America’s Secret War

In America’s Secret War: Inside the Hidden Worldwide Struggle Between America and Its Enemies, George Friedman, chairman and founder of Stratfor, has written an excellent book on the history behind the current war on terror, tracing its roots back to the Carter administration and explaining the reasons things are the way they are. Stratfor provides strategic intelligence on global business, economic, security and geopolitical affairs. According to their website, “Stratfor - the world's leading private intelligence firm -- provides corporations, governments and individuals with geopolitical analysis and forecasts that enable them to manage risk and anticipate political, economic and security issues vital to their interests.” As Stratfor’s founder and chairman, Friedman is highly qualified to write on this topic.

Friedman sees this current war as the fourth modern global conflict. Just as World War II grew out of World War I, and the Cold War grew out of World War II, the current global war on terror has grown out of the Cold War. The situation we face today is the direct result of the geopolitical changes that occurred as a result of the fall of the Soviet Empire. Both the events leading up to the collapse and the resulting global situation after the collapse set the stage for the conflict between radical Islam and the West.

One of the Soviet’s favorite techniques to weaken American power around the world was to support insurgents and guerillas in order to bog down U.S. forces. One of the most successful was the support of the North Vietnamese, ultimately driving the U.S. from the region. America, on the other hand had a lousy track record with supporting guerillas. When the Soviets attacked Afghanistan, it was an opportunity for the U.S. to use this technique against them. This was an opportunity to “make the Soviets bleed” like they made us bleed. President Carter authorized the recruitment, organization and supplying of guerilla warfare in Afghanistan by utilizing indigenous forces that were already rising to resist the Soviets. Carter signed the first “Intelligence Finding” authorizing covert military operations in Afghanistan in order to “harass” soviet troops. It was this “Finding” that served as the legal basis for the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan. It was also this “Finding” that would culminate, via a long, circuitous and unpredictable route, in September 11.

The first problem was how to fund the covert war. Ever since senator Church passed legislation requiring the CIA to get authorization for such funding, it would impossible to get money from Congress, and if it tried, then the operation would no longer be secret. Saudi Arabia realized that an America weakened by the oil embargo of the 1970s was dangerous to its national security, because if the Soviets or Iran won out in the region, they would be destroyed as a nation. Therefore, Saudi Arabia had a greater interest in what was happening in Afghanistan than America did. The United States was worried that the Soviets were attacking Afghanistan in order to push into the Middle East and capture the oil fields for itself.

Second, the United States had very little intelligence on Afghanistan, and what we did have was only from the CIA agents monitoring the narcotics trade and the poppy fields in the country. Therefore, America had to turn to Saudi Arabia for money and intelligence, making an alliance with the Wahabis in order to gain what we needed.

The U.S. structure a deal with the Saudis to provide funding and personnel to work with the CIA to build a guerilla force to bog down the Soviets in Afghanistan. This was the beginning of an alliance between the U.S. and Muslim fundamentalists.

The third fractor was Pakistan, a long-term American ally. It was torn between the secularism of its founders and the radical Islam of the majority of its population. It was also afraid of being trapped between a Soviet dominated Afghanistan and a pro-Soviet India. Pakistan had a lot of intelligence on Afghanistan and a long contiguous border where training camps, logistic systems, and bases of operations could be set up. The North Vietnamese had Laos and Cambodia; the U.S. had Pakistan.

A three-way alliance was formed. The United States would provide training, coordination and strategic intelligence; the Saudis would provide the money and the guerillas; the Pakistanis would provide the territory and the intelligence needed.

Jimmy Carter was the one who presided over this alliance. Yet, his goal was not to destroy the Soviet Union but to find a balance while restoring America’s power in the world after its decline over the last decade. Carter had no idea that the war in Afghanistan would lead to the destruction of the Soviet Union and the rise of Al Qaeda. When Reagan took office in 1981, he intensified Carter’s alliance and wove it into a larger plan to destroy the Soviet Union and intensify America’s global power.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, Al Qaeda was well-trained and well-equipped, possessing many Soviet and American weapons along with the expertise to use them. The Soviets were brutal in their attempts to squash the guerillas, killing many, so that those who lasted the decade-long war were well-trained, experienced, hardened and determined. These radical Islamic fighters saw the fall of the Soviet Union as a Muslim victory, as it was the first victory a Muslim army had achieved against a non-Muslim force in centuries. After the war, these Islamic fighters were irate at America because it threw them away without any hint of gratitude.

The United States saw the war in Afghanistan differently. The war in Afghanistan was only a part in a larger plan that brought the Soviet Union down. America felt it also played the major role, providing the support and training needed for victory. Without the U.S. backing, the guerillas would have been completely annihilated by the Soviets. Because the U.S. ignored their allies and expected them to maintain some kind of bond with us after the war, a rift was created between the Jihadists and America.

In the same way, the first Bush administration mistakenly believed that the Arab countries would be happy with America for helping them free Kuwait and a bond would be created between us and the Arab states. President Bush expected gratitude; he never expected rage. It is clear that the United States was ignorant of the Islamic world and made some serious blunders that caused so much anger and hatred that laid the foundation for Al Qaeda.

While Shiite Muslims are a minority in the whole Arab world, they are the majority in the Gulf region, especially in Iran. The Saudis, by contrast, are not only Sunni, but they are Wahabi, the most radical of the Sunnis. So the Saudis saw the Shiites of Iran not only as a threat to their religion but also a threat to their oil fields. The problem for Saudi Arabia was how to contain Iran and the Soviets at the same time, and the answer was Iraq. Both nations wanted to contain Iran and the Soviets, so America felt is was the best policy to back them as well. Unwittingly, however, the U.S. ended up supporting the most radical form of Islam as a negative unintended consequence. And this radical Wahabi Islam has proved to be even more dangerous to the United States than Shiite Iran.

In order to bog down Iran, the United States sent signals to Iraq that it wouldn’t oppose them if they decided to attack Iran. The resulting war tied up both countries for a decade, costing millions of lives and billions of dollars on both sides. The United States kept shifting its policy towards Iraq to keep it destabilized and to prolong the war. The United States knew that Iraq could not beat Iran, and the Saudis gladly backed the war in order to keep both armies bogged down for nearly ten years.

American foreign policy has chosen to make alliances of necessity with evil states in order to oppose even more evil states. The U.S. made alliances with Stalin and Mao in order to counter worse leaders. America also tends to create solutions that solve the short-term problem at the risk of creating greater problems down the road.

Saddam Hussein wanted to take over Iran and Kuwait in order to become the dominant power in the region. The U.S. quietly assured him, with deniability, that if he won the war we would allow him to have Kuwait as well. Then for the next ten years the U.S. kept shifting the balance of power to make sure Iraq never accomplished its goal and achieved its prize. After ten years, Iraq was less exhausted than Iran, and Saddam declared victory and demanded his prize. The American Ambassador, unaware of the intricacies and policy shifts, assured Saddam Hussein that while the U.S. was opposed to his taking Iraq, they would do nothing to stop him. As soon as Iraq invaded Kuwait, the U.S. worked with the Saudis to launch Operation Desert Shield and then Desert Storm.

The soldiers returning to Saudi Arabia from Afghanistan were outraged by the presence of non-Muslim forces on holy soil. They believed that Muslim states were not naturally weak and could defend themselves if they were willing to sacrifice and persevere. But they also believed that the current Muslim leaders were corrupt and incapable of defending their countries. Therefore, they felt that America had to be humiliated in order to break the psychological dependency on the United States and to generate confidence among the Islamic masses.

These fighters knew America’s strengths, but they also knew its weaknesses. They knew how the American intelligence agencies worked and how they carried out covert operations. These returning fighters were not the poor and disposed, but many were from wealthy families, educated and some even had advanced degrees in secular fields. They also had financial backing from the Saudi royal family and other wealthy Saudis. The financial network that had supported the guerillas in Afghanistan had never been shut down and now it was being used to fund Al Qaeda long after America had lost interest in it.

They knew they needed to take a long time to prepare to strike hard at the United States in order to pull it into a full-scale war against the Islamic world. By doing this they hoped to discredit secular Islamic states in the region and to sap American strength. Through a series of increasing attacks on American targets, the Embassies in Africa, the barracks in Saudi Arabia, and the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen, they hoped to illicit a hard response from America. Bill Clinton, however, didn’t want to seem impotent and make Al Qaeda look powerful, nor did he want to be drawn into a full-scale war, so he chose to respond in a half-hearted way.

The first mistake America made was to pull the plug on the resistance fighters in Afghanistan and not give them back their papers so they could return home. This was not solely America’s fault, since most of the governments didn’t want these fighters to come back and cause trouble at home. Stranded in a strange land, scarred by war, this band of about 1,000 soldiers united and became a fierce fighting force in the battles for supremacy after the war with the Soviets was won. Most ended up going back home, but the bond between them was strong. Being abandoned by the U.S. and rejected by their home governments was not only seen as a personal affront but as endemic of the malaise that shrouded all the Islamic governments in the Middle East. They viewed the outside threats to Islam, America and the Soviet Union, as manageable and insignificant compared to the inner threats of corrupt Islamic governments.

The first major incident leading up to the current situation goes way back to the Crusades and the loss of the Caliphate. At the height of its power, the Muslim Empire was actually larger than the Roman Empire. The goal of Al Qaeda was to take over one Islamic state in order to set an example and to establish a base of operations. Afghanistan became that base, with the Taliban running the internal affairs and Al Qaeda operating around the world. Al Qaeda hoped to sweep the Muslim world and establish fundamentalist governments throughout the Middle East, unifying the Islamic world and reestablishing the Caliphate.

The key element in their strategy was to show that America is weak and vulnerable in order to break the illusion of the super power’s dominance and remove the Muslim world’s fear and subservience. They felt that the United States lacked to power and moral character to assert its will in the long run. Vietnam, the Iran hostage crisis, Beirut, Somalia, and failure to depose Saddam Hussein all seemed to demonstrate the fact that America could strike a hard first blow but could not sustain a prolonged conflict.

Al Qaede realized that it had to strike a blow to the United States that was enormous and for which there was no easy defense, in order to send a clear message to the Islamic masses. The plan was to draw the United States into a prolonged conflict with multiple Islamic states to solidify the Islamic world and to drain the U.S. military dry.

In a society with many unguarded targets, a small group with explosives is very difficult to stop. The fewer the operatives, the more difficult it is to find them. The nearly infinite number of targets and the sparsity of operatives is what makes defending against terrorism a nightmare. The physical damage caused by terrorists is minimal while the psychological damage is extraordinary, making it a powerful political tool.

Al Qaeda’s strategy and ideology were different, and it wasn’t trying to send a message to the United States but to the Islamic world. They saw the United States as an actor that could be manipulated into behaving as they wanted it to behave.

After the end of the Cold War, America didn’t have a major enemy that could threaten its security. Attention was focused on rogue states, such as North Korea, Libya, Yugoslavia, Iran and Cuba, and these were not allied together against the United States. The major threat was threat was that they might develop nuclear weapons. The secondary threat was that they might invade their neighbors. The third level of threat was that they might violate the human rights of their own citizens. All of these were considered containable and manageable through international organizations, such as the United Nations.

The way the United States responded to the small crises throughout the world was triggering unexpected responses in the Islamic world. While the United States saw itself as neutral, impartial and doing good, the Islamic world saw America encroaching on Islamic territory and siding with those who were against Muslims. The intervention by the United States in Kosovo and Somalia, for example, were considered by the Muslim world as struggles between America and Muslims. The United States failed to realize that there was no such thing as a neutral intervention. The United States also saw the fact that these nations were Islamic as incidental while the rest of the Muslim world saw it as fundamental. Al Qaeda used these incidents to mobilize support against Americal Confusion was also created when the United States declined to get involved in other conflicts, making it seem as if America had no coherent foreign policy in place.

The United States also wrongly assumed that nations would be willing to trade a little bit of their sovereignty in order to have stability and security. This was true for many countries, but it infuriated the Muslim nations. The great powers in Europe were also uneasy about America’s growing power and unpredictability, and many were hoping, and even helping, that America would trip and fall, in order to limit America’s power and make us easier to predict and control. After the Cold War ended, America saw the global economy as the most important issue and assumed everyone else did too. However, most nations, especially Islamic countries, viewed national autonomy as more important than prosperity and security. The United States thought that all countries would welcome transnational prosperity, but some Islamic countries were ready to resist, even to the death.

When Al Qaeda started its global terrorism operation, most analysts either ignored it or misunderstood it. They viewed Al Qaeda like any other Palestinian terrorist organization, with limited political goals and operations. The term “terrorist” tended to obscure the issue, since there are vast differences between different organizations as to their ideology and strategy. They didn’t understand how different Al Qaeda was from any other terrorist organization. Al Qaeda wasn’t interested in symbolic gestures and affecting local politics but had a much more complex ideology that drove its global strategy to implement their international political goals. While most other terrorist organizations were based on Arab ethnicity and were trained by the Soviets to further local political agendas, Al Qaeda was based on Islam and they had a global religious agenda that was based on centuries of Islamic history and tradition. By merely focusing on its attacks and not its ideology, the United States totally misunderstood what Al Qaeda was about.

While the United States didn’t create Al Qaeda, we created the atmosphere and climate for it to grow and flourish. When Bill Clinton responded in a half-hearted manner to the embassy bombings and the attack on the Cole, he unwittingly empowered and emboldened Al Qaeda.


This is a summary of the first few chapters of the book which I found extremely helpful in understanding these events. Friedman goes on to dissect the problems with the American intelligence system and why it missed 9/11. He then goes on to explain how America’s military had been stripped down after the Cold War and was totally unprepared for a major military conflict on the scale that was needed to confront Al Qaeda. Friedman’s detailed analysis of what was involved in the September 11 attacks is impressive and chilling, clearly showing that Al Qaeda is highly trained, extremely disciplined and very determined to destroy the United States. He then shows how it is impossible to defend against such attacks and explains why most of what is being done in response to 9/11 is worthless.

I thought Friedman’s detailed account of how the United States prepared for and implemented a major military offensive against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan in less than a month was amazing. While Al Qaeda knew we would attack, they expected a massive assault in the following spring, but Operation Enduring Freedom was totally unconventional and unexpected, catching Al Qaeda by surprise. He goes on to describe how America fought the war, the alliances that had to be made with former, and current, enemies, and the problems of working with nationalistic forces within Afghanistan.

The book goes on to cover the war in Iraq up to the end of July, 2004. Friedman concludes that the United States is winning the war. Al Qaeda has failed to achieve any of its strategic goals. There has been no uprising in the Islamic world, no regimes toppled. In fact, most Islamic governments have increased their cooperation with the United States. Al Qaeda has been backed against a wall. The game is far from over, but the U.S. certainly has the lead -- in spite of an extraordinary array of blunders, some inexplicable.


You can read chapter summaries and learn more about the book at: http://www.americassecretwar.com/index.html