeck Band"
Sharon Case - actress
Glenn Zottola - trumpeter
Andrew Loog Oldham - writer
Dick Zimmerman - celebrity photographer
Jeffrey Tambor - actor
Eddie Deezen - actor
Corin Nemec - actor
Anita Mally - actress, screenwriter
Julia Migenes - opera singer
Lightfield Lewis - actor, director
Charles Lakes - Olympic gymnast
Laura Prepon - actress
Helga Wagner - jewelry designer; dated Prince Charles and Sen. Ted Kennedy
Deborah Rennard - actress
Sofia Milos - actress
Placido Domingo, Jr. - singer
Robert F. Lyons - actor and drama teacher
Carolyn Judd - ad writer and producer
Paul Haggis - screenwriter, story editor, TV producer
Josele Garza - racing car driver from Mexico
Lenny Macaluso - musician, songwriter, producer
Phillipe de Henning - racing driver, fashion designer
Milton Katselas - acting teacher, director
Maxine Nightingale - singer
Mario Feninger - composer and concert pianist
Jeffrey Scott - script writer, grandson of Moe Howard
Pamela Roberts - actress, clothes designer
Elena Roggero - Italian singer, songwriter
Karen Nelson-Bell - producer
Lamia Khashoggi - wife of wealthy and famous Saudi arms dealer Adnan Khashoggi
Noelle North - dancer, voice-over actress
Misha Segal - composer
Andrik Schapers - singer from Netherlands
Cass Warner - writer
Jason Lee - actor ("Chasing Amy")
Michelle Stafford - actress ("The Young and the Restless")
Denice Duff - actress ("The Young and the Restless")
Lynsey Bartilson - actress ("Grounded for Life")
Tom Fair - (a.k.a. Tom Feher) lyrcist for the 60s rock group the Left Banke
Moon Martin - rock star; "Bad Case of Lovin' You"
Clive Clerk - actor, singer
Jim McMullin - actor
Michael Wiseman - child actor ("Predator 2")
Ludwig Fisher - actor and artist
Ryan Paris - singer, musician
Michael Schnitzler - violinist
Peter Winsnes - actor
Eric Sherman - director
Peter Schless - composer, synthetisist and producer
Diana Venegas - beauty queen; Miss Venezuela; lace-gowns boutique in Beverly Hills
Jackson Sousa - Hollywood celebrity trainer
Michael Sellers - concert pianist
Susie Coelho - actress
Hans Gunter Arenz - race car driver
Fermin Sanchez - race car driver
Kit Carson - motorcycle racer
Al DiMeola - jazz musician
Janet Greeson - owner of Diet Centers
Willie B. Wilson - oil billionaire
Tony Morales - drummer with the Rippingtons
Hossam Ramzy - North African percussion ensemble leader, played with Peter Gabriel
Amanda Rice - (formerly "Raven") stripper; previously Kiefer Sutherland's girlfriend
Current Status in Scientology Is Unknown:
Bernadette Peters - actress
Jerry Seinfeld - comedian
Nicole Kidman - actress
Neil Gaiman - science fiction and comic book writer
Shirley MacLaine - actress (may have never been a member)
Harry Kipper - (a.k.a. Martin von Haselberg) performance artist, husband of singer Bette Midler
Amy Heckerling - director
Gottfried Helnwein - graphic artist
Wings Hauser - actor
Melanie - folk singer
Gloria Swanson - actress
Eden Vanning - violinist
Helena Rojo - Mexican singer
Sasha Malinin - Russian pop star
Helaine Lembeck - actress
Kim Yates - softcore "adult film" actress
Tony Jacklin - pro golfer
Past Adherents not Currently in Scientology:
Oliver Stone - film director
J.D. Salinger - popular, acclaimed novelist for his novel The Catcher in the Rye
Brad Pitt - actor
William S. Burroughs - author and Beat Generation icon
Christopher Reeve - actor who played "Superman"
Van Morrison - influential singer, songwriter, musician (lapsed)
Soleil Moon Frye - actress best known as "Punky Brewster"
Sharon Stone - actress
Peggy Lipton - actress
Mikhail Baryshnikov - ballet dancer
Patrick Swayze - actor
Kate Capshaw - actress, Steven Spielberg's wife
Rock Hudson - actor, movie star
Emilio Estevez - actor
John Brodie - football player
Don Simpson - producer, Top Gun, etc.
Candice Bergen - actress, star of TV series Murphy Brown, Boston Public, etc. (may have not actually been a member)
Leonard Cohen - songwriter, poet
Stanley Clarke - jazz bassist
Darby Crash - punk rocker
Ricky Martin - singer
Olivia D'Abo - actress
Cathy Lee Crosby - actress
Gloria Gaynor - singer and "disco queen"
Howard Wilkins - founder of Pizza Hut
Diana Canova - singer, actress
Raven de la Croix - stripper, psychic, actress
Gabor Szabo - jazz guitarist and composer (died 1982)
A.E. van Vogt - science fiction writer
Ingo Swann - writer, psychic, painter
Barbara Carrera - actress
Frank Stallone - actor, singer, songwriter; brother of Sylvester Stallone
Michael Garson - musician who toured with David Bowie
Michael Edwards - male model, former boyfriend of Priscilla Presley
Peter Lupus - actor (Mission Impossible TV series)
Al Jarreau - singer
Wendon Swift - Hollywood author, manager
Bobby Lipton - actor
Dini Petty - talk show host
Demi Moore - actress
Kalle Pohl - comedian
Bert Salzman - producer; won Academy Award in 1975 for a short film and thanked L. Ron Hubbard in speech
Bernhard Paul - clown, manager of "Circus Roncalli"
Harold Puthoff - mathematician, physicist, ESP researcher
The Incredible String Band - musicians, band
Lee Konitz - jazz musician
Stephen Boyd - actor
Joan Prather - actress
Leif Garrett - pop star
Carlos Palomino - athlete
Bruce Penhall - actor
Lou Rawls - soul music, jazz, and blues singer
John Dalmas - science fiction writer
Michael Lembeck - actor, director
Mickey McMeel - Three Dog Knight drummer
Cynthia Sikes - actress
Gordon Lightfoot - singer, composer, lyricist
Dale Haddon - actress, model
Chick Vennera - actor
Joan DiVito Vennera - actor
Flo Allen - major Hollywood agent
Hunter Carson - actor
Penny Perry - casting director
Ed Love -
Steven Boyd -
Lisa Blount - actress
Aldous Huxley - writer
Josh Dohnen - agent
Anne Francis - actress
Eileen Brennan - actress
Horst Buchholtz - actor
Tom Skeritt - actor
Nan Herst Bowers - celebrity, publicist
John Longenecker - Emmy Award-winning documentary filmmaker
Kathleen Brown - ran for governor of California (not clear if she was official member)
Maude Adams - actress, model
Charles Manson - infamous serial killer
Thursday, August 28, 2008
Major Christian Denominations
Christian Denominations
Catholicism
The Roman Catholic Church, with 980 million followers, is the largest Christian church in the world. It claims direct historical descent from the church founded by the apostle Peter. The Pope in Rome is the spiritual leader of all Roman Catholics. He administers church affairs through bishops and priests.
Orthodox Eastern Church
With 250 million followers worldwide, the Orthodox Eastern Church is the second largest Christian community in the world. The followers of the Orthodox Church are in fact members of many different jurisdictions, including the Church of Greece, the Church of Cyprus, and the Russian Orthodox Church. It began its split from the Roman Catholic Church in the fifth century. The break was finalized in 1054 with the Great Schism. The Orthodox agree doctrinally in accepting as ecumenical the first seven Ecumenical councils (Doctrine was established by seven ecumenical councils held between 325 and 787, and amended by other councils in the late Byzantine period.), and in rejecting the jurisdiction of the bishop of Rome (the Pope). Orthodox religion holds biblical Scripture and tradition-guided by the Holy Spirit as expressed in the consciousness of the entire Orthodox community-to be the source of Christian truth. It rejects doctrine developed by the Western churches. The word Orthodox became current at the time of the defeat (753) of iconoclasm in Constantinople. It also involves holding a sacramental doctrine of grace, and of veneration of the Virgin Mary-two points differentiating the Orthodox from Protestants. Relations between the Orthodox churches and Roman Catholicism have improved since the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965).
Anabaptists
Anabaptists are Christians of the Radical Reformation. Various groups at various times have been called Anabaptist, but the term is most commonly used to refer to the Anabaptists of 16th century Europe. Today the descendants of the 16th century European movement (particularly the Amish, Hutterites, Mennonites, Church of the Brethren, Brethren in Christ, and other respective German Baptist variants) are the most common bodies referred to as Anabaptist.
Baptists
Founded by John Smyth in England in 1609, and by Roger Williams in Rhode Island in 1638. The Baptist Church has 32 million members, and no creed; authority stems from the Bible. Most Baptists oppose the use of alcohol and tobacco. Baptism is by total immersion.
Brethren Church
Church of the Brethren is a Christian denomination organized in 1708 by eight people in Schwarzenau, Germany. The Brethren movement began as a melding of Pietist and Anabaptist ideas. The first of its churches in America was established in 1723. These churches became commonly known as German Baptist Brethren. The denomination holds the New Testament as its only creed. Historically the church has taken a strong stance for non-resistance or pacifism. Distinctive practices include believers baptism by trine immersion; a threefold Love Feast consisting of feet washing, a fellowship meal, and communion; anointing for healing; and the holy kiss.
Church of Christ
Organized by Presbyterians in Kentucky in 1804, and in Pennsylvania in 1809. It has 1.3 million members. Members believe in the New Testament, and they follow what is written in the Bible without elaboration. Rites are simple. Baptism is of adults.
Church of England
King Henry VIII of England broke with the Roman Catholic Church with the Act of Supremacy in 1534, which declared the king of England to be the head of the Church of England. The Church of England has 6,000 Anglican Orthodox Church members in the U.S. Supremacy of the Bible is the test of doctrine, but The Episcopal Church grants great latitude in interpretation of doctrine. Although it subscribes to the historic Creeds-the Nicene Creed, and the Apostles' Creed-it considers the Bible to be divinely inspired, and holds the Eucharist or Lord's Supper to be the central act of Christian worship. It tends to stress less the confession of particular beliefs than the use of the Book of Common Prayer in public worship. This book, first published in the sixteenth century, even in its revisions, stands today as a major source of unity for Anglicans around the world. The Church of England is part of the Anglican community, represented in the United States mainly by the Episcopal Church.
Episcopal Church
This U.S. offshoot of the Church of England has 2.7 million members. It installed Samuel Seabury as its first bishop in 1784, and held its first General Convention in 1789. The Church of England broke with the Roman Catholic Church in 1534. Worship is based on the Book of Common Prayer and interpretation of the Bible using a modified version of the Thirty-Nine Articles (originally written for the Church of England in 1563). Services range from spartan to ornate, from liberal to conservative. Baptism is of infants.
Evangelical Free Church
The Swedish Evangelical Free Church and the Norwegian-Danish Evangelical Free Church Association merged in June of 1950 to form the Evangelical Free Church of America. The merger conference took place at the Medicine Lake Conference Grounds near Minneapolis, Minnesota. The two bodies represented 275 local congregations at the time of the merger. The Swedish group formed as the Swedish Evangelical Free Mission in Boone, Iowa in October of 1884. Several churches that had been members of the Swedish Evangelical Lutheran Ansgar Synod and the Swedish Evangelical Lutheran Mission Synod, along with some independent congregations, were instrumental in organizing this voluntary fellowship. Also in 1884 two Norwegian-Danish groups, in Boston, Massachusetts and Tacoma, Washington, began to fellowship together. By 1912 they had formed Norwegian-Danish Evangelical Free Church Association.
Lutheran Church
The Lutheran Church has 8 million members in the U.S. It is based on the writings of Martin Luther (1483-1586), who broke with the Roman Catholic Church, and led the Protestant Reformation when he nailed his Ninety-Five Theses to the door of the Wittenberg Church. The first Lutheran congregation in North America was founded in 1638 in Wilmington, Delaware. The first North American regional synod was founded in 1748 by Heinrich Melchior Muhlenberg. Faith is based on the Bible. Salvation comes through faith alone. Services include the Lord's Supper (communion). Lutherans are mostly conservative in religious and social ethics; infants are baptized, the church is organized in synods. The two largest synods in the United States are the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, and the Lutheran Church Missouri Synod.
Mennonites
The Mennonites are a group of Christian Anabaptist denominations named after Menno Simons (1496–1561), though his teachings were a relatively minor influence on the group. As one of the historic peace churches, Mennonites are committed to nonviolence, nonviolent resistance/reconciliation, and pacifism. There are about 1.5 million Mennonites worldwide as of 2006.[1] Mennonite congregations worldwide embody the full scope of Mennonite practice from old fashioned 'plain' people to those who are indistinguishable in dress and appearance from the general population.
Methodist Church
Methodism has 13.5 million members in the U.S. It was founded by the Reverend John Wesley, who began evangelistic preaching with the Church of England in 1738. A separate Wesleyan Methodist Church was established in 1791. The Methodist Episcopal Church was founded in the United States in 1784. The name derives from the founders' desire to study religion "by rule and method," and follow the Bible interpreted by tradition and reason. Worship varies by denomination within Methodism (the United Methodist Church is the largest congregation). The church is perfectionist in social dealings. Methodists have Communion and they perform baptism of infants and adults.
Pentecostal Churches
The churches grew out of the "holiness movement" that developed among Methodists and Protestants in the first decade of the twentieth century. There are some 3.5 million followers today in the U.S. Pentecostals believe in baptism in the Holy Spirit, speaking in tongues, faith healing, and the second coming of Jesus. Of the various Pentecostal churches, the Assemblies of God is the largest. A perfectionist attitude toward secular affairs is common. Services feature enthusiastic sermons and hymns, and Pentecostals practice adult baptism and communion.
Presbyterian Church
Presbyterianism in the U.S. grew out of the Calvinist Churches of Switzerland and France. John Knox founded the first Presbyterian Church in Scotland in 1557. The first presbytery in North America was established by Irish missionary, Francis Makemie, in 1706. For 3.2 million members of the Presbyterian Church, faith is in the Bible. Sacraments are infant baptism and communion. The church is organized as a system of courts in which clergy and lay members (presbyters) participate at local, regional, and national levels. Services are simple, with emphasis on the sermon.
Catholicism
The Roman Catholic Church, with 980 million followers, is the largest Christian church in the world. It claims direct historical descent from the church founded by the apostle Peter. The Pope in Rome is the spiritual leader of all Roman Catholics. He administers church affairs through bishops and priests.
Orthodox Eastern Church
With 250 million followers worldwide, the Orthodox Eastern Church is the second largest Christian community in the world. The followers of the Orthodox Church are in fact members of many different jurisdictions, including the Church of Greece, the Church of Cyprus, and the Russian Orthodox Church. It began its split from the Roman Catholic Church in the fifth century. The break was finalized in 1054 with the Great Schism. The Orthodox agree doctrinally in accepting as ecumenical the first seven Ecumenical councils (Doctrine was established by seven ecumenical councils held between 325 and 787, and amended by other councils in the late Byzantine period.), and in rejecting the jurisdiction of the bishop of Rome (the Pope). Orthodox religion holds biblical Scripture and tradition-guided by the Holy Spirit as expressed in the consciousness of the entire Orthodox community-to be the source of Christian truth. It rejects doctrine developed by the Western churches. The word Orthodox became current at the time of the defeat (753) of iconoclasm in Constantinople. It also involves holding a sacramental doctrine of grace, and of veneration of the Virgin Mary-two points differentiating the Orthodox from Protestants. Relations between the Orthodox churches and Roman Catholicism have improved since the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965).
Anabaptists
Anabaptists are Christians of the Radical Reformation. Various groups at various times have been called Anabaptist, but the term is most commonly used to refer to the Anabaptists of 16th century Europe. Today the descendants of the 16th century European movement (particularly the Amish, Hutterites, Mennonites, Church of the Brethren, Brethren in Christ, and other respective German Baptist variants) are the most common bodies referred to as Anabaptist.
Baptists
Founded by John Smyth in England in 1609, and by Roger Williams in Rhode Island in 1638. The Baptist Church has 32 million members, and no creed; authority stems from the Bible. Most Baptists oppose the use of alcohol and tobacco. Baptism is by total immersion.
Brethren Church
Church of the Brethren is a Christian denomination organized in 1708 by eight people in Schwarzenau, Germany. The Brethren movement began as a melding of Pietist and Anabaptist ideas. The first of its churches in America was established in 1723. These churches became commonly known as German Baptist Brethren. The denomination holds the New Testament as its only creed. Historically the church has taken a strong stance for non-resistance or pacifism. Distinctive practices include believers baptism by trine immersion; a threefold Love Feast consisting of feet washing, a fellowship meal, and communion; anointing for healing; and the holy kiss.
Church of Christ
Organized by Presbyterians in Kentucky in 1804, and in Pennsylvania in 1809. It has 1.3 million members. Members believe in the New Testament, and they follow what is written in the Bible without elaboration. Rites are simple. Baptism is of adults.
Church of England
King Henry VIII of England broke with the Roman Catholic Church with the Act of Supremacy in 1534, which declared the king of England to be the head of the Church of England. The Church of England has 6,000 Anglican Orthodox Church members in the U.S. Supremacy of the Bible is the test of doctrine, but The Episcopal Church grants great latitude in interpretation of doctrine. Although it subscribes to the historic Creeds-the Nicene Creed, and the Apostles' Creed-it considers the Bible to be divinely inspired, and holds the Eucharist or Lord's Supper to be the central act of Christian worship. It tends to stress less the confession of particular beliefs than the use of the Book of Common Prayer in public worship. This book, first published in the sixteenth century, even in its revisions, stands today as a major source of unity for Anglicans around the world. The Church of England is part of the Anglican community, represented in the United States mainly by the Episcopal Church.
Episcopal Church
This U.S. offshoot of the Church of England has 2.7 million members. It installed Samuel Seabury as its first bishop in 1784, and held its first General Convention in 1789. The Church of England broke with the Roman Catholic Church in 1534. Worship is based on the Book of Common Prayer and interpretation of the Bible using a modified version of the Thirty-Nine Articles (originally written for the Church of England in 1563). Services range from spartan to ornate, from liberal to conservative. Baptism is of infants.
Evangelical Free Church
The Swedish Evangelical Free Church and the Norwegian-Danish Evangelical Free Church Association merged in June of 1950 to form the Evangelical Free Church of America. The merger conference took place at the Medicine Lake Conference Grounds near Minneapolis, Minnesota. The two bodies represented 275 local congregations at the time of the merger. The Swedish group formed as the Swedish Evangelical Free Mission in Boone, Iowa in October of 1884. Several churches that had been members of the Swedish Evangelical Lutheran Ansgar Synod and the Swedish Evangelical Lutheran Mission Synod, along with some independent congregations, were instrumental in organizing this voluntary fellowship. Also in 1884 two Norwegian-Danish groups, in Boston, Massachusetts and Tacoma, Washington, began to fellowship together. By 1912 they had formed Norwegian-Danish Evangelical Free Church Association.
Lutheran Church
The Lutheran Church has 8 million members in the U.S. It is based on the writings of Martin Luther (1483-1586), who broke with the Roman Catholic Church, and led the Protestant Reformation when he nailed his Ninety-Five Theses to the door of the Wittenberg Church. The first Lutheran congregation in North America was founded in 1638 in Wilmington, Delaware. The first North American regional synod was founded in 1748 by Heinrich Melchior Muhlenberg. Faith is based on the Bible. Salvation comes through faith alone. Services include the Lord's Supper (communion). Lutherans are mostly conservative in religious and social ethics; infants are baptized, the church is organized in synods. The two largest synods in the United States are the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, and the Lutheran Church Missouri Synod.
Mennonites
The Mennonites are a group of Christian Anabaptist denominations named after Menno Simons (1496–1561), though his teachings were a relatively minor influence on the group. As one of the historic peace churches, Mennonites are committed to nonviolence, nonviolent resistance/reconciliation, and pacifism. There are about 1.5 million Mennonites worldwide as of 2006.[1] Mennonite congregations worldwide embody the full scope of Mennonite practice from old fashioned 'plain' people to those who are indistinguishable in dress and appearance from the general population.
Methodist Church
Methodism has 13.5 million members in the U.S. It was founded by the Reverend John Wesley, who began evangelistic preaching with the Church of England in 1738. A separate Wesleyan Methodist Church was established in 1791. The Methodist Episcopal Church was founded in the United States in 1784. The name derives from the founders' desire to study religion "by rule and method," and follow the Bible interpreted by tradition and reason. Worship varies by denomination within Methodism (the United Methodist Church is the largest congregation). The church is perfectionist in social dealings. Methodists have Communion and they perform baptism of infants and adults.
Pentecostal Churches
The churches grew out of the "holiness movement" that developed among Methodists and Protestants in the first decade of the twentieth century. There are some 3.5 million followers today in the U.S. Pentecostals believe in baptism in the Holy Spirit, speaking in tongues, faith healing, and the second coming of Jesus. Of the various Pentecostal churches, the Assemblies of God is the largest. A perfectionist attitude toward secular affairs is common. Services feature enthusiastic sermons and hymns, and Pentecostals practice adult baptism and communion.
Presbyterian Church
Presbyterianism in the U.S. grew out of the Calvinist Churches of Switzerland and France. John Knox founded the first Presbyterian Church in Scotland in 1557. The first presbytery in North America was established by Irish missionary, Francis Makemie, in 1706. For 3.2 million members of the Presbyterian Church, faith is in the Bible. Sacraments are infant baptism and communion. The church is organized as a system of courts in which clergy and lay members (presbyters) participate at local, regional, and national levels. Services are simple, with emphasis on the sermon.
Terrorist Attacks Coming This Fall?
2008 Threat Season Heats Up
August 27, 2008
By Fred Burton and Scott Stewart
Summer has arrived, bringing with it rumors of attacks against the U.S. homeland. Currently, we are hearing unconfirmed word of plans in place for jihadists to be dispatched from Pakistan to conduct coordinated suicide attacks against soft targets in as many as 10 U.S. cities.
This year, the rumors seem to be emerging a little later and with a little less fanfare than last year, when we saw a number of highly publicized warnings, such as that from Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff and a National Intelligence Estimate saying al Qaeda was gaining strength. Last year also brought warnings from a former Israeli counterterrorism official that al Qaeda was planning a simultaneous attack against five to seven American cities, and of a dirty bomb attack against New York.
These warnings were followed by the Sept. 7, 2007, release of a video message from Osama bin Laden, who had been unseen on video since October 2004 or heard on audiotape since July 2006. Some were convinced that his reappearance — and veiled threat — signaled a looming attack against the United States, or a message to supporters to commence attacks.
However, in spite of all these warnings — and bin Laden’s reappearance — no attack occurred last summer or autumn on U.S. soil. As we discussed last October, there are a number of reasons why such an attack did not happen.
We are currently working to collect more information regarding this summer’s rumors. So far we cannot gauge their credibility, but they pique our interest for several reasons. First is the issue of timing, and second is the ease with which such attacks could be coordinated.
Timing is Everything
It is a busy time in U.S. politics. The Democratic National Convention (DNC) takes place this week in Denver, and the Republican National Convention (RNC) takes place next week in St. Paul, Minn. After these conventions, politics will be on the front page until the November elections. In addition, Americans are returning from summer vacations, with schools and universities resuming classes. The anniversary of the 9/11 attacks is also coming up.
While the al Qaeda core generally conduct operations when they are ready — rather than according to external calendars and anniversaries — their pattern of releasing statements on the 9/11 anniversary demonstrates their awareness of its significance and the painful emotions it evokes in the American psyche.
In 2004, just days before the U.S. presidential election, Osama bin Laden made a rare video appearance. In the video, he said al Qaeda’s problem was not with the two candidates, George Bush or John Kerry, but with U.S. policy regarding the Muslim world and the situations in Iraq and Israel. Bin Laden also pointed out that neither Bush nor Kerry could be trusted to keep the United States secure from more attacks. By creating such a message and releasing it at that time, bin Laden was demonstrating his organization’s understanding of the U.S. presidential election dynamic.
Furthermore, the al Qaeda core has historically planned or supported substantial operations in advance of elections. In 2004 we saw this with the Madrid train bombings, which took place prior to Spanish elections. Several other plots might also fall into category. In the summer of 2004, for example, we saw a plot to target a number of financial targets in the U.S. thwarted.
Another election-year attempt was the 2006 al Qaeda-tied plot against a series of airline flights originating from London’s Heathrow airport. While the plot was hatched in the United Kingdom, the selection of flights bound for Washington, Chicago, San Francisco and New York meant that the attack was actually targeted primarily against the United States. For perspective, we look at Operation Bojinka in the mid-1990s, the predecessor to the 2006 plot. Although planned to be launched from Asia, the plot was clearly an attack against the United States.
In another example, Jose Padilla was arrested in May 2002, a congressional election year, as he attempted to enter the United States. Padilla, according to the interrogation of captured al Qaeda member Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, had been sent to there to conduct attacks.
Attacks certainly occur in non-election years (and plots have been thwarted in off years), but the fact remains that jihadists appear mindful of election cycles in the United States. And al Qaeda is not alone in this thinking. Grassroots al Qaeda sympathizers have also attempted to interfere in election-related events. In August 2004, on the eve of the RNC in New York, authorities arrested a Pakistani man and his Pakistan-born U.S. citizen accomplice who claimed they were planning to attack a subway station in Manhattan two blocks from RNC site. The men were later convicted for the plot, with the main organizer receiving a 30-year sentence.
Speaking of elections, it is also interesting to consider that the last two U.S. presidents were forced to deal with jihadist strikes on American soil shortly after assuming office. Bill Clinton was inaugurated in January 1993, and the World Trade Center was bombed in late February 1993. George W. Bush was inaugurated in January 2001, and the World Trade Center and Pentagon were attacked in September 2001. In all likelihood this is a coincidence, but it is worth watching to see if the trend continues in 2009.
Of course, let’s put this in perspective. In the last 15 years — election year or not –- there has rarely been a time when some jihadist somewhere was not planning an attack against the United States. However, the al Qaeda core organization clearly attempted to conduct major attacks in 2002, 2004 and 2006, all of which were election years. These attempts (other than Madrid) were all thwarted. The fact that we haven’t seen an attempt during this year’s election cycle has us watchful — we sense that there must be plot out there somewhere.
Ease of Attack
Another thing that interests us about recent rumors is the concept behind the alleged plot: the simple and elegant idea of sending 10 independent actors to 10 cities. One factor that has sunk many past jihadist plots against the United States has been poor operational security and poor terrorist tradecraft. These mistakes have allowed U.S. authorities to identify and shut down the militant networks involved.
By using compartmentalized operatives, militants could more easily circumvent counterterrorist efforts. Furthermore, even if one or more of the operatives were detected and arrested by authorities, details of the operation at large would not be compromised. Each operative would only know about his own particular targeting instructions and would be unable to provide other details if captured.
In such a case, al Qaeda would most likely attempt to dispatch 10 “clean skin” operatives (those not obviously associated with the group) who are trained to construct improvised explosive devices using readily available materials and ultimately willing to undertake martyrdom missions. Due to changes in the immigration processes since the 2001 attacks, these operatives will likely be Westerners — U.S., Canadian or European citizens able to travel to the United States without the need to obtain a visa.
Recruiting such operatives could be easier that one might expect. Thousands of potential candidates who currently attend militant madrassas in Pakistan (including somewhere from 500 to 1,000 U.S. citizens) fit this description. In fact, no one really knows how many of these potential jihadist operatives exist at present. The government of Pakistan has not been forthcoming in answering requests from the United States and United Kingdom for lists of their citizens currently attending these institutions. Regardless, the idea of al Qaeda recruiting 10 “clean skins” for such an operation is not beyond the realm of possibility. Consider past recruits such as Mohammad Siddique Khan, the leader of the cell behind the July 7, 2005, London bombing, shoe bomber Richard Reid and Adam Gadahn (aka Azzam al-Amriki), or even the warnings o f German Muslims planning to conduct attacks in the West.
Levels of Severity
If this rumored operation is in fact legitimate, it would be the first one conducted using only operatives sent from the core al Qaeda group in Afghanistan or Pakistan since the 9/11 attacks. This is what we refer to as an al Qaeda 2.0 operational model. However, while sending operatives to work solo rather than in a group or with local grassroots jihadists increases operational security, it also reduces operational ability. Quite simply, it is more difficult for an individual to arrange a large attack than it is for a group working together. This means that lone operatives are unlikely to assemble major explosive devices like the truck-borne IED used in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Instead we would anticipate attacks similar in scope to grassroots undertakings; suicide bombings such as the July 7, 2005, London bombings or the 2002 armed assault on the El Al Ticket counter in Los Angeles. These theoretical attacks also would likely be conducted against soft targets such as buses, subways or shopping malls, where they can create a high number of casualties, rather than harder targets like the White House or Pentagon, where they would prove ineffective.
The October 2005 incident in Norman, Okla., in which a University of Oklahoma student detonated an IED outside a packed football stadium highlights the ease with which a device can be manufactured from readily available items without detection. But suicide operatives could undertake a number of different types of attacks. Recently we have seen Palestinian suicide operatives embarking on extremely simple plots, such as driving heavy vehicles into crowds.
While the individual attacks themselves would likely be small in magnitude, when combined and spread across the country they could have a far larger impact, similar to past attacks in places such as Madrid, London, Amman in Jordan, the Sinai Peninsula and Bali, Indonesia. Although the botched attacks in London and Glasgow last summer were conducted by the same cell, the planners also clearly sought to use multiple devices in geographically diverse locations. While such attacks would not be a strategic threat to U.S. existence, they would certainly kill people and create a great deal of fear and confusion.
We are not attempting to hype anything here and we do not want to create any kind of panic. These are just rumors, and unconfirmed ones at that. We have not seen any formal announcements from the U.S. government raising the alert level. However, it certainly seems to us to be a prudent time to increase situational awareness and update contingency plans in anticipation of the worst.
Taken from Stratfor.com
August 27, 2008
By Fred Burton and Scott Stewart
Summer has arrived, bringing with it rumors of attacks against the U.S. homeland. Currently, we are hearing unconfirmed word of plans in place for jihadists to be dispatched from Pakistan to conduct coordinated suicide attacks against soft targets in as many as 10 U.S. cities.
This year, the rumors seem to be emerging a little later and with a little less fanfare than last year, when we saw a number of highly publicized warnings, such as that from Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff and a National Intelligence Estimate saying al Qaeda was gaining strength. Last year also brought warnings from a former Israeli counterterrorism official that al Qaeda was planning a simultaneous attack against five to seven American cities, and of a dirty bomb attack against New York.
These warnings were followed by the Sept. 7, 2007, release of a video message from Osama bin Laden, who had been unseen on video since October 2004 or heard on audiotape since July 2006. Some were convinced that his reappearance — and veiled threat — signaled a looming attack against the United States, or a message to supporters to commence attacks.
However, in spite of all these warnings — and bin Laden’s reappearance — no attack occurred last summer or autumn on U.S. soil. As we discussed last October, there are a number of reasons why such an attack did not happen.
We are currently working to collect more information regarding this summer’s rumors. So far we cannot gauge their credibility, but they pique our interest for several reasons. First is the issue of timing, and second is the ease with which such attacks could be coordinated.
Timing is Everything
It is a busy time in U.S. politics. The Democratic National Convention (DNC) takes place this week in Denver, and the Republican National Convention (RNC) takes place next week in St. Paul, Minn. After these conventions, politics will be on the front page until the November elections. In addition, Americans are returning from summer vacations, with schools and universities resuming classes. The anniversary of the 9/11 attacks is also coming up.
While the al Qaeda core generally conduct operations when they are ready — rather than according to external calendars and anniversaries — their pattern of releasing statements on the 9/11 anniversary demonstrates their awareness of its significance and the painful emotions it evokes in the American psyche.
In 2004, just days before the U.S. presidential election, Osama bin Laden made a rare video appearance. In the video, he said al Qaeda’s problem was not with the two candidates, George Bush or John Kerry, but with U.S. policy regarding the Muslim world and the situations in Iraq and Israel. Bin Laden also pointed out that neither Bush nor Kerry could be trusted to keep the United States secure from more attacks. By creating such a message and releasing it at that time, bin Laden was demonstrating his organization’s understanding of the U.S. presidential election dynamic.
Furthermore, the al Qaeda core has historically planned or supported substantial operations in advance of elections. In 2004 we saw this with the Madrid train bombings, which took place prior to Spanish elections. Several other plots might also fall into category. In the summer of 2004, for example, we saw a plot to target a number of financial targets in the U.S. thwarted.
Another election-year attempt was the 2006 al Qaeda-tied plot against a series of airline flights originating from London’s Heathrow airport. While the plot was hatched in the United Kingdom, the selection of flights bound for Washington, Chicago, San Francisco and New York meant that the attack was actually targeted primarily against the United States. For perspective, we look at Operation Bojinka in the mid-1990s, the predecessor to the 2006 plot. Although planned to be launched from Asia, the plot was clearly an attack against the United States.
In another example, Jose Padilla was arrested in May 2002, a congressional election year, as he attempted to enter the United States. Padilla, according to the interrogation of captured al Qaeda member Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, had been sent to there to conduct attacks.
Attacks certainly occur in non-election years (and plots have been thwarted in off years), but the fact remains that jihadists appear mindful of election cycles in the United States. And al Qaeda is not alone in this thinking. Grassroots al Qaeda sympathizers have also attempted to interfere in election-related events. In August 2004, on the eve of the RNC in New York, authorities arrested a Pakistani man and his Pakistan-born U.S. citizen accomplice who claimed they were planning to attack a subway station in Manhattan two blocks from RNC site. The men were later convicted for the plot, with the main organizer receiving a 30-year sentence.
Speaking of elections, it is also interesting to consider that the last two U.S. presidents were forced to deal with jihadist strikes on American soil shortly after assuming office. Bill Clinton was inaugurated in January 1993, and the World Trade Center was bombed in late February 1993. George W. Bush was inaugurated in January 2001, and the World Trade Center and Pentagon were attacked in September 2001. In all likelihood this is a coincidence, but it is worth watching to see if the trend continues in 2009.
Of course, let’s put this in perspective. In the last 15 years — election year or not –- there has rarely been a time when some jihadist somewhere was not planning an attack against the United States. However, the al Qaeda core organization clearly attempted to conduct major attacks in 2002, 2004 and 2006, all of which were election years. These attempts (other than Madrid) were all thwarted. The fact that we haven’t seen an attempt during this year’s election cycle has us watchful — we sense that there must be plot out there somewhere.
Ease of Attack
Another thing that interests us about recent rumors is the concept behind the alleged plot: the simple and elegant idea of sending 10 independent actors to 10 cities. One factor that has sunk many past jihadist plots against the United States has been poor operational security and poor terrorist tradecraft. These mistakes have allowed U.S. authorities to identify and shut down the militant networks involved.
By using compartmentalized operatives, militants could more easily circumvent counterterrorist efforts. Furthermore, even if one or more of the operatives were detected and arrested by authorities, details of the operation at large would not be compromised. Each operative would only know about his own particular targeting instructions and would be unable to provide other details if captured.
In such a case, al Qaeda would most likely attempt to dispatch 10 “clean skin” operatives (those not obviously associated with the group) who are trained to construct improvised explosive devices using readily available materials and ultimately willing to undertake martyrdom missions. Due to changes in the immigration processes since the 2001 attacks, these operatives will likely be Westerners — U.S., Canadian or European citizens able to travel to the United States without the need to obtain a visa.
Recruiting such operatives could be easier that one might expect. Thousands of potential candidates who currently attend militant madrassas in Pakistan (including somewhere from 500 to 1,000 U.S. citizens) fit this description. In fact, no one really knows how many of these potential jihadist operatives exist at present. The government of Pakistan has not been forthcoming in answering requests from the United States and United Kingdom for lists of their citizens currently attending these institutions. Regardless, the idea of al Qaeda recruiting 10 “clean skins” for such an operation is not beyond the realm of possibility. Consider past recruits such as Mohammad Siddique Khan, the leader of the cell behind the July 7, 2005, London bombing, shoe bomber Richard Reid and Adam Gadahn (aka Azzam al-Amriki), or even the warnings o f German Muslims planning to conduct attacks in the West.
Levels of Severity
If this rumored operation is in fact legitimate, it would be the first one conducted using only operatives sent from the core al Qaeda group in Afghanistan or Pakistan since the 9/11 attacks. This is what we refer to as an al Qaeda 2.0 operational model. However, while sending operatives to work solo rather than in a group or with local grassroots jihadists increases operational security, it also reduces operational ability. Quite simply, it is more difficult for an individual to arrange a large attack than it is for a group working together. This means that lone operatives are unlikely to assemble major explosive devices like the truck-borne IED used in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Instead we would anticipate attacks similar in scope to grassroots undertakings; suicide bombings such as the July 7, 2005, London bombings or the 2002 armed assault on the El Al Ticket counter in Los Angeles. These theoretical attacks also would likely be conducted against soft targets such as buses, subways or shopping malls, where they can create a high number of casualties, rather than harder targets like the White House or Pentagon, where they would prove ineffective.
The October 2005 incident in Norman, Okla., in which a University of Oklahoma student detonated an IED outside a packed football stadium highlights the ease with which a device can be manufactured from readily available items without detection. But suicide operatives could undertake a number of different types of attacks. Recently we have seen Palestinian suicide operatives embarking on extremely simple plots, such as driving heavy vehicles into crowds.
While the individual attacks themselves would likely be small in magnitude, when combined and spread across the country they could have a far larger impact, similar to past attacks in places such as Madrid, London, Amman in Jordan, the Sinai Peninsula and Bali, Indonesia. Although the botched attacks in London and Glasgow last summer were conducted by the same cell, the planners also clearly sought to use multiple devices in geographically diverse locations. While such attacks would not be a strategic threat to U.S. existence, they would certainly kill people and create a great deal of fear and confusion.
We are not attempting to hype anything here and we do not want to create any kind of panic. These are just rumors, and unconfirmed ones at that. We have not seen any formal announcements from the U.S. government raising the alert level. However, it certainly seems to us to be a prudent time to increase situational awareness and update contingency plans in anticipation of the worst.
Taken from Stratfor.com
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