No Terrorist Attacks this Summer

I received the following bulletin from Stratfor.com

SUMMER 2007: THE ATTACK
THAT NEVER OCCURRED

By Fred Burton and Scott Stewart

The summer of 2007 was marked by threats and warnings of an
imminent terrorist attack against the United States. In addition to the
well-publicized warnings from Homeland Security Secretary Michael
Chertoff and a National Intelligence Estimate that al Qaeda was
gaining strength, a former Israeli counterterrorism official warned that
al Qaeda was planning a simultaneous attack against five to seven
American cities. Another warning of an impending dirty bomb attack
prompted the New York Police Department to set up vehicle
checkpoints near the financial district in Lower Manhattan. In
addition to these public warnings, U.S. government counterterrorism
sources also told us privately that they were seriously concerned
about the possibility of an attack.
All these warnings were followed by the Sept. 7 release of a video
message from Osama bin Laden, who had not been seen on video
since October 2004 or heard on audio tape since July 2006. Some
were convinced that his reappearance -- and his veiled threat -- was
the sign of a looming attack against the United States, or perhaps a
signal for an attack to commence.
In spite of all these warnings and bin Laden's reappearance -- not
the mention the relative ease with which an attack can be conducted
-- no attack occurred this summer. Although our assessment is that
the al Qaeda core has been damaged to the point that it no longer
poses a strategic threat to the U.S. homeland, tactical attacks
against soft targets remain simple to conduct and certainly are within
the reach of jihadist operatives -- regardless of whether they are
linked to the al Qaeda core.
We believe there are several reasons no attack occurred this
summer -- or since 9/11 for that matter.

No Conscious Decision
Before we discuss these factors, we must note that the lack of an
attack against the U.S. homeland since 9/11 has not been the result
of a calculated decision by bin Laden and the core al Qaeda
leadership. Far too many plots have been disrupted for that to be the
case. Many of those foiled and failed attacks, such as the 2006
foiled plot to destroy airliners flying from London to the United
States, the Library Tower Plot, Richard Reid's failed attempt to take
down American Airlines flight 63 in December 2001 and Jose
Padilla's activities -- bear connection to the core al Qaeda
leadership.
So, if the core al Qaeda has desired, and even attempted, to strike
the United States, why has it failed? Perhaps the greatest single
factor is attitude -- among law enforcement and intelligence
agencies, the public at large, the Muslim community and even the
jihadists themselves.

Law Enforcement and Intelligence
Prior to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the FBI denied the
existence of an international terrorism threat to the U.S. homeland, a
stance reflected in the bureau's "Terrorism in the United States"
publications in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Even after the radical
Zionist Rabbi Meir Kahane was killed by a jihadist with connections
to the Brooklyn Jihad Office and "Blind Sheikh" Omar Abdul-
Rahman, the FBI and Department of Justice denied the act was
terrorism and left the investigation and the prosecution of the
gunman, ElSayyid Nosair, to New York police and the Manhattan
District Attorney's Office. (Though they were greatly aided on the
federal level by the Diplomatic Security Service, which ran
investigative leads for them in Egypt and elsewhere.)
It was only after Nosair's associates detonated a large truck bomb in
the parking garage of the World Trade Center in 1993 that the
existence of a threat to the United States was recognized. Yet, even
after that bombing and the disruption of other plots -- the July 1997
plot to bomb the New York subway system and the December 1999
Millennium Bomb Plot -- the apathy toward counterterrorism
programs remained. This was most evident in the low levels of
funding and manpower devoted to counterterrorism programs prior to
9/11. As noted in the 9/11 Commission Report, counterterrorism
programs simply were not a priority.
Even the April 1995 Oklahoma City bombing made no real
difference. Some changes were made, such as physical security
enhancements at federal buildings, but they were merely window
dressing. The real problems, underlying structural problems in the
U.S. government's counterterrorism efforts -- resources, priorities
and intelligence-sharing -- were not addressed in a meaningful way.
Prior to 9/11, experts (including the two of us) lecturing to law
enforcement and intelligence groups about the al
Qaeda/transnational terrorist threat to the United States were met
with indifference. Of course, following 9/11 some of those same
groups paid careful attention to what the experts had to say.
Transnational terrorism had become real to them. The 9/11 attacks
sparked a sea change in attitudes within law enforcement and
intelligence circles. Counterterrorism -- aggressively collecting
intelligence pertaining to terrorism and pursuing terrorist leads -- is
now a priority.

Citizen Awareness
Before the 1993 World Trade Center bombing the American public
also was largely unconcerned about international terrorism. Even
after that bombing, the public remained largely apathetic about the
terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland. This was partly the result of the
media's coverage of the 1993 bombing, which seemed to focus on
the hapless, bumbling Mohamed Salameh and not the cunning and
dangerous Abdel Basit (who is more widely known by his alias,
Ramzi Yousef). Furthermore, the follow-on plot to that attack, the
1993 New York bomb plot -- for which Abdul-Rahman and some of
his followers were accused of planning strikes against the Lincoln
Tunnel and other New York City landmarks -- was thwarted. This led
many to believe that the government had a handle on terrorism and
that the United States was protected from such attacks. The second
plot was thwarted before it could be executed, and most Americans
never saw the gigantic crater (nearly 100 feet across) that the
February 1993 truck bomb created through several floors of Building
One's reinforced concrete parking garage. Instead, they saw only a
bit of smoke billowing from the damaged building. The 1993 cases
lacked the stunning visual displays of the 9/11 attacks.
The events of 9/11 also created a 180-degree change in how people
think about terrorism and how they perceive and respond to
suspicious activity. "If you see something, say something" has
become a popular mantra, especially in New York and other large
cities. Part of this stems from the changed attitudes of law
enforcement officials, who not only have issued appeals in the press
but also have made community outreach visits to nearly every flight
school, truck driving school, chemical supply company, fertilizer
dealer and storage rental company in the United States. Through
media reports of terrorist plots and attacks, the public also has
become much more aware of the precursor chemicals for improvised
explosive mixtures and applies far more scrutiny to anyone
attempting to procure them in bulk.
U.S. citizens also are far more aware of the importance of
preoperational surveillance and -- fair or not -- it is now very difficult
for a person wearing traditional Muslim dress to take a photograph of
anything without being reported to the authorities by a concerned
citizen.
This change in attitude is particularly significant in the Muslim
community itself. Contrary to the hopes of bin Laden -- and the fears
of the U.S. government -- the theology of jihadism has not taken root
in the United States. Certainly there are individuals who have come
to embrace this ideology, as the arrests of some grassroots activists
demonstrate, but such people are very much the exception. In spite
of some problems, the law enforcement community has forged some
strong links to the Muslim community, and in several cases Muslims
have even reported potential jihadists to law enforcement.
Even in places where jihadism has more successfully infiltrated the
Muslim community, such as Europe, North Africa and Saudi Arabia,
the jihadists still consider it preferable to wage the "real" jihad
against "crusader troops" in places such as Iraq, rather than to
attack soft civilian targets in the West or elsewhere. As unpopular as
it is to say, in many ways Iraq has served as a sort of jihadist
magnet, drawing young men from around the world to "martyr"
themselves. Pragmatically, every young jihadist who travels from
Europe or the Middle East to die in Baghdad or Ar Ramadi is one
less who could attack Boston, London, Brussels or Rome.

Attitude is Everything
In late 1992 and early 1993, amateur planning was all that was
required to conduct a successful terrorist attack on U.S. soil. In
addition to the almost comical mistakes made by Salameh, serious
gaffes also were made by Ahmed Ajaj and Basit as they prepared
for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. However, because of the
prevailing apathetic attitude among law enforcement officials and the
public in general, those mistakes were not fatal to the operation.
Given the changes in attitude since 9/11, however, no operation
conducted as poorly as the 1993 bombing would succeed today.
Before the bombing, the FBI investigated the cell that carried it out,
made the determination that the men were harmless fanatics and
closed the investigation. That would not happen today, as even
slightly goofy, wannabe terrorists such as the Miami Seven are
vigorously investigated and prosecuted when possible.
When Ajaj and Basit flew into JFK Airport in September 1992,
authorities pretty much ignored the fact that Ajaj was found
transporting a large quantity of jihadist material, including
bombmaking manuals and videos. Instead, he was sentenced to six
months in jail for committing passport fraud -- a mere slap on the
wrist -- and was then to be deported. Had authorities taken the time
to carefully review the materials in Ajaj's briefcase, they would have
found two boarding passes and two passports with exit stamps from
Pakistan. Because of that oversight, no one noticed that Ajaj was
traveling with a companion. Even when his co-conspirators called
Ajaj in jail seeking his help in formulating their improvised explosive
mixtures and recovering the bombmaking manuals, the calls were
not traced. It was not until after the bombing that Ajaj's involvement
was discovered, and he was convicted and sentenced.
These kinds of oversights would not occur now. Furthermore, the
attitude of the public today makes it far more difficult for a
conspirator like Niday Ayyad to order chemicals used to construct a
bomb, or for the conspirators to receive and store such chemicals in
a rented storage space without being reported to the authorities.
Another change in attitude has been on the legal front. Prior to the
1993 World Trade Center bombing, there were no "terrorism"
statutes concerning the use of weapons of mass destruction or acts
of terrorism transcending national borders. Instead, prosecutors in
terrorism cases struggled to apply existing laws. The defendants in
the 1993 New York bomb plot case were not charged with
conspiring to build bombs or commit acts of international terrorism.
Rather, they were convicted on "seditious conspiracy" charges.
Similarly, Salameh was convicted of violating the Special Agricultural
Worker program and with damaging U.S. Secret Service cars stored
in the basement of the World Trade Center building.
The U.S. security environment has indeed improved dramatically
since 1993, largely as a result of the sweeping changes in attitude,
though also to some extent due to the magnet effect of the war in
Iraq. Success can engender complacency, however, and the lack of
attacks could allow attitudes -- and thus counterterrorism resources -
- to swing back toward the other end of the spectrum.