The Real World Order
August 18, 2008
By George Friedman
On Sept. 11, 1990, U.S. President George H. W. Bush addressed Congress. He spoke in the wake of the end of Communism in Eastern Europe, the weakening of the Soviet Union, and the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein. He argued that a New World Order was emerging: “A hundred generations have searched for this elusive path to peace, while a thousand wars raged across the span of human endeavor, and today that new world is struggling to be born. A world quite different from the one we’ve known. A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights of the weak.”
After every major, systemic war, there is the hope that this will be the war to end all wars. The idea driving it is simple. Wars are usually won by grand coalitions. The idea is that the coalition that won the war by working together will continue to work together to make the peace. Indeed, the idea is that the defeated will join the coalition and work with them to ensure the peace. This was the dream behind the Congress of Vienna, the League of Nations, the United Nations and, after the Cold War, NATO. The idea was that there would be no major issues that couldn’t be handled by the victors, now joined with the defeated. That was the idea that drove George H. W. Bush as the Cold War was coming to its end.
Those with the dream are always disappointed. The victorious coalition breaks apart. The defeated refuse to play the role assigned to them. New powers emerge that were not part of the coalition. Anyone may have ideals and visions. The reality of the world order is that there are profound divergences of interest in a world where distrust is a natural and reasonable response to reality. In the end, ideals and visions vanish in a new round of geopolitical conflict.
The post-Cold War world, the New World Order, ended with authority on Aug. 8, 2008, when Russia and Georgia went to war. Certainly, this war was not in itself of major significance, and a very good case can be made that the New World Order actually started coming apart on Sept. 11, 2001. But it was on Aug. 8 that a nation-state, Russia, attacked another nation-state, Georgia, out of fear of the intentions of a third nation-state, the United States. This causes us to begin thinking about the Real World Order.
The global system is suffering from two imbalances. First, one nation-state, the United States, remains overwhelmingly powerful, and no combination of powers are in a position to control its behavior. We are aware of all the economic problems besetting the United States, but the reality is that the American economy is larger than the next three economies combined (Japan, Germany and China). The U.S. military controls all the world’s oceans and effectively dominates space. Because of these factors, the United States remains politically powerful — not liked and perhaps not admired, but enormously powerful.
The second imbalance is within the United States itself. Its ground forces and the bulk of its logistical capability are committed to the Middle East, particularly Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States also is threatening on occasion to go to war with Iran, which would tie down most of its air power, and it is facing a destabilizing Pakistan. Therefore, there is this paradox: The United States is so powerful that, in the long run, it has created an imbalance in the global system. In the short run, however, it is so off balance that it has few, if any, military resources to deal with challenges elsewhere. That means that the United States remains the dominant power in the long run but it cannot exercise that power in the short run. This creates a window of opportunity for other countries to act.
The outcome of the Iraq war can be seen emerging. The United States has succeeded in creating the foundations for a political settlement among the main Iraqi factions that will create a relatively stable government. In that sense, U.S. policy has succeeded. But the problem the United States has is the length of time it took to achieve this success. Had it occurred in 2003, the United States would not suffer its current imbalance. But this is 2008, more than five years after the invasion. The United States never expected a war of this duration, nor did it plan for it. In order to fight the war, it had to inject a major portion of its ground fighting capability into it. The length of the war was the problem. U.S. ground forces are either in Iraq, recovering from a tour or preparing for a deployment. What strategic reserves are available are tasked into Afghanistan. Little is left over.
As Iraq pulled in the bulk of available forces, the United States did not shift its foreign policy elsewhere. For example, it remained committed to the expansion of democracy in the former Soviet Union and the expansion of NATO, to include Ukraine and Georgia. From the fall of the former Soviet Union, the United States saw itself as having a dominant role in reshaping post-Soviet social and political orders, including influencing the emergence of democratic institutions and free markets. The United States saw this almost in the same light as it saw the democratization of Germany and Japan after World War II. Having defeated the Soviet Union, it now fell to the United States to reshape the societies of the successor states.
Through the 1990s, the successor states, particularly Russia, were inert. Undergoing painful internal upheaval — which foreigners saw as reform but which many Russians viewed as a foreign-inspired national catastrophe — Russia could not resist American and European involvement in regional and internal affairs. From the American point of view, the reshaping of the region — from the Kosovo war to the expansion of NATO to the deployment of U.S. Air Force bases to Central Asia — was simply a logical expansion of the collapse of the Soviet Union. It was a benign attempt to stabilize the region, enhance its prosperity and security and integrate it into the global system.
As Russia regained its balance from the chaos of the 1990s, it began to see the American and European presence in a less benign light. It was not clear to the Russians that the United States was trying to stabilize the region. Rather, it appeared to the Russians that the United States was trying to take advantage of Russian weakness to impose a new politico-military reality in which Russia was to be surrounded with nations controlled by the United States and its military system, NATO. In spite of the promise made by Bill Clinton that NATO would not expand into the former Soviet Union, the three Baltic states were admitted. The promise was not addressed. NATO was expanded because it could and Russia could do nothing about it.
From the Russian point of view, the strategic break point was Ukraine. When the Orange Revolution came to Ukraine, the American and European impression was that this was a spontaneous democratic rising. The Russian perception was that it was a well-financed CIA operation to foment an anti-Russian and pro-American uprising in Ukraine. When the United States quickly began discussing the inclusion of Ukraine in NATO, the Russians came to the conclusion that the United States intended to surround and crush the Russian Federation. In their view, if NATO expanded into Ukraine, the Western military alliance would place Russia in a strategically untenable position. Russia would be indefensible. The American response was that it had no intention of threatening Russia. The Russian question was returned: Then why are you trying to take control of Ukraine? What other purpose would you have? The United States dismissed these Russian concerns as absurd. The Russians, not regarding them as absurd at all, began planning on the assumption of a hostile United States.
If the United States had intended to break the Russian Federation once and for all, the time for that was in the 1990s, before Yeltsin was replaced by Putin and before 9/11. There was, however, no clear policy on this, because the United States felt it had all the time in the world. Superficially this was true, but only superficially. First, the United States did not understand that the Yeltsin years were a temporary aberration and that a new government intending to stabilize Russia was inevitable. If not Putin, it would have been someone else. Second, the United States did not appreciate that it did not control the international agenda. Sept. 11, 2001, took away American options in the former Soviet Union. No only did it need Russian help in Afghanistan, but it was going to spend the next decade tied up in the Middle East. The United States had lost its room for maneuver and therefore had run out of time.
And now we come to the key point. In spite of diminishing military options outside of the Middle East, the United States did not modify its policy in the former Soviet Union. It continued to aggressively attempt to influence countries in the region, and it became particularly committed to integrating Ukraine and Georgia into NATO, in spite of the fact that both were of overwhelming strategic interest to the Russians. Ukraine dominated Russia’s southwestern flank, without any natural boundaries protecting them. Georgia was seen as a constant irritant in Chechnya as well as a barrier to Russian interests in the Caucasus.
Moving rapidly to consolidate U.S. control over these and other countries in the former Soviet Union made strategic sense. Russia was weak, divided and poorly governed. It could make no response. Continuing this policy in the 2000s, when the Russians were getting stronger, more united and better governed and while U.S. forces were no longer available, made much less sense. The United States continued to irritate the Russians without having, in the short run, the forces needed to act decisively.
The American calculation was that the Russian government would not confront American interests in the region. The Russian calculation was that it could not wait to confront these interests because the United States was concluding the Iraq war and would return to its pre-eminent position in a few short years. Therefore, it made no sense for Russia to wait and it made every sense for Russia to act as quickly as possible.
The Russians were partly influenced in their timing by the success of the American surge in Iraq. If the United States continued its policy and had force to back it up, the Russians would lose their window of opportunity. Moreover, the Russians had an additional lever for use on the Americans: Iran.
The United States had been playing a complex game with Iran for years, threatening to attack while trying to negotiate. The Americans needed the Russians. Sanctions against Iran would have no meaning if the Russians did not participate, and the United States did not want Russia selling advance air defense systems to Iran. (Such systems, which American analysts had warned were quite capable, were not present in Syria on Sept. 6, 2007, when the Israelis struck a nuclear facility there.) As the United States re-evaluates the Russian military, it does not want to be surprised by Russian technology. Therefore, the more aggressive the United States becomes toward Russia, the greater the difficulties it will have in Iran. This further encouraged the Russians to act sooner rather than later.
The Russians have now proven two things. First, contrary to the reality of the 1990s, they can execute a competent military operation. Second, contrary to regional perception, the United States cannot intervene. The Russian message was directed against Ukraine most of all, but the Baltics, Central Asia and Belarus are all listening. The Russians will not act precipitously. They expect all of these countries to adjust their foreign policies away from the United States and toward Russia. They are looking to see if the lesson is absorbed. At first, there will be mighty speeches and resistance. But the reality on the ground is the reality on the ground.
We would expect the Russians to get traction. But if they don’t, the Russians are aware that they are, in the long run, much weaker than the Americans, and that they will retain their regional position of strength only while the United States is off balance in Iraq. If the lesson isn’t absorbed, the Russians are capable of more direct action, and they will not let this chance slip away. This is their chance to redefine their sphere of influence. They will not get another.
The other country that is watching and thinking is Iran. Iran had accepted the idea that it had lost the chance to dominate Iraq. It had also accepted the idea that it would have to bargain away its nuclear capability or lose it. The Iranians are now wondering if this is still true and are undoubtedly pinging the Russians about the situation. Meanwhile, the Russians are waiting for the Americans to calm down and get serious. If the Americans plan to take meaningful action against them, they will respond in Iran. But the Americans have no meaningful actions they can take; they need to get out of Iraq and they need help against Iran. The quid pro quo here is obvious. The United States acquiesces to Russian actions (which it can’t do anything about), while the Russians cooperate with the United States against Iran getting nuclear weapons (something Russia does not want to see).
One of the interesting concepts of the New World Order was that all serious countries would want to participate in it and that the only threat would come from rogue states and nonstate actors such as North Korea and al Qaeda. Serious analysts argued that conflict between nation-states would not be important in the 21st century. There will certainly be rogue states and nonstate actors, but the 21st century will be no different than any other century. On Aug. 8, the Russians invited us all to the Real World Order.
Taken from: Stratfor.com
Showing posts with label Iraq. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Iraq. Show all posts
Wednesday, August 20, 2008
Saturday, November 17, 2007
Iraq: Positive Signs
Here is an interesting article from Stratfor.com.
Iraq: Positive Signs
By George Friedman
The latest reports concerning the war in Iraq suggest the situation is looking up for the United States. First, U.S. military and Iraqi civilian casualties continue to fall. Second, there are confirmed reports that Sunni insurgents controlled by local leaders have turned on al Qaeda militants, particularly those from outside the country. Third, the head of U.S. Central Command, in an interview with the Financial Times, implied that an attack against Iran is a distant possibility.
It is tempting to say the United States has turned the corner on the war. The temptation might not be misplaced, but after many disappointments since 2003, it is prudent to be cautious in declaring turning points -- and it is equally prudent not to confuse a turning point with a victory. That said, given expectations that the United States would be unable to limit violence in Iraq, and that Sunni insurgents would remain implacable -- not to mention the broad expectation of a U.S. attack against Iran -- these three points indicate a reversal -- and must be taken seriously.
The most startling point is the decline in casualties, and particularly the apparent decline in sectarian violence. Explaining this is difficult. It could simply be the result of the more efficient use of U.S. troops in suppressing the insurgency and controlling the Shiite militias. If that were the only explanation, however, it would be troubling. Standard guerrilla warfare doctrine holds that during periods of intense enemy counterinsurgency operations, guerrillas should cease fighting, hide weapons and equipment and blend into the civilian population. Only after the enemy shifts its area of operations or reduces operational tempo should the guerrillas resume combat operations. Under no circumstances should insurgents attempt to fight a surge.
Therefore, if we were considering U.S. military operations alone, few conclusions could be drawn until after the operations shifted or slowed. In addition, in a country of 25 million, the expectation that some 167,000 troops -- many of them not directly involved in combat -- could break the back of an entrenched insurgency is optimistic. The numbers simply don't work, particularly when Shiite militias are added to the equation. Therefore, if viewed simply in terms of military operations, the decline in casualties would not validate a shift in the war until much later, and our expectation is that the insurgency would resume prior levels of activity over time.
What makes the situation more hopeful for the United States is the clear decline in civilian casualties. Most of those were caused not by U.S. combat operations but by sectarian conflict, particularly between Sunnis and Shia. Part of the decline can be explained by U.S. operations, but when we look at the scope and intensity of sectarian fighting, it is difficult to give U.S. operations full credit. A more likely explanation is political, a decision on the part of the various sectarian organizations to stop operations not only against the Americans but also against each other.
There were two wars going on in Iraq. One was against the United States. The more important war, from the Iraqi point of view, was the Sunni-Shiite struggle to determine who would control Iraq's future. Part of this struggle, particularly on the Shiite side, was intrasectarian violence. All of it was political and, in a real sense, it was life and death. It involved the control of neighborhoods, of ministries, of the police force and so on. It was a struggle over the shape of everyday life. If either side simply abandoned the struggle, it would leave a vacuum for the other. U.S. operations or not, that civil war could not be suspended. To a significant extent, however, it has been suspended.
That means that some political decisions were made, at least on the local level and likely at higher levels as well, as several U.S. authorities have implied recently. Civilian casualties from the civil war would not have dropped as much as they have without some sort of political decisions to restrain forces, and those decisions could not be made unilaterally or simply in response to U.S. military pressure. It required a set of at least temporary political arrangements. And that, in many ways, is more promising than simply a decline because of U.S. combat operations. The political arrangements open the door to the possibility that the decline in casualties is likely to be longer lasting.
This brings us to the second point, the attacks by the Sunnis against the jihadists. Immediately after the invasion in 2003, the United States essentially attempted to strip the Sunnis -- the foundation of Saddam Hussein's strength -- of their power. The U.S. de-Baathification laws had the effect of eliminating the Sunni community's participation in the future of Iraq. Viewing the Shia -- the victims of Hussein's rule -- as likely interested not only in dominating Iraq but also in retribution against the Sunnis, the Sunni leadership, particularly at the local level, supported and instigated an insurgency against U.S. forces. The political purpose of the insurgency was to force the United States to shift its pro-Shiite policy and include the Sunnis, from religious to Baathist, in the regime.
Given the insurgency's political purpose, the power of U.S. forces and the well-organized Shiite militias, the Iraqi Sunnis were prepared to form alliances wherever they could find them. A leading source of support for the Iraqi Sunnis came from outside Iraq, among the Sunni jihadist fighters who organized themselves under the banner of al Qaeda and, weapons in hand, infiltrated the country from outside, particular through Syria.
Nevertheless, there was underlying tension between the local Sunnis and the jihadists. The Iraqi Sunnis were part of the local power structure, many having been involved in the essentially secular Baath Party, and others, more religious, having remained outside the regime but ruled by traditional tribal systems. The foreign jihadists were revolutionaries not only in the sense that they were prepared to fight the Americans but also in that they wanted to revolutionize -- radically Islamize -- the local Sunni community. By extension, they wanted to supplant the local leadership with their own by supporting and elevating new local leaders dependent for their survival on al Qaeda power.
For an extended period of time, the United States saw the Sunni insurgency as consisting of a single fabric. The local insurgents and the jihadists were viewed as the same, and the adopted name of the jihadists, al Qaeda, caused the Americans to see them as the primary enemy. Over time, and particularly since the death of al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the United States has adopted a more nuanced view of the Sunni insurgency, drawing a distinction between the largely native Iraqi insurgents and the largely foreign jihadists.
Once this occurred and the United States began to make overtures to the native Iraqi insurgents, the underlying tensions between the foreign jihadists and the Iraqi insurgents emerged. The Sunnis, over time, came to see the jihadists as a greater danger to them than the Americans, and by the time U.S. President George W. Bush last visited Iraq, several Sunni leaders were prepared to be seen publicly with him. The growing animosities eventually turned into active warfare between the two factions, with al Qaeda being outnumbered and outgunned and the natives enjoying all of the perks of having the home-court advantage.
From the U.S. point of view, splitting the Sunni insurgency politically and militarily was important not only for the obvious reasons but also for influencing the Shia. From a Shiite point of view -- and now let's introduce Iran, the primary external backer of Iraq's Shiites -- the worst-case scenario would be the re-establishment of a predominantly Sunni government in Baghdad backed by the U.S. military. The political accommodation between the United States and the Iraqi Sunnis represented a direct threat to the Shia.
It is important to recall that Hussein and his Baathist predecessors -- all Sunnis leading a predominantly Sunni government -- were able to dominate the more numerous Shia for decades. The reason was that the Shia were highly fragmented politically, more so than the Sunnis. This historic factionalization made the Shia much weaker than their numbers would have indicated. It was no accident that the Sunnis dominated the Shia.
And the Shia remained fragmented. While the Sunnis were fighting an external force, the Shia were fighting both the Sunnis and one another. Given those circumstances, it was not inconceivable that the United States would try, and perhaps succeed, to re-establish the status quo ante of a united Iraq under a Sunni government -- backed by U.S. power until Iraq could regenerate its own force. Of course, that represented a reversal of the original U.S. goal of establishing a Shiite regime.
For Iran, this was an intolerable outcome because it would again raise the possibility of an Iran-Iraq war -- in which Iran might take another million casualties. The Iranian response was to use its influence among the competing Shiite militias to attack the Sunnis and to inflict casualties on American troops, hoping to force a withdrawal. Paradoxically, while the jihadists are the Iranians' foe, they were useful to Tehran because the more they attacked the Shia -- and the more the Shia retaliated -- the more the Sunnis and al Qaeda aligned -- which kept the United States and the Sunnis apart. Iran, in other words, wanted a united Sunni-jihadist movement because it would wreck the emerging political arrangements. In addition, when the Iranians realized that the Democrats in the U.S. Congress were not going to force a U.S. withdrawal, their calculations about the future changed.
Caught between al Qaeda and the militias, the Sunnis were under intense pressure. The United States responded by conducting operations against the jihadists -- trying to limit engagements with Iraqi Sunni insurgents -- and most important, against Shiite militias. The goal was to hold the Sunnis in the emerging political matrix while damaging the militias that were engaging the Sunnis. The United States was trying increase the cost to the Shia of adhering to the Iranian strategy.
At the same time, the United States sought to intimidate the Iranians by raising, and trying to make very real, the possibility that the United States would attack them as well. As we have argued, the U.S. military options are limited, so an attack would make little military sense. The Iranians, however, could not be certain that the United States was being rational about the whole thing, which was pretty much what the United States wanted. The United States wanted the Shia in Iraq to see the various costs of following the Iranian line -- including creating a Sunni-dominated government -- while convincing the Iranians that they were in grave danger of American military action.
In this context, we find the third point particularly interesting. Adm. William Fallon's interview with the Financial Times -- in which he went out of its way to downplay the American military threat to Iran -- was not given by accident. Fallon does not agree to interviews without clearance. The United States was using the interview to telegraph to Iran that it should not have undue fear of an American attack.
The United States can easily turn up the heat again psychologically, though for the moment it has chosen to lower it. By doing so, we assume Washington is sending two messages to Iran. First, it is acknowledging that creating a predominantly Sunni government is not its first choice. Also, it is rewarding Iran for the decline in violence by the Shiite militias, which undoubtedly required Tehran to shift its orders to its covert operatives in Iraq.
The important question is whether we are seeing a turning point in Iraq. The answer is that it appears so, but not primarily because of the effectiveness of U.S. military operations. Rather, it is the result of U.S. military operations coupled with a much more complex and sophisticated approach to Iraq. To be more precise, a series of political initiatives that the United States had undertaken over the past two years in fits and starts has been united into a single orchestrated effort. The result of these efforts was a series of political decisions on the part of various Iraqi parties not only to reduce attacks against U.S. troops but also to bring the civil war under control.
A few months ago, we laid out four scenarios for Iraq, including the possibility that that United States would maintain troops there indefinitely. At the time, we argued against this idea on the assumption that what had not worked previously would not work in the future. Instead, we argued that resisting Iranian power required that efforts to create security be stopped and troops moved to blocking positions along the Saudi border. We had not calculated that the United States would now supplement combat operations with a highly sophisticated and nuanced political offensive. Therefore, we were wrong in underestimating the effectiveness of the scenario.
That said, a turning point is not the same as victory, and the turning point could turn into a failure. The key weaknesses are the fragmented Shia and the forces and decisions that might emerge there, underwritten by Iran. Everything could be wrecked should Iran choose to take the necessary risks. For the moment, however, the Iranians seem to be exercising caution, and the Shia are responding by reducing violence. If that trend continues, then this really could be a turning point. Of course, any outcome that depends on the Shia and Iranians doing what the United States hopes they will do is fragile. Iran in particular has little interest in giving the United States a graceful solution unless it is well compensated for it. On the other hand, for the moment, Tehran is cooperating. This could simply be another instance of Iran holding off before disappointing the United States, or it could mean it has reason to believe it will be well compensated. Revealing that compensation -- if it is coming -- is the next turn of the wheel.
Iraq: Positive Signs
By George Friedman
The latest reports concerning the war in Iraq suggest the situation is looking up for the United States. First, U.S. military and Iraqi civilian casualties continue to fall. Second, there are confirmed reports that Sunni insurgents controlled by local leaders have turned on al Qaeda militants, particularly those from outside the country. Third, the head of U.S. Central Command, in an interview with the Financial Times, implied that an attack against Iran is a distant possibility.
It is tempting to say the United States has turned the corner on the war. The temptation might not be misplaced, but after many disappointments since 2003, it is prudent to be cautious in declaring turning points -- and it is equally prudent not to confuse a turning point with a victory. That said, given expectations that the United States would be unable to limit violence in Iraq, and that Sunni insurgents would remain implacable -- not to mention the broad expectation of a U.S. attack against Iran -- these three points indicate a reversal -- and must be taken seriously.
The most startling point is the decline in casualties, and particularly the apparent decline in sectarian violence. Explaining this is difficult. It could simply be the result of the more efficient use of U.S. troops in suppressing the insurgency and controlling the Shiite militias. If that were the only explanation, however, it would be troubling. Standard guerrilla warfare doctrine holds that during periods of intense enemy counterinsurgency operations, guerrillas should cease fighting, hide weapons and equipment and blend into the civilian population. Only after the enemy shifts its area of operations or reduces operational tempo should the guerrillas resume combat operations. Under no circumstances should insurgents attempt to fight a surge.
Therefore, if we were considering U.S. military operations alone, few conclusions could be drawn until after the operations shifted or slowed. In addition, in a country of 25 million, the expectation that some 167,000 troops -- many of them not directly involved in combat -- could break the back of an entrenched insurgency is optimistic. The numbers simply don't work, particularly when Shiite militias are added to the equation. Therefore, if viewed simply in terms of military operations, the decline in casualties would not validate a shift in the war until much later, and our expectation is that the insurgency would resume prior levels of activity over time.
What makes the situation more hopeful for the United States is the clear decline in civilian casualties. Most of those were caused not by U.S. combat operations but by sectarian conflict, particularly between Sunnis and Shia. Part of the decline can be explained by U.S. operations, but when we look at the scope and intensity of sectarian fighting, it is difficult to give U.S. operations full credit. A more likely explanation is political, a decision on the part of the various sectarian organizations to stop operations not only against the Americans but also against each other.
There were two wars going on in Iraq. One was against the United States. The more important war, from the Iraqi point of view, was the Sunni-Shiite struggle to determine who would control Iraq's future. Part of this struggle, particularly on the Shiite side, was intrasectarian violence. All of it was political and, in a real sense, it was life and death. It involved the control of neighborhoods, of ministries, of the police force and so on. It was a struggle over the shape of everyday life. If either side simply abandoned the struggle, it would leave a vacuum for the other. U.S. operations or not, that civil war could not be suspended. To a significant extent, however, it has been suspended.
That means that some political decisions were made, at least on the local level and likely at higher levels as well, as several U.S. authorities have implied recently. Civilian casualties from the civil war would not have dropped as much as they have without some sort of political decisions to restrain forces, and those decisions could not be made unilaterally or simply in response to U.S. military pressure. It required a set of at least temporary political arrangements. And that, in many ways, is more promising than simply a decline because of U.S. combat operations. The political arrangements open the door to the possibility that the decline in casualties is likely to be longer lasting.
This brings us to the second point, the attacks by the Sunnis against the jihadists. Immediately after the invasion in 2003, the United States essentially attempted to strip the Sunnis -- the foundation of Saddam Hussein's strength -- of their power. The U.S. de-Baathification laws had the effect of eliminating the Sunni community's participation in the future of Iraq. Viewing the Shia -- the victims of Hussein's rule -- as likely interested not only in dominating Iraq but also in retribution against the Sunnis, the Sunni leadership, particularly at the local level, supported and instigated an insurgency against U.S. forces. The political purpose of the insurgency was to force the United States to shift its pro-Shiite policy and include the Sunnis, from religious to Baathist, in the regime.
Given the insurgency's political purpose, the power of U.S. forces and the well-organized Shiite militias, the Iraqi Sunnis were prepared to form alliances wherever they could find them. A leading source of support for the Iraqi Sunnis came from outside Iraq, among the Sunni jihadist fighters who organized themselves under the banner of al Qaeda and, weapons in hand, infiltrated the country from outside, particular through Syria.
Nevertheless, there was underlying tension between the local Sunnis and the jihadists. The Iraqi Sunnis were part of the local power structure, many having been involved in the essentially secular Baath Party, and others, more religious, having remained outside the regime but ruled by traditional tribal systems. The foreign jihadists were revolutionaries not only in the sense that they were prepared to fight the Americans but also in that they wanted to revolutionize -- radically Islamize -- the local Sunni community. By extension, they wanted to supplant the local leadership with their own by supporting and elevating new local leaders dependent for their survival on al Qaeda power.
For an extended period of time, the United States saw the Sunni insurgency as consisting of a single fabric. The local insurgents and the jihadists were viewed as the same, and the adopted name of the jihadists, al Qaeda, caused the Americans to see them as the primary enemy. Over time, and particularly since the death of al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the United States has adopted a more nuanced view of the Sunni insurgency, drawing a distinction between the largely native Iraqi insurgents and the largely foreign jihadists.
Once this occurred and the United States began to make overtures to the native Iraqi insurgents, the underlying tensions between the foreign jihadists and the Iraqi insurgents emerged. The Sunnis, over time, came to see the jihadists as a greater danger to them than the Americans, and by the time U.S. President George W. Bush last visited Iraq, several Sunni leaders were prepared to be seen publicly with him. The growing animosities eventually turned into active warfare between the two factions, with al Qaeda being outnumbered and outgunned and the natives enjoying all of the perks of having the home-court advantage.
From the U.S. point of view, splitting the Sunni insurgency politically and militarily was important not only for the obvious reasons but also for influencing the Shia. From a Shiite point of view -- and now let's introduce Iran, the primary external backer of Iraq's Shiites -- the worst-case scenario would be the re-establishment of a predominantly Sunni government in Baghdad backed by the U.S. military. The political accommodation between the United States and the Iraqi Sunnis represented a direct threat to the Shia.
It is important to recall that Hussein and his Baathist predecessors -- all Sunnis leading a predominantly Sunni government -- were able to dominate the more numerous Shia for decades. The reason was that the Shia were highly fragmented politically, more so than the Sunnis. This historic factionalization made the Shia much weaker than their numbers would have indicated. It was no accident that the Sunnis dominated the Shia.
And the Shia remained fragmented. While the Sunnis were fighting an external force, the Shia were fighting both the Sunnis and one another. Given those circumstances, it was not inconceivable that the United States would try, and perhaps succeed, to re-establish the status quo ante of a united Iraq under a Sunni government -- backed by U.S. power until Iraq could regenerate its own force. Of course, that represented a reversal of the original U.S. goal of establishing a Shiite regime.
For Iran, this was an intolerable outcome because it would again raise the possibility of an Iran-Iraq war -- in which Iran might take another million casualties. The Iranian response was to use its influence among the competing Shiite militias to attack the Sunnis and to inflict casualties on American troops, hoping to force a withdrawal. Paradoxically, while the jihadists are the Iranians' foe, they were useful to Tehran because the more they attacked the Shia -- and the more the Shia retaliated -- the more the Sunnis and al Qaeda aligned -- which kept the United States and the Sunnis apart. Iran, in other words, wanted a united Sunni-jihadist movement because it would wreck the emerging political arrangements. In addition, when the Iranians realized that the Democrats in the U.S. Congress were not going to force a U.S. withdrawal, their calculations about the future changed.
Caught between al Qaeda and the militias, the Sunnis were under intense pressure. The United States responded by conducting operations against the jihadists -- trying to limit engagements with Iraqi Sunni insurgents -- and most important, against Shiite militias. The goal was to hold the Sunnis in the emerging political matrix while damaging the militias that were engaging the Sunnis. The United States was trying increase the cost to the Shia of adhering to the Iranian strategy.
At the same time, the United States sought to intimidate the Iranians by raising, and trying to make very real, the possibility that the United States would attack them as well. As we have argued, the U.S. military options are limited, so an attack would make little military sense. The Iranians, however, could not be certain that the United States was being rational about the whole thing, which was pretty much what the United States wanted. The United States wanted the Shia in Iraq to see the various costs of following the Iranian line -- including creating a Sunni-dominated government -- while convincing the Iranians that they were in grave danger of American military action.
In this context, we find the third point particularly interesting. Adm. William Fallon's interview with the Financial Times -- in which he went out of its way to downplay the American military threat to Iran -- was not given by accident. Fallon does not agree to interviews without clearance. The United States was using the interview to telegraph to Iran that it should not have undue fear of an American attack.
The United States can easily turn up the heat again psychologically, though for the moment it has chosen to lower it. By doing so, we assume Washington is sending two messages to Iran. First, it is acknowledging that creating a predominantly Sunni government is not its first choice. Also, it is rewarding Iran for the decline in violence by the Shiite militias, which undoubtedly required Tehran to shift its orders to its covert operatives in Iraq.
The important question is whether we are seeing a turning point in Iraq. The answer is that it appears so, but not primarily because of the effectiveness of U.S. military operations. Rather, it is the result of U.S. military operations coupled with a much more complex and sophisticated approach to Iraq. To be more precise, a series of political initiatives that the United States had undertaken over the past two years in fits and starts has been united into a single orchestrated effort. The result of these efforts was a series of political decisions on the part of various Iraqi parties not only to reduce attacks against U.S. troops but also to bring the civil war under control.
A few months ago, we laid out four scenarios for Iraq, including the possibility that that United States would maintain troops there indefinitely. At the time, we argued against this idea on the assumption that what had not worked previously would not work in the future. Instead, we argued that resisting Iranian power required that efforts to create security be stopped and troops moved to blocking positions along the Saudi border. We had not calculated that the United States would now supplement combat operations with a highly sophisticated and nuanced political offensive. Therefore, we were wrong in underestimating the effectiveness of the scenario.
That said, a turning point is not the same as victory, and the turning point could turn into a failure. The key weaknesses are the fragmented Shia and the forces and decisions that might emerge there, underwritten by Iran. Everything could be wrecked should Iran choose to take the necessary risks. For the moment, however, the Iranians seem to be exercising caution, and the Shia are responding by reducing violence. If that trend continues, then this really could be a turning point. Of course, any outcome that depends on the Shia and Iranians doing what the United States hopes they will do is fragile. Iran in particular has little interest in giving the United States a graceful solution unless it is well compensated for it. On the other hand, for the moment, Tehran is cooperating. This could simply be another instance of Iran holding off before disappointing the United States, or it could mean it has reason to believe it will be well compensated. Revealing that compensation -- if it is coming -- is the next turn of the wheel.
Wednesday, April 4, 2007
Flags of Our Fathers
While I liked the premise of the movie Flags of Our Fathers, I thought it was a little convoluted, taking away from the overall impact of the movie. The movie focuses mainly on John Bradley, a Navy medic and two of his comrades, Marines Rene Gagnon and Ira Hayes, three of the six men in the famous photograph of the lifting of the flag on Iwo Jima. The movie focuses on how the U.S. Government used these men to sell war bonds to fund the war effort, despite the facts that the photo was of the second flag going up and one of the original flag-raisers wasn’t mentioned.
Several themes predominate in the movie, one being that heroes are made by those at home and not by those on the battlefield. The men on the battlefield are too conscious of their own shortcomings and lack of courage, and many felt that they were just doing what anyone else would have done in their place. Most “heroes” feel awkward at being singled out and labeled for special treatment. The movie shows how the image of the heroes was created by the press and the government and then manipulated and used for the war effort. While the movie tended to be cynical and judgmental, it also tried to show how such hero worship is essential in times of war.
Flags of Our Fathers also demonstrates how powerful the media is in shaping our perceptions of war. One photograph changed the mood of the nation and rallied support for the war. In a similar way, though with an opposite effect, one picture of a South Vietnamese officer shooting a prisoner in the head turned American sentiment against the war in Vietnam. Recently, the photos from Abu Ghraib prison turned American sentiment sour on the war in Iraq. In addition, the constant reporting of suicide bombings in Iraq has caused the approval rating for the war in Iraq to plummet. What is happening in the media today is very similar to what happened 35 years ago. Even though we were winning the war in Vietnam, public perception was radically shaped by the media and political leadership, causing many to see the war as hopeless and meaningless. This is happening today as well, as the media and certain political leaders are turning victory into defeat.
Much of what is said in the media is either misleading or incomplete. Americans live on sound bites, making a coherent explanation and understanding of a complex military operation impossible. We don’t have the patience to dig in and find out what is really going on, so we just blindly believe what the news media and politicians tell us. Much of the rhetoric being thrown around today is pathetic and ultimately harmful to the United States. Wars today are lost, not because our military is weak, but because our media and political leaders are morally weak and misguided.
I am not writing this to defend the war in Iraq but merely to point out that the current mood and public discourse is clouded and misguided. My challenge is not to support the war or call for withdrawal but to stop listening only to the media and allowing your perceptions to be shaped by the news and political sound bites.
Several themes predominate in the movie, one being that heroes are made by those at home and not by those on the battlefield. The men on the battlefield are too conscious of their own shortcomings and lack of courage, and many felt that they were just doing what anyone else would have done in their place. Most “heroes” feel awkward at being singled out and labeled for special treatment. The movie shows how the image of the heroes was created by the press and the government and then manipulated and used for the war effort. While the movie tended to be cynical and judgmental, it also tried to show how such hero worship is essential in times of war.
Flags of Our Fathers also demonstrates how powerful the media is in shaping our perceptions of war. One photograph changed the mood of the nation and rallied support for the war. In a similar way, though with an opposite effect, one picture of a South Vietnamese officer shooting a prisoner in the head turned American sentiment against the war in Vietnam. Recently, the photos from Abu Ghraib prison turned American sentiment sour on the war in Iraq. In addition, the constant reporting of suicide bombings in Iraq has caused the approval rating for the war in Iraq to plummet. What is happening in the media today is very similar to what happened 35 years ago. Even though we were winning the war in Vietnam, public perception was radically shaped by the media and political leadership, causing many to see the war as hopeless and meaningless. This is happening today as well, as the media and certain political leaders are turning victory into defeat.
Much of what is said in the media is either misleading or incomplete. Americans live on sound bites, making a coherent explanation and understanding of a complex military operation impossible. We don’t have the patience to dig in and find out what is really going on, so we just blindly believe what the news media and politicians tell us. Much of the rhetoric being thrown around today is pathetic and ultimately harmful to the United States. Wars today are lost, not because our military is weak, but because our media and political leaders are morally weak and misguided.
I am not writing this to defend the war in Iraq but merely to point out that the current mood and public discourse is clouded and misguided. My challenge is not to support the war or call for withdrawal but to stop listening only to the media and allowing your perceptions to be shaped by the news and political sound bites.
Thursday, March 29, 2007
America’s Secret War
In America’s Secret War: Inside the Hidden Worldwide Struggle Between America and Its Enemies, George Friedman, chairman and founder of Stratfor, has written an excellent book on the history behind the current war on terror, tracing its roots back to the Carter administration and explaining the reasons things are the way they are. Stratfor provides strategic intelligence on global business, economic, security and geopolitical affairs. According to their website, “Stratfor - the world's leading private intelligence firm -- provides corporations, governments and individuals with geopolitical analysis and forecasts that enable them to manage risk and anticipate political, economic and security issues vital to their interests.” As Stratfor’s founder and chairman, Friedman is highly qualified to write on this topic.
Friedman sees this current war as the fourth modern global conflict. Just as World War II grew out of World War I, and the Cold War grew out of World War II, the current global war on terror has grown out of the Cold War. The situation we face today is the direct result of the geopolitical changes that occurred as a result of the fall of the Soviet Empire. Both the events leading up to the collapse and the resulting global situation after the collapse set the stage for the conflict between radical Islam and the West.
One of the Soviet’s favorite techniques to weaken American power around the world was to support insurgents and guerillas in order to bog down U.S. forces. One of the most successful was the support of the North Vietnamese, ultimately driving the U.S. from the region. America, on the other hand had a lousy track record with supporting guerillas. When the Soviets attacked Afghanistan, it was an opportunity for the U.S. to use this technique against them. This was an opportunity to “make the Soviets bleed” like they made us bleed. President Carter authorized the recruitment, organization and supplying of guerilla warfare in Afghanistan by utilizing indigenous forces that were already rising to resist the Soviets. Carter signed the first “Intelligence Finding” authorizing covert military operations in Afghanistan in order to “harass” soviet troops. It was this “Finding” that served as the legal basis for the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan. It was also this “Finding” that would culminate, via a long, circuitous and unpredictable route, in September 11.
The first problem was how to fund the covert war. Ever since senator Church passed legislation requiring the CIA to get authorization for such funding, it would impossible to get money from Congress, and if it tried, then the operation would no longer be secret. Saudi Arabia realized that an America weakened by the oil embargo of the 1970s was dangerous to its national security, because if the Soviets or Iran won out in the region, they would be destroyed as a nation. Therefore, Saudi Arabia had a greater interest in what was happening in Afghanistan than America did. The United States was worried that the Soviets were attacking Afghanistan in order to push into the Middle East and capture the oil fields for itself.
Second, the United States had very little intelligence on Afghanistan, and what we did have was only from the CIA agents monitoring the narcotics trade and the poppy fields in the country. Therefore, America had to turn to Saudi Arabia for money and intelligence, making an alliance with the Wahabis in order to gain what we needed.
The U.S. structure a deal with the Saudis to provide funding and personnel to work with the CIA to build a guerilla force to bog down the Soviets in Afghanistan. This was the beginning of an alliance between the U.S. and Muslim fundamentalists.
The third fractor was Pakistan, a long-term American ally. It was torn between the secularism of its founders and the radical Islam of the majority of its population. It was also afraid of being trapped between a Soviet dominated Afghanistan and a pro-Soviet India. Pakistan had a lot of intelligence on Afghanistan and a long contiguous border where training camps, logistic systems, and bases of operations could be set up. The North Vietnamese had Laos and Cambodia; the U.S. had Pakistan.
A three-way alliance was formed. The United States would provide training, coordination and strategic intelligence; the Saudis would provide the money and the guerillas; the Pakistanis would provide the territory and the intelligence needed.
Jimmy Carter was the one who presided over this alliance. Yet, his goal was not to destroy the Soviet Union but to find a balance while restoring America’s power in the world after its decline over the last decade. Carter had no idea that the war in Afghanistan would lead to the destruction of the Soviet Union and the rise of Al Qaeda. When Reagan took office in 1981, he intensified Carter’s alliance and wove it into a larger plan to destroy the Soviet Union and intensify America’s global power.
After the fall of the Soviet Union, Al Qaeda was well-trained and well-equipped, possessing many Soviet and American weapons along with the expertise to use them. The Soviets were brutal in their attempts to squash the guerillas, killing many, so that those who lasted the decade-long war were well-trained, experienced, hardened and determined. These radical Islamic fighters saw the fall of the Soviet Union as a Muslim victory, as it was the first victory a Muslim army had achieved against a non-Muslim force in centuries. After the war, these Islamic fighters were irate at America because it threw them away without any hint of gratitude.
The United States saw the war in Afghanistan differently. The war in Afghanistan was only a part in a larger plan that brought the Soviet Union down. America felt it also played the major role, providing the support and training needed for victory. Without the U.S. backing, the guerillas would have been completely annihilated by the Soviets. Because the U.S. ignored their allies and expected them to maintain some kind of bond with us after the war, a rift was created between the Jihadists and America.
In the same way, the first Bush administration mistakenly believed that the Arab countries would be happy with America for helping them free Kuwait and a bond would be created between us and the Arab states. President Bush expected gratitude; he never expected rage. It is clear that the United States was ignorant of the Islamic world and made some serious blunders that caused so much anger and hatred that laid the foundation for Al Qaeda.
While Shiite Muslims are a minority in the whole Arab world, they are the majority in the Gulf region, especially in Iran. The Saudis, by contrast, are not only Sunni, but they are Wahabi, the most radical of the Sunnis. So the Saudis saw the Shiites of Iran not only as a threat to their religion but also a threat to their oil fields. The problem for Saudi Arabia was how to contain Iran and the Soviets at the same time, and the answer was Iraq. Both nations wanted to contain Iran and the Soviets, so America felt is was the best policy to back them as well. Unwittingly, however, the U.S. ended up supporting the most radical form of Islam as a negative unintended consequence. And this radical Wahabi Islam has proved to be even more dangerous to the United States than Shiite Iran.
In order to bog down Iran, the United States sent signals to Iraq that it wouldn’t oppose them if they decided to attack Iran. The resulting war tied up both countries for a decade, costing millions of lives and billions of dollars on both sides. The United States kept shifting its policy towards Iraq to keep it destabilized and to prolong the war. The United States knew that Iraq could not beat Iran, and the Saudis gladly backed the war in order to keep both armies bogged down for nearly ten years.
American foreign policy has chosen to make alliances of necessity with evil states in order to oppose even more evil states. The U.S. made alliances with Stalin and Mao in order to counter worse leaders. America also tends to create solutions that solve the short-term problem at the risk of creating greater problems down the road.
Saddam Hussein wanted to take over Iran and Kuwait in order to become the dominant power in the region. The U.S. quietly assured him, with deniability, that if he won the war we would allow him to have Kuwait as well. Then for the next ten years the U.S. kept shifting the balance of power to make sure Iraq never accomplished its goal and achieved its prize. After ten years, Iraq was less exhausted than Iran, and Saddam declared victory and demanded his prize. The American Ambassador, unaware of the intricacies and policy shifts, assured Saddam Hussein that while the U.S. was opposed to his taking Iraq, they would do nothing to stop him. As soon as Iraq invaded Kuwait, the U.S. worked with the Saudis to launch Operation Desert Shield and then Desert Storm.
The soldiers returning to Saudi Arabia from Afghanistan were outraged by the presence of non-Muslim forces on holy soil. They believed that Muslim states were not naturally weak and could defend themselves if they were willing to sacrifice and persevere. But they also believed that the current Muslim leaders were corrupt and incapable of defending their countries. Therefore, they felt that America had to be humiliated in order to break the psychological dependency on the United States and to generate confidence among the Islamic masses.
These fighters knew America’s strengths, but they also knew its weaknesses. They knew how the American intelligence agencies worked and how they carried out covert operations. These returning fighters were not the poor and disposed, but many were from wealthy families, educated and some even had advanced degrees in secular fields. They also had financial backing from the Saudi royal family and other wealthy Saudis. The financial network that had supported the guerillas in Afghanistan had never been shut down and now it was being used to fund Al Qaeda long after America had lost interest in it.
They knew they needed to take a long time to prepare to strike hard at the United States in order to pull it into a full-scale war against the Islamic world. By doing this they hoped to discredit secular Islamic states in the region and to sap American strength. Through a series of increasing attacks on American targets, the Embassies in Africa, the barracks in Saudi Arabia, and the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen, they hoped to illicit a hard response from America. Bill Clinton, however, didn’t want to seem impotent and make Al Qaeda look powerful, nor did he want to be drawn into a full-scale war, so he chose to respond in a half-hearted way.
The first mistake America made was to pull the plug on the resistance fighters in Afghanistan and not give them back their papers so they could return home. This was not solely America’s fault, since most of the governments didn’t want these fighters to come back and cause trouble at home. Stranded in a strange land, scarred by war, this band of about 1,000 soldiers united and became a fierce fighting force in the battles for supremacy after the war with the Soviets was won. Most ended up going back home, but the bond between them was strong. Being abandoned by the U.S. and rejected by their home governments was not only seen as a personal affront but as endemic of the malaise that shrouded all the Islamic governments in the Middle East. They viewed the outside threats to Islam, America and the Soviet Union, as manageable and insignificant compared to the inner threats of corrupt Islamic governments.
The first major incident leading up to the current situation goes way back to the Crusades and the loss of the Caliphate. At the height of its power, the Muslim Empire was actually larger than the Roman Empire. The goal of Al Qaeda was to take over one Islamic state in order to set an example and to establish a base of operations. Afghanistan became that base, with the Taliban running the internal affairs and Al Qaeda operating around the world. Al Qaeda hoped to sweep the Muslim world and establish fundamentalist governments throughout the Middle East, unifying the Islamic world and reestablishing the Caliphate.
The key element in their strategy was to show that America is weak and vulnerable in order to break the illusion of the super power’s dominance and remove the Muslim world’s fear and subservience. They felt that the United States lacked to power and moral character to assert its will in the long run. Vietnam, the Iran hostage crisis, Beirut, Somalia, and failure to depose Saddam Hussein all seemed to demonstrate the fact that America could strike a hard first blow but could not sustain a prolonged conflict.
Al Qaede realized that it had to strike a blow to the United States that was enormous and for which there was no easy defense, in order to send a clear message to the Islamic masses. The plan was to draw the United States into a prolonged conflict with multiple Islamic states to solidify the Islamic world and to drain the U.S. military dry.
In a society with many unguarded targets, a small group with explosives is very difficult to stop. The fewer the operatives, the more difficult it is to find them. The nearly infinite number of targets and the sparsity of operatives is what makes defending against terrorism a nightmare. The physical damage caused by terrorists is minimal while the psychological damage is extraordinary, making it a powerful political tool.
Al Qaeda’s strategy and ideology were different, and it wasn’t trying to send a message to the United States but to the Islamic world. They saw the United States as an actor that could be manipulated into behaving as they wanted it to behave.
After the end of the Cold War, America didn’t have a major enemy that could threaten its security. Attention was focused on rogue states, such as North Korea, Libya, Yugoslavia, Iran and Cuba, and these were not allied together against the United States. The major threat was threat was that they might develop nuclear weapons. The secondary threat was that they might invade their neighbors. The third level of threat was that they might violate the human rights of their own citizens. All of these were considered containable and manageable through international organizations, such as the United Nations.
The way the United States responded to the small crises throughout the world was triggering unexpected responses in the Islamic world. While the United States saw itself as neutral, impartial and doing good, the Islamic world saw America encroaching on Islamic territory and siding with those who were against Muslims. The intervention by the United States in Kosovo and Somalia, for example, were considered by the Muslim world as struggles between America and Muslims. The United States failed to realize that there was no such thing as a neutral intervention. The United States also saw the fact that these nations were Islamic as incidental while the rest of the Muslim world saw it as fundamental. Al Qaeda used these incidents to mobilize support against Americal Confusion was also created when the United States declined to get involved in other conflicts, making it seem as if America had no coherent foreign policy in place.
The United States also wrongly assumed that nations would be willing to trade a little bit of their sovereignty in order to have stability and security. This was true for many countries, but it infuriated the Muslim nations. The great powers in Europe were also uneasy about America’s growing power and unpredictability, and many were hoping, and even helping, that America would trip and fall, in order to limit America’s power and make us easier to predict and control. After the Cold War ended, America saw the global economy as the most important issue and assumed everyone else did too. However, most nations, especially Islamic countries, viewed national autonomy as more important than prosperity and security. The United States thought that all countries would welcome transnational prosperity, but some Islamic countries were ready to resist, even to the death.
When Al Qaeda started its global terrorism operation, most analysts either ignored it or misunderstood it. They viewed Al Qaeda like any other Palestinian terrorist organization, with limited political goals and operations. The term “terrorist” tended to obscure the issue, since there are vast differences between different organizations as to their ideology and strategy. They didn’t understand how different Al Qaeda was from any other terrorist organization. Al Qaeda wasn’t interested in symbolic gestures and affecting local politics but had a much more complex ideology that drove its global strategy to implement their international political goals. While most other terrorist organizations were based on Arab ethnicity and were trained by the Soviets to further local political agendas, Al Qaeda was based on Islam and they had a global religious agenda that was based on centuries of Islamic history and tradition. By merely focusing on its attacks and not its ideology, the United States totally misunderstood what Al Qaeda was about.
While the United States didn’t create Al Qaeda, we created the atmosphere and climate for it to grow and flourish. When Bill Clinton responded in a half-hearted manner to the embassy bombings and the attack on the Cole, he unwittingly empowered and emboldened Al Qaeda.
This is a summary of the first few chapters of the book which I found extremely helpful in understanding these events. Friedman goes on to dissect the problems with the American intelligence system and why it missed 9/11. He then goes on to explain how America’s military had been stripped down after the Cold War and was totally unprepared for a major military conflict on the scale that was needed to confront Al Qaeda. Friedman’s detailed analysis of what was involved in the September 11 attacks is impressive and chilling, clearly showing that Al Qaeda is highly trained, extremely disciplined and very determined to destroy the United States. He then shows how it is impossible to defend against such attacks and explains why most of what is being done in response to 9/11 is worthless.
I thought Friedman’s detailed account of how the United States prepared for and implemented a major military offensive against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan in less than a month was amazing. While Al Qaeda knew we would attack, they expected a massive assault in the following spring, but Operation Enduring Freedom was totally unconventional and unexpected, catching Al Qaeda by surprise. He goes on to describe how America fought the war, the alliances that had to be made with former, and current, enemies, and the problems of working with nationalistic forces within Afghanistan.
The book goes on to cover the war in Iraq up to the end of July, 2004. Friedman concludes that the United States is winning the war. Al Qaeda has failed to achieve any of its strategic goals. There has been no uprising in the Islamic world, no regimes toppled. In fact, most Islamic governments have increased their cooperation with the United States. Al Qaeda has been backed against a wall. The game is far from over, but the U.S. certainly has the lead -- in spite of an extraordinary array of blunders, some inexplicable.
You can read chapter summaries and learn more about the book at: http://www.americassecretwar.com/index.html
Friedman sees this current war as the fourth modern global conflict. Just as World War II grew out of World War I, and the Cold War grew out of World War II, the current global war on terror has grown out of the Cold War. The situation we face today is the direct result of the geopolitical changes that occurred as a result of the fall of the Soviet Empire. Both the events leading up to the collapse and the resulting global situation after the collapse set the stage for the conflict between radical Islam and the West.
One of the Soviet’s favorite techniques to weaken American power around the world was to support insurgents and guerillas in order to bog down U.S. forces. One of the most successful was the support of the North Vietnamese, ultimately driving the U.S. from the region. America, on the other hand had a lousy track record with supporting guerillas. When the Soviets attacked Afghanistan, it was an opportunity for the U.S. to use this technique against them. This was an opportunity to “make the Soviets bleed” like they made us bleed. President Carter authorized the recruitment, organization and supplying of guerilla warfare in Afghanistan by utilizing indigenous forces that were already rising to resist the Soviets. Carter signed the first “Intelligence Finding” authorizing covert military operations in Afghanistan in order to “harass” soviet troops. It was this “Finding” that served as the legal basis for the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan. It was also this “Finding” that would culminate, via a long, circuitous and unpredictable route, in September 11.
The first problem was how to fund the covert war. Ever since senator Church passed legislation requiring the CIA to get authorization for such funding, it would impossible to get money from Congress, and if it tried, then the operation would no longer be secret. Saudi Arabia realized that an America weakened by the oil embargo of the 1970s was dangerous to its national security, because if the Soviets or Iran won out in the region, they would be destroyed as a nation. Therefore, Saudi Arabia had a greater interest in what was happening in Afghanistan than America did. The United States was worried that the Soviets were attacking Afghanistan in order to push into the Middle East and capture the oil fields for itself.
Second, the United States had very little intelligence on Afghanistan, and what we did have was only from the CIA agents monitoring the narcotics trade and the poppy fields in the country. Therefore, America had to turn to Saudi Arabia for money and intelligence, making an alliance with the Wahabis in order to gain what we needed.
The U.S. structure a deal with the Saudis to provide funding and personnel to work with the CIA to build a guerilla force to bog down the Soviets in Afghanistan. This was the beginning of an alliance between the U.S. and Muslim fundamentalists.
The third fractor was Pakistan, a long-term American ally. It was torn between the secularism of its founders and the radical Islam of the majority of its population. It was also afraid of being trapped between a Soviet dominated Afghanistan and a pro-Soviet India. Pakistan had a lot of intelligence on Afghanistan and a long contiguous border where training camps, logistic systems, and bases of operations could be set up. The North Vietnamese had Laos and Cambodia; the U.S. had Pakistan.
A three-way alliance was formed. The United States would provide training, coordination and strategic intelligence; the Saudis would provide the money and the guerillas; the Pakistanis would provide the territory and the intelligence needed.
Jimmy Carter was the one who presided over this alliance. Yet, his goal was not to destroy the Soviet Union but to find a balance while restoring America’s power in the world after its decline over the last decade. Carter had no idea that the war in Afghanistan would lead to the destruction of the Soviet Union and the rise of Al Qaeda. When Reagan took office in 1981, he intensified Carter’s alliance and wove it into a larger plan to destroy the Soviet Union and intensify America’s global power.
After the fall of the Soviet Union, Al Qaeda was well-trained and well-equipped, possessing many Soviet and American weapons along with the expertise to use them. The Soviets were brutal in their attempts to squash the guerillas, killing many, so that those who lasted the decade-long war were well-trained, experienced, hardened and determined. These radical Islamic fighters saw the fall of the Soviet Union as a Muslim victory, as it was the first victory a Muslim army had achieved against a non-Muslim force in centuries. After the war, these Islamic fighters were irate at America because it threw them away without any hint of gratitude.
The United States saw the war in Afghanistan differently. The war in Afghanistan was only a part in a larger plan that brought the Soviet Union down. America felt it also played the major role, providing the support and training needed for victory. Without the U.S. backing, the guerillas would have been completely annihilated by the Soviets. Because the U.S. ignored their allies and expected them to maintain some kind of bond with us after the war, a rift was created between the Jihadists and America.
In the same way, the first Bush administration mistakenly believed that the Arab countries would be happy with America for helping them free Kuwait and a bond would be created between us and the Arab states. President Bush expected gratitude; he never expected rage. It is clear that the United States was ignorant of the Islamic world and made some serious blunders that caused so much anger and hatred that laid the foundation for Al Qaeda.
While Shiite Muslims are a minority in the whole Arab world, they are the majority in the Gulf region, especially in Iran. The Saudis, by contrast, are not only Sunni, but they are Wahabi, the most radical of the Sunnis. So the Saudis saw the Shiites of Iran not only as a threat to their religion but also a threat to their oil fields. The problem for Saudi Arabia was how to contain Iran and the Soviets at the same time, and the answer was Iraq. Both nations wanted to contain Iran and the Soviets, so America felt is was the best policy to back them as well. Unwittingly, however, the U.S. ended up supporting the most radical form of Islam as a negative unintended consequence. And this radical Wahabi Islam has proved to be even more dangerous to the United States than Shiite Iran.
In order to bog down Iran, the United States sent signals to Iraq that it wouldn’t oppose them if they decided to attack Iran. The resulting war tied up both countries for a decade, costing millions of lives and billions of dollars on both sides. The United States kept shifting its policy towards Iraq to keep it destabilized and to prolong the war. The United States knew that Iraq could not beat Iran, and the Saudis gladly backed the war in order to keep both armies bogged down for nearly ten years.
American foreign policy has chosen to make alliances of necessity with evil states in order to oppose even more evil states. The U.S. made alliances with Stalin and Mao in order to counter worse leaders. America also tends to create solutions that solve the short-term problem at the risk of creating greater problems down the road.
Saddam Hussein wanted to take over Iran and Kuwait in order to become the dominant power in the region. The U.S. quietly assured him, with deniability, that if he won the war we would allow him to have Kuwait as well. Then for the next ten years the U.S. kept shifting the balance of power to make sure Iraq never accomplished its goal and achieved its prize. After ten years, Iraq was less exhausted than Iran, and Saddam declared victory and demanded his prize. The American Ambassador, unaware of the intricacies and policy shifts, assured Saddam Hussein that while the U.S. was opposed to his taking Iraq, they would do nothing to stop him. As soon as Iraq invaded Kuwait, the U.S. worked with the Saudis to launch Operation Desert Shield and then Desert Storm.
The soldiers returning to Saudi Arabia from Afghanistan were outraged by the presence of non-Muslim forces on holy soil. They believed that Muslim states were not naturally weak and could defend themselves if they were willing to sacrifice and persevere. But they also believed that the current Muslim leaders were corrupt and incapable of defending their countries. Therefore, they felt that America had to be humiliated in order to break the psychological dependency on the United States and to generate confidence among the Islamic masses.
These fighters knew America’s strengths, but they also knew its weaknesses. They knew how the American intelligence agencies worked and how they carried out covert operations. These returning fighters were not the poor and disposed, but many were from wealthy families, educated and some even had advanced degrees in secular fields. They also had financial backing from the Saudi royal family and other wealthy Saudis. The financial network that had supported the guerillas in Afghanistan had never been shut down and now it was being used to fund Al Qaeda long after America had lost interest in it.
They knew they needed to take a long time to prepare to strike hard at the United States in order to pull it into a full-scale war against the Islamic world. By doing this they hoped to discredit secular Islamic states in the region and to sap American strength. Through a series of increasing attacks on American targets, the Embassies in Africa, the barracks in Saudi Arabia, and the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen, they hoped to illicit a hard response from America. Bill Clinton, however, didn’t want to seem impotent and make Al Qaeda look powerful, nor did he want to be drawn into a full-scale war, so he chose to respond in a half-hearted way.
The first mistake America made was to pull the plug on the resistance fighters in Afghanistan and not give them back their papers so they could return home. This was not solely America’s fault, since most of the governments didn’t want these fighters to come back and cause trouble at home. Stranded in a strange land, scarred by war, this band of about 1,000 soldiers united and became a fierce fighting force in the battles for supremacy after the war with the Soviets was won. Most ended up going back home, but the bond between them was strong. Being abandoned by the U.S. and rejected by their home governments was not only seen as a personal affront but as endemic of the malaise that shrouded all the Islamic governments in the Middle East. They viewed the outside threats to Islam, America and the Soviet Union, as manageable and insignificant compared to the inner threats of corrupt Islamic governments.
The first major incident leading up to the current situation goes way back to the Crusades and the loss of the Caliphate. At the height of its power, the Muslim Empire was actually larger than the Roman Empire. The goal of Al Qaeda was to take over one Islamic state in order to set an example and to establish a base of operations. Afghanistan became that base, with the Taliban running the internal affairs and Al Qaeda operating around the world. Al Qaeda hoped to sweep the Muslim world and establish fundamentalist governments throughout the Middle East, unifying the Islamic world and reestablishing the Caliphate.
The key element in their strategy was to show that America is weak and vulnerable in order to break the illusion of the super power’s dominance and remove the Muslim world’s fear and subservience. They felt that the United States lacked to power and moral character to assert its will in the long run. Vietnam, the Iran hostage crisis, Beirut, Somalia, and failure to depose Saddam Hussein all seemed to demonstrate the fact that America could strike a hard first blow but could not sustain a prolonged conflict.
Al Qaede realized that it had to strike a blow to the United States that was enormous and for which there was no easy defense, in order to send a clear message to the Islamic masses. The plan was to draw the United States into a prolonged conflict with multiple Islamic states to solidify the Islamic world and to drain the U.S. military dry.
In a society with many unguarded targets, a small group with explosives is very difficult to stop. The fewer the operatives, the more difficult it is to find them. The nearly infinite number of targets and the sparsity of operatives is what makes defending against terrorism a nightmare. The physical damage caused by terrorists is minimal while the psychological damage is extraordinary, making it a powerful political tool.
Al Qaeda’s strategy and ideology were different, and it wasn’t trying to send a message to the United States but to the Islamic world. They saw the United States as an actor that could be manipulated into behaving as they wanted it to behave.
After the end of the Cold War, America didn’t have a major enemy that could threaten its security. Attention was focused on rogue states, such as North Korea, Libya, Yugoslavia, Iran and Cuba, and these were not allied together against the United States. The major threat was threat was that they might develop nuclear weapons. The secondary threat was that they might invade their neighbors. The third level of threat was that they might violate the human rights of their own citizens. All of these were considered containable and manageable through international organizations, such as the United Nations.
The way the United States responded to the small crises throughout the world was triggering unexpected responses in the Islamic world. While the United States saw itself as neutral, impartial and doing good, the Islamic world saw America encroaching on Islamic territory and siding with those who were against Muslims. The intervention by the United States in Kosovo and Somalia, for example, were considered by the Muslim world as struggles between America and Muslims. The United States failed to realize that there was no such thing as a neutral intervention. The United States also saw the fact that these nations were Islamic as incidental while the rest of the Muslim world saw it as fundamental. Al Qaeda used these incidents to mobilize support against Americal Confusion was also created when the United States declined to get involved in other conflicts, making it seem as if America had no coherent foreign policy in place.
The United States also wrongly assumed that nations would be willing to trade a little bit of their sovereignty in order to have stability and security. This was true for many countries, but it infuriated the Muslim nations. The great powers in Europe were also uneasy about America’s growing power and unpredictability, and many were hoping, and even helping, that America would trip and fall, in order to limit America’s power and make us easier to predict and control. After the Cold War ended, America saw the global economy as the most important issue and assumed everyone else did too. However, most nations, especially Islamic countries, viewed national autonomy as more important than prosperity and security. The United States thought that all countries would welcome transnational prosperity, but some Islamic countries were ready to resist, even to the death.
When Al Qaeda started its global terrorism operation, most analysts either ignored it or misunderstood it. They viewed Al Qaeda like any other Palestinian terrorist organization, with limited political goals and operations. The term “terrorist” tended to obscure the issue, since there are vast differences between different organizations as to their ideology and strategy. They didn’t understand how different Al Qaeda was from any other terrorist organization. Al Qaeda wasn’t interested in symbolic gestures and affecting local politics but had a much more complex ideology that drove its global strategy to implement their international political goals. While most other terrorist organizations were based on Arab ethnicity and were trained by the Soviets to further local political agendas, Al Qaeda was based on Islam and they had a global religious agenda that was based on centuries of Islamic history and tradition. By merely focusing on its attacks and not its ideology, the United States totally misunderstood what Al Qaeda was about.
While the United States didn’t create Al Qaeda, we created the atmosphere and climate for it to grow and flourish. When Bill Clinton responded in a half-hearted manner to the embassy bombings and the attack on the Cole, he unwittingly empowered and emboldened Al Qaeda.
This is a summary of the first few chapters of the book which I found extremely helpful in understanding these events. Friedman goes on to dissect the problems with the American intelligence system and why it missed 9/11. He then goes on to explain how America’s military had been stripped down after the Cold War and was totally unprepared for a major military conflict on the scale that was needed to confront Al Qaeda. Friedman’s detailed analysis of what was involved in the September 11 attacks is impressive and chilling, clearly showing that Al Qaeda is highly trained, extremely disciplined and very determined to destroy the United States. He then shows how it is impossible to defend against such attacks and explains why most of what is being done in response to 9/11 is worthless.
I thought Friedman’s detailed account of how the United States prepared for and implemented a major military offensive against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan in less than a month was amazing. While Al Qaeda knew we would attack, they expected a massive assault in the following spring, but Operation Enduring Freedom was totally unconventional and unexpected, catching Al Qaeda by surprise. He goes on to describe how America fought the war, the alliances that had to be made with former, and current, enemies, and the problems of working with nationalistic forces within Afghanistan.
The book goes on to cover the war in Iraq up to the end of July, 2004. Friedman concludes that the United States is winning the war. Al Qaeda has failed to achieve any of its strategic goals. There has been no uprising in the Islamic world, no regimes toppled. In fact, most Islamic governments have increased their cooperation with the United States. Al Qaeda has been backed against a wall. The game is far from over, but the U.S. certainly has the lead -- in spite of an extraordinary array of blunders, some inexplicable.
You can read chapter summaries and learn more about the book at: http://www.americassecretwar.com/index.html
Pulling out of Iraq
A letter sent between high level Al Qaeda leaders in July, 2005 clearly outlines their four step strategy in Iraq for establishing a Caliphate within the heart of the Islamic world:
First, expel the Americans from Iraq.
Second, establish a fundamentalist Islamic government in Iraq.
Third, extend the Jihad wave to the secular Islamic countries in the region.
Fourth, initiate a clash with Israel.
It is clear that even if we pull out of Iraq, it will not be the end of Jihadist activity. As long as they are able, they will carry on this war until they have unified the Muslim world under the control of a fundamentalist Caliph.
Al Qaeda has always had a long-term strategy for Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as for the whole region. Osama bin Laden is convinced that the American military, government and people are incapable of sustaining a long war and will quickly withdraw when it gets inconvenient. The current push to withdraw troops from Iraq within a year plays right into Al Qaeda’s hands. Those calling for the withdrawal are short-sighted and playing with America’s security in order to win political points for the upcoming election.
Check out this website for some excellent analysis of what is going on in the war on terror: http://www.stratfor.com/
First, expel the Americans from Iraq.
Second, establish a fundamentalist Islamic government in Iraq.
Third, extend the Jihad wave to the secular Islamic countries in the region.
Fourth, initiate a clash with Israel.
It is clear that even if we pull out of Iraq, it will not be the end of Jihadist activity. As long as they are able, they will carry on this war until they have unified the Muslim world under the control of a fundamentalist Caliph.
Al Qaeda has always had a long-term strategy for Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as for the whole region. Osama bin Laden is convinced that the American military, government and people are incapable of sustaining a long war and will quickly withdraw when it gets inconvenient. The current push to withdraw troops from Iraq within a year plays right into Al Qaeda’s hands. Those calling for the withdrawal are short-sighted and playing with America’s security in order to win political points for the upcoming election.
Check out this website for some excellent analysis of what is going on in the war on terror: http://www.stratfor.com/
Saturday, March 17, 2007
Love Your Muslim as Yourself
This article, "Love Your Muslim as Yourself", is one of the best Christian articles I have read about the situation in the Middle East. Most Christians (including myself) are woeful ignorant of what is really going on and what is motivating all of the violence. If we are going to love our neighbor as ourselves, we need to spend more time getting to know our neighbor. You can’t love someone you don’t understand, and we need to deepen our understanding of the world’s second-largest religion.
Here are a few quotes that I found convicting and helpful:
One reason is that Middle East conflicts are complex. In a press conference, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said the violence in Iraq cannot be described as a civil war. “I think that the words civil war oversimplify a very complex situation in Iraq,” he said. “I believe that there are essentially four wars going on in Iraq. “One is Shi'a on Shi'a, principally in the south; second is sectarian conflict, principally in Baghdad, but not solely; third is the insurgency; and fourth is al Qaeda, and al Qaeda is attacking, at times, all of those targets.” And that's just Iraq. Equally complex conflict characterizes Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lebanon, Iran, and, of course, Israel and Palestine. While few would argue that Middle East issues are solely religious, there are strong religious dimensions to which our military and diplomatic efforts must pay attention.
“We have little, if any, ability to deal with religious differences in a hostile setting,” Johnston says. To be clear: It's not that Sunnis and Shi'as are killing each other over doctrine or worship practices—politics, revenge, culture, religion, and ethnicity have all come together to create an explosive, hate-filled atmosphere. But knowing more about Islam can provide the basic understanding needed to begin addressing such issues.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that evangelicals hold as many stereotypes and misunderstandings about Muslims as does our broader culture. We need to use Sunday school classes and sermons to communicate more about who Muslims really are and how we can love them as ourselves.
You can read the article at: http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2007/april/11.27.html
Here are a few quotes that I found convicting and helpful:
One reason is that Middle East conflicts are complex. In a press conference, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said the violence in Iraq cannot be described as a civil war. “I think that the words civil war oversimplify a very complex situation in Iraq,” he said. “I believe that there are essentially four wars going on in Iraq. “One is Shi'a on Shi'a, principally in the south; second is sectarian conflict, principally in Baghdad, but not solely; third is the insurgency; and fourth is al Qaeda, and al Qaeda is attacking, at times, all of those targets.” And that's just Iraq. Equally complex conflict characterizes Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lebanon, Iran, and, of course, Israel and Palestine. While few would argue that Middle East issues are solely religious, there are strong religious dimensions to which our military and diplomatic efforts must pay attention.
“We have little, if any, ability to deal with religious differences in a hostile setting,” Johnston says. To be clear: It's not that Sunnis and Shi'as are killing each other over doctrine or worship practices—politics, revenge, culture, religion, and ethnicity have all come together to create an explosive, hate-filled atmosphere. But knowing more about Islam can provide the basic understanding needed to begin addressing such issues.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that evangelicals hold as many stereotypes and misunderstandings about Muslims as does our broader culture. We need to use Sunday school classes and sermons to communicate more about who Muslims really are and how we can love them as ourselves.
You can read the article at: http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2007/april/11.27.html
Is Ending the War a Matter of Faith
In his blog on Friday, March 16, 2007, Jim Wallis wrote an article entitled: “Ending the War is a Matter of Faith” in which he argued that the War in Iraq is morally wrong and cannot be justified. He says that it cannot be justified by the teachings of Jesus or by Augustine’s just war doctrine. He feels that not only is the war un-Christian, but it is an offense to all the young men who have been sent to fight, to the Iraqis, and to all who have been shortchanged by the diversion of funds from more important projects and concerns. Jim calls for all Christians to pray and seek the end of the war by mobilizing the faith community in our country to change the current wind of public opinion.
St. Augustine said that protection of one’s own life or property is never a just reason for killing one’s neighbor. However, this applies only to individuals and not to the leaders of nations who have the obligation to maintain peace and order. He states, “The natural order conducive to peace among mortals demands that the power to declare and counsel war should be in the hands of those who hold the supreme authority.” He continues, “A just war is wont to be described as one that avenges wrongs, when a nation or state has to be punished, for refusing to make amends for the wrongs inflicted by its subjects, or to restore what it has seized unjustly.” The intention of the war is very important for St. Augustine. He says, “The passion for inflicting harm, the cruel thirst for vengeance, an unpacific and relentless spirit, the fever of revolt, the lust of power, and such things, all these are rightly condemned in war.” St. Augustine emphasizes the idea of restoration of peace as the main motive of war. He says, “We do not seek peace in order to be at war, but we go to war that we may have peace. Be peaceful, therefore, in warring, so that you may vanquish those whom you war against, and bring them to the prosperity of peace.” So in St. Augustine's thinking a war "was limited by its purpose, its authority and its conduct.”
Preemptive strikes are not considered justified by this doctrine. Iraq never attacked the United States or threatened our security. However, President Bush claimed that Iraq was building weapons of mass destruction that he intended to give to terrorists to use against the United States and its allies. The prospect of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons being used against American civilians is a scary prospect, and unfortunately it is very likely to happen in the near future. It is debatable whether the war in Iraq has reduced or increased the chances of this kind of attack happening, but the ends don’t justify the means.
With such a real and imminent threat our government has the moral obligation to act to deter such an attack to protect its citizens. Attacking Iraq was put forth as an essential element in our government’s plan to end global terrorism. The questions that needs to be asked are: Is ending global terrorism within the moral and legal rights of the United States and is it just to pursue military action to secure that objective? Is attacking another sovereign nation justified if it harbors and aids global terrorists that have clearly declared war on the United States? Is military action the best course of action to secure these objectives? Can diplomacy, sanctions and other nonviolent means be used effectively to stop global terrorism?
While I agree with Jim Wallis that indiscriminate war is unchristian and unjustifiable, I am not sure that the war on global terrorism fits that label. International terrorist organizations have clearly and repeatedly declared war on the United States. These organizations have carried out numerous deadly attacks on U.S. citizens, military and civilian, around the world. These organizations have attacked and killed thousands of civilians and military personnel on our own soil. These organizations have publicly vowed to carry out more of such attacks in the future. These organizations are actively seeking out nuclear, biological and chemical weapons to use against civilian and military targets overseas and within our own borders. Whether we like it or not, we are at war. Even if we do not strike back, we are still at war.
The difficulty comes not in determining whether we are at war and if we should defend ourselves, but how doe we defend ourselves against attacks against our civilians that come not from other nation states with clearly defined borders, armies, and governments but are transnational and often are indistinguishable from the civilian populations around them. There are not clear military targets, definitive armies or simple borders as in the past. Our understanding of warfare needs to be updated and changed to reflect the new realities. We cannot evaluate wars in the same way as we have in the past. As Christians, we need to spend more time studying these realities and evaluating what biblical responsibilities a government has towards its citizens and how Christian principles should guide decision-making in this new situation.
I agree with most of what Jim Wallis says, yet I feel that his evaluation of the current situation is too limited. I agree that Jesus has clearly laid down principles of non-violence and Christians must not strike back at those who strike them. However, governments have the moral obligation to protect their citizens and to maintain order. The Apostle Paul says, “For rulers hold no terror for those who do right, but for those who do wrong. Do you want to be free from fear of the one in authority? Then do what is right and he will commend you. For he is God’s servant to do you good. But if you do wrong, be afraid, for he does not bear the sword for nothing. He is God’s servant, an agent of wrath to bring punishment on the wrongdoer” (Romans 13:3-4). The context is concerned about Christians obeying the government, yet there are some principles in this passage that are applicable to war. Governments are divinely appointed to maintain order and peace and have been invested with the authority to punish wrongdoers. It would be immoral for a government to not punish crime or to allow wrongdoers to continue to hurting citizens. The government has been given divine authority to “bear the sword” both in civil and international affairs. Therefore, it is not always wrong to go to war. In fact, there are times it is wrong to not go to war.
Therefore, the question we should be asking is whether the war in Iraq is essential to bringing criminals to justice and to prevent these criminals from committing future crimes against our citizens. Jim Wallis doesn’t believe that the war in Iraq meets these criteria and therefore should be stopped. I am very sympathetic to his call to peace, but I am still doing more research on the current situation before I make a final decision about the legitimacy of the war. Since I am coming at this years later that Jim, I am willing to give him the benefit of the doubt and hold my judgment in humility. However, I must still do my own research and make my own decision based upon as much correct information that I can obtain.
So, is the war in Iraq a matter of faith? Definitely. Should we pray for it to end? Yes. Was it a political and military blunder? Maybe. Is it a just war?
You can read Jim Wallis' article at: http://www.beliefnet.com/blogs/godspolitics/2007/03/jim-wallis-ending-war-is-matter-of.html
St. Augustine said that protection of one’s own life or property is never a just reason for killing one’s neighbor. However, this applies only to individuals and not to the leaders of nations who have the obligation to maintain peace and order. He states, “The natural order conducive to peace among mortals demands that the power to declare and counsel war should be in the hands of those who hold the supreme authority.” He continues, “A just war is wont to be described as one that avenges wrongs, when a nation or state has to be punished, for refusing to make amends for the wrongs inflicted by its subjects, or to restore what it has seized unjustly.” The intention of the war is very important for St. Augustine. He says, “The passion for inflicting harm, the cruel thirst for vengeance, an unpacific and relentless spirit, the fever of revolt, the lust of power, and such things, all these are rightly condemned in war.” St. Augustine emphasizes the idea of restoration of peace as the main motive of war. He says, “We do not seek peace in order to be at war, but we go to war that we may have peace. Be peaceful, therefore, in warring, so that you may vanquish those whom you war against, and bring them to the prosperity of peace.” So in St. Augustine's thinking a war "was limited by its purpose, its authority and its conduct.”
Preemptive strikes are not considered justified by this doctrine. Iraq never attacked the United States or threatened our security. However, President Bush claimed that Iraq was building weapons of mass destruction that he intended to give to terrorists to use against the United States and its allies. The prospect of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons being used against American civilians is a scary prospect, and unfortunately it is very likely to happen in the near future. It is debatable whether the war in Iraq has reduced or increased the chances of this kind of attack happening, but the ends don’t justify the means.
With such a real and imminent threat our government has the moral obligation to act to deter such an attack to protect its citizens. Attacking Iraq was put forth as an essential element in our government’s plan to end global terrorism. The questions that needs to be asked are: Is ending global terrorism within the moral and legal rights of the United States and is it just to pursue military action to secure that objective? Is attacking another sovereign nation justified if it harbors and aids global terrorists that have clearly declared war on the United States? Is military action the best course of action to secure these objectives? Can diplomacy, sanctions and other nonviolent means be used effectively to stop global terrorism?
While I agree with Jim Wallis that indiscriminate war is unchristian and unjustifiable, I am not sure that the war on global terrorism fits that label. International terrorist organizations have clearly and repeatedly declared war on the United States. These organizations have carried out numerous deadly attacks on U.S. citizens, military and civilian, around the world. These organizations have attacked and killed thousands of civilians and military personnel on our own soil. These organizations have publicly vowed to carry out more of such attacks in the future. These organizations are actively seeking out nuclear, biological and chemical weapons to use against civilian and military targets overseas and within our own borders. Whether we like it or not, we are at war. Even if we do not strike back, we are still at war.
The difficulty comes not in determining whether we are at war and if we should defend ourselves, but how doe we defend ourselves against attacks against our civilians that come not from other nation states with clearly defined borders, armies, and governments but are transnational and often are indistinguishable from the civilian populations around them. There are not clear military targets, definitive armies or simple borders as in the past. Our understanding of warfare needs to be updated and changed to reflect the new realities. We cannot evaluate wars in the same way as we have in the past. As Christians, we need to spend more time studying these realities and evaluating what biblical responsibilities a government has towards its citizens and how Christian principles should guide decision-making in this new situation.
I agree with most of what Jim Wallis says, yet I feel that his evaluation of the current situation is too limited. I agree that Jesus has clearly laid down principles of non-violence and Christians must not strike back at those who strike them. However, governments have the moral obligation to protect their citizens and to maintain order. The Apostle Paul says, “For rulers hold no terror for those who do right, but for those who do wrong. Do you want to be free from fear of the one in authority? Then do what is right and he will commend you. For he is God’s servant to do you good. But if you do wrong, be afraid, for he does not bear the sword for nothing. He is God’s servant, an agent of wrath to bring punishment on the wrongdoer” (Romans 13:3-4). The context is concerned about Christians obeying the government, yet there are some principles in this passage that are applicable to war. Governments are divinely appointed to maintain order and peace and have been invested with the authority to punish wrongdoers. It would be immoral for a government to not punish crime or to allow wrongdoers to continue to hurting citizens. The government has been given divine authority to “bear the sword” both in civil and international affairs. Therefore, it is not always wrong to go to war. In fact, there are times it is wrong to not go to war.
Therefore, the question we should be asking is whether the war in Iraq is essential to bringing criminals to justice and to prevent these criminals from committing future crimes against our citizens. Jim Wallis doesn’t believe that the war in Iraq meets these criteria and therefore should be stopped. I am very sympathetic to his call to peace, but I am still doing more research on the current situation before I make a final decision about the legitimacy of the war. Since I am coming at this years later that Jim, I am willing to give him the benefit of the doubt and hold my judgment in humility. However, I must still do my own research and make my own decision based upon as much correct information that I can obtain.
So, is the war in Iraq a matter of faith? Definitely. Should we pray for it to end? Yes. Was it a political and military blunder? Maybe. Is it a just war?
You can read Jim Wallis' article at: http://www.beliefnet.com/blogs/godspolitics/2007/03/jim-wallis-ending-war-is-matter-of.html
Wednesday, February 28, 2007
See No Evil
See No Evil chronicles the twenty-five years of Robert Baer’s career as a field operative for the CIA. Bob spent many years on the ground collecting intelligence in the Middle East and is privy to much of what went on behind the scene in this volatile area. Much of the book is more fascinating than a Tom Clancy or Robert Ludlum spy novel, especially because it records real events. The people Bob dealt with and the situations he got himself into, and out of, are more colorful than any fiction author could have imagined and put down on paper.
In addition to being entertaining, it is very informative. It is one of the best books I have read on the Middle East and terrorism so far. Bob has first hand knowledge of many of the key players in the Middle East and he traces all the connections with great detail. In fact, there is so much detail it is impossible to keep all the people, places, dates and facts straight.
As a case officer, Bob recruited and ran hundreds of agents, collecting information on terrorists vital to the security of our country. He paints a vivid picture of what life is like as a real secret agent, not some James Bond fantasy. His descriptions are so realistic they draw you into the action so you feel as if you are there experiencing everything with him.
Bob has a clear purpose for writing this book, and it isn’t merely to entertain people or to boost his image. He is serious about the degeneration of America’s intelligence agencies and their increasing inability to collect valuable intelligence on our enemies. Bob clearly saw the decline of the CIA from the inside, and its devolution into near complete incompetence led him to resign. When America’s intelligence officers become more concerned with protecting their careers than in gathering intelligence, it is the beginning of the end. It was shocking to see how so many within the CIA and other intelligence agencies were not collecting intelligence and actually preventing those in the field from collecting any worthwhile intelligence.
As a result, America is blind and deaf and has no clue what is happening around the world, especially in Islamic countries. At the beginning of the Iraq war, there was not a single agent within Iraq collecting intelligence for the U.S. There are no human intelligence resources in any Muslim nation, nor has anyone penetrated any terrorist organization. It is no wonder that we were taken by surprise on 9/11.
Another problem is the politicization of the intelligence agencies. More often than not, presidents and elected officials are more concerned with their public image and getting reelected than they are in dealing realistically with terrorism. Terrorism is messy and it is easier to sweep the information under the rug than to deal with it. For example, the CIA had clear intelligence that gave them the exact date and time that the U.S. Embassy in Beirut would be bombed, but the information was never acted upon. The CIA knew from the very beginning that Iran was behind the bombing and was using the Islamic Jihadist Organization as a front to cover their tracks. But instead of punishing Iran, the U.S. chose to ignore Iran’s terrorist activities and let it get away with many more terrorist strikes. In fact, the U.S. knew that a high ranking Iranian government official was the leader of the IJO attacks, yet chose to pin their hopes on building a relationship with him in order to normalize relationships with Iran.
In the 1990s there was clear evidence that Osama bin Laden had networked with the IJO and was being backed by Iran. In fact, bin Laden had a hand in many of the IJO’s bombings. Bin Laden went to Iran and convinced them to stop trying to undermine the Central Asian states and to join him in attacking America. Bin Laden also networked with Egypt’s Islamic Brotherhood, forming the most formidable terrorist alliance in history. These three organizations, IJO, IB, and Al Qaeda are all working together to destroy the West, and they are not only determined, they are trained and equipped to carry out their goal. The attacks of 9/11 were not carried out solely by Al Qaeda, but by this new terrorist alliance. The problem is much larger than the U.S. government has let on.
The CIA and the U.S. government knew of the connections of Iran and Saudi Arabia to radical Islamic terrorist organizations yet chose to remain silent. They felt it is better to “See no evil” than to deal with the growing threat. It is easier to sweep the bad news under the rug and leave it for the next administration to deal with. Getting reelected was much more important than stopping global terrorism, especially since any effective action would be politically damaging. All the presidents in the last 15 years have glossed over the problems, kept the truth from the public, and pretended that they were doing all they could to fight terrorism, all the while refusing to act on the truth. This is why we are in such a mess today. Terrorism has grown into one of the most pernicious problems because our government didn’t have the backbone to do what is necessary to stop it while it was still a localized problem.
America’s response to 9/11 was misguided since it failed to deal with the source of terrorism. Even if we killed Osama bin Laden or captured him and paraded him down the streets of Manhattan, all we would do would be to make a martyr out of him around which millions of young Islamic men would rally. By attacking Saddam Hussein, we have only done what is easy and not what is needed. By attacking Iraq we have only infuriated all the Islamic states and given them a chance to give us a black eye.
One of the most startling revelations Bob gives is the failed attempt by the Iraqi military to overthrow Saddam Hussein. The Iraqi general behind the plot begged for American assistance but the U.S. waited until the last day to tell the general that we would not help. By then it was too late since the key players were already committed and couldn’t back out. The end result was the capture and execution of all the coupe leaders, except the general who escaped to Belgium. The U.S. could have had Saddam ousted without a single American life lost, but because Clinton didn’t have the guts to do what was right, we are stuck in Iraq today.
The key is to gather intelligence on the terrorists. We need to infiltrate their networks, and get agents on the ground who can tell us what the terrorists are planning so we can stop them. As long as we trust in satellites and high tech gadgets and refuse to employ human intelligence, we will lose the war. We also have to do what is necessary to stop the terrorists before they can strike.
Terrorists do not have bureaucracies to slow them down, bureaucrats interested in protecting their careers, calcified channels of command and do-nothing politicians. Instead, they are highly motivated, highly trained, focused and agile, forming networks when needed, and then dismantling those networks when they are finished. They are quick, intelligent, and won’t stop until they succeed. We can’t afford to play games and sweep the truth under the rug any longer.
After retiring from the CIA, Robert Baer became a consultant. He moved to Beirut and renewed old networks. In August of 2001, one of his contacts gave him a list of all the operatives in Al Qaeda along with information that they were planning something “big.” This information, along with other crucial intelligence on bin Laden, was sent to the CIA, but no response was ever given. Bob then met with a high Saudi government official who refused to even look at the list. They, too, like America, wanted to keep their head in the sand and “see no evil.”
Here are some helpful links:
http://www.buzzflash.com/interviews/03/09/12_baer.html
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Baer
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200305/baer
http://books.guardian.co.uk/extracts/story/0,,631433,00.html
http://www.fpa.org/topics_info2414/topics_info_show.htm?doc_id=100339
In addition to being entertaining, it is very informative. It is one of the best books I have read on the Middle East and terrorism so far. Bob has first hand knowledge of many of the key players in the Middle East and he traces all the connections with great detail. In fact, there is so much detail it is impossible to keep all the people, places, dates and facts straight.
As a case officer, Bob recruited and ran hundreds of agents, collecting information on terrorists vital to the security of our country. He paints a vivid picture of what life is like as a real secret agent, not some James Bond fantasy. His descriptions are so realistic they draw you into the action so you feel as if you are there experiencing everything with him.
Bob has a clear purpose for writing this book, and it isn’t merely to entertain people or to boost his image. He is serious about the degeneration of America’s intelligence agencies and their increasing inability to collect valuable intelligence on our enemies. Bob clearly saw the decline of the CIA from the inside, and its devolution into near complete incompetence led him to resign. When America’s intelligence officers become more concerned with protecting their careers than in gathering intelligence, it is the beginning of the end. It was shocking to see how so many within the CIA and other intelligence agencies were not collecting intelligence and actually preventing those in the field from collecting any worthwhile intelligence.
As a result, America is blind and deaf and has no clue what is happening around the world, especially in Islamic countries. At the beginning of the Iraq war, there was not a single agent within Iraq collecting intelligence for the U.S. There are no human intelligence resources in any Muslim nation, nor has anyone penetrated any terrorist organization. It is no wonder that we were taken by surprise on 9/11.
Another problem is the politicization of the intelligence agencies. More often than not, presidents and elected officials are more concerned with their public image and getting reelected than they are in dealing realistically with terrorism. Terrorism is messy and it is easier to sweep the information under the rug than to deal with it. For example, the CIA had clear intelligence that gave them the exact date and time that the U.S. Embassy in Beirut would be bombed, but the information was never acted upon. The CIA knew from the very beginning that Iran was behind the bombing and was using the Islamic Jihadist Organization as a front to cover their tracks. But instead of punishing Iran, the U.S. chose to ignore Iran’s terrorist activities and let it get away with many more terrorist strikes. In fact, the U.S. knew that a high ranking Iranian government official was the leader of the IJO attacks, yet chose to pin their hopes on building a relationship with him in order to normalize relationships with Iran.
In the 1990s there was clear evidence that Osama bin Laden had networked with the IJO and was being backed by Iran. In fact, bin Laden had a hand in many of the IJO’s bombings. Bin Laden went to Iran and convinced them to stop trying to undermine the Central Asian states and to join him in attacking America. Bin Laden also networked with Egypt’s Islamic Brotherhood, forming the most formidable terrorist alliance in history. These three organizations, IJO, IB, and Al Qaeda are all working together to destroy the West, and they are not only determined, they are trained and equipped to carry out their goal. The attacks of 9/11 were not carried out solely by Al Qaeda, but by this new terrorist alliance. The problem is much larger than the U.S. government has let on.
The CIA and the U.S. government knew of the connections of Iran and Saudi Arabia to radical Islamic terrorist organizations yet chose to remain silent. They felt it is better to “See no evil” than to deal with the growing threat. It is easier to sweep the bad news under the rug and leave it for the next administration to deal with. Getting reelected was much more important than stopping global terrorism, especially since any effective action would be politically damaging. All the presidents in the last 15 years have glossed over the problems, kept the truth from the public, and pretended that they were doing all they could to fight terrorism, all the while refusing to act on the truth. This is why we are in such a mess today. Terrorism has grown into one of the most pernicious problems because our government didn’t have the backbone to do what is necessary to stop it while it was still a localized problem.
America’s response to 9/11 was misguided since it failed to deal with the source of terrorism. Even if we killed Osama bin Laden or captured him and paraded him down the streets of Manhattan, all we would do would be to make a martyr out of him around which millions of young Islamic men would rally. By attacking Saddam Hussein, we have only done what is easy and not what is needed. By attacking Iraq we have only infuriated all the Islamic states and given them a chance to give us a black eye.
One of the most startling revelations Bob gives is the failed attempt by the Iraqi military to overthrow Saddam Hussein. The Iraqi general behind the plot begged for American assistance but the U.S. waited until the last day to tell the general that we would not help. By then it was too late since the key players were already committed and couldn’t back out. The end result was the capture and execution of all the coupe leaders, except the general who escaped to Belgium. The U.S. could have had Saddam ousted without a single American life lost, but because Clinton didn’t have the guts to do what was right, we are stuck in Iraq today.
The key is to gather intelligence on the terrorists. We need to infiltrate their networks, and get agents on the ground who can tell us what the terrorists are planning so we can stop them. As long as we trust in satellites and high tech gadgets and refuse to employ human intelligence, we will lose the war. We also have to do what is necessary to stop the terrorists before they can strike.
Terrorists do not have bureaucracies to slow them down, bureaucrats interested in protecting their careers, calcified channels of command and do-nothing politicians. Instead, they are highly motivated, highly trained, focused and agile, forming networks when needed, and then dismantling those networks when they are finished. They are quick, intelligent, and won’t stop until they succeed. We can’t afford to play games and sweep the truth under the rug any longer.
After retiring from the CIA, Robert Baer became a consultant. He moved to Beirut and renewed old networks. In August of 2001, one of his contacts gave him a list of all the operatives in Al Qaeda along with information that they were planning something “big.” This information, along with other crucial intelligence on bin Laden, was sent to the CIA, but no response was ever given. Bob then met with a high Saudi government official who refused to even look at the list. They, too, like America, wanted to keep their head in the sand and “see no evil.”
Here are some helpful links:
http://www.buzzflash.com/interviews/03/09/12_baer.html
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Baer
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200305/baer
http://books.guardian.co.uk/extracts/story/0,,631433,00.html
http://www.fpa.org/topics_info2414/topics_info_show.htm?doc_id=100339
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